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VOLUME VII

Abhidharma Buddhism
to 150 A.D.

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PREFACE

With the present volume of the Encyclopedia we begin taking up the philosophy of Buddhism in South Asia. When this project was first planned, many years ago now, it was thought that Buddhist philosophy would be handled expeditiously in one volume on Abhidharma Buddhism and three more on Mahāyāna. After further reflection, however, it became apparent that though this division may represent what Buddhism has come to be seen as in modern times, it may well impose latter-day distinctions on a tradition which has a lot more in common throughout than such a division would well represent. As a result it has been decided to treat Buddhist philosophy all together chronologically, beginning with the Buddha and ending when Buddhist thought leaves India around the 14th century A.D. Thus Abhidharma and Mahāyāna writers will be treated side by side, and some may find distinctions among schools of Buddhism dealt with insufficiently for their liking. We can only say that it seems wisest not to impose more divisions into Buddhism than are historically apparent, and that although future scholarship may clarify the lines of distrinction among Buddhist schools and sect that is still a subject on which opinions differ, often heatedly.

Let me remind our readers that the scope of these volumes is limited to summaries of text that are of philosophical interest throughout, theoretical rather than practical in their intended function, and polemical or at least expository in a context where defence of one view among alternatives is appropriate. In the present volume these criteria have been interpreted broadly and loosely. Nevertheless, as in the volumes dealing with Vedānta, for example, where we summarize commentaries on the Upaniṣads but not those Upaniṣads themselves, in the present volume and the subsequent ones to appear dealing with Buddhism the original *sūtras*, the earliest literature regularly ascribed to the Buddha or his immediate disciples, is not summarized, following the same lines of distinction.

The present volume confines itself to Abhidharma philosophical texts. It may well be that certain of the *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras* had their origin at a time within the period covered here. However, since dating is quite unclear in such cases we have decided to take up those *sūtras* in the next volume on Buddhism, where we shall discuss in greater detail the question of the dates and affiliation of the earliest Mahāyāna Buddhist materials.

The preparation of this volume was made possible in part by a grant from the Division of Research Programs of the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent Federal agency. We acknowledge with gratitude the generous support of the Endowment

for this and subsequent volumes dealing with Buddhism, as well as for making possible acquisition of some of the summaries appearing in other volumes of our Encyclopedia. Thanks are also due to Smithsonian Institution for assistance relating to travel and maintenance for the General Editor while collecting some of the materials included herein, and to the American Institute for Indian Studies for their assistance in like ways. Finally, the editorial team would like to express particular thanks to Collett Cox, who read the finished manuscript and made helpful suggestions, and to Laura Townsend, our faithful typist.

June 1989 KARL H. POTTER

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

1

THE HISTORICAL BUDDHA AND HIS TEACHINGS

Noble Ross Reat

I. THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE HISTORICAL BUDDHA

It is generally accepted among scholars, with some reservations, that the historical Buddha was born in 563 B.C. and that he died in 483 B.C. This was a remarkable period in the history of India and the world as a whole. It is fascinating to ponder the fact that, give or take a few decades, it would have been possible during this period to assemble in one room the majority of the dozen or so most influential thinkers the world has ever seen. Confucius and Lao-tzu in China were formulating systems of thought that would guide one quarter of the world's population into the present century. In Persia and in Greece, Zoroaster and Socrates were formulating the ideological bases of the three great empires that dominated the classical history of the Western world, the Persian, the Greek and the Roman. In Israel, Jeremiah and Deutero Isaiah were formulating the principles of universal monotheism, which would later attain vast influence as a result of propagation by the followers of Christ and Muhammad. Yet no place on earth at this time was so intellectually and religiously stimulating as northern India, where the Buddha lived and taught. To gain some comprehension of the dynamism of this period in the history of India, it is necessary to look back into the mists of proto-history, where we know less of the events of entire millennia than we know of any single day in this century.

Ancient India: The Background of Buddhism

Two thousand years before the Buddha's time, in approximately 2500 B.C., a highly advanced civilization flourished along the valley of the Indus River in what is present-day Pakistan. The two major cities of this civilization are now known by the modern names of

the archeological sites at Harappa and Mohenjo Daro. They rivalled any cities known to humankind at that time and for millennia afterward. Harappa and Mohenjo Daro do not appear to have been rivals, but rather cooperative centers of a unified civilization covering roughly the area of present-day Pakistan. This we suspect because the size of bricks for building and weights for use in beam balances are uniform throughout the Indus Valley archeological sites. A standard system of weights and measures throughout such a large area suggests a strong central government, or at least two cooperating centers of power at Harappa and Mohenjo Daro.

Both of these great cities were designed around an orderly grid of streets and avenues lined with one and two storey brick townhouses whose connected outer walls formed a barrier to the noise and dust from the street. Narrow alleyways through this outer wall led to the common courtyard of a dozen or so private dwellings in each city block, which thus formed a sort of neighborhood compound. Under the streets ran an extensive network of sewers, so that these great cities were probably more hygienic than most European cities were before the turn of the twentieth century. Some of the houses were equipped with flushing toilets and rooms for bathing which drained into these sewers. In addition to such pleasant domestic quarters, each city had an ample granary where emergency food supplies were stored, and numerous large municipal buildings and complexes which appear to have been palaces, assembly halls, government houses, and even perhaps schools and universities.

Our knowledge of such things today, at least for the time being, is necessarily vague and tentative, for the Indus Valley civilization had vanished entirely from human memory until its two major cities were unearthed by archeologists early in this century. As a result of this four thousand year gap, the Indus Valley writing system is a puzzle that has yet to be deciphered, nor is it likely to be deciphered unless the equivalent of a Rosetta Stone is unearthed from an Indus Valley site. Without being able to read Indus Valley writing, the nature of religious belief and practice in this ancient culture is largely a matter of speculation. Nonetheless, a few conclusions about the religion of this great civilization are now, widely if not universally, accepted among historians of India. These conclusions are based not so much upon the positive evidence of archeological relics from the Indus Valley as they are upon the absence of appropriate evidence in another source of knowledge about the religion of ancient India, the *Ṛg Veda*.

Until the rediscovery of the long forgotten Indus Valley civilization, the *Ṛg Veda* was our only source of knowledge about the religions of India before approximately 1000 B.C. The bulk of the *Ṛg Veda*

was not, however, composed in India. It was the sacred scripture of an invading nomadic horde related racially and linguistically to modern-day Europeans. Nonetheless, according to the Hindu religious tradition this ancient scripture, gradually compiled between 2000 and 1000 B.C., is the sole fountainhead of all the sacred knowledge of India, which is regarded as an elaboration of the eternal truths enshrined in the obscure hymns of the *Ṛg Veda.* Acceptance of the overriding authority of the *Ṛg Veda* is in fact one of the major criteria of Hindu orthodoxy. Nonetheless, when one examines these hymns critically, one finds very little if any evidence of many of the prominent characteristics of Hinduism or of Indian religion in general. Few of the major deities of classical Hinduism have convincing counterparts in the *Ṛg Veda,* nor is there any real foreshadowing of the almost universal Indian beliefs in an immortal soul, a tiresome round of rebirths determined by one's *karma* (moral action), and liberation therefrom. Instead, the *Ṛg Veda* offers praises to a pantheon of archaic deities scarcely recognizable in classical Hinduism.

These hymns of praise are intended to elicit from the deities immediate material benefits and finally a blessed afterlife in heaven, characterized as the blissful abode of the ancestors. Alternatively there is a hell of "blind darkness." In either case, the *Ṛg Veda* envisions only one earthly life, its aftermath determined primarily on the basis of whether or not one had been scrupulous in performing the proper rituals. Rituals relating to the afterlife were thought to create in heaven a subtle body (*tanu*) which one would join after death. This subtle body, it was thought, had to be maintained by continuing rituals performed on one's behalf by one's descendants. Otherwise one would fall into "blind darkness", which appears to be a metaphor for utter and final death. The *Ṛg Veda* does not appear to contain the concepts of an immortal soul, of rebirth, or of spiritual release therefrom.

Before the discovery of the Indus Valley civilization, it was difficult to imagine how the integrated complex of beliefs in a soul, rebirth and spiritual release from rebirth could have gained such prominence in Indian religion without having a basis in the *Ṛg Veda.* It was similarly difficult to imagine how the classical Hindu pantheon had developed from Vedic antecedents. After the discovery of the Indus Valley civilization, it seemed only natural to suppose that classical Indian civilization and religion had its origins in the common historical phenomenon of the conqueror being conquered intellectually by the conquered race, in this case the Indus Valley civilization. The prominence of female deities in the Indus Valley, in contrast to the male dominated pantheon of the *Ṛg Veda,* may account for the many

goddesses of Hinduism. The popular Hindu deity Kṛṣṇa, meaning literally "the dark one," might have found his way into the Hindu pantheon as a representative of the dark skinned indigenous inhabitants of India. There is evidence too of an Indus Valley deity associated with asceticism and wild animals, possibly a prototype of the Śiva of classical Hinduism.

This last possibility is particularly intriguing, in that Śiva is the favored deity of yogic practitioners. Essentially yoga is a system of meditative practice designed to *release* the *soul* from *rebirth*, rebirth being regarded as a tedious and pointless repetition of suffering, illness, old age and death. It seems possible, then, that the yogic triad of souls, rebirth and release derives from indigenous Indian religion rather than Vedic sources. History records two apparently indigenous religious traditions in India which claim to predate and to be independent of the *Ṛg Veda*, namely the Jainas and the Ājīvakas. Both systems are purely yogic in that they are solely concerned with release of the soul from rebirth. Given the absence of such doctrines in the *Ṛg Veda*, it appears that the claims of these traditions to independence and great antiquity may well be valid. If so, most of the characteristics of classical Hinduism can be explained by postulating a synthesis of Vedic and yogic religion which occurred in the first millennium B.C.

Such a synthesis appears to inspire much of the material in the principal *Upaniṣads*, composed between 800 and 300 B.C. These texts contain the first clear expressions of the fundamental doctrines of classical Hinduism, often set forth in terms which coordinate Vedic theistic concerns with yogic concerns regarding release of the soul from rebirth. The *Upaniṣads* accomplish this synthesis by highlighting a relatively minor Vedic theme which appears in only a few of the latest hymns of the *Ṛg Veda*—the question of the ultimate origin of the universe. They answer this question with reference to the yogic triad of souls, rebirth and release.

In its enthusiasm for heaping lavish praises upon its many deities, the bulk of the *Ṛg Veda* without apparent hesitation credits several deities with having created the universe singlehandedly. Some of the latest contributors to the *Ṛg Veda*, however, betray a conviction that the multiple gods themselves must have been the result of a single creative act by a more essential, unitary divine principle. The nature of this universal principle, according to the Vedic sages, is the greatest of all mysteries. The authors of the *Upaniṣads* seize upon the Vedic theme of the origin of the universe and elaborate it with reference to the yogic triad of souls, rebirth and release. They urge that the mystery of the origin of the universe is to be resolved by yogic introspection. They hold that such introspection will reveal

that the creative principle of the universe is in fact one's innermost self, which is identical to the universal self, in which all things and all beings are one. The manifold universe is an illusion, a dream, as are the apparently individual souls which perceive, experience and act, are reborn according to their karmic merit, and finally attain release. Release, according to many Upaniṣadic passages, is an awakening from this illusory dream. Actually, one only appears to suffer repetitive life, sickness, old age and death as an individual. Ignorance is regarded as the primary barrier to release from this illusory process, ignorance of the true origin and nature of the self or soul and of the true origin and nature of the universe.

By contrast, the purely yogic systems of the Jainas and Ājīvakas postulate the release of simple, individual souls within the context of an independently existing, objective universe. In these purely yogic systems there is no speculation regarding the origin of the universe. It is simply a given. It has always been here, and it will always be here. Yogic practices of austerity and introspection merely serve to purify the soul of the practitioner. When this purification is accomplished, the Jainas held that the soul would rise to the pinnacle of the universe and live there forever in bliss. The Ājīvakas held that the soul would simply cease to exist, and be released thereby from its countless sufferings through eons of rebirth. In either case, the impurity of the soul, rather than ignorance of the true nature of the soul and the universe, was regarded as the primary barrier to release from rebirth.

Both these doctrines bear some resemblance to Buddhism, which is uninterested in speculations regarding the origin of the universe, and which regards release from rebirth as a cessation of mundane existence. Buddhism thus belongs primarily to the yogic tradition of Indian religion. Buddhism originated, however, at a time when the religious and intellectual traditions of two great civilizations were in the midst of vigorous interchange and ferment, as is evident in the speculations of the *Upaniṣads*. There is no indication that the Buddha was specifically acquainted with any of the *Upaniṣads* which have come down to us, but there is ample indication that he was familiar with such speculations.[1]

Early Buddhism is not, then, merely a variation upon the yogic theme of release of the soul from rebirth. This much is clear in the Buddhist denial of the soul. Instead, the Buddha participated in a critical and creative movement to synthesize ancient, traditional worldviews which vied for the collective heart of India in his time. By the time of the Buddha, this synthetic movement had become widespread and urgent. One must try to imagine the cultural impact of conquering or being conquered by an alien race, and then slowly

intermarrying over the centuries to form a unitary new race and culture. In the age of the Buddha, several remarkable thinkers began to attempt also to create a coherent unity from the religious and intellectual heritages of two great peoples in the process of becoming one.

Aside from the Buddha, other participants in this movement included the Upaniṣadic sages fomenting revolution within the ranks of Vedic orthodoxy, heterodox rag-draped or naked bands of wandering ascetics seeking or claiming to have found ultimate truth, and the more established orders like the Jainas and Ājīvakas. The movement included priests, princes, merchants, workers and outcastes, often indistinguishable as they pursued the search for ultimate truth within one group or another. The literature of ancient India abounds with such figures. Arjuna himself, the greatest mortal hero of Indian mythology, ponders in the *Bhagavadgītā* the alternative of quitting the battlefield for the serene life of a homeless holy man. Like the mythical hero Arjuna, many men, and fewer women, felt the lure of the simple life of the homeless ascetic and the single-minded search for truth. So many followed their urges that these wandering mendicants, who would have seemed a bizarre mob to modern Westeners, were a highly respected, even revered element of society.

Early Life of the Buddha: Birth to the Great Renunciation

The most influential individual to emerge from this period of transition in ancient India was the Buddha, without a doubt the greatest historical figure of India. In the millennium following the life of the Buddha, the spread of Buddhism throughout East and Southeast Asia makes him arguably the most influential historical figure of the entire Eastern world. As the founder of a great religious tradition, the Buddha bears obvious similarities to Christ. It must be emphasized at the outset, however, that an inquiry into the historical Buddha is not analogous to the quest for the historical Jesus. Buddhism as a religious teaching claims to be valid independently of any special status of its founder. Even if it were to be discovered that the historical Buddha never existed, Buddhism as a system of thought and a spiritual path would nonetheless remain theoretically valid. As the Buddhist scriptures themselves state:

> Whether or not Buddhas arise, constant is the status of truth, the law of truth, the relationship of cause and effect.[2]

The Buddha is again comparable to Christ in that very little reliable information concerning his early life is available. A royal inscription dating to within three hundred years of the event confirms that the Buddha was born in what is today southern Nepal and was a member of the aristocratic Śākya clan.[3] He was born into a royal family with the surname Gotama (sometimes spelled Gautama), and his given name is said to have been Siddhārtha (Pali Siddhattha), which means "goal-accomplished." The word "Buddha," meaning "the awakened one," is a title, and it is technically improper to apply it to Prince Siddhārtha Gotama before the event of his enlightenment at the age of thirty-five. Instead, he should be referred to with his given name or as "the Bodhisatta" (Skt. Bodhisattva), which means "Buddha to be."

The voluminous scriptures which purport to contain the teachings of the Buddha provide little credible information regarding his early life. A few passages preserved in the Pali language by the Theravāda Buddhist tradition of Sri Lanka have at least the appearance of historical fact. One such passage indicates that Siddhārtha's parents were at least minor royalty, and that the young prince lived in luxury in three different palaces, one for each of three Indian seasons.[4] This same passage, corroborated by another,[5] also records the Buddha as recalling that he was inspired to abandon this privileged life for the austere life of a wandering seeker of truth because of existential *angst* regarding the universal affliction of human life by old age, sickness and death. Several passages indicate that Siddhārtha's parents opposed his decision to become a wandering holy man and resisted it with tears and pleadings.[6]

There is little or no reason to doubt this basic scenario of the Buddha's early life: that he was a gifted, intelligent and privileged young man who, like many in his day, rejected the comforts of the household life in favor of the freedom of the mendicant seeker of truth. Legends of the Buddha's life recorded in the Pali canon and elsewhere amplify extravagantly upon this credible historical scenario. These legends add little to our historical knowledge of the Buddha's life, but they are revealing of the ethos of the time and of the way Buddhists regard the founder of their religion. The following legendary account of the early life of the Buddha draws upon several sources—the *Mahāvastu*, the *Lalitavistara*, and Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita*—but is based primarily upon the *Nidānakathā* of the Pali canon, probably the earliest extant legendary account of the life of the Buddha. All of these treatments, in turn, appear to derive from two *sūtra*s or discourses on the Pali canon. Both of these *sūtras*—the *Acchariyabbhutadhamma Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* and the *Mahāpadāna Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*—reveal how early

and how widespread was the tendency to mythologize the life of the Buddha.

Buddhist legends portray the Buddha's father Śuddhodana as a mighty ruler of unimaginable wealth. His mother, the beautiful Queen Māyā, is said to have received numerous auspicious omens heralding the exalted status of the child she bore, most notably, a dream of a white elephant entering her abdomen when the prince was conceived. The birth is said to have occurred not in the royal palace at Kapilavastu, but in a nearby park at Lumbini, while Queen Māyā was on a pleasure outing. This detail may well be historical fact, but accounts of the birth itself can scarcely be accepted as such. The infant prince is said to have issued miraculously from his mother's side, immediately able to walk and speak eloquently, and to have proclaimed then and there his supremacy in all the world and his destiny to enlightenment. This miraculous infant, it is said, was endowed with the thirty-two major and eighty minor marks of the superman. These vary in different accounts, but usually include wheel symbols on the soles and palms, perfect proportions of body and face, radiant, golden hued complexion, a protuberance on the crown of the head (*uṣṇīṣa*), and a circle of hair between the eyebrows (*ūrṇā*), as commonly seen on Buddha images.

On the basis of these marks, King Śuddhodana's ministers predicted that the child was destined to supreme greatness, either as a universal monarch—a *cakravartin* or "wheel turner" of the mythical wheel of universal dominion—or as a spiritual savior of humankind. The ministers warned that if the sensitive young man ever came in contact with human suffering, he would be so overcome with compassion that he would abandon the princely life and embark singlemindedly on a quest for spiritual release from the sorrows of worldly life, thereby becoming the spiritual savior of the world rather than its political ruler. The king naturally preferred that his son follow in his own royal footsteps and rule the world as its righteous monarch, and so, as advised by his ministers, he is said to have constructed three magnificent palaces within which to isolate the young prince from any contact with the sorrow and suffering of the outside world.

And, so the legend goes, Prince Siddhārtha lived out his youth within the walls of these pleasure palaces. He was often the focus of miraculous events and quickly attained superhuman proficiency in all of the respected arts of the day, intellectual, military and amorous. He enjoyed a large company of the most desirable and adoring concubines imaginable, and at the age of sixteen wed in addition the most beautiful woman in the land, Princess Yaśodharā. Never was he allowed to experience or even witness strife, disease,

old age, death, or indeed any form of suffering whatsoever. Despite these extraordinary protective measures, Buddhist legend asserts that in his twenty-ninth year the gods themselves conspired to bring the Bodhisattva in contact with four great visions which inspired him to embark on the quest for enlightenment. Most accounts say that Prince Siddhārtha was on a pleasure outing, driven by his faithful charioteer Channa, when he encountered for the first time in his life the sight of an old man, a diseased man, a corpse, and finally a radiantly serene mendicant holy man.

The first three visions, according to legend, had the effect upon the prince predicted by the king's ministers. He became preoccupied with the unavoidable sufferings of mundane life. The fourth vision inspired in him the resolution to renounce material well-being and enter the austere path of spiritual enlightenment. Because of his innate spirituality, he had realized spontaneously on the basis of these four experiences alone that even such extravagant worldly pleasures as he had enjoyed were doomed to pass away due to the ravages of old age, disease and death, and that in all the world only the simple contemplative life of the mendicant seeker of truth held the key to release from the ravages of these sufferings. As noted above, the Pali *sūtras* record the Buddha himself as indicating that contemplation of the universal misery of old age, disease and death inspired his search for truth.

As a result of these "four visions" Buddhist legend says that Siddhārtha summoned his charioteer Channa in secret and ordered him to saddle his horse Kaṇṭhaka so that he might flee from the palace. Despite the king's extensive measures to secure the palace, the three escaped and traveled to the bank of a river where Siddhārtha cut off his hair and changed his jewel-encrusted garments for rags from a rubbish heap. He then bid farewell to his beloved friends Channa and Kaṇṭhaka, and set forth on the path of seeker of truth. His charioteer returned alone to Kapilavastu with the sad news of Siddhārtha's departure, for the prince's faithful horse died then and there on the river bank, of a broken heart.

It is at this point in the life story of Siddhārtha Gotama that the protagonist emerges from the fanciful fabrications of legend onto the stage of history. From this point only can we begin to speak of the Buddha as a real historical personage. Nonetheless, the legendary material recounting the early life of the historical Buddha is important in the story of Buddhism for more than its imaginative charm. In the first place, when the hyperbole and miraculous elements are stripped away, the story is a credible account of the broad outlines of the early life of a precocious and privileged young man of Siddhārtha's time. It is unlikely that the infant bore the major

and minor marks of the superman, that his parents' protectiveness was so extreme, or that their financial means were so extensive, but it is not at all unlikely that the historical Buddha was the cherished child of a wealthy chieftain who lavished parental attention and high expectations upon his son. It is not unlikely either that a young man of such great intelligence and sensitivity as to become one of the acknowledged saviors of humankind would have begun to question—in the face of the sufferings of others—the pursuit of power and luxury urged upon him by doting parents and admiring peers.

It is telling of the society of that day that the parents' primary anxiety, as recorded in the legends of the Buddha's early life, is that their son would opt out of society and follow the path of a mendicant seeker of truth. Many parents of their day must have had similar worries, as do ambitious parents of the present day. Siddhārtha's decision to follow the mendicant's path was a rejection of conventional society in favor of a controversial lifestyle, but a lifestyle nonetheless admired in his day as attracting the most intelligent and creative people and producing the noblest expressions of the values and aspirations of the society in which he lived.

Legends of the early life of the historical Buddha also reveal tellingly the religious beliefs and values of an important segment of Indian society in his day. Saviors were expected. They might be born to mortals. They were thought to perform miracles and consort with deities almost as a matter of course. Their task was to discover and teach the path that leads beyond the relentless suffering of this and future lives. In this exalted search, the gods themselves, while not denied, were thought to be merely assistants and well-wishers. The final salvation of humankind would be realized not through divine intervention, but through truth, discovered and taught by extraordinary human beings. These saviors would emerge from the ranks of the homeless, mendicant ascetics who walked the land in humble attire seeking only enough food, clothing and shelter to sustain their strenuous meditative and ascetic practices.

Such spiritual sentiments may not have been universal in the India of the Buddha's time, but they were certainly widespread. When the Bodhisattva Siddhārtha set out on the open road, after the "Great Renunciation" of home and family, he entered a richly varied and stimulating subculture, which is described with surprisingly vivid detail in the *Sutta Piṭaka* of the Pali canon, the earliest record of the teachings he himself was eventually to give. The question of the historical accuracy of this record is discussed at length below. These *sūtras*,[7] or discourses, do not specifically seek to give a connected account of the enlightenment and ministry of the Buddha,

and they doubtless contain much elaboration and hyberbole. Nonetheless, they include a surprising amount of material which appears to capture actual historical events and people in remarkable detail for literature of that age.

The Search For Truth

In the course of giving his religious discourses, after he had realized enlightenment, the Buddha is recorded in the *Sutta Piṭaka* as making occasional reference to his own search for truth. The following account is reconstructed from those scattered references, primarily the *Ariyapariyesana* and *Mahāsaccaka sūtras* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*.[8] While this account cannot be historically verified, there is little reason to doubt its basic truthfulness.

Soon after Siddhārtha left his home, he studied meditative techniques under two acknowledged masters, Āḷāra Kāḷāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta. Under their instruction he quickly mastered the uppermost levels of meditative trance, experiences of the "sphere of nothingness" and the "sphere of neither perception nor nonperception". In all, eight of these advanced levels of concentration are retained as important spiritual exercises in the teachings of the Buddha, but Siddhārtha did not accept the meditative attainments of either of his teachers as final enlightenment and release from the suffering of human existence.[9]

After studying with these two teachers, dissatisfied, Siddhārtha set out to seek enlightenment on his own. He soon attracted a band of five followers, and with them performed severe ascetic practices involving self-mortification and starvation. Such practices were common among seekers of the truth in his day, and were intended to liberate the immortal soul within from the mortal body it inhabited. The following purports to be the Buddha's own description of the rigors of the ascetic discipline he imposed upon himself.

> I was unclothed, indecent, licking my hands... I took food only once a day, or once in two or seven days. I lived under the discipline of eating rice only at fortnightly intervals... I subsisted on the roots and fruits of the forest, eating only those which fell (of their own accord). I wore coarse hempen cloth... rags from a rubbish heap... clothes of grass and of bark... I became one who stands (always) refusing to sit... I made my bed on thorns. The dust and dirt of years accumulated on my body... I subsisted on the dung of suckling calves... So long as my own dung and urine held out, I subsisted on that... Because I ate so little, my limbs became like the knotted joints of withered creepers, my buttocks like a bullock's hoof, my protruding

> backbone like a string of beads, my gaunt ribs like the crazy rafters of a tumble-down shed. My eyes were sunken deep in their sockets... My scalp was shriveled... The hair, rotted at the roots, fell out if I stroked my limbs with my hand.[10]

After some six years of such rigorous ascetic discipline, the Pali *sūtras* record the Buddha as saying that he realized that self-mortification would not lead him to the ultimate goal of enlightenment and spiritual liberation. He is said to have recalled that while his father was ploughing, as a child he had entered spontaneously into a tranquil condition later known as the first meditative trance (*dhyāna*, P. *jhāna*). He resolved at this point to pursue this more natural and wholesome means of spiritual development and to practice a moderate, middle path between self-indulgence and self-mortification. Later the term 'Middle Path' would name and epitomize the entire edifice of Buddhist doctrine and practice. As a result of this realization, the Bodhisattva Siddhārtha resolved to begin taking food in moderate but adequate amounts. He had known the extremes of sensual indulgence and mortification. He now rejected both as inhibiting spiritual progress, and developed the moderate daily routine that governs the lives of Buddhist monks to the present day. His five companions regarded this change as backsliding, and abandoned him in disgust.[11]

Siddhārtha then carried on alone, going on an alms round in the morning, eating one moderate meal a day before noon, and spending the afternoon and evening in meditation, often late into the night. His progress was swift, and before long he sat before the fabled Bodhi tree (tree of enlightenment), a descendant of which still stands at Bodh Gaya, near Patna in modern Bihar. As he sat cross-legged beneath this tree on the night of the Great Enlightenment, it is said that he resolved not to stand until he had attained final spiritual enlightenment and release. In the morning, he stood, having realized at the age of thirtyfive the ultimate attainment of men and gods: Buddhahood. From this point, it is proper to speak of him as the Buddha, 'the awakened one'.

Buddhist doctrine emphasizes that the specific content of the Buddha's experiences on the night of enlightenment can never be conveyed by mere words. *Sūtra* accounts say that the Buddha experienced the 'three knowledges': remembrance of his past rebirths in detail, knowledge of the past and future rebirths of other beings, and knowledge that he himself was free of all faults and illusions and would therefore never be reborn again.[12] This latter 'knowledge' is synonymous with the realization of liberation (*nirvāṇa*, Pali *nibbāna*). Buddhist legends recount the events of that night as a struggle between the Buddha's resolve and the temptations

and onslaughts of Māra, the Buddhist equivalent of Satan. In these accounts, Māra's terrifying armies and seductive daughters represent mythologically the terrors and temptations of mundane existence as well as the arduousness of meditational discipline. Such doctrines and mythological formulations, however, only serve to convey a slight hint of the content of the experience of enlightenment.

Because of the inexpressibility of enlightenment and liberation, and the difficulty of the path thereto, the Buddha is said at first to have despaired of ever being able to convey his discovery to others. Various deities are said to have intervened and encouraged him to teach the *dharma* (truth) and 'to open the door of deathlessness' to gods and men. The gods themselves informed him that the most capable recipients of his new teaching, his previous teachers Āḷāra Kāḷāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, had died. The Buddha then concluded that the people best qualified to understand his profound and subtle discovery were the five ascetics with whom he had undergone austerities. He is said to have been able to perceive with his miraculous "divine eye" that they were then staying at Sarnath, near Varanasi (Benares) in modern day Uttar Pradesh. Having journeyed to Sarnath, the Buddha was able to overcome the initial resistance of the five ascetics who had rejected him for abandoning the ascetic path, and thus gained his first followers.[13]

Divine intervention and clairvoyance aside, it would have been natural in the Buddha's time for a spiritual teacher with a new doctrine to propound to head for Varanasi, then as now the most sacred city of India. There is then little cause to doubt the *sūtras* in this detail. The *Sutta Piṭaka* also preserves what purports to be the first sermon of the Buddha after his enlightenment, the "Turning of the Wheel of Truth".[14] As one might expect, this *sūtra* propounds the Four Noble Truths, an outline of the fundamental doctrines of Buddhism. For the next fortyfive years, until his death, the Buddha attracted to himself an ever growing band of followers. Ironically, Prince Siddhārtha had become, as his father had desired, a *cakravartin*, a "Wheel Turning Monarch", but the wheel he had set in motion with this first discourse was the death-conquering wheel of truth rather than the mythical world-conquering wheel of universal monarchy.

The Buddha and his Followers

In the course of attempting to record the sermons of the Buddha, the *Sutta Piṭaka* also records incidentally a good deal of information regarding the personality, daily life and habits of the Buddha and some of his more prominent followers. Essentially, the Buddha taught a lifestyle and spiritual discipline whereby others could follow in

his footsteps and realize for themselves the enlightenment and liberation he had gained under the Bodhi tree. The fundamental principle of this lifestyle and discipline was following a "middle path" between self-indulgence and self-mortification, as the Buddha himself had done. Whether traveling singly or in groups, the followers of the Buddha observed the same daily routine as the Buddha. All were expected to abstain from sex, intoxicants, and all harmful or abrasive conduct. In addition the Buddha and his followers eschewed all luxuries of attire, accommodation and diet. Like their teacher, they possessed only their robes and begging bowls, and moved constantly from place to place lest they become attached even to such rudimentary shelter as a certain tree or cave.

Singly or in groups, they rose early in the morning, sometimes sitting in meditation before going on their daily alms rounds in a nearby village. They ate only one meal a day, before noon. In the afternoon they would listen to sermons by the Buddha or his foremost disciples, and then put the teachings into practice by meditating, often long into the night. These afternoon and evening sermons were often attended by lay followers of the Buddha, interested and sometimes hostile followers of other religious persuasions, and the merely curious. It was primarily through these sermons by the Buddha and his chief disciples that Buddhism grew steadily in numbers.

Increasingly, the Buddha attracted to himself wealthy patrons who made lavish arrangements to host sermons by him. Such patronage no doubt further increased his following. The Pali *sūtras* probably exaggerate when they claim that up to 2500 people attended some sermons, but it is not unlikely that several hundred may have gathered on some occasions to hear the teachings of the man who was very likely the best known religious teacher in India at the time. In spite of this fame, the Buddha and his followers remained faithful to the simple life of wandering about the countryside with a minimum of possessions and accepting only minimal hospitality—in the form of almsfood, robes and medicines—from their followers.[15]

An exception to this wandering lifestyle came during the monsoon season, when Buddhist monks were allowed to take permanent shelter for a period of about two months. As more followers of the Buddha joined the Saṅgha—the order of Buddhist monks and later of nuns as well—centers for assembling during the rains came to be recognized. At first these were caves and groves of trees, but as the lay following of the Buddha increased in numbers and wealth, permanent shelters sprang up across the countryside. These were the beginnings of the first monasteries, in which it is now customary for Buddhist monks to dwell permanently. During the Buddha's life and for several generations afterward, however, the Buddhist monk's

routine was to wander the countryside alone or in small groups for most of the year. During the rainy season, the communal retreats provided a no doubt welcome variation on this solitary lifestyle. In these periods of residence, novice monks had an opportunity to gain instruction in the teachings of the Buddha from their more experienced brothers, and during these retreats a recognized canon of teachings attributed to the Buddha and his foremost disciples began to form.

These recognized teachings were recorded in the *Sutta* and *Vinaya Piṭakas* or "collections" comprising respectively the sermons of the Buddha and his foremost disciples and the rules governing the Saṅgha or order of Buddhist monks. After a time, the Saṅgha developed the practice of gathering fortnightly to confess lapses against the Vinaya rules and prescribe punishments for such lapses. These gatherings culminated in a communal recital of the cardinal rules of monastic conduct. Though no mention of recitals of *sūtras* is mentioned in the early texts themselves, it seems likely that the corpus of *sūtra* literature began to develop during these fortnightly gatherings as well as during the monsoon retreats. Certainly the form in which the *sutras* survive suggests this conclusion.

Writing was virtually unknown in India during the time of the Buddha, so that his sermons could be preserved only through memorization by his followers until they were written down in the Pali language at about the time of Christ. The literary form of the Pali *sūtras* suggests that they are indeed a record of just such an oral tradition. There is a great deal of repetition from one *sūtra* to another, not only in terms of the doctrines expressed, but also in terms of extensive verbatim repetition of much material. This suggests that the *Sutta Piṭaka* is a sincere attempt to record memorized versions of individual sermons rather than an edited compilation of doctrine. Individual *sūtras* usually identify the location at which the *sūtra* was preached. They always identify the speaker of the sermon—who is sometimes not the Buddha but one of his chief disciples—and they often provide details about the audience and the circumstances surrounding the discourse. The *sūtras* which survive from this earliest period of Buddhism come down to us in a highly formulaic and repetitive mnemonic form which is something of a strain on our modern literary sensibilities. They are nonetheless effective in preserving a body of teachings by means of memorization. Though the Pali *sūtras* obviously exaggerate and mythologize the qualities and deeds of the Buddha, with regard to his teachings they have every appearance of constituting for the most part a faithful and reasonably accurate record.

Despite this immediate appearance of reliability, doubts regarding

the historical accuracy of the teachings preserved in the Pali *sūtras* have been raised by modern Western scholars of Buddhism, most notably Edward Conze.[16] These scholars point out quite accurately that in addition to the Pali *sūtras* of Theravāda Buddhism, other quite different accounts of teachings ascribed to the Buddha survive and form the basis of Mahāyāna Buddhism. They point out too that none of the literature purporting to contain the authentic teachings of the Buddha was actually written down before the time of Christ, approximately 500 years after the death of the Buddha. Because of such considerations, it will probably remain forever impossible to determine with historical certainty the precise nature of the original teachings of the Buddha. The following section, however, considers the schism of Buddhism into the Theravāda and Mahāyāna branches and the available evidence bearing upon their respective claims to preserve accurately the teachings of the historical Buddha. On the basis of this historical evidence, it is possible to provide a reasonably confident account of at least the broad outlines of the original teachings of the historical Buddha.

II. THE DEATH OF THE BUDDHA AND SCHISM IN THE SAṄGHA

From the night of his enlightenment under the Bodhi tree until his death at the age of eighty, the Buddha and the Saṅgha of monks over whom he presided wandered northern India following a routine of collecting alms, meditating, mastering the teachings of the Buddha and spreading these teachings through sermons and by example. So long as the Buddha lived, his supreme authority within the Saṅgha prevented any serious doctrinal disagreements from erupting among his followers. The best available account of the death of the Buddha indicates that such disputes within the Saṅgha began to develop almost immediately after the Buddha died.

This account, the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* or 'Sūtra of the Great Decease',[17] cannot be regarded as a rigorously accurate historical document. Nonetheless, the story it tells merits brief recounting here for the elements of historical truth which it probably does contain as well as for the insights it provides into the attitudes of early Buddhists toward the founder of their religion. Most notable among these attitudes is a tendency to idealize and in fact divinize the Buddha. This tendency eventually developed into full-fledged devotionalism in Mahāyāna Buddhism, though it is unlikely that such doctrines played a part in the original teachings of the historical Buddha.

The *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* opens with a lengthy account of the Buddha's movements and sermons immediately prior to the great

decease. Most of these sermons have to do with living together in peace and harmony, as if the Buddha were attempting to prepare his followers for the time when he would no longer be among them to settle disputes. During the last rainy season of his life, the Buddha is said to have taken up residence at Beluva, a small village near the city of Vaiśālī, in the modern state of Bihar. There he became gravely ill and, it is said, at eighty years of age warded off death only by a great effort and firm resolve to take leave of the Saṅgha and give them his last instructions before dying his final death. Shortly after coming out of the rainy season retreat, however, the Buddha is believed to have contracted food poisoning and died in a grove of trees near a small village called Kuśīnārā, without having had an opportunity to address many members of the Saṅgha. Instead, Ānanda, the Buddha's faithful attendant for most of the fortyfive years of his ministry, received most of the final teachings of the Buddha. These final teachings as recorded in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* do not differ in any significant way from the overall doctrine taught in the Pali *sūtras* as a whole.

As gleaned from the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, the actual historical events surrounding the death of the Buddha are remarkable only by virtue of their insignificance. This historical skeleton, however, is fleshed out and clothed extravagantly with numerous supernatural events. Trees burst spontaneously into flower out of season and shower the dying Buddha with blossoms. Muddy water becomes clear for him to drink. Deities in their thousands assemble to witness the passing away of the Buddha, who announces that if he had so desired he could have chosen to live on until the end of the eon. The Buddha gives elaborate instructions concerning how his body is to be cremated in a manner befitting a king of kings. From out of nowhere 500 monks appear in order to hear the last words of the Buddha:

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In the commingling of fact and fantasy in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, two points are particularly interesting from the point of view of the development of schisms in the Saṅgha and subsequent disagreements concerning the original teachings of the Buddha. In his final address, the Buddha is recorded as saying that after his death the Saṅgha could abolish minor rules of monastic discipline if they

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The First Buddhist Council

Traditionally, a gathering of 500 enlightened followers of the Buddha was convened shortly after the Buddha's death by the senior monk Mahā Kaśyapa at Rājagṛha, a village in the modern day state of Bihar. This gathering is known as the First Council. The historicity of the First Council is debated by modern scholars,[19] and will probably remain in doubt forever. In the course of such debate, however, it must be remembered that the followers of the Buddha were accustomed to gathering on a fortnightly and yearly schedule, and that the death of the Buddha would have provided a natural impetus for a special convocation. Whether there was any such single convocation as large or as representative and authoritative as it is traditionally supposed to have been is not as important historically as the point that soon after the death of Buddha, if not already within his lifetime, a corpus of his teachings regarded as authentic began to take shape. The Pali *sūtras* record the Buddha himself as referring to named collections of teachings, one of which appears to correspond to the eventual contents of the Pali canon.[20] This probably indicates on the one hand that the passage in question is relatively late, but on the other hand that the practice of compiling doctrine began relatively early on.

Regardless of the historicity of the First Council, it remains customary among scholars of Buddhism to refer to three primary councils of monks—the first of which occurred soon after the death of the Buddha—even when denying that one or another of these councils actually transpired. The locus classicus of this convention is the Pali *Vinaya Piṭaka*, that section of scripture which deals with monastic rules of discipline. The section of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* known as the *Cullavagga* contains in chapters 11 and 12 what purports to be a historical account of a First Council and a Second Council which occurred a hundred years later. The Third Council is recorded only in later works, the *Mahāvaṃsa* and the *Dīpavaṃsa*, which deal with

the early history of Buddhism in India and Sri Lanka. These books, composed in Sri Lanka, depend upon the *Cullavagga* for their accounts of the first two councils.

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The Second Council and the Mahāsāṅghika Schism

Because of the apparent restraint and reliability of its compilers, the *Cullavagga* is also probably the most reliable historical source concerning the Second Council. According to the *Cullavagga*, this council was held approximately a hundred years after the Buddha's death (i.e. around 380 B.C.) at Vaiśālī, north of modern day Patna. The *Cullavagga* is not the only historical source for the Second Council, however, for the Second Council resulted in the great Buddhist schism between the Sthaviravāda or 'School of Elders' and the Mahāyāna. The *Cullavagga*, ostensibly a Sthaviravādin text, represents the Elders' point of view. The Mahāyāna version of the Second Council occurs in the writings of Vasumitra[21] (around 100 A.D.), and in later, derivative accounts by Bhāvaviveka and Vinītadeva.[22] The sixth century historian Paramārtha also wrote of the Second Council on the basis of these and other sources.[23] According to these Mahāyāna texts, the Second Council was held in Patna itself, then known as Pāṭaliputra. This and other considerations have led some historians to conclude that there were two separate "Second Councils", one dominated by the School of Elders and the other dominated by a proto-Mahāyānist faction.[24]

The disagreement between the Theravāda and Mahāyāna accounts of the "Second Council" centers upon the circumstances which made the convening of a council necessary. According to the Theravāda version, the venerable elders Yasa and Revata called for the assembly because many monks had become lax concerning ten points of discipline. The most important of the practices regarded as reprehensible were accepting money in lieu of almsfood, eating after noon, and following improper procedures at meetings. According to the Mahāyāna version, the Second Council was initiated by five criticisms raised by the liberal monk Mahādeva against the conservative *arhats* who dominated the Buddhism of the time by virtue of their supposed enlightenment. According to Mahādeva, those who claimed to be *arhats* had not fully conquered passion because they still had wet dreams, were not omniscient because they often had to ask for directions, etc., were still subject to doubts, and had gained their knowledge through others rather than through their own experience. The fifth point is obscure, but seems to have to do with making verbal exclamations during meditation. The circumstances which occasioned the Second Council will probably remain forever doubtful, if indeed there was one rather than two Second Councils. At any rate, all accounts agree that a large group of monks—known as the Mahāsāṅghikas or—"majority group"—refused to accept the authority of the Council of Elders, and that as a result a major schism

in Buddhism occurred at this time.

These Mahāsāṅghikas eventually became the Mahāyāna. The Elders—the Sthaviras or Theras—came to be called first the Sthaviravāda and then the Theravāda. Though Sthaviravāda and Theravāda mean exactly the same thing, "Doctrine of the Elders", the archaic Sthaviravāda spawned several different schools—traditionally seventeen[25]—before emerging finally as the Theravāda, the sole surviving School of the Elders. Mahāyānists typically refer to these seventeen schools collectively with the derogatory term "Hīnayāna", which means "small, inferior vehicle" as opposed to Mahāyāna, which means "great, glorious vehicle". As a collective term for non-Mahāyāna Buddhism the term Hīnayāna can be convenient, but it should never be used as a synonym for Theravāda, a practice which is both offensive and inaccurate.

The actual differences among the several Hīnayāna schools, though hotly debated at the time, appear minor in retrospect, and in most cases are hopelessly obscure.[26] The minor differences among the descendants of the Sthaviras are certainly insignificant in comparison to the major rift in Buddhism occasioned by the Mahāsāṅghika schism. This initial rift widened into separate traditions of scripture and formulations of doctrine so widely divergent that the original teachings of the Buddha have become a matter of historical uncertainty. The most viable means of moving toward resolution of this uncertainty is comparison of the surviving scriptures of the various early schools of Buddhism. Unfortunately, aside from a few miscellaneous texts from other schools, relatively complete canons of only two early schools of Buddhism survive.

Comparison of Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Scriptures

Aside from the canon of the Theravāda, the only extensive literature to survive from any of the Hīnayāna schools is the Sarvāstivāda canon, large sections of which are preserved in Chinese translations. The *Vinaya* of the Sarvāstivāda survives also in Tibetan translation. The Chinese translations of Sarvāstivāda scriptures are in reasonably good general agreement with their Theravāda counterparts,[27] which establishes a common tradition regarding the teachings of the Buddha going back to approximately 250 B.C. when the Sarvāstivāda split from the Sthaviravāda.[28]

The Theravāda scriptures are organized into three major collections known as *piṭakas*. These are the *Vinaya, Sutta* and *Abhidhamma Piṭakas*. Together they comprise the *Tipiṭaka* or "Three Collections". The *Vinaya Piṭaka*, containing the rules of monastic discipli-

ne, is further subdivided into three sections. The first and most important is the *Sutta Vibhaṅga,* which contains the Prātimokṣa Rules, the rules which govern the day-to-day life of the Buddhist monk. Each of these 227 rules is followed by a detailed commentary explaining the rule and a story which purports to describe the circumstance which originally made the rule necessary. These stories provide an interesting and entertaining insight into day-to-day life in ancient India. The second section of the *Vinaya,* the *Khandhaka,* contains primarily procedural rules for the conduct of the affairs of the Saṅgha as well as some miscellaneous rules of the individual discipline. The *Khandhaka* is divided into the *Mahāvagga* and the *Cullavagga,* the latter of which contains the accounts of the First and Second Councils discussed above. The third section of *Vinaya,* the *Parivāra,* is a supplement to the other two sections. The *Vinaya* of the Sarvāstivāda—preserved in Chinese and Tibetan translations—is very similar to that of the Theravāda, except that it contains a different supplement in place of the *Parivāra.*

From the standpoint of early Buddhist doctrine, by far the most important section of the *Tipiṭaka* is the *Sutta Piṭaka,* which contains the sermons of the Buddha and a few of his foremost disciples. In the Theravāda canonical tradition, these discourses are divided into five groups known as *nikāyas.* The *Dīgha Nikāya* or "Long Group" contains the longest sermons. The *Majjhima Nikāya* or "Middle-length Group" contains the shorter discourses. The *Saṃyutta Nikāya* or "Connected Group" contains short discourses grouped according to their subject, and the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* or "Numerical Group" contains material grouped according to the number of items discussed. Each of these Theravādin *nikāyas* corresponds to similar groupings known as *āgamas* of the Sarvāstivāda canon. The actual content of *Dīgha* and *Majjhima Nikāyas* agrees relatively well with that the corresponding *āgamas* of the Sarvāstivāda canon. The *Saṃyutta* and *Aṅguttara Nikāyas* are less similar to their Sarvāstivādin counterparts, as might be expected given that these *nikāyas* or *āgamas* appear to be derivative from the "Long" and "Middle length" discourses. In addition to these four groups of discourses, the Theravāda *Sutta Piṭaka* also contains a *Khuddaka Nikāya* or "Minor Group", which is comprised of several miscellaneous works—some short, some long, some purporting to be the word of the Buddha, some composed by eminent disciples, some very early, and some relatively late. Though labeled "minor" this group of texts contains some of the most revered scriptures of Theravāda Buddhism. The Sarvāstivāda canon also contains a miscellaneous section known as the *Avadāna,* but the material therein does not correspond well to the Theravāda *Khuddaka Nikāya.*

The third section of Theravāda canon, the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, also has a Sarvāstivādin counterpart, but aside from a general similarity of the ideas expressed, the actual content of the two corpuses is not similar at all. Both are comprised of seven books, but the Theravādins ascribe their composition to the Buddha himself, whereas the Sarvāstivādins ascribe them to seven different disciples of the Buddha. In both cases it is clear that the Abhidharma represents a scholastic development within Buddhism quite some time after the death of the Buddha. It represents a technical, scholastic movement to systematize the numerous philosophical, psychological and moral concepts of early Buddhism. The nature and content of this third section of the canon is discussed at length further on in the present introductory material.

Analysis of the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda material just outlined reveals distinct stages in the development of Buddhist scriptures. The *Dīgha Nikāya* itself contains two *sūtras* which foreshadow the mnemonic organizational structure of the *Saṃyutta* and *Aṅguttara Nikāyas*. The *Saṅgīti Sutta* records a communal recital of essential points of Buddhist doctrine organized in groups of from one to ten items, apparently for ease of memorization. The *Dasuttara Sutta* records a similar ten-sectioned summary of doctrine spoken by Śāriputra. Both *sūtras* prefigure the organization of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, which also organizes Buddhist doctrine in groups of from one to ten items with a short concluding section on elevenfold groupings. In a similarly mnemonic vein, the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* organizes scriptural material according to the subject matter addressed. Both of these *Nikāyas* thus appear to be early attempts to organize doctrine in a systematic and easily remembered form. This may indicate that these *Nikāyas* are something of an innovation, albeit a very conservative innovation, involving rearrangement rather than alteration of the core teachings contained in the *Dīgha* and *Majjhima Nikāyas*. It is almost certain that parts of the Theravāda *Khuddaka Nikāya*, the Sarvāstivādin *Avadāna* and the *Abhidhamma* as a whole, represent doctrinal developments in Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Buddhism beyond what the historical Buddha taught.

The next stage in this development is recorded only in the Theravāda tradition in a large number of commentaries and sub-commentaries on the texts of the *Tipiṭaka*. These were composed originally in the indigenous Sinhalese language of Sri Lanka, and translated into Pali by the great scholar Buddhaghoṣa in the fifth century A.D. These commentaries confine themselves to expounding the texts of the *Tipiṭaka*, but in so doing they interpret, extrapolate, systematize and thereby modify the doctrines found in the Theravāda *sūtras* and *abhidhamma*. Buddhaghoṣa's great manual, the *Visuddhimagga*,

provides an admirable summary of the commentarial tradition in Theravāda Buddhism and reveals a marked development beyond the ancient doctrines expressed in the *Sutta Piṭaka*.

The earliest doctrinal developments in Mahāyāna Buddhism, by contrast, appear in the *sūtras* themselves. Parts of some Mahāyāna *sūtras* appear to be very old, but these are augmented, mixed and mingled with material which appears to represent doctrinal development and innovation. The conservative Theravādins appear to have been reasonably careful, though perhaps not absolutely scrupulous, in separating new or doubtful material from their most ancient texts. This isolation appears to have occurred first in the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, then in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, and finally in the commentarial literature. The Sarvāstivādins apparently did the same, though no commentarial literature survives from the school. The Mahāyānists, by contrast, appear to have been content to incorporate new ideas and interpretations into the scriptures themselves.

The Question of Original Buddhism

The evidence considered thus far suggests that the *Sutta* and *Vinaya Piṭakas* of the Theravāda, in particular the *Majjhima* and *Dīgha Nikāyas*, probably contain the most reliable surviving record of the teachings of the historical Buddha. There is, however, precious little real evidence. No Buddhist scriptures of any sort were committed to writing before about the time of Christ, almost five hundred years after the death of the Buddha. By this time the Mahāyāna had begun to develop, and based its doctrines on a scriptural corpus entirely different from the Pali canon of the Theravāda. Moreover, the earliest Mahāyāna literature was written down in India at about the same time as the Pali canon was committed to writing in Sri Lanka, in the early years of the Christian calendar.

On the surface, the form and content of Mahāyāna literature suggests that it is much later in origin than the Theravāda scriptures. In form, the Pali *sūtras* are formulaic and repetitive, like songs with choruses: relatively easy to memorize, pleasant to hear, but somewhat tedious to read. They have every appearance of being the end product of a preliterate, oral tradition. In general, Mahāyāna scriptures are more literary in form. They appear to be the products of a literate age in which works were composed and transmitted in writing. Many Mahāyāna *sūtras* contain complex narratives and elaborate descriptive passages which would be difficult if not impossible to memorize in any great quantity.

The content of Mahāyāna *sūtras* also suggests that they are later in origin than the Pali *sūtras*. On the one hand, they contain complex,

sophisticated philosophy which appears to have developed out of incipient ideas expressed in the Pali *sūtras*. On the other hand, Mahāyāna *sūtras* in general are characterized by highly fanciful mythological content. To be sure, the Pali *sūtras* also contain much myth and miracle, but the Mahāyāna *sūtras* are extravagant in this regard. The process of divinizing the Buddha, begun in the Pali *sūtras*, is dramatically advanced in the Mahāyāna *sūtras*. Many of them purport to have been delivered by the Buddha under supernatural circumstances to the deities in various heavens, almost a tacit admission that they do not record historical events.

Nonetheless, Mahāyānists maintain that their *sūtras* do record accurately the teaching of the historical Buddha. Most Mahāyānists do not deny that the Theravāda *sūtras* were also taught by the Buddha, but they assert that these were inferior teachings for those with inferior intelligence, the Mahāyāna teachings being reserved for the spiritual elite among the Buddha's followers. Again, this does not seem likely. Circumstantial evidence all points toward a greater historical authenticity of the Pali *sūtras*. The evidence considered thus far, however, is all circumstantial. The hard fact is that we have no relevant records which were actually committed to writing much before the time of Christ. This fact has led some modern historians of Buddhism to conclude that one is not justified in assuming that Mahāyāna Buddhism is a development from an original Buddhism enshrined in the Pali *sūtras*. Instead, they argue that in the absence of evidence to the contrary we must surmise that both the Theravāda and the Mahāyāna scriptures are divergent developments of an original, precanonical teaching which has been lost forever. Among these historians, Edward Conze is the most prominent.[29]

Conze argues that only Mahāsāṅghika literature could conceivably resolve the problem of original Buddhism. Only if we could locate Mahāsāṅghika material which agrees with material in the scriptures of their rivals the Theravāda, he asserts, could we be reasonably certain that this material predates the Second Council.[30] Unfortunately, the only known Mahāsāṅghika works—the *Mahāvastu* and possibly the *Lalitavistara*—are highly mythological accounts of the life and previous lives of the Buddha which provide no insight whatsoever into the original doctrines of Buddhism.

Fortunately, there does exist at least one *sūtra* which appears to satisfy Conze's rigorous criterion. This *sūtra*, the *Śālistamba* or 'Stalk of Rice', is concerned with the doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), an important Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda doctrine, but a doctrine of little importance in Mahāyāna Buddhism. The *Śālistamba Sūtra* does not exist in the original Sanskrit, but it does exist in Tibetan and Chinese translations. It appears to have

been a very important Mahāyāna *sūtra* in its day, for it is extensively quoted as being authoritative in several Mahāyāna commentarial texts which do survive in the original Sanskrit. By locating these quotations and matching them against the Tibetan and Chinese translations, one can reconstruct reliably approximately 90% of the original Sanskrit text of the *sūtra.*[31]

As early as 1913 L. de la Vallée Poussin noted that although the *Śālistamba Sūtra* was regarded as an authoritative Mahāyāna text it bears much general similarity to Theravāda *sūtras* and contains numerous passages directly paralleled in the Pali texts. Without the benefit of Conze's work, Poussin did not note at the time that this probably indicates that the *Śālistamba Sūtra* is either a Mahāsāṅghika text or one of the earliest if not the earliest surviving example of Mahāyāna literature. Though the scope of the *Śālistamba Sūtra* is limited, its general agreement with Theravāda doctrine, enhanced by many directly parallel passages, suggests that early Mahāyāna doctrine and literature diverged gradually from an original source very similar to the Pali *sūtras*. This evidence does not conclusively establish the historical accuracy of Pali *sūtras* as a whole, but it does satisfy Conze's rigorous criterion with regard to several cardinal doctrines and a few notable formulaic passages. In doing so it sheds more light than any other available source upon the development of Buddhist doctrine and literature from the Mahāsāṅghika schism to the reign of the emperor Aśoka, i.e. from the mid-fourth to the mid-third centuries B.C. This evidence is considered in greater detail in the following section on "The Teachings of the Historical Buddha".

The Emperor Aśoka and the Ascendancy of the Mahāyāna in India

Starting with the reign of Aśoka in approximately 250 B.C., the development of Buddhism becomes clearer. Aśoka—often compared to the first Christian emperor, Constantine—was actually an even more important figure in the development and spread of Buddhism than Constantine was for Christianity. Only from the time of Aśoka can one begin to speak of India as a political entity, for it is he who conquered and united for the first time roughly the landmass which constitutes current day India. Before Aśoka the sub-continent was divided into numerous small kingdoms. Aśoka waged a ruthless and bloody campaign to bring all of these kingdoms under his rule. Once he had become the undisputed emperor of all India, Aśoka is remembered and revered as one of the most benevolent and progressive monarchs of all time. Buddhists assert that this transformation from ruthless warmonger to benign lover of peace was due to

Aśoka's conversion to Buddhism. Be that as it may, it is clear that the emperor chose Buddhism as the religion with which to unify the vast variety of peoples over whom he ruled. It is also clear that he ruled wisely by promoting peace, harmony and justice in the name of Buddhism.

Not only is Aśoka responsible for the political unification of India under a benign and progressive regime, he also reintroduced the art of writing on a wide scale after some two millennia of illiteracy in India. He left a legacy of scores of high-minded edicts carved into rocks and on great granite pillars erected throughout his empire. These edicts are the first surviving examples of writing in India after the still undeciphered Indus Valley writings, which petered out around 1500 B.C. Aśoka's edicts are thus the earliest decipherable written source of Indian history.

The Aśokan edicts do not mention any specific sectarian divisions within Buddhism, though they do frequently encourage the unity of the Saṅgha and express concern over schism within the order.[32] They mention a few Buddhist texts by name, but none of these can be indisputably identified with a specific school of Buddhism. Aśoka mentions in one of his edicts "the *Rāhulavāda*, spoken by the Lord Buddha with reference to wrong speech." It is likely that this *sūtra* can be associated if not identified with the *Ambalatthikā Rāhulovāda Sutta* of the Theravādin *Majjhima Nikāya*, a dramatic condemnation of lying. It is possible too that Aśoka's *Munigāthā* (*Verses of the Sages*) refers to the *Theragāthā* (*Verses of the Elders*) of the Pali canon.[33] The edicts also mention Buddhist missions sent to lands beyond Aśoka's realm. It is clear that at least one of these, the mission to Sri Lanka, was Theravādin, for Sri Lanka continued to be the bastion of Theravāda Buddhism long after the Mahāyāna had become dominant in India.

A Third Buddhist Council, supposed to have been convened under the auspices of Aśoka, is recorded in Theravāda sources written in Sri Lanka after the time of Christ, i.e. the *Mahāvaṃsa* and the *Dīpavaṃsa*. Naturally, these sources regard the Third Council as validating once again the conservative teaching of the Elders. Mahāyāna sources do not mention a Third Council, nor does the Theravādin *Cullavagga*, further indication that the *Cullavagga* text was frozen before the time of Aśoka and not subject to sectarian corruption thereafter. It is quite likely, however, that Aśoka would have convened some such council in order to standardize the state religion of his empire. Though his edicts do not mention a council of monks under his auspices, they do specify that any who incite schism in the Saṅgha will be disrobed. The Sāñcī Edict in particular appears to indicate that some action to unify the Saṅgha took place in his

reign.

> The Saṅgha of monks and nuns has been made united (to endure) through the generations as long as the sun and moon. That monk or nun who divides the Saṅgha shall be compelled to wear the white garments (of a layperson) and live in nonresidence.[34]

Aśoka may very well have encouraged, if not presided over, specific actions to unify the Saṅgha. At any rate, all indications are that he favoured the conservative "Hīnayāna" over the more liberal and innovative Mahāyāna and that the Theravāda was regarded as the most authentic form of Buddhism in his time. Nonetheless, despite Aśoka's apparent Theravādin orientation, it was he who established the environment which would result in the ascendancy of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India. Aśoka transformed Buddhism overnight from one of the many non-Vedic sects in India into a mass religion, the state religion of one of the greatest empires on earth. In addition he inaugurated one of the greatest ages of religious freedom and free thinking that the world has ever seen. In this atmosphere, the more liberal and innovative Mahāyāna proved to be more viable than the conservative Theravāda. The pressure for doctrinal development, innovation and popularization was much greater in the cosmopolitan intellectual ferment of post-Aśokan India than in the relative isolation in which Theravāda Buddhism thrived on the island of Sri Lanka. As noted above, the Mahāyānists tended to incorporate doctrinal developments into their *sūtra* literature. As a result, the Mahāyāna *sūtras* eventually came to contain an exposition of Buddhism which is scarcely recognizable from the Theravādin point of view.

In the light of the foregoing, the innovations of the Mahāyāna appear to fall into three major categories: (1) the introduction of new scriptures, most purporting to be the word of the Buddha, (2) the development of new and divergent doctrines on the basis of these scriptures, and (3) the introduction of supernatural savior figures into the originally self-reliant religion of the historical Buddha. Despite the confidence and vigor of these innovations, however, the Mahāyāna did not go so far as to deny that their "Hīnayāna" brethren preserved an accurate recollection of the teachings of the historical Buddha. They maintained only that these teachings were deficient and had been superseded by the Mahāyāna teachings, which had been reserved by the Buddha for the spiritual elite. The following section indicates that it is more likely that the basic Mahāyāna doctrines developed gradually out of the teachings of the Buddha as recorded most accurately in the Pali *sūtras*.

III. THE TEACHINGS OF THE HISTORICAL BUDDHA

As the foregoing material indicates, the content of the historical Buddha's teachings is a matter in dispute among both Buddhists and scholars of Buddhism. To summarize briefly, the salient elements of this dispute are as follows. There are two major, extant branches of Buddhism, the Theravāda and the Mahāyāna, both of which claim to record accurately the teachings of the historical Buddha. Neither branch actually committed to writing any record of the Buddha's teachings until approximately five hundred years after his death. From a historian's point of view it is clear that the Mahāyāna version of these teachings is highly embellished, but this does not prove that the Theravāda version does not also deviate from the original teachings. The Sarvāstivāda scriptures which survive in Chinese translation reveal only that in about 250 B.C. the Hīnayānists agreed among themselves concerning most of the content of the "Long" and "Middle-length" discourses of the Buddha. Such considerations led Conze to formulate the principle that rigorous verification of teachings which may claim to have originated with the historical Buddha requires agreement between early Mahāyāna scriptures and those of the Hīnayāna. Otherwise, each of the major branches of Buddhism may lay equally valid claim to recording piecemeal a pre-canonical version of the historical Buddha's teachings, and neither can be discredited with any historical certainty.

As noted above, there is every immediate indication that the Mahāyāna scriptures are not an accurate historical record of the teachings of the historical Buddha. The large majority of the *Mahāyāna Sūtras* are not even conceivably literal historical accounts for any but the least critical of readers. Nonetheless, their hyperbole could represent embellishment upon aspects of original Buddhism methodically edited out of the Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin scriptures. Conze and others claim to find evidence of such editing in passages in the Pali *sūtras* which at face value appear to contradict Theravāda doctrine and which have a Mahāyāna flavor about them. These passages, Conze argues, were regarded as being too sacred or too authentic to alter or expunge. At the same time, he holds that many other similar passages were removed without a trace or altered beyond recognition, in an attempt to bolster Theravāda doctrine and to discredit the Mahāyāna scriptures. This corpus of expurgated material, he implies, characterized that aspect of precanonical Buddhism upon which the Mahāyāna scriptures are based. Following several Polish scholars whom he regards as belonging to a "Franco-Belgian" school of Buddhology, Conze cites Pali passages such as the following as instances of surviving traces of Mahāyāna

teachings in the Pali *sūtras*.[35]

> The mind (*citta*) is luminous. It is defiled by defilements from without and (may be) cleansed of these defilements.[36]
>
> Consciousness (*viññāna*), invisible, infinite and shining everywhere: it is there that water, earth, air, fire and air do not penetrate, that long and short, subtle and gross, pure and impure, name and form cease without a trace. With the cessation of consciousness, these all cease.[37]

It is noteworthy that Conze's argument is the historiographic equivalent of the sectarian Mahāyāna position that the Hīnayānists follow a deficient form of the Buddha's teachings. If anything, the actual historical significance of passages such as the foregoing is that the Pali *sūtras* *do* record elements later seized upon and developed in the Mahāyāna, and that their compilers *did not* edit out such elements when a Mahāyāna interpretation emerged. In their Theravāda contexts, these passages are perhaps odd, by virtue of being uncharacteristic, but they are quite comfortable, and do not require apologetic interpretation. Again it should be emphasized that the Mahāyāna has never claimed that the Hīnayāna scriptures are historically inaccurate in what they do contain, but only that they are deficient in not recording teachings found in the Mahāyāna scriptures. Mahāyānists attribute these additional teachings to the historical Buddha. The historian must be inclined to conclude that the additional doctrines found in the Mahāyāna scriptures are more likely to be natural historical developments from antecedents in the Pali texts.

It is at this point in the debate that a text like the *Śālistamba Sūtra* is invaluable in reaching a reasoned historical conclusion concerning the nature of original Buddhism. Its status as a Mahāyāna *sūtra* is amply attested by the fact that it is quoted extensively as an autoritative text on the doctrine of conditioned arising in Śāntideva's *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and in several of the most important commentarial works of Mahāyāna Buddhism.[38] On the other hand, its extensive parallelism with Pali texts—in terms of both the doctrines expressed and the phraseology employed—suggests strongly that the *Śālistamba Sūtra* represents a period in the development of Buddhist literature before the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna accounts of the historical Buddha's thought had diverged significantly.

That there was such a period in the development of Buddhism belies the Mahāyāna position, whether traditional or scholarly, asserting a radical disagreement from the beginning between the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna concerning the teachings of the historical Buddha. Instead, the *Śālistamba Sūtra* appears to indicate that the rift between the two branches of Buddhism was minor in the beginning, at least from the standpoint of scripture and doctrine, and

that it widened over time. The basic similarity and in some instances direct parallelism between the *Śālistamba Sūtra* and the Pali *sūtras*, moreover, indicates that the widening of this rift was due mostly to innovations within the Mahāyāna.

The only obviously Mahāyāna content of the *Śālistamba Sūtra* is that it is delivered by Maitreya, the mythological future Buddha, and that it encourages realization of Dharmakāya Buddha—the metaphysical "Truth-body" of the Buddha—as the ultimate spiritual goal. It should be noted, however, that the mythological figure Maitreya appears also in the Pali *sutras*,[39] along with other clearly non-historical characters like the previous Buddha Vipassi in the *Mahāpadāna Sutta*.[40] Also noteworthy is the fact that the *Śālistamba Sūtra*, in its treatment of Dharmakāya Buddha, confines itself to conflating two well known passages from the Pali texts: "Whoever sees conditioned arising sees the Dharma"[41] and "Whoever sees the Dharma sees the Buddha."[42] In the Theravādin context, the latter statement clearly intends that one need not set eyes upon the person of the Buddha in order to gain the full benefit of his teachings. In the *Śālistamba Sūtra*, the conflated statement clearly intends an abstract, divinized concept of the Buddha, as is typical of the Mahāyāna.

Though the *Śālistamba Sūtra* does not specifically elaborate further upon realization of Dharmakāya Buddha, it does incorporate an incipient form of a doctrine of illusion (*māyā*) resorting to the simile of a reflection in a mirror, imagery which is again typical of later Mahāyāna literature.[43] The "illusion" which the *Śālistamba* illustrates with this simile, however, is the illusion of an entity which transmigrates in the course of rebirth, a use of the mirror simile which is actually more similar to imagery found in the Pali *sūtras*.[44] The fact that the Mahāyāna content of the *sūtra* is so tentative and so nearly Theravādin in expression indicates that initially there were only minor disagreements concerning the content of the historical Buddha's teachings.

The bulk of the *Śālistamba Sūtra* is a straightforward account of the doctrine of conditioned arising which would be slightly surprising to a Theravādin at a few points, but nowhere objectionable. Fortunately, the doctrine of conditioned arising is so central in Hīnayāna Buddhism that in the course of its exposition the *Śālistamba Sūtra* touches upon virtually all points of basic Buddhist doctrine as recorded in the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda versions of the "Long" and "Middle-length" discourses. On this basis, one may say with confidence that the essence of the historical Buddha's teachings was the Four Noble Truths: (1) Mundane existence is fundamentally unsatisfactory (frustrating, conducive to suffering, *duḥkha*, P. *dukkha*); (2) Desire is the cause of suffering; (3) *Nirvāṇa* is the

cessation of suffering; and (4) Buddhism provides a means of realizing the cessation of suffering, i.e. the Noble Eightfold Path. All of Theravāda and most of Mahāyāna Buddhism may be regarded as an elaboration upon these four fundamental doctrines.

The Noble Eightfold Path includes as its first "limb" recognition of the Four Noble Truths *via* "right view". Thus the Eightfold Path includes the Four Noble Truths and vice versa. The Eightfold Path is traditionally divided into *philosophical, moral* and *meditative* segments, a categorization of the Buddha's teachings which finds almost universal assent within all forms of Buddhism. For this reason these three headings provide a convenient framework within which to consider the likely teachings of the historical Buddhas. The following discussion of the "likely teachings" of the historical Buddha takes Conze's rigorous criterion, as addressed by the *Śālistamba Sūtra,* as a starting point. Given this initial orientation, this discussion also looks to evidence provided by the Upaniṣads, non-Buddhist texts roughly contemporary with the Buddha. Where Buddhist doctrines are similar to Upaniṣadic teachings there is additional reason to regard them as archaic. Moreover, again given rigorous historical criteria as a starting point, the fact that incipient doctrines in the Pali *sūtras* provide a convincing basis for doctrinal developments in the Mahāyāna may be regarded as further evidence bearing upon the question of the Buddha's original teachings. The phrase "original teachings", given the rigor of Conze's criterion, must be taken broadly as indicating early Buddhist doctrines which developed within one hundred years of the death of the historical Buddha.

A final criterion to be considered is the internal coherence of the early Buddhist doctrines identified on the basis of the foregoing historical criteria. One must assume that the historical Buddha's teachings were coherent, if not perhaps rigidly systematic, when they were given. Therefore any reconstruction of these teachings should reveal a coherent framework of doctrine. The following treatment may well be deficient, in that some original teachings may be omitted for lack of specific evidence, but it attempts to present a coherent framework of doctrine, based on specific historical criteria, which convincingly prefigures the remarkable diversity of subsequent Buddhist thought.

Analytical Philosophical Teachings

The first Noble Truth is often rendered in English as "suffering", a literal translation of the Pali *dukkha* or the Sanskrit *duḥkha.*[45] "Unsatisfactoriness" or "frustration," however, are more adequate

renditions of the term in its Buddhist context. Buddhism recognizes readily that existence can sometimes seem pleasant. The apparent pleasantness of existence is in fact regarded as the chief disincentive to the pursuit of a spiritual life. The first Noble Truth of Buddhism asserts that all mundane things—from the most trivial to the most sublime—are impermanent (*anitya*, P. *anicca*) and doomed to pass away in time. Atypically in the Indian context, according to Buddhism this impermanence applies to our selves as well, and consequently there is no self (*atta*, Skt. *ātman*). All beings in the universe—from the most trivial to the most sublime—are also doomed to pass away utterly in time. The doctrines of impermanence and selflessness thus form the two complementary facets of the most fundamental of Buddhist doctrines, the doctrine of universal unsatisfactoriness. These three together—*anitya*, *anātman* and *duḥkha*—constitute the "three marks" (*trilakṣaṇa*) of existence. Recognition of these three essential characteristics in all things is held to be tantamount to penetration of the true nature of reality.

Most religious thinkers of any age or place would accept the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence enthusiastically and without reservation. The doctrine of "non-self" (*anatta*, Skt. *anātman*), however, set Buddhism apart from contemporary Indian religions in the age of the historical Buddha and continues to set Buddhism apart from and at odds with all other major religious faiths. In the first place, belief in rebirth and in the self as the vehicle of rebirth had become practically axiomatic among Indian religions at the time of the Buddha. Denial of the self was tantamount to denial of an afterlife in the ancient Indian context, though as discussed below, the Buddha affirmed rebirth by means of a novel dovetailing of causal theory and morality. In the second place, the Buddha's denial of the self had the effect of relativizing any and all deities. Though the Buddha did not deny the existence of deities, they too, according to the non-self doctrine, are doomed eventually to pass away.

This latter assertion was less radical in the Indian context than it is in relation to Western theistic religions. Indians of the Buddha's time had become accustomed to cyclical theories of cosmology, whereby the universe goes through enormously long periods of evolution and devolution, alternating between chaos and cosmos. Minor deities—and in some schools of thought all but the most sublime metaphysical principle of the universe—were believed to be caught up in this cyclical universal process, coming into existence and going out of existence along with the cosmos as a whole. The Pali *sūtras* make it clear, however, that no deity and no metaphysical principle is exempt from this cyclical evolution and devolution of the universe. According to early Buddhism, there is no creator or

ruler of the universe, and no unchanging metaphysical principle undergirding it.

Later forms of Buddhism drifted away from the radical atheism of the Pali *sūtras*, but it is arguable that none of them drifted so far as to be accurately characterized as theistic, and that at most they can be termed "absolutistic." Mahāyāna Buddhism typically identified an abstract concept of the true Buddha—the *dharmakāya* or "Truth-body" of the Buddha—as opposed to the *nirmāṇakāya* or "manifest body" of the historical Buddha—with the metaphysical principle of the universe. Nonetheless Mahāyāna Buddhism does not go so far as to assert that this metaphysical *dharmakāya* Buddha created or governs the universe. Early Buddhism avoided any such metaphysical speculation. Instead, like their contemporaries, the Jainas and Ājīvakas, early Buddhists accepted the universe as a given—it has always been here and always will be here. Early Buddhists also accepted the common Indian belief in a cyclical universe, though this was not by any means a central or even important doctrine of the religion.

In the place of a supreme deity or metaphysical principle, early Buddhism's ultimate referent and goal was *nirvāṇa*, cessation of rebirth and thereby of suffering. Grammatically, the term *nirvāṇa* means "blown out". It was probably intended originally to connote extinction of the consuming flame of desire and ignorance which keeps one entangled in *saṃsāra*, the mundane realm of rebirth. There is some indication too that the term may have referred to extinction of the "flame" of consciousness, which according to early Buddhism is the medium in which the process of rebirth takes place. As a passage already verified as authentic states:

> Consciousness (*viññāna*), invisible, infinite and shining everywhere: it is there that water, earth, air, fire and air do not penetrate, that long and short, subtle and gross, pure and impure, name and form (*nāma-rūpa*) cease without a trace. With the cessation of consciousness, these all cease.[46]

The spiritual ambition to bring an end to rebirth and thus to mundane consciousness as we know it was common in both orthodox and heterodox Indian religions of the Buddha's time. Common too were the beliefs that achieving an end to rebirth entailed cessation of individual consciousness, that this in turn involved realization of and participation in the ultimate nature of reality, and that both the experience of spiritual release and the ultimate reality thus encountered were utterly beyond the scope of words or thought.[47] The Buddha, however, was more explicit and systematic than any of his recorded

contemporaries in denying that one could in any way express or conceive of the ultimately real. In the course of this denial, the Buddha resorted to the famed *catuṣkoṭi*—the 'four-cornered negation' or 'tetralemma'. The four-cornered negation is fundamental and ubiquitous in the Mādhyamika philosophy of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

According to the *catuṣkoṭi* there are four logical possibilities given any assertion: (1) it is, (2) it is not, (3) it both is and is not, and (4) it neither is nor is not. With regard to any positive assertion about *nirvāṇa* the Buddha held that all of these possibilities were false. Specifically, he denied that after realizing final *nirvāṇa* one exists, does not exist, both does and does not exist, or neither does nor does not exist.[48] The Pali *sūtras* also record instances in which the Buddha maintained a "noble silence" in response to a similar line of questioning.[49] Mahāyāna Buddhism elaborated extensively upon the theme of the silence of the Buddha in the course of its development of an abstract concept of *dharmakāya* Buddha and of the doctrine of illusoriness. The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, for example, proclaims that in reality the Buddha never uttered a single word, "for not speaking is the Buddha's speaking."[50]

Reasoning based on the *catuṣkoṭi* underpins the philosophical characterization of Buddhism as the "Middle Path", a characterization universally accepted throughout Buddhism. In the first instance, the Middle Path characterized a spiritual discipline between the two extremes of self-indulgence and self-mortification. By the outset of his own solitary search for enlightenment, the historical Buddha, by all accounts, had experienced both these extremes to the full, first as a pampered prince and then as a rigorous ascetic. After the Buddha's enlightenment, in the early stages of the formulation of his teaching, "Middle Path" came to connote also a philosophical position between the two extremes of nihilism and speculative metaphysical absolutism, in Pali Buddhist terminology the metaphysical extremes of absolute discontinuity (*ucchedavāda*) and eternalism (*śāsvatavāda*).[51] In context, these two rejected extremes refer to nihilism on the one hand and naive belief in an everlasting soul or metaphysical principle on the other, precisely as the terms are used in the *Śālistamba Sūtra*, where it is said that the being who is reborn is not to be viewed as eternal (*śāsvata*) and not to be viewed as "cut off" (*uccheda*).[52]

Aside from the fact that reasoning based on the *catuṣkoṭi* is conspicuous throughout Indian thought, the *Śālistamba Sūtra* overtly employs the tetralemma,[53] thus satisfying Conze's criterion for establishing the content of original Buddhism. Upaniṣadic texts roughly contemporary with the Buddha employ similar though less systematic denials in the course of elucidating their concepts of

ultimate reality,[54] and Jainism employs prominently a more elaborate version of such reasoning in its *syādvāda* or "doctrine of possibilities."[55] These latter two considerations may indicate that the *catuṣkoṭi* was not an invention of the Buddha, but they enhance the case for including this important doctrine in an account of the teachings of the historical Buddha. It bears repeating, moreover, that the *catuṣkoṭi* and the doctrine of the ineffability of the ultimately real are an indispensable foundation for later developments in the Mādhyamika dialectic of emptiness (*śūnyatā*).

Reasoning derived logically from the *catuṣkoṭi* and resorting directly to the philosophical doctrine of the Middle Path is also integral to the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth without a soul. No aspect of Buddhism has been so poorly understood and so often misrepresented in the West, possibly because of failure to come to grips with the reasoning behind the multiple logical possibilities recognized in Buddhism from its inception. Some Westerners have even attempted to deny that the Buddha ever taught the doctrine of non-self,[56] presumably because they felt that it is contradictory to Buddhism's conspicuous and admirable moral philosophy. Be that as it may, the doctrine of non-self is so widely recognized, if not always emphasized, in the various extant forms of Buddhism and Buddhist literature that there can be no serious doubt that it formed an integral part of the original teachings of the Buddha. Nor can there be any doubt that in conjunction with this doctrine the Buddha taught that one is morally responsible and accountable for one's actions (*karma*) through the mechanism of rebirth.

The apparent contradiction in asserting rebirth while denying that there is any abiding personal identity, i.e. any self which can be reborn, is not a contradiction at all from the standpoint of *catuṣkoṭi* reasoning. Put simply, there both is and is not rebirth, and there neither is nor is not something which is reborn. The classical Theravādin statement on rebirth is that the being as which one is reborn is "not oneself and not another" (*na ca so, na ca añño*). This statement is not canonical, but encapsulates admirably the canonical position expressed in a passage[57] where the Buddha, again resorting to the *catuṣkoṭi*, denies that one's suffering is caused by oneself, by another, by both or "arisen by chance" (*adhiccasamuppanna*).[58] The *Śālistamba Sūtra* employs a direct parallel to this Pali passage in the course of expounding both the growth of a sprout from a seed and the process of rebirth.[59] The Pali passage concludes with the following statement, which is well verified in both terminology and concept as an encapsulation of the early Buddhist understanding of rebirth.

> "The person who acts experiences the results": this, Kassapa, which you first called "suffering caused by another" amounts to the eternalist theory. "One acts and another experiences the results" occurs to the experiencer as "suffering caused by another" and amounts to the annihilationist theory... Avoiding both extremes, the Tathāgata (Buddha) teaches the truth (*dharma*) by a middle (way): ignorance conditions mental formations (etc., enumerating the formula of conditioned arising discussed below).[60]

Thus, in both the Theravāda *sūtras* and the *Śālistamba Sūtra* the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth is held to be preeminently intelligible in the light of the Buddhist theory of causation as elucidated in the doctrine of dependent origination.

According to the Buddhist theory of causation, the laws of cause and effect operate just as inexorably in the moral realm as they do in the physical world. Like the *Śālistamba Sūtra*, the Pali *sūtras* employ the simile of a seed growing into a plant to illustrate this point.[61] If one plants a seed, and various conditions necessary for its growth are met, a plant will grow. The plant is not the seed, and yet it is not other than the seed. It is a *result* of the seed. Obviously, the type of seed sown determines the type of plant which will result. Similarly in the moral realm, if one performs an action (*karman*), a result (*vipāka*) similar in nature to the action performed will accrue to the one who performed the action.

Just as in the physical realm a result may not be simultaneous with its cause, so in the moral realm there may be a delay in the actualization of the moral result of an action. During this delay, there may well have been a considerable change in the person who initially performed the action in question. He or she may well have aged several years. By this time, the being who suffers or enjoys the result of the previously performed action would be "not the same, and yet not another". Similarly in the physical realm, a drought at the time of planting a seed may result later in a stunted plant. Both the plant and the person in question may suffer or profit from causes and conditions which themselves occurred and vanished long ago. In fact, according to Buddhist moral and causal theory, both the plant and the person as such are at any given time the sum total result of myriad causes and conditions which have occurred in the past. The constant operation of cause and effect brings about constant change in both sentient beings and inanimate objects. The effect of any given cause—whether immediate or delayed, and whether occurring in the physical or moral realm—often operates upon a thing or being which has changed in a minor or major way since the

occurrence of the cause in question. Whether or not the same thing or being "deserves" the result which accrues at the time is a moot point, for the laws of cause and effect are impersonal and inexorable, whether operating in the physical or the moral realm.

In the physical realm, this constant changing of things is denoted by the term *anityatā*, "impermanence", while the constant change in sentient beings gives rise to the term *anātman*, "no self". Thus far, the Buddhist theory of karma and its results is empirical. It is a fact of life that one may suffer as an adult for actions performed as a teenager, and that the adult who suffers is not the teenager who performed the action. The Buddhist moral doctrine, of course, also includes the concept of rebirth, whereby one may suffer or prosper in a future lifetime as a result of actions performed in a past life which one does not remember at all.

Some may not accept the doctrine of rebirth, but as noted above, rebirth was all but axiomatic in India at the time of the historical Buddha. It was one of those commonly held, antecedent beliefs upon which all great religions have been built. In this area, the radical contribution of the historical Buddha to Indian moral philosophy was his insistence that the laws of moral cause and effect are similar to the physical laws of cause and effect, and that they operate between lifetimes just as they operate within a single lifetime. This is to say that moral effects invariably operate upon a being who has changed since the performance of the action in question, whether in this or a future lifetime.

Thus, though the Buddha accepted the general theory of rebirth current in his day, this acceptance was by no means uncritical. The Buddha's teaching of rebirth without a soul was actually an attempt to rationalize existing concepts of rebirth which were based on belief in the self or soul. Pre-Buddhist theories of rebirth regarded the soul as the innermost essence of one's identity. As such, the soul was usually regarded as sublime and unchanging.[62] On the other hand, the soul was universally regarded as the agent ultimately responsible for evil as well as good actions. This contradiction in the existing theories of the soul and rebirth was not lost entirely upon the forebears of the Buddha. The Upaniṣadic sages, some of whom definitely predated the Buddha, conceived of the innermost self in various ways, but typically regarded it as the eternal, sublime, unchanging essence of one's being. They recognized early on the contradiction in asserting that such an entity could meaningfully be said to suffer or benefit from actions occurring in the mundane world, or indeed that such an entity could conceivably be responsible for relatively "good" or "bad" actions. In order to overcome such problems, religious thinkers predating the Buddha, some of them

recorded in the Upaniṣads, had begun to devise various hierarchies of the faculties of the soul, and suggest that karma and rebirth affected only the lower, less essential aspects of the person which were somehow shed by the essential, eternal soul at the point of release.[63]

While the immediate motivation behind such speculations was religious apologetic, the speculations themselves involved a remarkable degree of quasi-scientific psychological observation and deduction. The available textual evidence suggests that before the historical Buddha the Upaniṣadic sages had recognized the five empirical senses as conduits of information to the mind (*manas*), and postulated yet deeper levels of consciousness remarkably similar, though perhaps not identical, to modern psychological concepts such as ego (*ahaṃkāra*), consciousness (*vijñāna*), and the superconscious (*buddhi, prajñā*). The best known of these layered theories of the self is probably the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*'s doctrine of the five "sheaths" of the soul, the material (*anna*), the vital (*prāṇa*), the mental (*manas*), the conscious (*vijñāna*) and the blissful (*ānanda*).[64]

There is every indication that the historical Buddha expanded upon this existing fund of psychological observation and speculation in order to formulate his own systematic analysis of the individual human being into the "five aggregates" (*pañcaskandha*, Pali *pañca khandha*), again a doctrine conspicuously treated in the *Śālistamba Sūtra*. According to this doctrine, that which we typically experience as the individual self is in fact divisible into at least five "aggregates". These are: (1) body or materiality (*rūpa*), (2) feelings (*vedanā*), (3) conceptual identification (*saṃjña*), (4) conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*, Pali *saṅkhārā*) and (5) consciousness (*vijñāna*). Together these form a constantly fluctuating conglomerate which only gives the appearance of abiding personal identity. Each aggregate, in turn, can be further analysed into constituent components. Body, like all material phenomena, is composed of the elements earth, air, fire and water. *Ākāśa*, a fifth element recognized in the *Śālistamba Sūtra*, and a common feature in Mahāyāna literature, is relatively scarce in the Pali *sūtras* as one of the recognized elements.[65] Feelings, conceptual identifications and consciousness all occur as results of the activity of the five senses and the mind (*manas*) as *sensus communis*. Thus there may be visual feeling, olfactory identification or tactile consciousness and so on up to eighteen types of feeling, identification and consciousness (i.e. 6 senses times 3 aggregates). As the following sections of this introductory material show, this rudimentary categorization of experience was eventually expanded dramatically in the Abhidharma literature in an attempt to analyze

minutely and exhaustively the various possible moments of consciousness.

In the Pali *sūtras* themselves, each of the eighteen basic types of feeling, identification and consciousness may be yet further analyzed according to the nature of the aggregate in question. Feelings, the most primitive level of experience, occur in three categories: pleasant, unpleasant and neutral. Identifications represent the more refined experiences normally denoted with adjectives, such as red, round, smooth, fragrant, etc. At this point, a specific identification regarding the object in question may be formed at the level of the "conditioning factors" aggregate. For example pleasant visual, tactical and olfactory feelings, along with similar identifications of "red, round, smooth and fragrant", may give rise to the concept "an apple". Upon further experience this concept may be revised to, for example, "a pomegranate". In addition to conceptualization, volition also occurs at the level of conditioning factors. In this context volition indicates karmic efficient reactions such as desire (e.g., for apples) or aversion (e.g., to pomegranates). Similar processes occur throughout one's waking life, and presumably in sleep and dreams as well. Interestingly, however, there is little indication of an early Buddhist doctrine regarding sleep and dreaming, though such speculations were enthusiastically pursued among the Buddha's Upaniṣadic contemporaries, most notably in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.*

Be that as it may, according to early Buddhism a constant barrage of experiences continually modifies the fifth aggregate, consciousness, which is typically represented metaphorically as a stream in the Pali *sūtras*. In these *sūtras* the term "consciousness" most often appears to represent the sum total functioning of the other three nonmaterial aggregates. In some instances, however, it appears to denote a deeper, more essential level of being reminiscent of Upaniṣadic treatments of the layered self.[66] This lack of clarity may be intentional, or may have been regarded as unavoidable given the delicacy of propounding a doctrine of rebirth without a soul in a culture in which the two doctrines were so closely associated.

At any rate, consciousness occupies a unique position in early Buddhist doctrine by virtue of its crucial role in the process of rebirth and release. On the one hand, the Pali *sūtras* state explicitly and firmly that consciousness does not pass from one birth to another as an entity.[67] On the other hand, some role for consciousness in the rebirth passage is implied in several passages which indicate that upon the realization of final liberation consciousness "ceases" or is not "reinstated", or that it "descends" at rebirth. Such phrases seem to indicate that the consciousness aggregate represents the medium through which rebirth occurs.[68] In any case, it is clear that

consciousness characterized as a *stream* is not to be taken as an *entity*. A stream flows along, constantly changing, constantly modified by rocks, debris, etc., and yet recognizable as the same stream. At some point it may plunge over a precipice, shatter into spray, and then reform at the bottom into another stream which is "neither the same stream nor a different stream". Similarly, early Buddhist doctrine appears to represent consciousness—whether as a separate aggregate or the sum total functioning of the other nonmaterial aggregates—as flowing along in a recognizably continuous though constantly changing pattern throughout one's life, being radically interrupted at death, and then reforming in rebirth in such a way as to be "not oneself, and yet not another".

Clearly, a systematic concept of cause and effect—governed by the four logical alternatives of the *catuṣkoṭi*—underpins all of the foregoing psychological and philosophical material. For example, one *is not* reborn, because no abiding entity survives death. On the other hand one *is* reborn in the sense that one's actions and experiences in this life will affect causally a consciousness reinstated in another life. Even in a single lifetime, in one sense an infant develops into an adult through the mechanism of cause and effect operating both mentally and physically, while in another sense, the infant's physical body, desires, motivations and intentions perish utterly through that same mechanism. The infant both does and does not survive infancy.

Both of these processes of identity in difference—whether in one lifetime or across many lifetimes—are summarized in the Buddhist doctrines of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). The *Śālistamba Sūtra*'s extensive treatment of the twelvefold formula of dependent origination leaves little doubt that the classical formula as frequently expounded in the Pali *sūtras* goes back to within a hundred years of the historical Buddha himself. It is notable, however, that the Theravāda *Dīgha Nikāya* nowhere contains the complete, classical, twelvefold formula. Instead, it contains only truncated or variant formulas. This seems to verify the immediate impression that the classical Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination is in fact an amalgamation of the several separate formulas, and suggests that the classical formula may well not have been assembled until after the death of the historical Buddha. At the same time, such glaring omissions in the *Dīgha Nikāya* formulas again testify that the preservers and compilers of the Pali *Nikāyas* were remarkably conscientious as historians and textualists. The temptation to complete deficient formulas of such central doctrinal concern must have been great indeed.

The classical, twelvefold formula of dependent origination, which

incorporates many of the terms and concepts already discussed, runs as follows: (1) ignorance conditions conditioning factors, (2) conditioning factors (in turn) condition consciousness, (3) consciousness conditions name-and-form, (4) name-and-form conditions the six senses (including mind), (5) the six senses condition sensual contact, (6) sensual contact conditions feeling, (7) feeling conditions craving, (8) craving conditions grasping, (9) grasping conditions existence, (10) existence conditions birth (i.e. rebirth), (11) birth conditions (12) aging and death.

According to the classical Theravādin interpretation of the formula, it carries on in a cycle. If one dies in a state of ignorance, this will condition, i.e. influence, the final thoughts occurring in that life, which will in turn determine the initial state of consciousness in the next life. This initial state of consciousness conditions "name-and-form", which is taken to denote the conscious and corporeal aspects of the human being developing in the womb. This construal of the term "name-and-form", though supported in the *Śālistamba Sūtra*, is dubious on lexicographical, historical and conceptual grounds, and the overall interpretation is awkward at several points. For example consciousness, a fundamental aspect or comprehensive designation of mind, occurs before "name-and-form", which is supposed to mean "mind and body". Birth occurs twice within the formula, and existence, which the entire formula is held to describe, only occurs near the end.

As a result of such difficulties, modern scholars have suggested that the classical twelvefold formula of conditioned arising is actually an artificial amalgamation of three originally separate, though possibly overlapping formulas.[69] In the above enumeration, items 1-3 appear to refer to rebirth, assuming that "name-and-form" refers to "mind and body" as per the traditional interpretation. Items 3-9 appear to refer to the psychology of desire independently of the doctrine of rebirth; and items 10-12 appear to be an expansion upon the first "noble truth" of the inherent unsatisfactoriness of existence. Thus, on the one hand there is reason to suspect that the classical formula of dependent origination may be an amalgamation. On the other hand, there is equally good reason to believe that such amalgamation reflects a deliberate systematization of very early Buddhist doctrine, an amalgamation which may have occurred even during the Buddha's lifetime. The *Śālistamba Sūtra*'s extensive treatment of the twelvefold formula of conditioned arising alone confirms the antiquity of the classical formulation of the doctrine.

In any case, the problem remains that there is little in the Pali *sūtras* themselves to suggest that "name-and-form" refers to the conscious and corporeal duality often supposed to constitute a

human being. This situation suggests a third interpretation of dependent origination which renders the classical formula more coherent and emphasizes similarities between the overall standpoint of the Pali *sūtras* and that of Mahāyāna Buddhism. This third interpretation centers on the term *nāmarūpa*.

Literally, *nāma* means "name" and *rūpa* means "form or appearance". There are several appropriate Sanskrit and Pali words for "mind" or "consciousness", notably *citta* and *vijñāna*. *Kāya* or *śarīra* are immediately obvious terms for "body". It is thus very doubtful that *nāmarūpa* originally meant "mind and body." In the Upaniṣads, which are roughly contemporary with the historical Buddha, the term *nāmarūpa* is a general designation for any discrete phenomenon. According to Upaniṣadic reasoning, all phenomena are characterized by their names and forms. "Name" is more than a verbal designation. It implies a concept, existing in the mind of the perceiver, which is at least potentially nameable. "Form" does not necessarily imply substance, but rather appearance or perceptibility. According to Upaniṣadic reasoning, in order to exist in any meaningful sense of the term, a phenomenon must present a *form* perceivable by the senses, and must be greeted in consciousness with a *concept* corresponding to that form. In short, consciousness and the objects of consciousness are interdependent. It is most likely that the term *nāmarūpa* in the Pali *sūtras* should be similarly construed.

The Pali *sūtras* repeatedly affirm the interdependence of consciousness and the objects of consciousness without asserting the priority of either.[70] The following passage is a notable example. On the one hand, form "comes to be" as a result of having been perceived. On the other hand, consciousness is said to arise on the basis of form.

> When, sir, the internal eye is intact, external forms come within its range and there is appropriate attention, then there is appearance of the appropriate type of consciousness. Whatever is the form (*rūpa*) of what has thus come to be is called the grasping aggregate of form.[71]

In addition, a few Pali passages clearly intend an Upaniṣadic construal of the term "name-and-form".[72] For example:

> There is just this body and external to it, name-and-form. This is a pair. Conditioned by this pair are (sensory) contact and the six (sense) spheres.[73]

Most occurrences of the term *nāmarūpa* in the Pali *sūtras* are

readily amenable to interpretation as "concept-and-appearance", and only a very few, if any, actually appear to refer to "mind-and-body."[74]

Given the obvious similarity between the early Buddhist and Upaniṣadic usages of the term *nāmarūpa,* it is also possible, in addition to the traditional and Western scholarly interpretations, to construe the classical formula of dependent origination as a quasi-immaterialist treatment of the repeated arising and passing away of phenomena existing in mutual interdependence with consciousness. According to this interpretation, each new phenomenon is greeted with ignorance, which gives rise to a conditioning factor, an idea, which in turn influences the state of consciousness of the perceiving subject. This state of consciousness influences the concept and appearance (name-and-form) of the object perceived. The predisposition entailed in the subjective "concept and appearance" of the phenomenon in question conditions the nature of sensual information transmitted, and so on until the decay and demise of that particular, impermanent phenomenon occurs. Similarly, the perceiving subject is constantly modified by the nature of the objects perceived and is also discontinuous and impermanent. Consciousness, like the phenomena to which it responds, arises and passes away repeatedly.

The implication of the foregoing is that according to early Buddhist thought one never experiences "external" objects as such. One only experiences *apparent* objects with an admixture of subjective bias. On the other hand, one's subjective consciousness is influenced by the objects with which it comes in contact. In other words, consciousness and the objects of consciousness are interdependent and mutually determinative. As the *Mahāpadāna Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* states:

> When there is consciousness, there is name-and-form. Consciousness is the condition of name-and-form. When there is name-and-form, there is consciousness. Name-and-form is the condition of consciousness.[75]

Though a full analysis is beyond the scope of the present introduction, it is obvious that such psychological theories provide a convincing prototype for both the Mādhyamika dialectic and Vijñānavāda metaphysics. The implication of the Pali *sūtras* as a whole, and arguably that of the formula of dependent origination, is that the mutual interdependence of consciousness and its objects precludes valid knowledge of any independent reality, whether objective or subjective. Similarly, in terms of the Mādhyamika dialectic, there

can be no self-existent knower, no self-existent thing known, and no self-existent act of knowing.[76] In terms of Vijñānavāda metaphysics as classically formulated by Dharmakīrti, though there may well be objectively existing external objects, it is impossible to establish their existence, and it is possible to proceed with rigorous, formal logic without reference to any objectively existing reality. In highlighting the necessary subjective component in any experience of an object, the Pali *sūtras* pave the way for discarding the objective referent of consciousness altogether in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy.

Moral Doctrines

The foregoing analytical philosophy and psychology, in addition to countering *ignorance* of the true nature of reality, is intended to counter *desire* as well. By virtue of its position as the second Noble Truth, the cause of all human suffering, desire may appear to be regarded in early Buddhism as a graver fault than ignorance. In fact, ignorance is regarded as the obverse of desire. The two are inseparable. According to early Buddhist doctrine, and much of later Buddhist doctrine as well, if one were truly to comprehend the impermanence of all phenomena, including oneself, one's desire would automatically cease. Conversely, in the absence of desire that things be other than what they are, ignorance of how things actually are would automatically fade.

In particular, mistaken belief in an abiding self or soul, and all of the desires that such belief spawns, are held to be responsible for all moral evil.

> I do not see any way, monks, to embrace belief in the soul so that grief, anguish, suffering, despair and lamentation would not arise.[77]

The analytical content of the Buddha's teaching is not, therefore, an end in itself. It is instead quite explicitly a means to the end of overcoming desire, and thereby bringing about an end to suffering. Analytical doctrine is not, however, a self-sufficient means to this end. Desire must be attacked not only at its source—ignorance of the first Noble Truth and all that it entails—but must also be attacked in its results, immoral behavior.

In addition to ignorance and desire, the third grave fault, according to the Pali *sūtras*, is hatred. Desire, hatred and ignorance when considered together are usually referred to in the Pali *sūtras* as *lobha*, *dosa* and *moha*, or in Sanskrit as *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha*, a triad which

occurs in the *Śālistamba Sūtra,*[78] and is well attested throughout Buddhism. These three are termed in Pali the "roots of unwholesomeness" (*akusalamūla*). Their opposites are the roots of wholesomeness (*kusalamūla*). Buddhist morality in general, whether early or late, is based upon a distinction between the wholesome and the unwholesome rather than between good and evil. This terminology is important because Buddhism posits no God who might decree what is good and what is evil. Instead, within the realm of karma and rebirth, thoughts and actions truly conducive to the immediate as well as the ultimate relief of suffering, both one's own and that of others, are wholesome. Their opposites, of course, are unwholesome. Buddhist morality is thus founded upon compassion towards one's fellow beings rather than obedience to divine decree. The *Sutta Nipāta*, a very ancient Buddhist text, summarizes admirably the essence of Buddhist morality:

> As I am, so are they. As they are, so am I. Comparing others with oneself, one should not harm or cause harm.[79]

The compassionate attitude enjoined by Buddhist morality is held to be practically validated by the mechanism of karma and rebirth. The term "karma", whether in the Buddhist context or in other Eastern contexts, is often misunderstood in the West and therefore requires brief elucidation as the term occurs in Sanskṛit. Literally, "*karman*" means "action". In most Indian contexts, and particularly in the Buddhist context, karma implies "volitional action or thought". Emphatically, karma is not like some sort of blessing or curse hovering around one. One does not *have* good or bad karma, one *performs* good or bad karma. The *result* of a volitional action or thought is *karmavipāka* or *karmaphala*, "the maturing or fruit of karma". If one stubs one's toe, that is not bad karma, it is the *result* of bad karma. Karma is volitional action or thought itself, nothing more. Volition, moreover, is the essence of karma.[80] Unintentional actions are not regarded as morally operative, even though they may cause great benefit or harm. Negligence, of course, *is* regarded as volitional, so that for example a drunk driver is karmically liable for negligence whether or not an accident results.

With these fundamental concepts in mind, it becomes clear that the noble eightfold path, the fourth Noble Truth, deals primarily with Buddhist morality. There is little contention among Buddhists or scholars of Buddhism concerning the basic moral teachings of the historical Buddha. The eightfold path, moreover, is recognized as a teaching of the historical Buddha in virtually all schools of Buddhism, thus meeting the historical criterion of consensus. It

therefore serves admirably in the present context as a framework within which to exhibit the Buddha's moral teachings. The eightfold path is traditionally divided into three categories known as "pillars" (*skandha*, Pali *khanda*): wisdom (*prajñā*, Pali *paññā)*, ethics (*śīla*) and meditation (*samādhi*). The Buddha himself, however, is not recorded in the *Dīgha* or *Majjhima Nikāyas* as dividing the path in this way. In the *Majjhima Nikāya* this threefold division of the path is attributed to the nun Dhammadinnā,[81] and in the *Dīgha Nikāya* Ānanda is recorded as dividing a variant list of stages of spiritual progress in this way.[82] In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, in the section on threes, the Buddha is recorded as referring to *prajñā*, *śīla* and *samādhi* as a triad, but not specifically in relation to the eightfold path.[83]

This situation emphasizes the fact that there is a considerable degree of arbitrariness in the traditional threefold categorization of the eight "limbs" of the path. For example, according to the traditional order of enumeration of the limbs of the path, the twofold wisdom pillar comes first, its components being (1) right view and (2) right thought. Right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*) is consistently equated in the Pali *sūtras* with acceptance of the four Noble Truths, and thus may be regarded as entailing understanding of and agreement with the analytical, doctrinal material considered in the previous section of this introduction. The second limb of the path, however, *samyaksaṃkalpa*, "right thought" or "right intention", relates more to morality than to analytical philosophy. *Samyaksaṃkalpa* is consistently said in the Pali *sūtras* to involve three things, thoughts or intentions of renunciation, benevolence and nonviolence (*niṣkāma*, *avyāpāda*, and *avihiṃsā*).[84] These three "right thoughts" constitute the volitional underpinnings of Buddhist morality rather than a philosophical position, as might be suggested by their inclusion in the "pillars" of wisdom. This point is fundamental to a sympathetic understanding of early Buddhist morality, which otherwise may appear to be merely a set of rules designed to insure one's karmic welfare in this and future lives.

If ethics as a code of behavior is to be distinguished from morality as the quality of the intentions behind one's behavior, the second pillar of the eightfold path delineates Buddhist ethics. These three limbs of the path: (3) right speech, (4) right action and (5) right livelihood correspond roughly to the "five precepts" (*pañcaśīla* traditionally enjoined upon the Theravāda Buddhist layperson. Again, however, the traditional Theravāda doctrine is not strictly borne out in the early texts, for only four of the traditional "five precepts" are included in *sūtra* treatments of the eightfold path. Though it is clear that the Buddha did not approve of alcohol and drugs,[85] abstinence from intoxicants is not included in elucidations

of right action in the Pali *sūtras*, and is thereby not nearly as prominent and ethical issue as it came to be in later Buddhism. The *sūtras*[86] normally mention only abstinence from (1) violence toward living creatures (*pāṇātipāta*), (2) taking what is not given (*adinnādāna*), and (3) sexual misconduct (*kāmesu micchācāra*), as constituting "right action." When this list is expanded upon[87] abstinence from intoxicants still finds no place, but rather abstinence from harming plants, exploiting animals, attending shows, using adornments and ostentatious seats and beds.

With regard to "sexual misconduct," as the term *kāmesu micchācāra* is usually understood, it should be noted that the term actually implies immoderate behavior motivated by sensual desire of any kind, e.g. desire for comfort or possessions.[88] This is an important consideration given that desire for sensual gratification is one of the three types of desire which constitute the second Noble Truth, desire as the cause of suffering. The threefold categorization of desire typical of the Pali *sūtras* is: (1) desire for sensual gratification (*kāmatṛṣṇā*), (2) desire for existence (*bhavatṛṣṇā*) and (3) desire for nonexistence (*vibhavatṛṣṇā*). This is to say that in addition to sensual gratification, one also desires that those things and beings one loves, usually including oneself, will continue to exist, and one desires that those things and beings which one despises, sometimes including oneself, will cease to exist. It should be noted, however, that the *Śālistamba Sūtra* does not mention this threefold categorization of desire, even though there is ample occasion to do so.

With regard to sexual misconduct as such, monks and nuns are forbidden any sort of sexual contact. On the other hand, the specific sexual prohibition for laypeople is remarkably liberal, though cast in terms which give women little explicit guidance. Men are consistently enjoined to refrain from having sex with women who are "under the protection of" (*rakṣita*), i.e. supported by, parents, relatives or a husband.[89] Presumably, women too should have sexual dealings only with men who support themselves, assuming in either case, of course, that no violence or dishonesty is involved.

Right speech is consistently defined as abstaining from falsehood, slander, verbal abuse and idle chatter.[90] At this point, the question arises as to why right speech is given such prominence in the eightfold path rather than being considered as a subdivision of right action. The answer to this question probably lies in the pan-Indian notion that karma—volitional, morally effective actions—can be performed through mind, speech or body. The eightfold path reflects this notion in limbs (2) right thought, (3) right speech, and (4) right action. The fifth limb of the path, right livelihood, is elucidated with various lists of professions which would entail wrong thought, speech or action,

or would encourage them in others.[91]

With the sixth limb of the Path, "right effort" (*samyagvyāyāma*), begins the section or "pillar" of the path normally regarded as pertaining to meditation. The standard definition of right effort, however, also pertains critically to morality as cultivation of the good (*kuśala*) and rejection of the bad (*akuśala*). Exerting right effort, one is enjoined to (1) expunge existing unwholesome states of mind, (2) insure that other unwholesome states of mind do not arise, (3) cultivate existing wholesome states of mind, and (4) encourage the arising of other wholesome states of mind.[92] A discourse in the *Majjhima Nikāya* entitled "The Forms of Thought"[93] makes it clear on the one hand that this "right effort" is in part a contemplative exercise, but at the same time specifically enumerates the moral "roots of wholesomeness and unwholesomeness" (greed, hatred, delusion and their opposites) as the objects of the exercise. Thus five limbs of the eightfold path, representing wisdom, ethical behavior and meditation, all bear directly upon Buddhist morality. The natural confluence of Buddhist morality and meditation is nowhere better illustrated than in the well known verse 183 of the *Dhammapada*,[94] said to encapsulate the essence of the Buddha's teaching:

> Avoidance of all evil (*pāpa*),
> Cultivation of the wholesome (*kuśala*),
> Purification of one's mind:
> This is the teaching of the Buddhas.

This natural overlapping of morality and meditation within the eightfold path lends additional credence to the *brahmavihāra* meditations as an original part of Buddhism. According to this contemplative practice, one is to cultivate and extend to all beings a mental attitude of benevolence (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*) and equanimity (*upekṣā*).[95] In the same vein, the extremely popular Theravādin *Metta Sutta* and the *Sutta Nipāta* (verse 148) enjoin:

> Just as a mother would protect her only child at the risk of her own life, even so one should cultivate a boundless heart toward all beings.

This prominent attitude of compassion and benevolence in the Pali *sūtras* is extended rather than altered by the *bodhisattva* ideal of Mahāyāna Buddhism, whereby all of one's actions are to be motivated by a sincere desire to relieve all sentient beings of their sufferings.

In concluding this section on the moral teachings of the historical

Buddha, it is perhaps revealing to note that the *Dīgha Nikāya* contains in the *Mahāpadāna Sutta* a lengthy discourse attributed to the Buddha himself recounting the altruistic deeds of the former Buddha Vipassi.[96] The story told resembles the career of the historical Buddha as recounted in the Pali *sūtras*, and may have been derived therefrom. On the other hand, purported incidents in the historical Buddha's life may equally well have been derived from this legend. At any rate, there is no real reason to doubt that the historical Buddha occasionally told such stories, and every reason again to respect the compilers of the Pali *sūtras* for not editing out material comforting to their rivals the Mahāyāna. It is easy to see that such mythological material, in conjunction with the altruistic moral teachings of the Pali *sūtras*, serves as a sufficient basis for the development of the *bodhisattva* ideal in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Meditative Teachings

It is with regard to meditative teachings that the greatest doubt regarding the teachings of the historical Buddha exists. In the first place, given the prominence of meditative practice in the early Buddhist spiritual path, remarkably little space in the *Sutta Piṭaka* is dedicated to elaboration upon these practices. Such elaboration as exists is normally formulaic and sweeping in scope, treating the stages of a lifetime's meditative practice in a paragraph or so. On the other hand, the Pali *sūtras* are far more informative regarding the actual practice of meditation than other contemporary texts, most notably the Upaniṣads. The general scarcity of precise information on meditative practices no doubt reflects the fact that the details of meditative practice are an individual affair to be worked out between teacher and pupil.

The eightfold path, in addition to "right effort", contains two further items which relate specifically to meditation. These are right mindfulness and right concentration. Two *sūtras*—the *Satipaṭṭhāna* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* and the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*—deal specifically with mindfulness and define it precisely as continuous and systematic attention to the body, feelings, the mind, and certain points of doctrine (*dharma*). The two *sūtras* which concentrate upon mindfulness indicate clearly that like "right effort", mindfulness is to be observed at all times, not only during formal meditative practice. What is required of the practitioner, moreover, is objective observation—not evaluation or conscious modification—of (1) the composition, postures and activities of the body, (2) the pleasant, unpleasant or neutral nature of the feelings, and (3) the emotional and moral quality of the mind. Even with regard to (4)

aspects of doctrine, the meditator is enjoined merely to note the presence or absence of the five hindrances (*pañca nīvaraṇa*)[97] and the seven limbs of enlightenment (*satta bojjhaṅga*),[98] and to analyze experience with reference to the five aggregates, the six senses (including mind) and their corresponding objects, and according to the four Noble Truths.

Right concentration, which as the term implies involves the ability to attain "mental one-pointedness" is consistently defined as cultivation of the first four meditative states.[99] Four higher states, the "formless" (*arūpa*) meditations are consistently enumerated as (1) the sphere of infinite space, (2) the sphere of infinite consciousness, (3) the sphere of nothingness, and (4) the sphere of neither-identification-nor-nonidentification. These are often appended to the first four states, apparently as desirable but optional meditative accomplishments beyond what is regarded as minimally necessary for the realization of liberation. It will be remembered that the Buddha is said to have learned the last two meditative states from his two teachers Āḷāra Kalāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, and to have rejected their attainment as being less than final enlightenment and release.[100] A ninth state, however, the "cessation of perception and feeling" (*saññavedayitanirodha*), also known as "the attainment of cessation" (*nirodhasamāpatti*), appears to be regarded as an integral part of the realization of liberation.[101] The following characterization of this meditational state indicates that it involves suspension of all mental activity.

> The monk who has attained *saññavedayitanirodha*, his bodily activities, verbal activities and mental activities have been stopped, have subsided, but his vitality is not destroyed, his (body) heat is not allayed, and his senses are purified. This, sir, is the difference between a dead thing, passed away, and that monk.[102]

This poses a problem with regard to the concept of *nirvāṇa* in the Pali *sūtras*.[103] On the one hand spiritual release appears to be regarded as the result of intellectual comprehension of the true nature of reality and a consequent intuitive penetration of the reality of things as they are (*yathābhūta*). On the other hand, the actual realization of *nirvāṇa* appears to be regarded as involving simultaneously a meditative attainment entailing the cessation of even the most rudimentary mental activity. Part of this apparent confusion may be due to an attempt to reconcile a conflict in early Buddhist practice by integrating two apparently distinct meditative endeavors: on the one hand the cultivation of concentration and tranquility, and on the other

hand the cultivation of intuitive wisdom (*vipaśyanā, jñāna* or *prajñā*).

The traditional Theravāda division of Buddhist practice into *śamatha* (tranquility) and *vipaśyanā* (insight) is foreshadowed, if not specifically spelled out, in the Pali *sūtras*.[104] It is also fairly clear that the *sūtras*, like the Theravāda tradition, regard *śamatha*, a general term for tranquility, as roughly equivalent to *samādhi* in the specific sense of cultivation of the meditative states. The *sūtras* also equate *vipaśyanā* and *prajñā*, particularly in the Pali phrase *adhipaññadhammavipassanā*, "supreme-wisdom-truth-insight."[105] Even more common in the *sūtras* than division of meditative practice into *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* is the related distinction between "mind-liberation" (*ceto-vimutti*) and "wisdom liberation" (*paññāvimutti*).[106] In most cases, the development of tranquility and insight, and the resulting mind-liberation and wisdom-liberation appear to be regarded as mutually supportive and equally essential.

There are, however, some notable instances in which these two aspects of meditative practice are explicitly contrasted with one another. Most notably, one passage[107] records traces of an outright and acrimonious dispute between two factions of monks: the *jhāyins*, who cultivated meditation, and the *dhammayogabhikkhus*, who appear to have concentrated upon development of analytical insight. The passage in question attempts to quell this dispute without deciding in favor of either side, but given the existence of such a dispute, several passages in the Pali *sūtras* appear to weigh in on one side or the other.

The *Dīgha Nikāya* asserts that even before the Buddha there were two types of recluse, the meditators and an inferior group incapable of the rigors of the meditative regimen.[108] In a notable passage[109] two monks are questioned with regard to their non-speculative, direct insight into the arising and cessation of frustration according to the formula of dependent origination. Both give the same positive answers to each question, but when asked if they are *arahatss*, one remains silent, implying the affirmative, while the other answers

> I have seen directly (*yathābhūta*) through right wisdom (*sammāpañña*) that *nirvāṇa* is the cessation of existence, but I am not an *arahat*, not one whose defilements (*āsava*) are destroyed.

This passage, regardless of the actual intent of the first monk's silence, indicates that even highly developed intuitive wisdom is not alone sufficient for release. At least one important passage in the *Dīgha Nikāya* suggests that development of the ninth meditational state may have been regarded in some circles as being itself tantamount to the realization of *nirvāṇa*.

> To one standing at the summit of consciousness (after realization of the eight *jhānas*) it may occur: 'To think at all is inferior. It would be better not to think...' So he stops thinking or willing, and perception ceases... He touches cessation (*nirodhaṃ phussati*). Thus, Poṭṭhapāda, does the gradual and deliberate attainment (*samāpatti*) of cessation (*nirodha*) occur.[110]

Yet another passage does not mention specifically the ninth meditation, *nirodhasamāpatti*, but implies that destruction of the intoxicants (*āsava*) and consequently *nirvāṇa* are to be attained primarily through cultivation of *śamatha* or tranquility meditation and development of the meditative states.[111]

On the other hand, the general tenor of the Pali *sūtras* is that if anything insight is more essential than tranquility. The *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, the *sūtras* most explicitly dedicated to elucidating meditational practice, both suggest that enlightenment and release are possible without cultivation of the meditative states at all. In addition, it must be remembered that the Buddha is supposed to have rejected the cultivation of meditative states, which he practiced under his two teachers, as not leading to final release from suffering. To a considerable degree, this rejection is the basis of the difference between Buddhism and other contemporary spiritual paths.

Also weighing in on the side of insight as opposed to tranquility meditation is a frequently enumerated "tenfold path". This enumeration, which occurs over sixty times in the first four *nikāyas* of the *Sutta Piṭaka*, mostly in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, adds to the standard eightfold path (9) "right insight" (*samyag jñāna*) and (10) right release (*samyag vimukti*). The eightfold path concludes with "right concentration," i.e. cultivation of the meditative states *via* tranquility, whereas this tenfold listing seems to suggest that insight is the ultimate spiritual cultivation. One passage states specifically that this tenfold path is the path of the *arahat* and is superior to the eightfold path, which is the path of the learner.[112] "Right insight" and the "three wisdoms" realized by the Buddha on the night of his enlightenment are both consistently listed in the Pali *sūtras* immediately after the attainment of the four meditative states. "Right insight" thus appears to be associated with (1) remembrance of one's own past lives, (2) ability to discern the past and future lives of others, and (3) realization of the destruction of all intoxicants.[113] In general, it is destruction of the intoxicants of sensual desire, existence and ignorance which the *sūtras* regard as the essential factor in the realization of liberation.

In this tenfold listing, "right liberation" clearly indicates realization of *nirvāṇa*. The majority of relevant passages indicate that right liberation is held to involve both mind liberation and wisdom-liberation, and thus cultivation of both tranquility and insight.[114] This would seem to be a natural state of affairs, except that some passages specifically mention the ideal of "liberation in both ways" (Pali *ubhato-bhāga-vimutti*).[115] This rather artificial third category emphasizes rather than resolves the tension between the quietistic meditative practices and the intellectual content of the Buddhist path to enlightenment as depicted in the Pali *sūtras*.

Overall, then, the Pali *sūtras* are ambivalent with regard to the relative importance of the meditative practices of tranquility and insight. By contrast, the Theravāda commentarial tradition is decisive in its emphasis upon insight. Again, the fact that the Pali *sūtras* record ambivalence where orthodox Theravāda doctrine is unequivocal indicates that these *sūtras* themselves did not suffer excessive sectarian revision at the hands of their preservers and compilers. If they had been subject to biased revision, a few words omitted here and a few added there would have expunged all traces of conflict among the meditative practitioners of early Buddhism.

As it is, we may note that whereas the Theravāda tradition emphasized insightful penetration of the analytical teachings of Buddhism as the paramount object of meditation, the early Mahāyāna tended to emphasize the nonconceptual, concentrative side of meditation. Starting with the *Prajñāparamitā* or "perfection of wisdom" literature, as systematized in the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna, Mahāyāna Buddhism exhibited a conspicuous mistrust of doctrine, and tended to regard enlightenment as a purely intuitive, nonconceptual, meditative attainment. The *jhāyins* or meditators of the Pali *sūtras* may be said to survive in the *dhyāna* school of Mahāyāna Buddhism transmitted to China as Ch'an by Bodhidharma, and thence to Japan as Zen. Even the more doctrine-oriented Vijñānavāda or "Consciousness School" of the Mahāyāna tended to emphasize the equivalent of the Pali *sūtras' ceto-vimutti* in their conceptualization of enlightenment as a quietistic state of *parinispannavijñāna* or "perfected consciousness."

By contrast; the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda traditions—as apparently most of the so-called Hīnayāna schools of Buddhism—tended to emphasize the analytical content of the historical Buddha's teachings in their meditational as well as their intellectual endeavors. As the following sections of this introduction indicate, the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda developed in their respective Abhidharmas a rigorously systematic guide to the practice of meditation. Such systematization did not, however, preclude the spontaneous and intuitive

element of Buddhism, as is amply demonstrated by the *Theragāthā* and *Therīgāthā*, the inspirational "Songs of the Monks and Nuns" enshrined in the Pali canon. On the other hand, though the Mahāyāna tended to emphasize the intuitive element of Buddhist meditation as portrayed in the Pali canon, none would suggest that Mahāyānists have lacked the proclivity or the talent for rigorous systematization.

The diversity of sincere and legitimate interpretations and developments which have arisen from the teachings of the historical Buddha are an abiding testimony to the genius of the founder of this great religion. All of the foregoing material regarding the historical Buddha, the affairs of his Saṅgha, and the probable nature of his original teachings, supports the conclusion that Buddhism began and remains a spiritual path in which the analytical intellect, morality and meditation play mutually supportive roles, and in which each is necessary and none alone sufficient for enlightenment and release from the suffering of the realm of karma and rebirth. The vast diversity of Buddhism appears to have resulted primarily from emphasis upon one or another of these mutually supportive aspects of the original teaching of the historical Buddha.

2

THE BUDDHIST WAY TO LIBERATION

Karl H. Potter

A standard list of moral practices is the "five precepts" (*pañcaśīla*) involving abstinence from killing, from stealing, from sexual misconduct, from lying and from intoxicating drugs or drinks. These can be practiced by the Buddhist layperson during the ordinary time of life. Beyond this Buddhist ethics generally applies to the Buddhist monk, who has left his family and home and become a member of the order (*saṅgha*), a monk (*bhikṣu*, P. *bhikkhu*). Although those who do not choose or cannot follow the monastic precepts are allowed the ability to proceed far along the path, their ability to do so is severely limited; the requirements of everyday life regularly interfere with the meditation, the peaceful contemplation which is central to the path to liberation. Thus moral philosophy in Buddhism tends to be addressed to one who is either a monk or one ready to become one.

Having made the decision to become an adept or monk, one's moral training becomes more intense. He should follow the precepts for monks set forth in the *prātimokṣa*, a code of conduct and training which constitutes the heart of the Buddha's advice to those preparing for liberation. Secondly, he should begin to practice control of his sense-faculties, trying to become less sensitive to the attractions of "signs" (*nimitta*). The term "sign" as used here cuts a wide swath: it has many meanings[1] ranging from deliberately intended meanings of words to delicate hints and suggestions—the general meaning incorporates any indication of something else. One at this introductory stage tries, through practicing "mindfulness" (*smṛti*), to "ward off the spontaneous impulses to cling to the pleasant and reject the unpleasant."[2] Thirdly, the monk should plan his vocation carefully, making sure it is consistent with the principles of his monastic life. He should not take up work which involves lying, scheming, concupiscence and other undesirable attitudes. And finally, he should take a correct attitude toward the few things he has kept—his robe, dish,

body, abode; he should be aware that they are not possessions but merely means to an end. These four purifications (*catuḥpariśuddhi*) were taught at the outset by the Buddha.

Another decision characteristically made at this stage is to choose a mentor, a "good friend" (*kalyāṇamitra*) who can help indicate the path. The Buddha himself, as reported in the Pali canon, spoke often of the benefits of having such a good friend who can indicate to the adept appropriate objects on which to meditate, and who is available for consultation and advice when needed.

The fledgling monk also needs to choose a suitable place to live, one where he can practice meditation without distraction. The Buddha mentioned some features of appropriate dwelling places: not too far from or near to a village, quiet, protected from the weather, a place where the four purifications can be practiced and appropriate teachers are available. He even recommends types of such places: in a forest, on a mountain, in a cemetery, etc.

It is at this point that the texts speak of commencing "meditation" (*dhyāna*, P. *jhāna*). There are in Buddhism said to be four (though sometimes eight or nine) meditative states and each of them can be identified in two ways: in terms of what needs to be done to shed the relevant bonds that bind the aspirant at this point, and in terms of what needs to be done to attain what is required for entrance into the next meditation. The path of meditation begins here, with the shedding of the five "hindrances" (*nīvaraṇa*), the attitudes and thoughts which distract one from meditative application.

The abandoning of these five hindrances and the consequent attainment of the reverse qualities is critical. These are the things, and the only things according to the texts, that preclude entrance onto the meditative path. Thus to get rid of them is requisite for any practice designed to lead toward ultimate liberation. The terminology for this list is, as is regularly the case, open to alternatives: we offer here some frequently used terms for the five hindrances.

First of the five is said to be sensual desire, desire for the objects of the senses and the consequent finding of such objects to be attractive and stimulating. Such attachment breeds greed and desire, which are the root causes of frustration. Second in the list is the opposite of desire, that is, aversion, the feeling of dislike and hatred toward disagreeable things. Third in the list is sloth and torpor, the opposite of the requisite mindfulness or alertness with which the aspirant protects his virtuous approaches to things. The fourth hindrance is said to be restlessness and worry, distracting responses to situations which preclude or severely limit one's capacity to meditate. Finally, fifth, there is doubt, insufficient resolve or conviction concerning the basic beliefs of Buddhism such as concern

for the Buddha, the *dharma*, the order and the whole procedure of training, doubts which breed skepticism and undermine resolve.

These five hindrances, then, are the first problem for the aspirant. The method for controlling and eventually eliminating them characterizes the first meditative stage, understanding of which requires first that one is clear as to what causes these hindrances to occur and perpetuate themselves. The Buddha at one point traces the source of the hindrances through "three types of misconduct (bodily, verbal and mental)..., non-restraint of the sense faculties... lack of mindfulness and discernment... unwise consideration... lack of faith... not listening to the true *dharma*... not associating with superior men."[3] Critical here is "unwise consideration" (*ayoniso manasikāra*), wrong thinking about things, which in another passage[4] the Buddha associates specifically with each of the five hindrances, identifying in each case the "nutriments" of those hindrances. It is these mistaken ideas and the attitudes and practices they germinate which have to be addressed.

At this point we come to a parting of the ways between the path of insight and the path of meditation.

> Two different approaches are offered because of the differing mental dispositions of disciples. Disciples of a contemplative bent generally incline to first attain concentration by suppressing the hindrances through *jhāna* and then move on the development of insight. These are called practitioners of the vehicle of serenity (*samathayānika*) who develop 'insight preceded by serenity'. Other disciples, of an intellectual bent, are generally disposed to strive immediately for insight, leaving until later the task of deepening concentration. These are called practitioners of the vehicle of insight (*vipassanāyānika*) who develop 'serenity preceded by insight'. Both types must eventually cultivate insight by practising the foundations of mindfulness, since insight-wisdom is needed to reach the supramundane path. They differ, not with respect to the inclusion of insight, but in the sequence they follow to develop it. The practitioner of serenity attains *jhāna*, then cultivates insight, and finally reaches the path. The practitioner of insight reaches the path directly by cultivating insight, without relying on a foundation of *jhāna*.[5]

The foundations of mindfulness referred to here are the four central types of things for ordinary awareness: the body, feelings, states of awareness and the contents of the awarenesses, viewed as usual in this connection as factors. The seeker of insight reflects that all these, initially especially the contents of awareness, are shot through with

the five hindrances. Contemplating each content and the hindrances that accompany them one learns the nature of each thing, realizes its momentariness, unsatisfactoriness and lack of substantiality. He does not seek the kind of concentration that the follower of meditation does, but because of the fixity of his mind he may attain a kind of momentary concentration, and the series of such concentration replaces the kinds of experiences that involved the hindrances. The hindrances are thus suppressed by habit, and the practitioner is ready to become a "stream-enterer". What does he do then? He takes up the meditative methods which his counterpart who has already adopted the path of meditation has achieved. Thus the two ways—of insight and meditation—end up at the same point, as was said, differing only in the order in which the two vehicles are taken up.

What, then, is the method followed by the seeker who follows the path of meditation? He takes up the first meditative stage, but instead of concentrating on the characteristics of objects, he practices the first of a series of meditations on material form. By meditating on certain things he empties his mind of certain kinds of factors which are part of the causal nexus leading to bondage to ordinary existence. Specifically, in the first meditative stage five crucial factors are mentioned: initial thought (*vitarka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), joy (*prīti*), satisfaction (*sukha*) and one-pointedness (*ekāgratā*).

The first factor, initial thought, appears to mean what we would call "attending to" an object. It is the most basic aspect of thinking or awareness of objects. In itself initial thought is neither good nor bad; it is what it is accompanied by that makes the difference. Thoughts are bad when they are tainted by greed, hatred and delusion, good when they are associated with the opposites of those three basic "roots". The texts spell out what sorts of ideas constitute examples of each of these sets of three. Generally, bad thoughts are those which are aimed at gaining pleasures of the senses, at doing mischief or harming others, but there are many varieties of bad thoughts. Perhaps the best way to think of these bad thoughts here is to consider them as those thoughts that are associated with five hindrances.

All bad thoughts cease by the time one masters the first meditative state. All thoughts after that accomplishment are good or, eventually, neither good nor bad. Meditation comes in as a way of practicing limiting one's thoughts to good ones. One practices this by selecting something (called in Pali a *kasiṇa*) to concentrate on. One selects something visible—a color or a colored thing, for example, or other ordinary objects with which we are all acquainted.

> He takes a preliminary object such as a colored or elemental *kasiṇa* and concentrates on it until he is able to visualize it with

> his eyes closed as clearly as when he looks at it with his eyes open... When the object comes into focus when he attends to it with eyes shut as clearly as it does when he looks at it with open eyes the learning sign (*ugrahanimitta*) is said to have arisen. At this point the *yogin* should leave off the physical object and focus solely on the learning sign, developing it by striking at it over and over with applied thought and sustained thought.
>
> As he practices thus the *jhāna* factors grow in strength, each suppressing its respective hindrance.[6]

Initial thought counters the hindrance of sloth and torpor; the practitioner needs constant alertness to maintain his concentration.

Thus we reach the second factor, sustained thought. The mind must not only be fixed mentally in the way just described; that concentration needs to be maintained, not to be distracted by other thoughts or emotions, etc. So the first two factors operate together to bring about mental concentration.

Distraction is not only caused by the objective features of disparate objects. It is also caused by our emotional responses to objects. Just as the first two factors train our *intellectual* efforts on good features of things, so the second two factors of joy and satisfaction train our *emotional* attitudes toward things. And just as initial thought leads directly to sustained thought, so joy leads directly to satisfaction. Various grades of joy are distinguished in our text, ranging from initial pleasurable feeling to "pervading rapture", implying that just as one seeks to extend initial to sustained thought, one seeks to extend passing pleasure to sustained bliss. And these states are in turn accompanied by a subsiding of attempts to resist, question and otherwise leave the meditational state. As these subside one experiences a greater and greater satisfaction or tranquility. This in turn eases the difficulties of concentration.

The fifth factor, one–pointed concentration, arises naturally when the distractions born of thoughts and emotions dwindle. In its minimal form it is present in any awareness and feeling, but like the two preceding pairs of factors it is capable of more intensification, until at its most advanced form it consists in the concentration from which one need not retreat. This condition comes at a point beyond this first meditative state, however.

So far the adept has learned how to meditate for periods of time during which he can concentrate attentively on an object in a nondistracted pleasurable state. He can do this for a period of time, but in due course his attention is lost and he finds himself once again subject to desires, dislikes and the other unwanted attitudes of mind. Thus he finds his mastery so far insufficient, and discovers upon

consideration that not only is his meditative state not stable, it also deals with insufficiently satisfying objects. That is the problem—there are too many objects, too much objectivity; these things that come to him without his asking for them threaten him by occasioning the types of emotional responses he is trying to avoid. He seeks for an even purer meditative state, and so sets out toward the second meditative stage.

Initial and sustained thoughts are necessary conditions for language. One thing that advancement to the second stage implies is the abandonment of language, as well as of linguistic conceptualization and classification of factors in our environment. This presents an obvious problem for continued description of further progress, and the reader should be aware (and beware) of the problems that situation poses. The adept becomes silent. No longer distracted by objects or by the challenges of thinking or speaking about them, he can experience even more developed stages of the other three factors—joy, satisfaction and one-pointedness. We are told that the feeling with which these higher states come to him is tranquility.[7] In the previous, first meditative state one was not fully confident, since he was aware, even when meditating, that his meditation was trained on a something of a this-rather-than-that kind which he associated with other things and which in any case he could lose if he stopped thinking of it and thought of something else. There the concentration was imperfect since subject to these changes. Without conceptual ties to ideas of objects, that concentration becomes more confident, less subject to disturbance by causes out of one's control. A comparably greater degree of concentration is achieved, greater in length, purity, satisfaction and bliss.

Having achieved the second stage and meditated for ever longer periods, one still finds oneself issuing from it from time to time and reflecting on why one does so. The fact that one is still inclined to indulge in thoughts couched in language bothers him—though supposedly he has abandoned thought he still finds himself thinking when not in the meditative situation. He also realizes that his situation is unsatisfactory for what is perhaps a different reason—he is *enjoying* the extended happiness he experiences during his meditations, and this contrasts noticeably with his experiences while he is out of the trance state. He realizes that joy is an excessive state, too attractive to be sustained without being bound to it in a way which carries with it disappointment when it leaves him. The problem is not that the experience of joy is unwanted, but that it is precisely its attractiveness which implies its impermanence. So, he embarks toward a third meditative state, in which he will not be subject to these subtle forms of frustration.

Instead of joy what he now seeks is equanimity. Instead of being pleased by X in a way one is not pleased by Y, one cultivates a clear, fair, unimpassioned attitude toward everything. One remains neutral toward all that his meditative attention—and his attention while out of the meditative state—ranges over. This equanimity is not to be confused with a kind of disinterested feeling, for disinterested feeling is a kind of feeling, and what our seeker is striving here to achieve is a state free from feeling. The equanimity he seeks is complete neutrality.

Being without feelings does not, however, imply unawareness. Quite the reverse. The aspirant for the third state is not seeking nonawareness—he is not suicidal, at least in the ordinary way, for he is endeavoring to achieve more and more extended experiences of satisfying meditative contemplation, an extended steady state of awareness. Two Sanskrit terms used to characterize the kind of cognitive state one aspires for at this stage of meditation are *smṛti* and *samprajñā*. *Smṛti* is usually translated as "memory", and that is suggestive, though we normally mean by "memory" a type of awareness of objects, and we know that the third-stage meditator is no longer aware of objects in his trances. Better, then, to find a different expression for *smṛti* here. It is usually rendered "mindfulness", and constitutes the attentiveness to his meditation which, without being bound either by objects or passions, brings it about that the mind "does not wander away" (*avilāpana*). *Samprajñā* or discernment is the same thing as wisdom (*prajñā*); the wise, discerning person inspects the world—whatever world is given him to inspect—in a nonfalsifying way, not misled by it, seeing it as it is.

The one who achieves the third state of meditation, then, is one who examines his meditative object in a way which does not distort it, and continues to do so in a manner which is detached but by no means cool, for this comprehension carries for him great satisfaction. He now has, by comparison with his past states, superior ability to concentrate meditatively on an object.

Thinking about his mastery of contemplation, however, during those periods when he is not in meditation, he finds himself still dissatisfied. Though he has turned his back on joy in favor of equanimity during his meditative practices, he finds that when out of the trance joy is still attractive; further, this very satisfactoriness which he experiences during his trances breeds suspicion—for isn't it subject to disorder, to being lost or jarred by the trials of life? And won't he feel utterly lost and unhappy that it is? He sees the fallaciousness of satisfaction itself, or more properly, he abandons feelings of both satisfaction and frustration, of both joy and grief,

and cultivates an approach to things which is constituted of mindfulness, which is completely neutral, neither satisfying nor frustrating, happy or sad. His meditations are lengthened to this end. His mindfulness is clarified by equanimity alone.

Having emptied his mind of thoughts and feelings while in meditation, the seeker has mastered the path of meditation, has achieved serenity. Of course, he is able to do this by meditating on an object, a material object. He may find the very materiality of this object limiting. Despite the fact that the object of his meditation in the fourth state above is said to have become "subtle" rather than gross, he is dissatisfied because he is still bound to material form. If he feels this way he may choose to meditate further on a series of immaterial objects, thus developing even more subtle and peaceful types of comprehension.

It is to be emphasized that he need not do this. These advanced states of meditation are optional, not required. What is strictly required by one seeking liberation who has reached the fourth meditative state is to combine his achievement of meditation with a parallel achievement of wisdom. However, if the meditator still feels limited by the materiality of the objects he uses as crutch for his meditation, he can further rarify the things on which he meditates. Instead of meditating on *kasiṇas* such as material things, colors and the like, he may direct his meditation to less limited things in order to free his meditations from the limits inherent in those things.

What he does, if he is so inclined, is to begin by meditating, not on the *kasiṇa* itself, but rather on the space it appears in. In this way he removes the *kasiṇa* from his attention and gains a meditative state which is "boundless" as space itself is. Remember that his approach to this boundless space is still through a combination of equanimity and emotional neutrality. It does not, therefore, involve any advancement in the kind of meditation practiced, only in the object of that meditation.

Still, as before, the meditator may eventually find himself dissatisfied with this first "immaterial" (*arūpya*) meditation, since despite the impartite quality of unbounded space it still comes to the meditator as an object, a content *of* consciousness, thus implying a dualism of subject against object. He thus seeks out another object to meditate on which is subjective rather than objective, namely consciousness itself, referred to as "boundless" or "unending" (*ananta*) consciousness. He meditates, that is, on his awareness of boundless space.

But again this is unsatisfactory, since this awareness of awareness is still being viewed as a thing contrasting, however abstractly, with other possible things. Thus the meditator is led to a third immaterial

meditation on nothingness (*akiñcana*), conceived as the absence or emptiness (*śūnyatā*) of anything. He meditates on this by repeating "*neti neti*" ("not this, not that" or "void, void") (*śūnya, śūnya*), and gradually becomes absorbed in a consciousness with no object at all.

Finally, however, even the contemplation of nothingness is unsatisfactory, since it is definitively apophatic just as the preceding states had been definitively kataphatic. In fact, neither negative nor positive awareness of things fully satisfies, since they each suggest too strongly their opposites, by involving the conception of those opposites. So one meditates on something that is neither-identification-nor-nonidentification, thinking of the aggregates of feeling, identification, conditioning factors and consciousness merely as peaceful but neither existent nor nonexistent. So doing he arrives at the fourth immaterial meditative state, which is the most serene state of concentration envisaged in Abhidharma Buddhism.

As we pointed out, these four immaterial meditations are not required of the seeker, and one can appreciate why. They do not advance the aspirant any nearer to his ultimate goal of enlightenment and *nirvāṇa*. Though he has achieved the pinnacle of serene concentration he has not eliminated all his hindrances. What has he attained, then? The texts tell us that he has attained one or another of innumerable planes of existence, where he will be reborn until the merit earned by his attainments is exhausted. But eventually he will return and be faced with the same problem, the ultimate one of overcoming rebirth altogether.

After practicing, if he wishes, the immaterial meditations, the aspirant who has mastered the fourth meditative state may develop certain further sorts of "higher faculties" (*abhijñā*). These are variously identified in the texts surveyed in the present study, sometimes numbering three, sometimes five, six or more. The lists sometimes include one item which seems not to fit with the others, namely, knowledge of the destruction of one's intoxicants. Of course one can only know that destruction if it has actually occurred, so this higher faculty is in fact only available for the *arhat*, the perfected being who has in fact eliminated all his hindrances. Sometimes this higher faculty is distinguished from the other as "supramundane". We shall omit it from consideration at this juncture, to return to it at its appropriate place below.

The other higher faculties represent what are actually supernormal types of knowledge held to be attainable by special efforts beyond those needed to gain the eight meditative states so far described. These efforts involve a heightened practice of the meditative states, applying them to all *kasiṇas* one by one and in different orders. These

special efforts bring one special kinds of knowledge, according to Buddhism, of the following sorts:

1. Special powers (*ṛddhi*)—such as the ability to appear in many forms in many places and at many times; to make oneself appear or disappear; to pass through walls, mountains, etc.; to make the earth become water and vice versa; to walk on water; to fly; to touch the sun and moon; to travel to the world of Brahmā;

2. The divine ear (*divyaśrotra*)—the ability to hear far-off sounds or those extremely close inside one;

3. Awareness of others' minds (*paracittavijñāna*)—knowing the thoughts of other people;

4. Remembrance of previous lives (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛti*); and

5. The divine eye (*divyacakṣus*)—the ability to see beyond ordinary visual limits, particularly to see the future and to know what karmic outcomes will transpire. Some texts mention still different kinds of special knowledge, but for the most part they seem to be versions of the above five.

Up to this point all the stages of meditation we have discussed have been available to ordinary people—the term used in the texts is "worldly" (*lokiya*), mundane. By practicing meditation one can purify one's awareness and achieve serenity, whether before or after the development of insight. But while these activities are indispensable preparations they do not themselves eliminate all the hindrances. They decrease the number and force of these intoxicants, but they are still with the aspirant if only in latent form. The final part of the path to liberation in Abhidharma Buddhism, then, teaches how to get rid of all hindrances without exception.

In the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* we are taught that there are seven purifications. These are (1) purification of morality (*śīla*), practised at the outset; (2) purification of awareness (*citta*), that is, practice of the several meditative states, thereby suppressing the five hindrances; (3) purification of view (*dṛṣṭi*), meaning the elimination of the view of self; (4) purification by overcoming doubt (*kāṅkṣāvitaraṇa*), consisting of the understanding of the dependent origination of mental as well as material things and the resultant conviction of the basic truths of Buddhism; (5) purification by knowledge and vision of the right and wrong paths (*mārgāmārgajñānadarśana*), which involves classification of all *dharmas* as impermanent, frustrating and not self; (6) purification by knowledge and vision of the way (*pratipadājñānadarśana*), carried forward by attainment of a series of insights into the destructibility of all things; and (7) purification by knowledge and vision (*jñānadarśana*), beginning with what is technically called "change of lineage knowledge" (*gotrabhūjñāna*)

and continuing on through several intermediate states to that of perfected being (*arhat*). The first six of these stages collectively summarize the various steps of the two paths of insight and meditation.

Change of lineage knowledge represents entry into the supramundane or higher-worldly path, and marks the beginning of awareness of liberation. One who has this knowledge is said to enter the stream, and is thus known as a "stream-enterer". What is different about the aspirant now is that from here forward his knowledge and practice function to cut off the remaining intoxicants. Since he is now committed to understanding the four noble truths he is also termed a "noble one" (*ārya*) who has entered the noble eightfold path.

The stream-enterer's efforts are directed specifically toward eliminating certain hindrances arising from the three bad roots. Some of these are among the five hindrances which were the concern of the meditations of his preparatory states. However, *those* meditations, while enabling the meditator to avoid those states of mind in which the hindrances figure, did not actually eliminate the source of those states of mind but merely suppressed them during the periods of meditation. Whereas the suppression of hindrances in meditation is temporary, it is the complete eradication of them that is now aimed at. They are to be "cut off at the root" by the successive stages of higher-worldly meditative practice.

There are in all ten hindrances which have to be eliminated before one is termed a perfected being, destined to be liberated at the end of one's lifetime. These ten are (1) wrong view about existence (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), (2) doubt (*vicikitsā*), (3) clinging to rites and rituals (*śīlavrataparāmarśa*), (4) sensual desire (*kāmacchanda*), (5) ill will (*vyāpāda*), (6) desire for material existence (*rūparāga*), (7) desire for immaterial existence (*arūparāga*), (8) conceit (*māna*), (9) restlessness (*auddhatya*), and (10) ignorance (*avidyā*). The first five tie us to the round of ordinary existence, the last five pertain to the higher realms of meditation. They are all to be eliminated through meditation of a supramundane sort.

The stream-enterer's meditation on liberation is designed to destroy the first three hindrances in the above list. Although these have been better understood during previous meditations and insights, they were not permanently eliminated thereby. The stream-enterer's meditation not only cuts off these three hindrances but also eliminates greed for sense pleasures as well as hatred toward unpleasant things. Since it is standardly held to be these desires and aversions which dictate the most unfortunate kinds of rebirth one is subject to, and since the stream-enterer has eliminated them, it follows that

he cannot be reborn in such a lower state—e.g., as an animal or insect.

One who successfully follows the stream-enterer's path achieves the result or "fruit" or stream-entry, and enjoys more extended moments of blissfulness and peace. More importantly, he reflects on a new understanding of things called in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* the faculty which realizes that "I shall know the unknown" (*anājñāta ājñāsyāmīti*). He also (again following the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*) acquires certain states called "factors of the path" (*mārgāṅga*) and "factors of enlightenment" (*bodhyaṅga*). The former comprises those states which belong in the noble eightfold path. The latter are the seven states of mindfulness, inquisitiveness, energy, rapture, tranquility, concentration and equanimity. It should be appreciated that we have now arrived at a stage where both the paths of wisdom and insight have come together. The stream-enterer is also described as being destined to no more than seven more births as human or deity.

One who has successfully accomplished the results of stream-entry may proceed to a second higher-worldly meditation, and become a "once-returner" (*sakṛdāgāmin*). This meditation weakens the fourth and fifth items of the ten hindrances, viz., sensual desire and ill will, although it does not completely destroy them.

The destruction of hindrances four and five comes at the next stage, of "nonreturner" (*anāgāmin*). Again one enjoys the fruits of his attainment, reflects, and meditates further. He is now called a "nonreturner" since even if he goes no further in *this* life he will achieve perfection in the next one. He also begins to master what the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* calls "the factor of final knowledge" (*ājñīndriya*), a mastery which increases as he progresses through the next stage and culminates in the realization in one's state of perfection that one now knows completely.

The final stage of meditation is that of perfected being. This is attained by meditating as before. Now, however, with the worldly hindrances destroyed, the meditator is ready to lose the final set of hindrances, the last five in the list given above. And when these are destroyed none are left, and the adept becomes a perfected being. He arrives at the faculty of the completion of knowledge (*ājñātāvīndriya*).

George Bond argues that

> the *arahant* concept seems to have developed from an ideal readily attainable in this life... into an ideal considered remote and impossible to achieve in one or even many lifetimes.[8]

In some of the Pali canonical texts, he reminds us, we hear of various

people attaining liberation and getting rid of their hindrances. The description we have rehearsed in the preceding pages suggests, however, a longer and more difficult path which needs several lifetimes to perfect, besides facing severe difficulties in just getting on the path. Bond associates this with what he calls a "second phase" in the development of the *arhat* notion, and goes on to discuss a third phase, beyond the scope of the period covered in the present volume, in which the path came to be viewed as tremendously difficult to complete and *arhat* ship "a remote but controlling ideal".[9] Bond argues in the article quoted against I.B. Horner's interpretation,[10] which has the development run the opposite way, from greatly difficult toward easier attainment of *nirvāṇa*. If he is right, the increase in difficulty of attaining *arhat*ship is a reflection of the greater control of the monastic community over the business of Buddhism, with an increasing emphasis on the message to ordinary Buddhists concerning everyday life.

In any case, whether quickly or more slowly, the perfected being is one whose existence will come to an end, a flame blown out, when the present lifetime reaches its natural termination. During the remaining period of the *arhat*'s existence he is able to enter into protracted meditative periods during which he experiences only the pure bliss of consciousness, ending when the *arhat* wills it to by prior determination before entering a trance.

The perfected being, as was implied before, also attains the sixth higher faculty, knowledge of the destruction of one's own hindrances.

Besides these there is a third attainment termed *nirodhasamāpatti*, the attainment of cessation. This is the most advanced supernormal state, attainable only by nonreturners and perfected beings.

> To attain cessation requires full possession of the two powers of serenity and insight... It cannot be reached in the immaterial realms since it must be preceded by the four immaterial *jhānas*, which are lacking in those realms.[11]

It involves a fifth higher faculty, beyond the other four, termed "the attainment of the cessation of identification and feeling" (*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*). It appears to be a state devoid of bodily, mental or verbal functions. The texts say that only two things remain in one who has entered this trance state: vitality and heat.

> ... The closest analogy in Western psychological parlance to this condition would be some kind of profound cataleptic trance... even more radical... than are the dominant Western models for the understanding of catalepsy... not only... (is)

> there no reaction to stimuli and no initiation of action, but also... no internal mental life of any kind. It is, in brief, a condition in which no mental events of any kind occur, a condition distinguishable from death only by a certain residual warmth and vitality in the unconscious practitioner's body.[12]

In the end, however, there seems still to be difference between those perfected beings who are "liberated by wisdom" (*prajñāvimukta*) and those who are "liberated both ways" (*ubhatobhāgavimukta*), that is, liberated by both wisdom and meditation. The difference is by no means a later one only; one finds these terms used in the *nikāyas* over and over. The one who is liberated by wisdom alone, the "pure insight practitioner" (*śuddhavipaśyanāyānika*), does not practice the various sorts of meditations we have been describing, although he must have attained right concentration, one of the eight path factors required for liberation. Although being liberated "both ways" may be viewed as admirable it is not normally suggested that being liberated that way is any more of a liberation than that of one liberated "by wisdom".[13]

The perfected being, then, is liberated; he has attained *nirvāṇa*, and when he dies he will have attained *parinirvāṇa*.

3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ABHIDHARMA PHILOSOPHY

Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and *Padmanabh S. Jaini*

I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN *SŪTRA* AND ABHIDHARMA

> This *dharma*, won to by me, is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, intelligible to the learned.[1]

The Buddhist religion is founded upon the complete and perfect enlightenment achieved by the Buddha through his awakening. As the *Mahāvagga* relates, after his moment of final realization the Buddha spent several more weeks in contemplation, experiencing the bliss of liberation. Following the final seven-day period, the Lord finally reflected on the profundity of the *dharma* he had experienced with the words cited above. Brahmā Sahampati ultimately was able to prevail on the Lord to teach the *dharma* for the welfare and weal of the world, an endeavor in which he continued until his death some forty years later. Those teachings formed the core of what was eventually to become several distinct doctrinal systems within the Buddhist religion. Despite the differences that characterized these various scholastic schools, however, all were devoted to one goal: the ascertainment of the definitive meaning of that *dharma* realized by the Lord through his enlightenment.

The discourses delivered by the Buddha during his teaching career were collected by his followers as *sūtras*, a term used by the tradition to refer to both the unique teachings of the Buddha on such matters as dependent origination or the four noble truths, as well as the collected preachings of the Buddha. The *sūtras* are accounts of particular teachings made by the Buddha, to unique audiences, and in specific circumstances. As such, the teachings given by the Buddha were adapted to the precise needs of the audience, and were

presented in such a way that they would be readily accessible to their unique spiritual propensities. It is this tendency toward adaptation that makes the content of the *sūtras* intentional (*ābhiprāyika*) or conventional (*aupacārika*), i.e. their meaning had to be drawn out in order to be understood correctly. Hence, different *sūtras* could give divergent explanations on a variety of doctrinal questions. Because of the inherent circumscription of their scope and application, the *sūtras* were not an ideal vehicle for constructing an indefeasible system of philosophy, such as would be required if Buddhism were to compete in the crowded sectarian scene that characterized Indian religious life. It was to construct such a definitive system that Abhidharma was born.

Abhidharma is defined in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* xi.3 as "that by which the meaning of the *sūtra* is best understood" (*abhigamyate sūtrārtha etenety abhidharmaḥ*). As the Pali *Aṭṭhasālinī* also remarks,[2] the Abhidharma surpasses the *dharma* presented in the *sūtras*, because the various classifications of the elements of existence are listed haphazardly in the *sūtras*, while the Abhidharma gives them in their definitive catechetic forms. Thus, the *sūtras* are preached from the standpoint of conventional truth according to specific worldly circumstances, but the Abhidharma deals with absolute truth, and is concerned with the analysis of mind and matter (*nāmarūpaparicchedа*).[3]

This same sense of "*abhidharma*" is also alluded to by Vasubandhu, who in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (I.2ab) notes that Abhidharma means that unsullied wisdom (*prajñā' malā*) which analyzes factors (*dharmapravicaya*).[4] Hence, while the *sūtras* might use terms in their conventional meanings, the Abhidharma would always use them only in their definitive sense.[5] For example, the term "*atīta*" might be used to refer to the past in general (*adhvā*), to a particular continuum (*santati*), to a general time-frame (*samaya*), or to a discrete moment (*kṣaṇa*). Of these four meanings, the first three are correct only in a figurative sense, as might be found in the *sūtras*; only the last, however, would be used in Abhidharma, as it is the only one that is valid from an ultimate standpoint and qualifies as a non-figurative, literally definitive statement.[6]

This notion of literalness suggests that the early Buddhists did accept that there were specific laws (*dharmatā*) by which the factors of existence (*dharma*) were considered to function. These laws were invariably correct as a fact of nature, and did not need to be revealed by the Buddha: "Whether or not the Tathāgatas arise (in the world), this law of the elements of existence remains fixed."[7] Certain presuppositions are found in all *sūtras*, whether addressed to monks or laypeople, which are not necessarily spelled out. Indeed, all Indian

philosophical schools have similar presuppositions upon which their doctrinal edifices are constructed. The Jains, for example, take the multiplicity of aspects as the hallmark of their doctrine, and consider that all one-sided views were of merely relative validity. Similarly, in many doctrines originating in the Upaniṣads, the notions of the eternal, unchanging nature of universal Brahman or the individual self were ultimate teachings, and any contrary ideas were nondefinitive. For Buddhists, the laws consisted principally of the cardinal doctrines of impermanence, frustration, and lack of an eternal self. These were supplemented by such pan-Indian ideas as the continuity of moral action and result, as well as by such uniquely Buddhist concepts as dependent origination. The varied nature of the specific teachings found in the *sūtras* compelled the Buddhists to look for general standards by which those teachings could be evaluated. The most important of these standards was the four references to authority,[8] which were used to verify claims that a specific teaching was authentic: i.e. that it was learned from (1) the Buddha himself; (2) a *saṅgha* of elders; (3) groups of monks who were specialists in the *sūtras*, the discipline, or the doctrinal lists of matrices (*mātṛkā*); (4) individual monks who were such experts. The manner in which such claims were approved itself involves three separate criteria. The Sanskrit versions, for example, state that a doctrine that claimed to have been learned from the Buddha himself should not be praised or disparaged, but, having heard and understood its words and syllables, one should see if it comes down in the *sūtras* and compare it with the *Vinaya*. If it passes these tests and does not contradict the law, then let this be said: "Truly, Noble one, these *dharmas* have been spoken by the Lord. Noble One, these *dharmas* have been well understood by you. Put against the *sūtra* and compared with the *Vinaya*, these *dharmas* come down in the *sūtra* and are reflected in the *Vinaya* and do not contradict the law."[9] The third of these three criteria is not found in the recensions of this exchange found in either the *Dīgha* or *Aṅguttara Nikāyas*,[10] but does appear in the later *Nettippakaraṇa*, an extracanonical Pali work ascribed by tradition to Mahākaccāna, one of the Buddha's immediate disciples. There, the author clarifies the Theravāda interpretation of the meaning of these three criteria: those words and syllables should be put beside the *sūtras*, compared with the *Vinaya*, and tested against the law. Which *sūtras* are they to be put beside? The four noble truths. With which *Vinaya* are they to be compared? With the pacification of passion, ill will, and infatuation. With which law are they to be tested? With the doctrine of dependent origination.[11] Because of the varied nature of the teachings found in the *sūtras*, the incipient Abhidharma schools sought to delineate these general

rules of interpretation, so as to outline a coherent, systematic approach to Buddhist doctrine. Hence, Abhidharma claimed to supersede the *sūtras* by deriving its authority from its own adherence to the overriding standard of the law, thereby establishing itself as superior to the *sūtras*. In its attempts to establish definitive general rules, Abhidharma ultimately became both an explanation of the *sūtra* teachings as well as a distinct body of exegetical material in its own right.

Such unanimity of opinion concerning the law was of considerable importance if the Buddhists were to avoid nascent disputes about the nature of *nirvāṇa* or the path, which could have had disastrous consequences for the successful dissemination of the religion. The Buddha himself had warned in the *Sāmagāmasutta* of the dangers that would result if controversies about the fundamental principles of the teachings were to develop: "Of little concern, Ānanda, are quarrels respecting the rigors of regimen or the code of discipline. It is possible quarrels in the Order about the Path or the course of training that really matter."[12] Such controversies did eventually result, due to the differences in the *sūtra*-collections of the developing early schools and their varied exegeses of their own distinctive laws. Indeed, such disputes were noted later by such Mahāyāna polemicists as Haribhadra, who says in his *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka*: "There is no concordance between different versions of the *Sūtra* and *Vinaya Piṭakas*. The *dharmatā* established in one school is not identical with that of the other schools. With eighteen different schools each having its own separate version of *Tripiṭaka*, it is improper to hold up the *mahāpadeśas* as a standard for judging the authenticity of the words of the Buddha."[13]

We find in Haribhadra's passage a reference to the split of the early church into eighteen contending schools, which is considered to have taken place by the time of Aśoka (ca. third century B.C.). We may now examine the process by which the different sectarian schools of Abhidharma are traditionally said to have developed. Considerable scholarly controversy has raged concerning the histori city of the various synods that are said to have been convened to deal with disputes within the order.[14] Our concern here will not be with the adjudication of the respective merits of the scholarly opinions concerning these councils. Instead, our focus will be on outlining the traditional accounts of both the derivation of the principal Abhidharma schools and the methods that they adopted to legitimize their treatises. These accounts will reveal the major issues that seem to have led to the development of distinct Abhidharma traditions within Buddhism.

As the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* relates, soon after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* (ca. 486 B.C.), controversies began to develop over points of discipline and doctrine, as is found in the comments of the elderly Subhadda, who after the Buddha's death rejoiced: "Enough, sirs! Weep not, neither lament! We are well rid of the great Samaṇa. We used to be annoyed by being told 'This beseems you, this beseems you not.' But now we shall be able to do whatever we like; and what we do not like, that we shall not have to do!"[15] This attempt to guard against dissension in the order by establishing a definitive collection of the discourses of the Buddha was the motivation behind the convocation of the first council, which took place in Rājagṛha in the Rainy Season following the Buddha's death.[16] Mahākāśyapa, the Buddha's senior disciple, convened the council, and Ānanda and Upāli recited the *sūtra* and *vinaya* texts, respectively. The historicity of this council has been challenged by virtually all modern scholars. Bareau has even suggested that the account of this first council was directly inspired by the history of the second, in order to justify the authenticity of the canon that was compiled at that latter convocation.[17] According to the tradition, even after this synod, however, there was at least one renowned elder, Puṇṇa by name, who refused to be bound by the reading of the discourses and the rules of discipline agreed upon at the Council, preferring to remember the Buddha's words as he himself had heard them.[18] Such differences in the renditions of specific *sūtras* would eventually lead to varying recensions of the scriptures, and ultimately to distinct canonical collections.

Two discrepant accounts of the second council are preserved in Buddhist literature. According to the narrative included in the *Vinayas* of various schools, the second council was held at Vaiśālī, some one hundred years after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*. It was prompted by ten lax practices of the Vajjiputtaka (Vṛjiputraka) monks of Vaiśālī, such as storing salt in a horn, accepting gold and silver, etc.[19] Seven hundred elders convened to decide on the propriety of these practices, with Revata as president, and finally rejected them. Some scholars have concluded that the refusal of the Vaiśālī monks to accept this judgement led to the first schism in the order, between the Sthaviras (the "Elders"), who are alleged to have relied upon the stricter original *Vinaya* in rejecting these new practices, and the schismatic majority group, who labelled themselves the Mahāsāṃghikas (the "Great Assembly"), who were more flexible in their interpretation of *Vinaya*.[20] This theory was, however, debunked first by M. Hofinger, who concluded that the Council dispersed in concord.[21] Following non-*Vinaya* sources, such as the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* by the Sarvāstivādin exegete Vasumitra, André

Bareau proposed a second theory concerning this second council: there was instead a separate synod held at Pāṭaliputra in 349 B.C. (137 years after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*), which resulted in the first major schism. This council was said to have been convened because of five points of dissension raised by Mahādeva, which challenged the very foundations of Buddhism by calling into question the utility of the systematic path of practice outlined by the Buddha, and the ultimacy of the enlightenment attained by perfected beings through following that path. According to Mahādeva, the perfected beings even after their enlightenment (1) remain subject to temptation, (2) may have residual ignorance, (3) may continue to entertain doubts, (4) gain knowledge through others' help, and (5) the path may be attained by an exclamation such as "Aho!"[22] Bareau further proposes that after an unsuccessful attempt on the part of King Mahāpadma to mediate the crisis, the Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas split into separate *saṅghas*, and eventually compiled their own distinct canons. Both these theories have been challenged by Nattier and Prebish. They have marshalled considerable evidence that seems to contravene any conclusion that the schism between the Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas was caused by either the disciplinary excesses of the Vajjiputtaka monks or the five propositions of Mahādeva. In their hypothesis, "the sole cause of the initial schism in Buddhist history pertained to matters of Vinaya, but rather than representing a reaction of orthodox Buddhists to Mahāsāṃghika laxity, as maintained by both Bareau and Demiéville, it represents a reaction on the part of the future Mahāsāṃghikas to unwarranted expansion of the root Vinaya text on the part of the future Sthaviras."[23]

Pali sources alone mention a putative third council, which is alleged to have taken place also at Pāṭaliputra in 247 B.C. during the reign of King Aśoka. This council was presided over by the Elder Tissa-Moggaliputta, who is said to have compiled the *Kathāvatthu* in order to present the definitive Sthaviravāda conclusions concerning the doctrinal debates that took place during the convocation.[24] Two schools were the primary targets of the Sthaviravādins in the *Kathāvatthu*. First was the Sammitīyas who, along with the Vajjiputtakas, were said to have advocated a view that was anathema to all other Buddhists: that there was persisting personal entity (*pudgala*, Pali *puggala*). No writings that can be definitively attributed to this sect are extant, and what little we know about them comes from the admittedly biased accounts of their Buddhist rivals.[25] The second group, which was the major challenger to the Sthaviravādins, was the Sabbatthivādins (Skt. Sarvāstivādins), who were named for their unique doctrine that *dharmas* existed throughout the past, present, and future. From the *Kathāvatthu* debates, which we will examine

later, it would appear that the Sthaviravādins and Sarvāstivādins shared a similar set of scriptures, but differed in their interpretation of those texts—i.e. their laws were distinct. Their differing interpretative positions eventually led to the bifurcation of the Abhidharma tradition into these two great schools. Bareau has concluded that it was at the time of this council that the final division of the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins took place.[26] A complete *Tripiṭaka* of the Sthaviravādins was apparently compiled during this council and missionaries were sent out under Aśoka's direction to all parts of the known world.[27] It was at that time that Buddhism eventually made its way to Sri Lanka,[28] which, after the demise of the Sthaviravādins on the mainland, eventually became the center of the school (where it was known as Theravāda). It was principally the Sarvāstivādins among the early Buddhist schools that survived on the sub-continent and continued to exert predominant influence over the subsequent development of Buddhist and Indian philosophy.

Before the third century B.C., the term *sarvāstivāda* is not attested in the literature, and the canon of that school certainly postdates Aśoka. The prominent place of that school in the *Kathāvatthu*, however, suggests that its influence was equal, if not superior, to that wielded at that time by the Sthaviravādins. Similar to the way in which the Theravādins in the *Mahāvaṃsa* have claimed for themselves the patronage of Aśoka,[29] several *avadānas* dealing with Emperor Aśoka and his successors found in the Mūla-Sarvāstivāda collection, *Divyāvadāna*, claim that Aśoka instead favored their school.[30] Indeed the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins both claim that their most eminent representatives (Tissa-Moggalliputta and Upagupta, respectively) served as Aśoka's personal teacher.[31] But first the Brahmanical advisors to Aśoka (who allegedly imprisoned the emperor for his profligacy in donating the wealth of the kingdom to Buddhist religious groups), and followed later by the Śuṅgas, who overthrew the Mauryan empire, worked to establish Brahmanical hegemony in Pāṭaliputra, which had been the stronghold of the Sarvāstivādins. This apparently prompted a mass migration of followers of that school first to Mathurā in north-central India, and later to northwest India, from whence the school eventually spread throughout central and east Asia. It was in Kashmir, under the sponsorship of the Kuśāna (Scythian) king Kaniṣka, that a separate third council, that of the Sarvāstivādins, was said to have been held, allegedly during the first century A.D. It was during this council that the Sarvāstivādin canon was codified, and their massive exegesis of Abhidharma, the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, written.[32]

We may now turn to a consideration of the ways in which the two major schools of Abhidharma, the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda,

attempted to prove that their treatises were the authentic words of the Buddha. The Abhidharma books were the first major extension of the scope of Buddhist literature to take place in India, and the approach to legitimation taken by the Ābhidharmikas adumbrates that adopted later by the Mahāyāna school. Three major concerns were apparent in their attempts to establish the authenticity of their new books: first, to prove that the Buddha himself had personally taught the Abhidharma; second, that it had been formally transmitted to eminent disciples of the Buddha, by whom it was then collected; and third, that the Abhidharma works had in fact been recited and codified at the time of the putative first council. In this wise, the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins attempted to justify the inclusion of their *Abhidharmas* as part of the canon.

According to the Theravāda account in the *Aṭṭhasālinī*,[33] the Abhidharma was preached by Buddha first to his mother, Mahāmāyā, during a three-month sojourn in the Tāvatiṃsa heaven. As the *Divyāvadāna* also relates,[34] the Buddha's mother had died soon after giving birth to the Bodhisattva and had never received the benefit of his teaching. This filial legend was therefore a convenient foil for the Theravādins to use in accounting for the time and provenance of the preaching of their Abhidhamma. A novel explanation for the transmission of the Abhidhamma to the disciples is then given in the *Aṭṭhasālinī*. Leaving a phantom of himself (*nimittabuddha*) in heaven, the Buddha returned to Anotatta (Skt. Anavatapta) Lake, in the Himalayas near Kailāśa, where he taught the Abhidhamma to Sāriputta. Sāriputta then determined the textual order of the Abhidhamma books, decided upon the numerical series in the *Paṭṭhāna*, and finally transmitted the teachings to five hundred of his own disciples.[35] Despite this vital role played by Sāriputta in the compilation of the Abhidhamma, however, the Theravādins continued to claim that it was the Buddha himself who had actually first understood the Abhidhamma, at the time of his final enlightenment. Sāriputta's role was merely to have "laid down the numerical series in order to make it easy to learn, remember, study and teach the Law."[36] Finally, Ānanda rehearsed the Abhidhamma during the First Council, and the ancient Commentary (*Aṭṭhakathā*) thereon was recited by Mahākassapa, the head of the congregation.[37]

In spite of this attempt on the part of the commentators to make the Buddha the sole author of the *Abhidhammapiṭaka*, the commentators agree to a large extent that the individual Abhidhamma books were propounded by the Elders. The major challenge to this extension of the words of the Buddha to include the Abhidhamma focussed on the *Kathāvatthu*, which even the commentators admitted was compiled at the third council by Tissa-Moggaliputta, long after the

Buddha's passing. The authority of the matrices of the doctrine was central to justifying the inclusion of the Abhidhamma in the canon. As will be discussed in more detail below, the matrices constitute the superstructure around which the complete edifice of the Abhidhamma was constructed. The creation of these *dharma*-lists was considered to be the exclusive province of the Buddha himself, not of his disciples. Accordingly, although authorship of such Abhidhamma treatises as the *Kathāvatthu* might be attributed to disciples like Tissa-Moggaliputta, since these works were built upon matrices propounded by the Lord they could still be considered the word of the Buddha. The Theravādins were aware that several of the scriptures included in their *Suttapiṭaka* as the Buddha's words were actually preached by Ānanda, Moggallāna, Sāriputta, and Mahākaccāyana. For example, *Aṭṭhasālinī* cites the *Madhupiṇḍikasutta* in the *Majjhimanikāya* as an example of such a scripture: although the scripture was preached by Mahākaccāyana, it was spoken by him on the basis of a synopsis given first by the Buddha, and thus qualified as the Buddha's work.[38]

A somewhat similar approach is used by the Sarvāstivādins in attempting to establish the authenticity of their own seven Abhidharma books as a separate *piṭaka*. For the Sarvāstivādins, the Abhidharma consisted of a variety of teachings of the Buddha scattered throughout the canon, which were systematized by the elders to whom these treatises were attributed. As Yaśomitra tells us,

> The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that the *Abhidharmapiṭaka*, which deals with nature of the characteristics of elements and belongs to the Upadeśa class, was preached by the Buddha to his disciples, and remains scattered here and there. Just as Dharmatrāta compiled several *udānas* of the Master in the work *Udānavargīya*, similarly, the Elders Kātyāyanīputra and others collected the *Abhidharma* together in these *śāstras*.[39]

The fortuitous similarity between the name of Kātyāyanīputra—the Elder mentioned in Yaśomitra's quote who was considered to be the author of their central *Abhidharma* book, the *Jñānaprasthāna*—and that of the Buddha's disciple, Mahākātyāyana, who participated in the Council at Rājagṛha, allowed the Sarvāstivādins to claim further that the *Jñānaprasthāna*, compiled from various teachings of Buddha, was sanctioned as his own words by the Buddha himself during his own lifetime.[40] A similar approach was made to authenticating the six branch-treatises of the Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma*. Like

the Theravādins, the Sarvāstivādins also claimed finally that this *Abhidharmapiṭaka* was recited by Ānanda during the first council.[41]

The principal challenge to Sarvāstivāda attempts to claim that their *Abhidharmapiṭaka* was spoken by the Buddha came from the Sautrāntikas (lit. "those who follow the *sūtras*"). Both Pali and Sanskrit sources consider this school to be the last of the traditional eighteen *nikāyas*, branching off from the main body of the Sarvāstivāda school. One of the primary reasons that the Sautrāntikas split from the Sarvāstivādins was their rejection of the claim that the Abhidharma books were spoken by the Buddha himself. As the Sautrāntika advocate, Yaśomitra, says, this view that the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* was preached by the Buddha, "is a view of the Ābhidharmikas," not of the Sautrāntikas. Indeed, we are told that the *Abhidharmaśāstras* actually have individual authors.[42] The Sautrāntikas accepted the three-basket classification of canonical texts, but understood the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* to mean specific types of *sūtras* that were concerned with determining meanings and characteristics of *dharmas*; hence, the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* was a class of literature that was found scattered through the *Sūtrapiṭaka*, and not a separate collection, as the Sarvāstivādins and Theravādins had both Pali and Sanskrit sources in which the Abhidharma is grouped under a subsection of the *sūtras*, called variously *vyākaraṇa* or *upadeśa*. Various interpretations of the term "*abhidharma*" further emphasize the relation of the Abhidharma to the *sūtras*. For example, as was noted above, *abhidharma* was defined in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* as that by which the meanings of the *sūtras* are best understood. Hence, there is some precedent for the Sautrāntika's radical rejection of the classification of the Abhidharma as a separate section of the canon. Having mentioned this Sautrāntika caveat that Abhidharma should be looked for in the *sūtras*, we may now turn to a survey of the course by which the Abhidharma developed as a separate class of literature in the major schools.

II. THE LITERATURE OF THE VARIOUS ABHIDHARMA SCHOOLS

The Inception Of Abhidharma

The beginnings of Abhidharma are found in certain fundamental listings of *dharmas* made by the Buddha, which were considered to be definitive and indisputable. The most important of these early listings was that of the thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment (Pali *bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*). These the Buddha raised to a status superior to other teachings in such texts as the *Pāsādikasuttanta*, where he called them "the truths which when I had perceived, I made known to you, and which, when ye have come together and have associated

yourselves, ye are to rehearse, all of you, and not quarrel over, comparing meaning with meaning and phrase with phrase."[43] Here, it is not a particular *sūtra* that is said to be supreme; rather, it is the sum total of all the teachings, as systematized into such a classification as the seven limbs of enlightenment.[44] This list is the focus of a large number of *sūtras* in the *Dīgha* and *Majjhima Nikāyas*, and constitutes one of the final teachings given by the Buddha prior to his entrance into *parinirvāṇa*. Such tabulations of seven categories of factors as a definitive listing of the path-related factors acceptable to all Buddhists is common to many *sūtras* in all five *nikāyas*; it marks the first stage in the development of the Abhidharma. The next stage is found in a whole series of *sūtras* classified as "*vibhaṅga*",[45] a term meaning distribution, division, or expansion, which eventually came to be used to designate a commentary of exegesis. The second book of the Pali *Abhidhammapiṭaka*, for example, is called *Vibhaṅga*, and it serves as a virtual supplement to the listings of the elements of existence that appear in the preceding *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. These two functions of collection and expansion characterize the *vibhaṇga-sūtras*, which constitute the second stage in the development of the Abhidharma. Several other *sūtras* in the *nikāyas* exhibit a similar tendency toward collection and classification of *dharma* lists, at times even elaborating on the advanced teachings of the Buddha. A number of *sūtras* in the *Saṃyuttanikāya*, for example, give long discourses on the stereotyped formulae repeated *ad infinitum* throughout the *nikāyas*.[46] The numerical order of the *Aṅguttaranikāya* is itself quite similar to the sequential lists found in many Abhidharma texts. A number of these *sūtras* are not the direct words of the Buddha himself, but elaborations made by his main disciples, such as Sāriputta or Mahākaccāyana, to a bare outline of doctrine (*uddesa*) made by the Buddha.[47] The factors that are discussed in these various expositions can be classified under such ubiquitous technical terms as *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *indriya*, *satya*, *pratītyasamutpāda*, karma, *kleśa*, *mārga*, the four and five *dhyānas*, the six *abhijñās*, the eight *vimokṣas*, the thirty-seven *bodhipākṣikadharmas*, et al. The collective name for all these *dharmas* is "*abhidharma*", in that it "exceeds and is distinguished from the *Dhamma* (the *Suttas*)."[48] The contents of all the principal works on Abhidharma do not, in essence, stray from these major topics.

We may now turn to the *Saṅgīti* and *Dasuttara suttantas*, scriptures propounded by the Buddha's chief disciple, Sāriputta, which mark the start of Abhidharma literature proper. The *Saṅgītisuttanta* opens with a brief historical introduction outlining the reason for the recital of the Doctrine. Sāriputta notes that after the death of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, the leader of the Jaina community,[49] discord over the

true nature of his teachings divided his followers into several contending factions. In order to prevent such an occurrence after the passing of the Buddha, Sāriputta hastened to draw up a voluminous outline of the doctrine, covering 903 individual factors in 227 classes, presented sequentially as ones, dyads, triads, etc., up to decads. The *Dasuttarasutta* follows a similar pattern, also presenting groups of from one to ten factors. The format of these two scriptures can be readily compared to the matrices of the Abhidhamma, which we will discuss next. The Ābhidharmika character of these two *sūtras* was noted early on by T.W. Rhys Davids, "All that we know is that each of them forms a sort of thematic index to the doctrines scattered through the Four Nikāyas... In the two features they have in common, of catechism as a monologue by the catechuman, and of the absence of narrative, this further interest attaches to these last *suttantas*, that they become practically *Abhidhamma* rather than *Sutta Piṭaka*."[50] This observation is further confirmed by the fact that a *Saṅgītiparyāya* is included among the seven Abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivāda school. As Junjiro Takakusu first demonstrated, the Chinese recension of this text is attributed to Śāriputra, and contains the same historical introduction that opens the *Saṅgītisuttanta*.[51] Hence, it was such summaries of the doctrine that eventually came to be called "*abhidharma*".

THE MATRICES

This penchant of the Buddha's disciples to compile categorized lists of *dharmas* culminates in the tabulation of matrices which form the nucleus of the formal Abhidharma. Such listings were made (quite probably with the Buddha's approval) by such eminent elders as Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana, and Mahākātyāyana, who were all renowned for their skill in exposition, and seem to have been well known to the early Buddhists. For example, the *Gulissānisutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya* states that a monk living in the forest should apply himself to *abhidhamma* and *abhivinaya*.[52] These two terms are glossed as follows in the *Majjhimanikāya-Aṭṭhakathā*:

> He should apply himself to the study of the *Abhidhammapiṭaka* and the *Vinayapiṭaka*, together with the commentaries. As regards the *Abhidhamma*, he should at least know the *Duka-* and *Tika- Mātikas* together with the "*Dhammahadaya-vibhaṅga*" [the last chapter of the *Vibhaṅga*]. As regards the *Vinayapiṭaka*, he must at least learn the two *Pātimokkhas*.[53]

Although the correlation of Abhidhamma in this passage with the *Abhidhammapiṭaka* is certainly a later commentarial extrapolation, the emphasis on knowing the matrices suggests the significance of

these lists in the early church. Indeed, in early Pali canonical literature, the term "matrix" (*mātikā*) may be taken as a virtual synonym of *abhidhamma*, and experts in those lists were called *mātikādhara*, as was noted above in the discussion on the *mahāpadeśas*. The term *mātikādhara* always occurs in association with both *dhammadhara* (specialist in the *sūtras*) and *vinayadhara* (specialist in the *vinaya*)[54], suggesting the existence of matrices as a separate collection of the word of the Buddha. The term *mātikā* is also known to the Mūla–Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* and the *Divyāvadāna*, where it is also mentioned in tandem with *sūtra* and *vinaya dharmas*.[55]

The matrices form the exegetical framework of the first book of the Pali Abhidhamma, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. An elaborate list of twenty-two triads and one-hundred dyads appear at the beginning of the text, supplemented by an additional list of forty-two *suttanta* dyads.[56] The triad matrix begins with a triad of factors that are good, bad, and indeterminate. Their arrangement is made by grouping together factors in three mutually exclusive sets which, when combined, encompass all mental (*nāma*) factors in some cases and both mental and material (*nāmarūpa*) factors in others. Six of these triads (nos. 2, 7, 13, 16, 19, 21) cover only mental factors, while the remaining sixteen include both mental and material. These latter thus cover the entire range of phenomena as well as the unconditioned realm of liberation, called the *asaṃskṛta dhātu*, which is included among the *nāma* factors.[57] The dyad matrix consists of one-hundred dyads in thirteen groups. Ten of these groups are called "clusters" (*gocchaka*), and deal with the ten types of corruptions (*āsava*; *saṃyojana*, *kleśa*, etc.) and their related factors; these are found only in the Pali Abhidhamma. The remaining three groups, called *cūḷantaraduka* (shorter intermediate set of seven dyads), *mahantaraduka* (longer intermediate set of fourteen dyads), and *piṭṭhiduka* (supplementary set of eighteen dyads), treat various miscellaneous pairs of factors, such as *hetu*, *na-hetu*, etc. Many of the dyads in the *mahantaraduka* deal with the mutual relation of awareness and mental states. These three groups seem to be older and, as will be seen below, contain several items common to the matrices of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. Finally, the *suttanta* matrix contains forty–two dyads of miscellaneous factors. Rather than dealing with *nāma* and *rūpa*, as the *Abhidhamma* matrices do, the *suttantika* matrices are more soteriological in import and are principally concerned with factors related to moral precepts, concentration, and views. Thirty-two of its forty–two pairs are identical to the pairs of factors appearing in the *Saṅgītisuttanta* of the *Dīghanikāya*,[58] probably accounting for the designation of this listing as the *suttantika* matrices.

None of the formal matrices of the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra schools are now extant, but such tabulations can be reconstructed on the basis of the items dealt with in their Abhidharma works. Both schools have lists of dyads and triads that are nearly identical to those found in the mature Theravāda Abhidhamma. In the first and third chapters of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* the factors are listed as follows:[59]

Factors			Corresponding Item in Pali
1.	(a) impure (*sāsrava*)	(b) pure (*anāsrava*)	37
2.	(a) conditioned (*saṃskṛta*)	(b) unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*)	30
3.	(a) visible (*sanidarśana*)	(b) invisible (*anidarśana*)	31
4.	(a) resisting (*sapratigha*)	(b) unresisting (*apratigha*)	32
5.	(a) good (*kuśala*) (c) neutral (*avyākṛta*)	(b) bad (*akuśala*)	
6.	(a) *re* sexual passion (*kāmadhātupratisaṃyukta*) (c) *re* the immaterial (*ārūpyapratisaṃyukta*)	(b) *re* matter (*rūpapratisaṃyukta*)	115-7
7.	(a) initial thought (*savitarkavicāra*) (c) noninitial thought (*avitarkavicāra*)	(b) sustained thought (*vicāramātra*)	6
8.	(a) with supporting object (*sālambana*)	(b) without supporting object (*anālambana*)	77
9.	(a) appropriated (*upātta*)	(b) unappropriated (*anupātta*)	
10.	(a) primary (*bhūta*) (c) mediate (*nobhaya*)	(b) derived (*bhautika*)	
11.	(a) accumulated (*saṃcita*)	(b) unaccumulated (*asaṃcita*)	
12.	(a) "cooked" (*vipākaja*)	(b) grown (*aupacayika*)	
13.	(a) internal (*adhyātman*)	(b) external (*bāhya*)	88
14.	(a) homogeneous (*sabhāga*)	(b) heterogeneous (*tatsabhāga*)	
15.	(a) destroyed by vision (*darśanaheya*) (c) not destroyed (*aheya*)	(b) destroyed by practice (*bhāvanāheya*)	8
16.	(a) views (*dṛṣṭi*)	(b) without views (*na dṛṣṭi*)	
17.	(a) burning (*dāhaka*)	(b) burned (*dāhya*)	
18.	(a) weight (*tulya*)	(b) weigher (*tolayitṛ*)	
19.	(a) impure (*sāsrava*) (c) both (*ubhaya*)	(b) pure (*anāsrava*)	37
20.	(a) "cooking" (*vipāka*)	(b) not "cooking" (*na-vipāka*)	
21.	(a) with "cooking" (*savipāka*)	(b) without "cooking" (*avipāka*)	

Thus, of the six triads and fifteen dyads found in the *Abhidharmakośa*, four triads and eight dyads have their parallels in the Pali matrices.

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* of Asaṅga gives the Yogācāra matrix in its opening chapter, *Tridharmapariccheda*.[60] It opens with a list of sixteen dyads:

Factors				*Pali No.*
1. (a)	actual (*dravyamat*)	(b)	nominal (*prajñaptimat*)	
2. (a)	conventional (*saṃvṛtisat*)	(b)	real (*paramārthasat*)	
3. (a)	cognized (*jñeya*)	(b)	known (*vijñeya*)	
4. (a)	material (*rūpin*)	(b)	immaterial (*arūpin*)	33
5. (a)	visible (*sanidarśana*)	(b)	invisible (*anidarśana*)	31
6. (a)	resisting (*sapratigha*)	(b)	unresisting (*apratigha*)	32
7. (a)	impure (*sāsrava*)	(b)	pure (*anāsrava*)	37
8. (a)	conflicting (*saraṇa*)	(b)	not conflicting (*araṇa*)	122
9. (a)	fleshly (*sāmiṣa*)	(b)	not fleshly (*nirāmiṣa*)	
10.(a)	based on grasping (*gṛdhāśrita*)	(b)	based on renunciation (*naiṣkramyāśrita*)	
11.(a)	conditioned (*saṃskṛta*)	(b)	unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*)	30
12.(a)	worldly (*laukika*)	(b)	higher-worldly (*lokottara*)	34
13.(a)	arisen (*utpanna*)	(b)	not arisen (*anutpanna*)	17
14.(a)	grasper (*grāhaka*)	(b)	grasped (*grāhya*)	77
15.(a)	external (*bahirmukha*)	(b)	internal (*antarmukha*)	
16.(a)	defiled (*kliṣṭa*)	(b)	undefiled (*akliṣṭa*)	99.

Five triads follow:

17.(a)	past (*atīta*)	(b)	future (*anāgata*)	
(c)	present (*pratyutpanna*)			18
18.(a)	good (*kuśala*)	(b)	bad (*akuśala*)	
(c)	neutral (*avyākṛta*)			1
19.(a)	*re* sexual passion (*kāmapratisaṃyukta*)	(b)	*re* matter (*rūpapratisaṃyukta*)	
(c)	*re* immaterial (*ārūpyasaṃyukta*)			115-7
20.(a)	seeker (*śaikṣa*)	(b)	adept (*aśaikṣa*)	
(c)	neither (*naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣa*)			11
21.(a)	destroyed by vision (*darśanaprahātavya*)	(b)	destroyed by meditation (*bhāvanāprahātavya*)	
(c)	not to be destroyed (*aprahātavya*)			

The matrix finally concludes with three more dyads:

22.(a)	homogeneous (*sabhāga*)	(b)	heterogeneous (*tatsabhāga*)	
23.(a)	with cooking (*savipāka*)	(b)	without cooking (*avipāka*)	3
24.(a)	higher (*anuttara*)	(b)	lower (*sottara*)	121

As can now be readily gleaned from these listings, both the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra schools had matrices that closely paralleled those found in the Pali Abhidhamma. Another tack to take in attempting to ascertain the original form of the *mātikā* lists would be to single out only those items which appear in the works of all three of these schools. As outlined above, the Theravāda recognized 22 triads and 100 dyads (excluding the *suttanta* matrices), the Sarvāstivāda 6 triads and 15 dyads, and the Yogācāra 5 triads and 22 dyads. Considering the overlapping character of several of the listings of dyads and triads found in the Pali matrices, it would seem that the Sarvāstivāda listing is more primitive and has less accretions. The Yogācāra listings are also much closer to the Sarvāstivādins than the Theravādins. Hence, the Sarvāstivāda matrices would appear to have the best chance of being closer to the original matrices than would those of the other two schools.

Another approach to ascertaining the original matrices has been taken by A.K. Warder. As Warder notes, while the prominent placement of the three formal Pali matrices at the start of the first book of its *Abhidhammapiṭaka* was obviously meant to indicate their fundamental position in its doctrinal edifice, various other tabulations of phenomena are also found throughout the remainder of the Theravāda Abhidhamma. Such variable groupings of lists like the five *skandhas*, twelve *āyatanas*, eighteen *dhātus*, etc., serve as the framework for other books of the *Abhidhammapiṭaka*, such as the *Vibhaṅga*, *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapaññatti*, and *Yamaka*. Indeed, Warder proposes that these relatively unsophisticated listings of factors may actually have been the original matrix, which was subsequently refined by the Theravādins into the much more elaborate dyads and triads of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*.

> We may thus suppose that the Abhidhamma Pali originated from the *mātikā* of the *Vibhaṅga* and the texts dependent on it (i.e. *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapaññatti*, and to a lesser extent *Yamaka*)... The Theravāda school then worked up its new system of *tikas* and *dukas* into the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, ... which it placed at the head of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. The *Kathāvatthu* had probably been added already, since it precedes the *Yamaka*. Finally the *tika-duka* analysis was worked up in a different way into the *Paṭṭhāna*, the great exposition of the theory of causation which was regarded as the crowning work of the whole *Piṭaka*.[61]

By comparing the Pali matrices with their Sanskrit counterparts appearing in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, the *Aśokāvadāna*, and the Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, Warder finally hypothesizes that the original matrix may have been in the form of the following twenty-two groups:[62]

Column 1	*Column 2*	*Column 3*
4 applications of mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhāna*)	5 (4?) precepts (*sikkhāpada*)	5 aggregates (*skandha*)
4 right endeavors (*sammappadhāna*)	4 right results (*sāmaññaphala*)	12 bases (*āyatana*)
4 supernatural powers (*iddhipāda*)	4 traditional practices of a monk (*ariyavaṃsa*)	18 elements (*dhātu*)
5 faculties (*indriya*)	4 discriminations (*paṭisambhidā*)	22 faculties (?)
5 powers (*bala*)	4 meditations (*jhāna*)	
7 conditions of enlightenment (*bojjhaṅga*)	4 boundless states (*appamaññā*)	? persons (*puggala*)
8 stages on the path (*maggaṅga*)	6 (4?)higher faculties (*abhiññā*)	4 truths (*sacca*)
		12 elements in dependent origination

The first column is the list of *bodhipakkhiya* factors which, as was discussed *supra*, was probably the earliest formal tabulation of factors; it gives a systematic outline of Buddhist spiritual development, and suggests the soteriological orientation of the nascent Abhidharma. The second column is a further elaboration of this group, with more focus on the gnoseological concerns of the early Buddhists. The third column is predominantly metaphysical in orientation, and outlines the Buddhist analysis of the world; it serves as the core for the later philosophical elaborations found especially in the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda school.

By building upon these various matrices the different schools of Abhidharma constructed coherent, systematic exegeses of Buddhist doctrine. It is to the literature of the two major schools of Abhidharma, the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda, that we may now turn.

III. THE STHAVIRAVĀDA (THERAVĀDA) SCHOOL

Three Stages in the Development of Theravāda Abhidhamma

As was mentioned above, the literature of the Sthaviravāda (Theravāda) school was transmitted to Sri Lanka from India at the time of the third sectarian council (ca. 3rd century B.C.), whence it was diffused throughout the countries of Southeast Asia. Virtually all of these Theravāda texts are preserved in the Pali language, which became the church language of southern Buddhism. From the discussion in the *Kathāvatthu*, it seems apparent that most of the school's Abhidhamma books had been codified in near-final form by that time, and they had already become the subjects of a burgeoning commercial literature. Soon after the school's transmission to Sri Lanka, however, the importance of the Sthaviravādins on the subcontinent began to wane, and the Indian branch of the school eventually passed into obscurity. Hence, after the second century B.C., the Theravāda Abhidhamma literature of Sri Lanka and South-East Asia developed in virtual isolation from the rest of Indian philosophical thought, and exerted little influence on the future course of Indian Abhidharma literature.

Three principal stages in the development of Theravāda Abhidhamma can be discerned: (1) the composition and codification of the seven canonical Abhidhamma books and other semi-canonical texts; (2) writing of commentaries, called *aṭṭhakathās*, to these books and general manuals of Abhidhamma doctrine; (3) the composition of an extensive subcommentarial literature, known as *Mūlaṭīkās* and *Anuṭīkās*.[63]

The Canonical Books

According to tradition, the seven books of the Pali *Abhidhamma-piṭaka* are listed as follows: *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *Vibhaṅga*, *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapaññatti*, *Kathāvatthu*, *Yamaka* and *Paṭṭhāna*. While authorship of these works is attributed to the Buddha himself, they probably could not have been compiled until some two or three hundred years after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* (ca. 4th/3rd century B.C.). Text-critical analysis indicates that these books were composed in three stages. The earliest stage saw the compilation of the *Puggalapaññatti* and at least some sections of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and *Vibhaṅga*. These three texts contain extensive quotations from the *sūtras* and, while the method of analysis in the latter two texts is obviously of later origin, their principal concern is to explain points of controversy in the *Nikāyas*. Hence, their overall approach is more indicative of this primitive stage of development. The middle period saw the composition of the *Dhātukathā* and *Kathāvatthu*. A dialectical

approach is commonly followed in these two texts, in which the doctrine is taught through a complex series of questions and answers. The final period of development of the canonical books includes the uniquely Theravāda texts, *Yamaka* and *Paṭṭhāna.* Both employ an extremely advanced catechetical style that is all but incomprehensible to non-Abhidhammikas, which may be considered the culmination of the stylistic and doctrinal tendencies exhibited in the earlier Abhidhamma books.

The doctrinal edifice of the Pali Abhidhamma rests upon the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi,* the first book of the *Abhidhammapiṭaka.* The *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* presents a systematic analysis of all individual compounded elements of existence (*saṃskṛta* factors) within three major categories: states of consciousness (*citta*), mental concomitants (*cetasika*), and material form/corporeality (*rūpa*). To this has also been added some discussion on the uncompounded element (*asaṃskṛta* factor), *nirvāṇa.* The three categories of compounded elements are treated from the standpoint of moral cause-and-effect as being either karmically good, bad, or neutral. Because of its primary stress on the analysis of mind and the mental concomitants, the approach of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* may be considered psychological in orientation.

The *Vibhaṅga,* the second book of the Pali Abhidhamma, is a series of eighteen independent treatises (*vibhaṅga*) on important categories of Buddhist doctrine, such as the five aggregates, twelve senses, bases and objects, etc. Each exegesis is generally given in three parts: the explanation taken from the *sūtra,* the Abhidhamma expatiation, and a catechetical series of questions and answers to elaborate on specific issues. The *Vibhaṅga* is cited extensively in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* of the *Khuddakanikāya,* and seems to have been the inspiration of that later text.

The *Dhātukathā* consists of fourteen chapters in catechetic style describing the relationship pertaining between individual factors and the classifications of aggregates, elements and senses. This relationship may be by way of fourteen categories, as to whether a factor is included or not included in any of these three groups, whether they are both included and unincluded, both unincluded and included, both included and included, and both unincluded and unincluded, etc. Its rigorous analysis of the interrelationships pertaining between factors provides more precise definitions of commonly used Buddhist technical terms; just as importantly, however, it also augurs the subsequent development of a sophisticated logical form, called the *catuṣkoṭi,* which is found in many later Buddhist texts.

The *Puggalapaññatti* is the shortest book of the *Abhidhammapiṭaka,* and is distinct from all of the other canonical works in

discussing not an ultimate factor of existence, but a conventional concept (Pali *paññatti*; Skt. *prajñapti*), that of the individual person (Pali *puggala*; Skt. *pudgala*). The language of the text also shares more affinities with the conventional discourse of the *sūtras* than the definitive language of the Abhidhamma, and much of its contents may be traced to the *Aṅguttaranikāya* and *Saṅgītisuttanta* of the *Dīghanikāya*. It is because of these affinities that the *Puggalapaññatti* is generally considered to belong to the earliest stratum of Pali Abhidhamma literature. The Theravāda school recognizes six conventional concepts, as are given in the matrix that opens the *Puggalapaññatti*: aggregates, bases, elements, truths, faculties, and concepts of persons. Because the first five concepts are said to be discussed elsewhere in the Abhidhamma—particularly in the *Vibhaṅga*, as the commentary to the text notes—they are not treated in this work. The *Puggalapaññatti* instead discusses 386 specific types of persons, in 142 different groupings. The text is notable for its often extensive treatments of different types of liberated beings, including Buddhas, *pratyekabuddhas*, and perfected beings, to the extent that the term *puggala* in its title is glossed as *ariyapuggala*, or noble person. Because of this focus on noble persons the concerns of the *Puggalapaññatti* are thus brought within the purview of Abhidhamma, allowing the book's inclusion in the *Abhidhammapiṭaka*.[64] Technical terms that figure in the discussion of human types are also explained in detail here, and include definitions and similes that are not to be found elsewhere in Pali exegetical literature.

The *Kathāvatthu*, the fifth book of the Pali Abhidhamma, is the only work in that *piṭaka* which is not explicitly ascribed to the Buddha himself, though as was noted above, its contents were said to have been anticipated by the Buddha. The book is traditionally assumed to have been compiled by Moggaliputta Tissa, the convener of the Sthaviravāda Third Council, which was convened at Pāṭaliputra by King Aśoka ca. 246 B.C. As Nyanatiloka notes, however, "The whole seems rather to have grown gradually so that already for this reason one would hesitate to ascribe the entire work to one single author. But the fact that most of the heretical opinions are ascribed to schools, which have come to life several centuries later, I consider positive proof that Moggali-putta-tissa could not have been the only author of the work."[65] The *Kathāvatthu*, as supplemented by the clarifications appearing in its commentary, the *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā*, gives one of the earliest accounts of the eighteen schismatic schools in which the early Buddhist order was considered to have divided. Because the rival views held by these various sects threatened to undermine the authority of the Sthaviravādin elders, these views were examined in detail in the *Kathāvatthu*, and the heterodox

opinions of the schismatic schools were refuted. A total of 219 different controversies are covered in 23 chapters, with little apparent order. The *Kathāvatthu* itself supplies no references as to which schools the various views were ascribed; these are instead provided by its commentary. Schools whose heterodox views were recorded in the text include virtually all of the known sects of early Buddhism, though the Sammitīyas and Sarvāstivādins are among the most prominent. Some of these sects may have been predecessors of later Mahāyāna schools, as is perhaps the case with the Vetulyakas, who are identified in the text as Mahāsuññatāvādins (Madhyamakas?).[66]

A number of important doctrinal controversies that will figure in our treatment of the development of Indian Abhidharma are covered in the *Kathāvatthu* and deserve brief mention here. The text opens with what is perhaps the most compelling issue facing any Buddhist school: can a person (*puggala*, glossed as self [*attā*]) be said to exist in any real sense? This view, ascribed by the commentary to the Vajjiputtakas and Sammitīyas, is also the subject of a detailed refutation in the Sarvāstivādin *Vijñānakāya*, and later in Vasubandhu's Appendix to his summary of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

Several soteriological issues receive extensive treatment in *Kathāvatthu*. Controversies concerning the enlightened status of the perfected being, for example, are especially rife. Controversy I.2, for example, concerns theories that a perfected being was subject to regression from his state of enlightenment, a view that is attributed to the Sammitīyas, Vajjiputtakas, Sabbatthivādins, and some Mahāsāṃghikas. II.1 suggests that perfected beings were still subject to nocturnal emissions, and thus had not totally sundered the bond of sensuality. II.2–II.3 cover claims that the perfected being was still subject to ignorance and doubts about his achievement. The Uttarāpathakas held the heterodox view that a layman could become an *arhat*, but then continues to live the household life (controversy IV.1); this position was vehemently opposed by the Theravādins and a number of other Buddhist schools. Views such as these challenged the very underpinnings of Buddhist spiritual practice, and would ultimately contribute to the Mahāyānist revision of the ideal toward which practice was directed, replacing the *arhat* with the Bodhisattva. Intimations that some ordinary men were destined never to attain enlightenment, such as are found in controversy XIX.7, adumbrate both the concern in the Sarvāstivāda school with those whose capacities for wholesome action have been lost and the later Mahāyāna doctrine of the *icchantikas*, i.e. those who will never be able to attain Buddhahood. Controversy I.4 involves the Andhaka, Sammitīya, Sabbatthivādins, and Bhadrayānika claim that the defile-

ments were abandoned gradually. The Theravādins reply citing *Suttanipāta* V.231 et al. indicating that defilements are excised forever at the time of insight. A related issue is controversy II.9, involving whether there could be the gradual realization of the four stages of sainthood. This controversy will recur frequently in Buddhist thought, and perhaps contributed to the schism between the Sarvāstivādins and Theravādins (ca. 237 B.C.), the former maintaining that insight was gradual, involving sixteen stages in the realization of the four noble truths, the latter, that it was immediate. This debate received perhaps its most noted coverage in the putative debate that took place at the "Council of Lhasa" between the Chinese "Sudden" teachings of the Ch'an master Mo-ho-yen and the Indian "Gradual" doctrine of Kamalaśīla.[67]

A number of issues of specific importance to the Sarvāstivāda school, the main rival of the Theravādins, are also treated in *Kathāvatthu*. Perhaps the most prominent is controversy I.6, where the Sarvāstivādin view that factors exist in all three times is taken up; the Theravādins refute this view, allowing only that factors exist in the present moment. As is to be expected, this dispute will receive considerable treatment not only in Sarvāstivādin works, but also in other Abhidharma texts such as the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* (alt. *Tattvasiddhi*) by the Bahuśrutiya author, Harivarman, as well as in Vyāsa's celebrated commentary on the *Yogasūtras*. Several disputes that relate to the Sarvāstivādin theory of dissociated factors (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*) appear also in *Kathāvatthu*. Controversy XIX.4 treats the Pubbaseliya view that acquisition (*pattī*; Skt. *prāpti*) is an uncompounded (*asaṅkhata*) factor; rather than calling it uncompounded, the Sarvāstivādins instead included acquisition in their list of dissociated factors (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*). III.11 discusses the Andhaka claim that the unconscious gods (*asaññasatta*; Skt. *asaṃjñisattva*) are still able to perceive, since rebirth cannot take place without the presence of the mental faculties; the Sarvāstivādins attempt to resolve this problem by positing a peculiar type of "unconscious absorption" (*asaṃjñisamāpatti*) among their dissociated forces. The issue of whether the cessation-trance is mundane or supramundane is taken up in XV.7-XV.8; both the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins will claim that it is neither, but the Sarvāstivādins will attempt to resolve disputes over its peculiar nature by including this absorption among its list of dissociated factors. The Rājagirika and Siddhatthika rejection of the reality of mental states, treated in controversy VII.3, will also reappear in the views of the Dārṣṭāntika Dharmatrāta and the Sarvāstivādin teacher Buddhadeva. Controversy VIII.8 discusses the issue of whether a subtle form of matter still exists in the immaterial realm; this may adumbrate the Sarvāsti-

vāda theory of unmanifest matter (*avijñaptirūpa*). Finally, II.11 concerns the Mahīśāsaka, Andhaka, and Sarvāstivāda view that there are two types of *nirvāṇa*, "cessation through reflection" (*paṭisaṅkhānirodha*; Skt. *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), and cessation without reflection (*appaṭisaṅkhānirodha*; Skt. *apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*).

A few issues that seem to adumbrate later concerns of the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna appear also in the *Kathāvatthu*. The Andhaka view (IX.5) that the awareness achieved through insight could occur without a corresponding object augurs the later Yogācāra theory of *nirālambanajñāna*, in which consciousness is permitted to operate in isolation from external objects. Suchness (*tathatā*), which appears in the Yogācāra list of uncompounded factors, was held by the Uttarāpathakas also to be uncompounded, as XIX.5 discusses.

Controversies involving the processes governing the world are also frequently taken up in *Kathāvatthu*. The role of the individual in shaping the physical world are covered in such controversies as VII.7, in which the earth is considered to be a karmic maturation, opening up the debate on what exactly karma yields. Another vitally important issue here, covered in VIII.2, is whether there was an intermediate state between rebirths, a view attributed to the Sammitīyas and Pubbaseliyas, and maintained also by the Sarvāstivādins. Disputes over the nature of karma abound in the text, such as XV.11, in which the accumulation of karma was considered by the Sammitīyas and Andhakas to operate independently of mind and was karmically neutral.

Finally, we may also note a number of controversies concerning the transcendent nature of the Buddha, which was a mainstay of Mahāsāṅghika and later Mahāyāna belief. XVIII.1-XVIII.2, for example, discuss claims of the Vetulyakas (proto-Mahāyānists?) that the Buddha sent a phantom of himself to earth to preach the doctrine while he remained in Tusita heaven. This may also be compared with the Andhaka view that the Buddha's conventional speech was also supramundane (II.10). The Mahāsāṅghika position that there were multiple Buddhas living in all four quarters of the universe is discussed in XXI.6, a view that is remarkably similar to that found in many Mahāyāna texts.

The *Kathāvatthu* is also notable for the logical approach adopted in the text: while that cannot be considered syllogistic, it is nevertheless systematic. In *Kathāvatthu* I.1, for example, there is the application of a five-step logical method, which, after eight separate analyses, becomes a dialectical whole.[68] The usage of a ten-member logical formula elsewhere in the *Kathāvatthu* led later Indian logicians to require concrete examples in order to clarify the alleged relation-

ships pertaining between constituents in the formula.

The sixth book of the *Abhidhammapiṭaka* is the *Yamaka*, a handbook of logical analysis, which examines a number of doctrinal concepts in terms of their related doctrinal classifications and range of application. Its title, *Yamaka* (*The Pairs*) derives from its paired grouping of a question and its converse. In this wise the text attempts to clarify whether a term may be applied to all members of the class it denotes, some of them, or none. For example, the opening discussion (*Yamaka*, I.1) on good faculties concerns their relationship with good *dharmas*: i.e. whether good faculties encompass good factors, the converse, or neither. Various other related questions then follow, such as whether such related factors have the identical faculty, etc. The analytical style of the *Yamaka* is perhaps the most complex of the entire *Abhidhammapiṭaka*, and has kept the text from exerting much influence over the development of Theravāda Abhidhamma.

The final book of the Pali Abhidhamma, the *Paṭṭhāna*, is best known for its elaboration of causation theory. It is considered to be pure Abhidhamma, because it does not include the *suttanta* matrix that appears in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*; along with the *Yamaka* it is considered one of the most recondite of all Abhidhamma texts. The *Paṭṭhāna* is an exhaustive examination of one of the cornerstones of Buddhist doctrine: the conditioned nature of all compounded factors. The Introduction to the text provides a detailed list of twentyfour specific types of conditioned relationships (*paccaya*; Skt. *pratyaya*) that may pertain between different factors. These are: (1) root condition, (2) object-content, (3) dominant, (4) proximity, (5) contiguity, (6) conascence, (7) mutuality, (8) dependence, (9) strong dependence/decisive support, (10) prenascence, (11) postnascence, (12) repetition, (13) act, (14) maturation, (15) nutriment, (16) faculty, (17) meditation, (18) path, (19) association, (20) dissociation, (21) presence, (22) absence, (23) disappearance, (24) nondisappearance.[69] These twentyfour conditions are not intended to be mutually exclusive; indeed, the later Pali manual, *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, reduces them all to four—object, decisive support, act, and presence—a list that comes closer to the six causes and four conditions of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. After this already lengthy Introduction follow four prolix chapters, each several hundred pages in length, in which all twentyfour conditions are systematically applied to each and every factor, following the standard matrices of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, et al. For example, each member and every possible combination of the first triad of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* matrix —that of good, bad, and neutral factors—are treated in terms of all twentyfour conditions, giving a grand total of 1176 investi-

gations that take place for just this one triad. As can thus be imagined, the scope of the book is virtually overwhelming, and few are those who have ever claimed to have mastered it.

The *Paṭṭhāna*[70] also includes the earliest canonical reference to a term of prime importance in Theravāda Abhidhamma: *bhavaṅga*, or life-continuum. *Bhavaṅga*, literally, "the limb on which existence occurs" is that substratum which maintains the continuity of the individual throughout that life, a sense evocative of the Sarvāstivādin technical term *nikāyasabhāgatā*. The *bhavaṅga* plays a vital role in the sequence of sensory perception, as will be discussed below and, in a number of ways, serves many of the same purposes as the Yogācāra doctrine of the storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*).[71] While the *Paṭṭhāna* is revered as the quintessence of Pali Abhidhamma literature, much in the same way that the Prajñāpāramitā materials are held in esteem by Mahāyānists, its very prolixity has tended to limit the contribution it has been able to make to Abhidhamma philosophy.

The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* And the Semicanonical Works

We may now turn to other treatises in the Pali canon that have Abhidhamma affinities. Perhaps the oldest of these quasi-Abhidhamma texts is the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*. This text, attributed with little proof by the tradition to the Buddha's disciple, Sāriputta, is considered canonical by all Theravādins, and is now included in the *Khuddakanikāya*. Its three major sections include thirty chapters of extensive discussion on major doctrinal issues in Theravāda Buddhism, in the format of a *mātikā* followed by a detailed exegesis—the style of many Abhidhamma books. Buddhaghoṣa's commentary to the *Dīghanikāya*, the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, reports that the reciters of the *Majjhimanikāya* included the text in the *Suttapiṭaka*, but the *Dīgha* reciters instead entered it into the *Abhidhammapiṭaka*.[72] This evidence of the Abhidhamma affinities of the text is substantiated by the fact that four passages from the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* are cited as being "in the Abhidhamma" in the later *Vimuttimagga*, which some scholars believe to have been a text of the Abhayagirivāsa subsect of Theravāda; hence, the intimations are strong that the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* was originally an Abhidhamma text and suggests that the Abhayagirivāsins after their schism in B.C. 38 restored it to that position.[73] The nucleus of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* appears to be a hypothetical commentary to the *Dasuttarasutta* discussed earlier, which might have been entitled *Dasuttarapariyāya*. Subsequent sections of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* presume knowledge of several chapters of the *Vibhaṅga*, and much of the

text was probably composed during the same period as the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (ca. 3rd century B.C., with the final product completed by the first century B.C.[74]

The term *paṭisambhidā* (Skt. *pratisaṃvid*) refers to four specific types of analytical knowledge, or 'discrimination': meaning (*attha*), elements of existence (*dhamma*), languages (*nirutti*), and perspicuity (*paṭibhāna*). This classification is virtually unknown in the Pali *sūtras* and, apart from this text, it is mentioned in only a few later Theravāda works, such as the *Niddesa*, *Vibhaṅga* and *Kathāvatthu*. Similarly, the term *paṭisambhidā* receives only nominal mention in such rival Abhidharma texts as the Sarvāstivādin *Prakaraṇapāda* and the Bahuśrutīya *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*. The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* itself does not define these types of understanding, and seems to presuppose the definitions found in the *Vibhaṅga* (chapter xv). Its purpose is to illustrate in great detail the ways in which comprehension takes place as an adept progresses along the path: that is, what occurs as a person comes to understand the Buddha's teachings. Thirty separate "treatises" on specific types of understanding are included in the book, such as the meaning of action, the enlightenment factors, insight, and liberation. Its outline of the types of 'discrimination' required for progress on the path will find its greatest elaborations later in the *Visuddhimagga* and *Abhidhammāvatāra*.

The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* seems to anticipate a later Theravāda description of factors according to their unique characteristics (Pali *lakkhaṇa*, Skt. *lakṣaṇa*), function (*rasa*), and essential natures (*sabhāva*; Skt. *svabhāva*). While the term *sabhāva* appears in Pali in the semicanonical *Peṭakopadesa*, and the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi-Aṭṭhakathā* (*Aṭṭhasālinī* 39), as well as in such independent treatises as *Visuddhimagga*, it is only in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* that it is described as being "empty by essential nature", a phrase that has been glossed by Mahānāma (ca. 6th century A.D.), the author of the commentary to the text, the *Saddhammappakāsinī*, as "having emptiness as its own nature". This term gained currency in the Sarvāstivāda school, where *svabhāva* as the abiding nature of factors was contrasted with *kāritra*, or the ephemeral functioning of those factors. This elaboration of a theory of the essential nature of factors (*dharmasvabhāva*) eventually led to Nāgārjuna's dialectical critique of this position, and spawned the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna philosophy. The use of *rasa* for "function" is a late usage that is fully developed only in the *Aṭṭhakathās*; this text, however, seems to represent a transition point between the basic *sūtra* meaning of "taste" and the developed commentarial sense of the term.

The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (Section I, chapters 5-11) also is apparently the source for the series of "insight knowledges" that

constitute the way to liberation in later Theravāda treatises: (1) knowledge of comprehension; (2) contemplation of rise and fall; (3) insight which is understanding of the contemplation of dissolution; danger; equanimity about compounded things. This series was apparently adopted by the *Aṭṭhakathās* from the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, outlined in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* and Buddhadatta's *Abhidhammāvatāra*, and eventually expanded to their final tenfold stage in later Abhidhamma manuals, such as *Paramatthavinicchaya*, *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, and *Nāmarūpapariccheda*. One of the most extensive discussions of the problematic term *gotrabhū* ("change-of-lineage") as the final type of insight knowledge is found in this text also, where it is interpreted as the conquest of the lineage of the worldling (*puthujjanagotta*) through the realization of the *ariyagotta*.[75]

A number of other Pali texts relevant to Abhidhamma are considered to be canonical by the Theravādins of Burma (who include them in the *Khuddakanikāya*), but only semicanonical by the Singhalese and Thais. Two of these texts, the *Nettippakaraṇa* and *Peṭakopadesa*, are both attributed to the Buddha's eminent disciple, Mahākaccāyana, but most probably were written around the first century B.C., about one century after the codification of the seven official Abhidhamma books. These books are actually two different recensions of the same text, the *Nettippakaraṇa* being somewhat improved and thus accepted as the definitive version by the Theravādins.[76] Both of these texts, which may be treated in tandem, are hermeneutical manuals, guiding Theravādin commentators and preachers in correct scriptural interpretation. The *sūtra*-teachings of the Buddha, which were said to be of the one taste of liberation (*vimuttirasa*),[77] actually varied considerably in their approach, and those who heard it differed also in their capacities for spiritual understanding. Hence, the internal consistency of the *dharma*—and, by extension, its utility as a teaching-tool—could only be conveyed by providing the exegete with hermeneutical principles through which the intent of the Buddha in preaching specific *sūtras* was ascertainable. These principles are broadly based on meaning (*artha*) and phrasing (*vyañjana*), two elements by which the *sūtras* were differentiated by the Buddha himself. In these two texts, *artha* refers to the soteriological aim that unifies all of the Buddha's teachings: *nirvāṇa* and the path of practice leading to that experience. *Vyañjana* suggests the diverse ways in which that *artha* has been framed in Buddhist texts. Through detailed analyses of these two elements via *naya* (five meaning guidelines that illustrate how the *dharma* is made to relate to different people) and *hāra* (sixteen phrasing categories that reveal the identity of meaning of variant expressions of *dharma*), the underlying unity of

the *sūtras* may be restored. Different *sūtra* typologies are provided in both the *Nettippakaraṇa* and *Peṭakopadesa.*[78] This is based upon a fourfold division, i.e. of *sūtras* dealing with defilement, moral life, penetration, and the adept. As will be readily apparent, there is an explicit progression in these types, from the stage of defilement to that of final liberation. This basic listing is expanded to eight in the *Nettippakaraṇa* and sixteen in the *Peṭakopadesa*; the later text also gives two variant typologies of thirteen and twentyeight *sūtra*-types.

IV. THE ABHIDHARMA LITERATURE OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA SCHOOL

Outline of the Literature

Among the traditional eighteen schools of the early Buddhist tradition, it is the Sarvāstivādins who exerted the most profound influence on the subsequent development of the religion. Based upon the eponymous teaching that factors exist in all three time-periods (*sarvam* (*sarvadā*) *asti*), its ontology and soteriology inspired the developing Mahāyāna schools.[79] As one concrete doctrinal example, the recension of the *Jñānaprasthāna* translated by Hsuan-tsang includes a fortytwo membered matrix (*T.* 26.943b7-16), beginning with twentytwo faculties and ending with ninetyeight contaminants, which outlines the contents of the eight chapters of the treatise.[80] Many of these same factor-listings will reappear in later Mahāyāna writings, such as the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa.* Sarvāstivādin theories also served as the point of departure in the subsequent examinations of Buddhist tenets by the Madhyamaka school.

The Sarvāstivādins are considered to have separated from the main trunk of the Sthaviravāda lineage sometime prior to the third sectarian council at Pāṭaliputra, during King Aśoka's reign, as was discussed above. Their teachings occupy a prominent place in the Theravādin *Kathāvatthu*, where the *Aṭṭhakathā* refers to it as the *sabbatthivāda* (the Pali equivalent of *sarvāstivāda*).

The Sarvāstivādin school had the widest geographical distribution on the Indian subcontinent of all the early schools. After migrating from Pāṭaliputra in the second century B.C., they made their home in the Mathurā region.[81] The school soon spread to Kashmir in northwest India, which ultimately became the orthodox base of the school: unless otherwise stated, most references to the Sarvāstivādins in later Buddhist literature refer to this Kashmir branch. A major subsect of the school, known as the *bahirdeśakas* (or "foreign teachers"),[82] was prominent in Gandhāra, in the extreme north of the Indian culture sphere, and Bactria. Because these masters of the Kashmir and Gandhāra schools considered their teachings to be

elaborations of the doctrines found in the Abhidharma *Mahāvibhāṣā*, a massive commentary-cum-compendium of Sarvāstivādin doctrine, they commonly referred to themselves as Vaibhāṣikas ("those who follow the *Vibhāṣā*"). Many classical sources on the lineages of the early Buddhist schools also distinguish between the Sarvāstivādins and the Mūlasarvāstivādins, but the relationship between the two remains unclear. Both apparently accepted the same Abhidharma texts, but recognized minor variances in certain Avadāna texts, and maintained different recensions of the *Vinaya*.[83] In addition to its widespread currency in India, however, the Sarvāstivāda was also the only of the early schools to achieve popularity throughout greater Asia as well. The Chinese pilgrim, I-ching (ca. A.D. 671-95), for example, reported finding the Sarvāstivāda school flourishing in several of the petty kingdoms of central Asia, in southeast Asia on the islands of Sumatra and Java (where also was found the Theravāda school), and in the southern, western and eastern provinces of China,[84] from whence it spread to other regions of East Asia.

The Sarvāstivāda was the only school besides the Theravāda that was known to have had a complete Abhidharma canon, based upon a central text, the *Jñānaprasthāna*, and six subsidiary treatises, called the *padaśāstras*. A massive commentary to the *Jñānaprasthāna*, known as the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, remains our principal source of information on the intrasectarian controversies that apparently raged within the school. In addition to these canonical texts, there are also several handbooks of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma that are still extant; these find their closest Pali parallels in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* or Anuruddha's *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*. Of all this massive amount of material, only the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and fragments of the *Abhidharmadīpa* are extant in Sanskrit; apart from portions of the *Prajñaptibhāṣya* which survive in Tibetan, the remainder of the canonical literature is available only in Chinese translation. This dearth of materials in the original Sanskrit has long inhibited research in the canonical literature of the Sarvāstivādins, and still today little has been written in Western languages about the individual texts of the school. For this reason, our discussion about Sarvāstivādin literature and teachings will have to be regarded as somewhat more tentative than is the case with Pali materials.

Unlike the texts of the Pali Abhidharma canon, the original outlines of which are all attributed to the Buddha himself, the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma books are all ascribed to human authors, though the Sarvāstivādins themselves considered these men to be mere compilers of the Buddha's words (see discussion *supra*). The *Jñānaprasthāna* is commonly considered to be the body of the Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharmapiṭaka*, and the six supplements its limbs (lit. 'feet';

pāda).[85] However, since the *Jñānaprasthāna* is considered to be the youngest of the canonical Abhidharma texts, this could not have been the original meaning of the term "foot". Ching-mai's postface to Hsüan-tsang's translation of the *Dharmaskandha* suggests a different sense: a text "was titled *pada* because it relied on the Abhidharma."[86] Hence, this interpretation that these texts were subsidiary to the *Jñānaprasthāna* is probably a later development.[87] The *Jñānaprasthāna*, also known as the *Aṣṭagrantha*, or the "Eight-chapters", is attributed by all accounts to Kātyāyanīputra, a Sarvāstivādin master who lived in the later years of the precommon era.[88] It is now generally considered to be the youngest of all the canonical works of the Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharmapiṭaka*.[89] According to the Sanskrit tradition, preserved in Yaśomitra's commentary to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the *Sphuṭārtha Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*,[90] its six supplements appeared in the following order (with their ascribed authors in parentheses) : (1) *Prakaraṇapāda* (Ch., Skt., Tib. Vasumitra); (2) *Vijñānakāya* (Ch., Skt., Tib. Devaśarman); (3) *Dharmaskandha* (Ch. Maudgalyāyana; Skt. and Tib. Śāriputra); (4) *Prajñaptibhāṣya* (alt. *Prajñaptiśāstra*; Ch. Kātyāyana; Skt. and Tib. Maudgalyāyana); (5) *Dhātukāya* (Ch. Vasumitra; Skt. and Tib. Pūrṇa); (6) *Saṅgītiparyāya* (Ch. Śāriputra; Skt. and Tib. Mahākausthila). Three separate Chinese recensions of a commentary to the *Jñānaprasthāna* are still extant: *Vibhāṣā* (*T* 1547), *Abhidharmavibhāṣā* (*T* 1546), and *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā* (*T* 1545), which has the most extensive coverage of the three. Finally, systematizations of the canonical literature were composed by Sarvāstivāda exegetes, such as Ghoṣaka's *Abhidharmāmṛta*.

Considerable controversy reigns among modern scholars concerning the authorship and chronology of these various texts however. Ryogon Fukuhara, the scholar who has made the most exhaustive study of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma canon, has given what is perhaps the most plausible ordering of the canonical texts: *Saṅgītiparyāya* and *Dharmaskandha* in the earliest group; *Prajñaptibhāṣya*, *Dhātukāya*, and *Vijñānakāya*, and *Prakaraṇapāda* in the middle group; followed by the latest of the canonical works, the *Jñānaprasthāna*.[91] Fukuhara's listing will be followed in this brief survey of the principal contributions of these various texts.

The Canonical Texts of the Early Period

Saṅgītiparyāya

Based on its structure and content, it is clear that the *Saṅgītiparyāya* belongs to the earliest stratum of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. The matrix that opens the book includes 122 separate classifications

of a total of 205 factors, which are arranged in a sequential series of monads, dyads, triads, up to decads, in a way that is quite similar to the format of the *Ekottarāgama.*[92] Hence, in format its affinities are more with the various recensions of the *Saṅgītisuttanta* found in the Pali *Nikāyas* and Chinese *Āgamas* than with the Abhidharma texts of the later Sarvāstivāda school; perhaps its closest parallel among the Pali Abhidharma texts is the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi.* In its theory of the seven types of noble persons, however, the *Saṅgītiparyāya* is slightly more developed than the *Dharmaskandha.* While the *Dharmaskandha*[93] only refers to two types of noble persons—the faith-followers and the followers of *dharma*—the *Saṅgītiparyāya*[94] gives a more complete listing of seven noble persons: faith-followers, *dharma*-followers, resolved in faith, view-attainers, bodily witness, liberated by wisdom, and liberated both ways[95]—suggesting that these portions of the text postdate the *Dharmaskandha.* While this listing is more advanced than anything found in either the *Āgamas* or the *Dharmaskandha,* it in no way represents any sort of revolutionary expansion of the scope of the *Āgama* presentation of the path, such as will be found later in the *Jñānaprasthāna.*

Dharmaskandha

The *Dharmaskandha* is the second of the two earliest books of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. While its coverage closely parallels that of the Pali *Vibhaṅga* and the first half of the *Śāriputrābhidharma-śāstra,* its style appears to be the most primitive of the three.[96] Its antiquity is indicated by its treatment of major classifications of factors: while later Sarvāstivāda texts, for example, always list the aggregates, bases, and elements in that order (in agreement with the Theravāda tradition), the *Dharmaskandha* instead gives them as bases, aggregates, and elements, without accounting for this discrepancy.[97] The major portion of the text is taken up with coverage of the individual constituent-classes of the thirtyseven limbs of enlightenment. These chapters constitute one of the first attempts in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma to systematize the *mārga* scheme. One of the major innovations of the *Dharmaskandha* is the distinction it draws between the path of insight and the path of practice, a division that would come to be of cardinal importance in the mature soteriological scheme of the Vaibhāṣikas, and would exert enormous influence on the outline of the Buddhist path found in many Mahāyāna texts. The latter half of the text treats various technical classifications, such as the bases and elements. These two major divisions are synthesized in the sixteenth chapter, which emphasizes in particular the defilements and their removal.

The Canonical Texts of the Middle Period

Prajñaptibhāṣya

The *Prajñaptibhāṣya* is the only one of the canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivādins that is not extant in its entirety in Chinese translation. It is in its Tibetan recension that all three sections of the text are to be found: *Lokaprajñapti*, *Kāraṇaprajñapti*, and *Karmaprajñapti*. The first section is an extension of the cosmogonic speculations of the *Āgamas*, such as are found in the *Aggaññasutta*.[98] A similar orientation is found also in the *Li-shiḥ a-pi-t'an lun*,[99] translated by Paramārtha. The Chinese translation of the *Prajñaptibhāṣya*, which was made ca. early 11th century during the Sung dynasty, several centuries after the translation of the other canonical texts, preserves only portions of the second section on causes. Coverage includes material on the causes leading to the various stages in a Bodhisattva's career, from entering the womb to entering *parinirvāṇa*, a topic that is conspicuously absent in the Theravāda Abhidharma. Surprisingly, however, the *Prajñaptibhāṣya* is the text most quoted in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*,[100] suggesting that despite the provisional nature of most of the topics it covered, its speculations were nevertheless of concern to the Vibhāṣāśāstrins.

Dhātukāya

The *Dhātukāya*, traditionally the fifth of the six *pādaśāstras*, is representative of this middle stratum of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts. It is a preliminary attempt to systematize the burgeoning numbers of mental phenomena into a coherent matrix. Its unique listings of many of the more important of these concomitant mental factors were precursors of the standardized Ābhidharmika lists found in the *Prakaraṇapāda* and later Sarvāstivādin manuals. The telling parallels between the *Dhātukāya* and the *Prakaraṇapāda*, both of which are ascribed by the Chinese tradition to Vasumitra, have suggested to some scholars that the *Prakaraṇapāda* is an expansion of the abbreviated coverage of factors found in the *Dhātukāya*.[101] The *Dhātukāya* is never cited in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, suggesting that it was of marginal concern to the Vaibhāṣikas, perhaps because so many of the issues it raised were more extensively treated in the *Prakaraṇapāda*.

Vijñānakāya

The compilation of the *Vijñānakāya* is ascribed by tradition to Devaśarman,[102] and is considered by modern scholars to have been

composed in the later half of the first century A.D.[103] The book is divided into six sections, based on an analysis of the six types of sensory consciousnesses. The most notable contribution made by the *Vijñānakāya* to Abhidharma philosophy is its account of the Sarvāstivāda theory that factors exist in all three time-periods, which is the only such treatment found anywhere in the *pādaśāstras* or the *Jñānaprasthāna*. This discussion occurs in Chapters One and Two[104] as a refutation of the rival view of a certain Maudgalyāyana that things exist only in the present, not in either past or future.[105] The reasons given by the Sarvāstivādin school in support of their view that factors exist in all three time-periods have been summarized by Hsüan-tsang's disciple, P'u-kuang (fl. 650-63), in his *Chu-she lun chi* [Notes on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*]: "Because it was spoken by the Buddha; because of the contact of sense-base and sense-organ [leading to the production consciousness]; and because karman has a fruition."[106] The *Vijñānakāya* provides extensive treatment of all of these reasons.[107] The close consideration of the three times issue found in the *Vijñānakāya* stems at least partially from the book's need to prove that there was a distinct cause for the arising of consciousnesses that cognized past or future objects. If there were no such objects existing in reality, such cognition could not take place; since they do occur, however, past and future objects must also be real. The *Vijñānakāya* is cited frequently in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* as the source of the three times theory; thus the *Vijñānakāya* is the basis for the refinements of the school's position that is found in later Vaibhāṣika materials.

This discussion on the three times is followed in the second chapter with a treatment of the issue of whether a person (*pudgala*) exists—a heterodox view that some Buddhist schools, such as the Vatsīputrīyas and Sammitīyas, had proposed. The *Vijñānakāya* approach to this question would have a profound effect on the later development of Sarvāstivādin doctrine. Having proven to its satisfaction the reality of factors in all three times, the *Vijñānakāya* continues on[108] to show that factors have a unique essential nature (*svabhāva*); this investigation is then the foil against which the refutation of the reality of the person occurs. The *Vijñānakāya* gives the Pudgalavāda definition of *pudgala* as that which performs action, receives pleasure and pain, etc., and cites four *sūtra* passages used by the Pudgalavādins in support of their position. The *Vijñānakāya* then exposes the inherent contradictions between the *pudgala* and a variety of other basic Buddhist doctrines, and finally treats a number of ancillary issues, such as the question, found discussed later in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*,[109] that if there is no self, then how is it possible that the conception of self arises? The *Vijñānakāya* gives the only treatment

of no-self theory found in the canonical literature of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma; even the *Mahāvibhāṣā* lacks a section devoted exclusively to the refutation of *pudgalavāda* (though there are several treatments of no-self in the *Vibhāṣā*).[110] The only treatment in Sarvāstivādin literature that compares in extent and sophistication with that of the *Vijñānakāya* is the Appendix to Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.* From the discussion that appears there, it is clear that Vasubandhu was thoroughly familiar with the *Vijñānakāya* treatment of *pudgalavāda,* and was strongly influenced by its content and approach.

The *Vijñānakāya* also illustrates the concern that *Abhidharmaśāstras* of the middle period had with the theory of causation. The *Vijñānakāya* mentions[111] fourteen types of *hetu,* and it includes a discussion on the arising of the sense-consciousnesses that focuses on the role of the four types of conditions in bringing about that origination. This section is important, because it represents the earliest attempt of the Sarvāstivādins to determine the functioning (*kāritra*) of the essential nature of a factor, a concept that will play a central role in the defence of the three times found later in Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra.*[112] In bringing causation theory to the forefront of Abhidharma concerns, the *Vijñānakāya* thus played an important role in the development of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, and was to exert a profound influence over the later Abhidharma manuals.[113]

Prakaraṇapāda

The *Prakaraṇapāda* is considered by the tradition to be the last of the six *pādaśāstras* of the Sarvāstivādins. It is attributed to Vasumitra, the author of the *Dhātukāya*—an ascription that is probably authentic given the close parallels in coverage between the two works. In its contents and style, the *Prakaraṇapāda* appears to be the latest of the six *pādaśāstras*. Its one-hundred citations in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* are second in number only to those of the *Prajñaptibhāṣya.* There are two separate translations of the work in Chinese;[114] in addition, two completely independent books, the *Abhidharmapañcavastukasūtra*[115] and *Sarvāstivādanikāyapañcavastukavibhāṣā*[116] appear to be early translations of the first chapter of the *Prakaraṇapāda.* Fukuhara has proposed that the *Pañcavastukasūtra,* translated in the mid-second century by An Shih-kao (fl. 148-70 A.D.), represents the first stage in the development of text, which someone else, perhaps Vasumitra himself, then rewrote into the *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā*; the scope of that version was then expanded into a major Abhidharma treatise, which is the *Prakaraṇapāda* as it has come down

to us today.[117] The *Prakaraṇapāda* illustrates the mature synthesis of Sarvāstivādin doctrine, which will receive its most complete outline in the subsequent Abhidharma manuals, and thus represents the transition point between the *śāstras* of the middle period of Sarvāstivāda literature and the later commentarial materials.

The *Prakaraṇapāda* is the work that established definitively the Sarvāstivāda school's distinctive classifications of factors: materiality (*rūpa*), mind (*citta*), mental concomitants (*caitta*), factors dissociated from mind (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*), and uncompounded elements (*asaṃskṛtadharma*). This fivefold grouping is not found in the Theravāda tradition and seems to have developed within the Sarvāstivāda school, from which it was then adopted by other Buddhist schools. The origin of this scheme appears to have been in the *Dharmaskandha*,[118] which treats all factors in terms of four classes (*skandha*): (1) matter; (2) feelings: (3) identification and consciousness; and (4) conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*), which included both associated (*cittasaṃprayukta*) and dissociated (*cittaviprayukta*) factors. This division of conditioning factors into two parts was a special characteristic of the *Dharmaskandha*'s treatment of factors, and was an essential step in the development of the mature fivefold scheme. The formal division into five classes, however, also seems adumbrated in the *Dharmaskandha*: in its treatment of the good, bad, and neutral elements, the *Dharmaskandha*[119] maintains that the latter type includes unmanifest matter (*wu-chi se, avijñapti-rūpa*), awareness, concomitant mental factors, dissociated mental factors, and various unconditioned factors, the precise division that would become standard in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. The division of mental concomitants found in *Dharmaskandha*[120] is also followed by later texts, such as the *Dhātukāya* (see the matrix in the summary of that text) and thence the *Prakaraṇapāda*. Hence, it is clear that the fundamental insight of the *Prakaraṇapāda* was drawn directly from the *Dharmaskandha* (indeed, the *Dharmaskandha* is even cited by name in the *Prakaraṇapāda*, showing its author's familiarity with that earlier text).[121] The *Prakaraṇapāda* was not however content to give merely a listing and definition of each individual factor within the five classes. Rather, the text expanded upon these five classes in a comprehensive fashion, treating each of them in terms of various general characteristics such as the eight types of knowledge,[122] no-self, the four noble truths, frustration, and so forth.[123]

The influence exerted by the *Prakaraṇapāda*'s classification scheme is illustrated by the prominent place of the *pañcavastukas* in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. The *Jñānaprasthāna*, the text that served as the basis of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, gives only a fourfold division of factors:

awareness, mental concomitants, matter, and dissociated conditioning factors. The adoption of the *Prakaraṇapāda*'s classification scheme by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins assured that it would enter the mainstream of the Sarvāstivāda school, from whence it would become standard in all later Vaibhāṣika works. The *Abhidharmāvatāra*[124] of *Skandhila follows the *Vibhāṣā* treatment, as does the *Abhidharmakośa*'s organization of seventyfive dharmas in five groupings. This listing then influenced the treatment of factors found in the *Tattvasiddhi*, as well as in works by authors in the Sautrāntika, Madhyamaka, and Yogācāra schools.[125]

The Mature Sarvāstivāda: The *Jñānaprasthāna*

All sources agree that the doctrinal edifice of the Sarvāstivāda school is built upon the *Jñānaprasthāna*. The compilation of this text is attributed to Kātyāyanīputra, who is now generally considered to have lived around the later part of the first century B.C.[126] The six *pādaśāstras*, with their variant approaches to Sarvāstivādin doctrine, were apparently in near final from by Kātyāyanīputra's time; hence, like Buddhaghoṣa in the Theravāda school, Kātyāyanīputra was less a philosophical innovator than a scholastic systematizer. While contributing little unique to Sarvāstivāda thought, he was nevertheless the man who conceptualized the grand scale of the scholastic Sarvāstivāda system, with special attention to its outline of spiritual practice.

Two separate recensions of the *Jñānaprasthāna* are now extant in Chinese translation: the *Aṣṭagrantha*,[127] translated by Saṃghadeva and Chu Fo-nien in 383 A.D., and the *Jñānaprasthāna*[128] translated by Hsüan-tsang between 657 and 660. While both are substantially the same text, there are slight differences in the structure of the argumentation and the characteristics of the teachings, which seem to indicate that they belong to separate scholarly lineages. Indeed, the transliterations included in the *Aṣṭagrantha* suggest that it may have been the Gandhāran version of the text, while the *Jñānaprasthāna* represents the recension used by the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas. These are only hypotheses, however, and much philological work remains to be done before any definitive conclusions can be drawn.[129]

The fundamental outlook of the *Jñānaprasthāna* was soteriological, and the entire book is an attempt to systematize the various stages of the path of spiritual cultivation based on the overriding organizing principle of the four noble truths. The first chapter on miscellaneous factors opens with a discussion of the higher-worldly factors, and is primarily concerned with the truth of path. Chapter Two on fetters treats the truth of origination, while Chapter Three on knowledge and Chapter Seven on concentration are concerned with the truth of cessation. Chapters Four through Six, on action, the four great

elements, and the faculties are principally concerned with the truth of frustration. While these first seven chapters outlined the correct outlook on the four noble truths, the final chapter, on views, is devoted to rebutting the mistaken views of non-Buddhists. Hence, the main body of the text is concerned with presenting a systematic outline of the process of spiritual development. Concentration, the motive force behind progress on the path, is placed in the penultimate chapter; the realities of the world and the reasons that practice needs to be undertaken are placed in the middle sections; and knowledge, the fundamental cause of liberation, appears at the beginning of the book. Hence, as the structure of the book suggests, due to the cause of knowledge and the condition of concentration there is liberation from the fetters, entrance into the highest worldly factors, and realization of the various levels of sainthood.

The notion of highest worldly factor (*laukikāgradharma*), which opens the book, is perhaps the major conceptual innovation of the *Jñānaprasthāna*. The earliest appearance of the term in Sarvāstivādin literature is in the *Saṅgītiparyāya*,[130] but no explanation is given of the meaning of the term. The opening line of the *Jñānaprasthāna*[131] provides the first definition of "highest worldly factor": "If *citta* and *caitta dharmas* become immediate [*ānantarīya*; i.e. without any object interrupting their focus on the *nirvāṇa* object] and [bring about] the entrance into the certainty of insight (*samyaktvaniyāmā-vakrānti*), these are called highest worldly *dharmas*." Hence, a higher worldly factor is the transition point between the worldling (*pṛthagjana*) and the noble person (*ārya*), and brings about the entrance into the path of insight (*darśanamārga*). It is through this prominent focus on highest worldly factors that the *Jñānaprasthāna* is best able to integrate the major segments of the path: the mundane path of practice, the path of insight, the supramundane path of practice and finally the path of the realized adept. By opening his work with this stage of the path, Kātyāyanīputra is explaining that the transmutation of the worldling into a saint is the highest religious aspiration of the Sarvāstivādin school. In this manner also, Kātyāya-nīputra is delineating the scope of the Abhidharma concern with soteriology: unlike the Theravādin *Visuddhimagga*, which gives considerable room to coverage of such preliminary undertakings as common morality and choice of a meditation topic, the Sarvāstivādin *Jñānaprasthāna* is only concerned with the higher reaches of the path. Kātyāyanīputra's initial attempt to fix the stages of the path will prove to be a major influence on later Sarvāstivādin scholiasts, as well as on Yogācāra and other Mahāyāna exegetes. Each of the principal stages of these various paths broached in the *Jñānaprasthāna*, for example, will receive full elaboration in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. And

Kātyāyanīputra's scheme will receive one of its clearest outlines in the sixth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the *Mārgapudgala-nirdeśa.*[132]

Perhaps the second greatest contribution of the *Jñānaprasthāna* is its systematization of the scheme of six causes into what become one of the cardinal doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins: efficient cause, simultaneous cause, connected cause, homogeneous cause, cause recurring in every instance, and retributory cause. These six causes are not found anywhere in the *Āgamas*, and earlier Abhidharma texts, such as *Vijñānakāya*, mention only four.[133] This teaching seems to have been adopted by Kātyāyanīputra in order to account for the cause/effect relationships that pertained between the various stages of the path, which were his major concern in the *Jñānaprasthāna*. From the account in the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā*,[134] there seems to have been considerable controversy among the early Vaibhāṣikas about whether to accept these six causes as an authentic teaching of the Buddha. But it was Kātyāyanīputra who brought them to the forefront of Sarvāstivādin etiological investigations.[135]

The Vaibhāṣikas: *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā*

The *Mahāvibhāṣā* is a massive sourcebook of Sarvāstivādin doctrine, compiled according to tradition in the first half of the second century A.D. at the time of the third sectarian council convened in Kashmir under the sponsorship of King Kaniṣka. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* is conceived as an exposition of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, and follows the chapters and section divisions of that text. However, by no means is it simply a word-for-word commentary. The value of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* lies in its immense expansion of the coverage of doctrinal issues found in the *Jñānaprasthāna* and the earlier *pādaśāstras*. Competing currents within the contemporary Sarvāstivādin school are treated: not only are the theories of the "four Ābhidharmikas" (Dharmatrāta, Vasumitra, Ghoṣaka, and Buddhadeva) mentioned, but a number of other teachers now otherwise unknown, who apparently are all Sarvāstivādins, are also cited, including Buddharakṣa, Ghoṣavarman, Vāmalabdha, Jīvala, Saṅghavasu, Kṣemadatta, Pūrṇayaśas, Vaṣpa, Dharadatta and Dharmanandin. The intrasectarian debates recorded in this text are of enormous value in reconstructing the development of Sarvāstivāda philosophy; in addition, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* represents the pristine Vaibhāṣika viewpoint, free from the Sautrāntika bias of the later *Abhidharmakośa*, the principal text through which most Abhidharma scholars have investigated the Sarvāstivāda school. Rival schools of Buddhism also receive extensive coverage: among the more prominent are the Dharmaguptaka, Mahīśasaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Vātsīputrīya, Kāśyapīya, Sthaviravāda,

Vibhajyavāda (either the Sthaviravāda or a branch of the Mahāsāṅghika), Dārṣṭāntika (the early Sautrāntika), the Sautrāntikas proper, and the Yogācāra (probably referring only to "practitioners of Yoga", not the later Mahāyāna school of the same name). Of considerable importance, too, is the information on the proto-Mahāyāna movement found in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, which illustrates the accommodations reached between the Hīnayāna and early Mahāyāna schools, as well as the means by which the Hīnayāna would eventually evolve into the Mahāyāna. This information provides much support for the thesis that it was Sarvāstivādin ontology and soteriology, rather than the Mahāsāṅghika *bodhisattva* doctrine as found in the *Mahāvastu*, which served as the basis for the development of Mahāyāna. A variety of non-Buddhist schools are also treated, including the Nirgrantha (Jaina), Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Lokāyata (materialists), Śabdavāda (philosophers of language), and Hetuvidyā (logicians).[136] In addition, the text includes extensive information on other nonphilosophical aspects of Indian culture, including astrology, calendrics, and medicine, which would be of interest to social historians. Thus, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* provides both a comprehensive record of Buddhist and pan-Indian philosophy in the early decades of the common era, as well as valuable information on Indian cultural life in general.

There are a number of variant traditions concerning the compilation and dating of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. The text itself opens with several different views concerning its authorships.[137] The anonymous compilers of the text, known as the Vibhāṣāśāstrins, maintain that the text was in fact composed by the Buddha himself. Forced to explain the catechetical style of the text, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins reply that the Buddha responded to the questions of an interlocutor, who is identified variously as Śāriputra, the five hundred perfected beings, the gods, or a phantom monk conjured up by the Buddha himself specifically for this task. Regardless of the circumstances in which the text was composed, however, its final compilation and transmission is attributed by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins to Kātyāyanīputra, the author of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, in keeping with the common Indian practice of an author writing autocommentaries to his own treatises (as is the case with Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*).

Hsüan-tsang's lineage of Chinese Abhidharma scholars give a somewhat different account. According to them, the Kuṣāna king Kaniṣka (r. ca. 144-178 A.D.) called a convocation of *arhats* with the elder monk, Pārśva, as its chief, which included the four great Ābhidharmikas, Dharmatrāta (I, a Dārṣṭāntika; not the fourth-century author of the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*). Ghoṣaka, Vasumitra (not the author of the *Prakaraṇapāda*), and Buddhadeva;

at this third sectarian council, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* was compiled over a twelve-year period.[138] Paramārtha's *Life of Vasubandhu* says that Kātyāyanīputra himself was president of the convocation; the renowned Buddhist poet, Aśvaghoṣa, who had been converted to the Sarvāstivāda school by Pārśva somewhat ealier, was said to have been the vice-president, and was in charge of polishing the literary style of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.[139] As is indicated in the opening discussion of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, the text in its present form represents the teachings of the Kashmiri branch of the Vaibhāṣika school, and focuses on the followers of Kātyāyanīputra, the compiler of the *Jñānaprasthāna*. Taiken Kimura, however, first demonstrated that such references in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* as "In the past, at the time of Kaniṣka",[140] show that the text had to have been composed later than Kaniṣka's time. He suggests that the text probably dates from sometime between the reign of Kaniṣka and the advent of Nāgārjuna, or ca. 150 A.D.[141] The four Ābhidharmikas who receive prominent place in the text could not possibly have all been in attendance, hailing as they did from different regions and periods. Instead, the compilers apparently examined their respective positions and then critiqued them, in order to establish definitive Sarvāstivāda positions on controversial doctrinal issues.

The *Mahāvibhāṣā* is written in the catechetical style that is so ubiquitous in Abhidharma texts. After a statement introducing a matter of controversy, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins commonly begin with the statement that this view was held by the earlier Abhidharma scholars (Pūrvācāryas), and generally continue with a variety of anonymous opinions. After these unattributed citations, the views of rival Ābhidharmikas are given. Among these doctrinal specialists, those most commonly quoted are Pārśva, Vasumitra, Ghoṣaka, Dharmatrāta, Buddhadeva, and Kātyāyanīputra, who is referred to simply as the Bhadanta.[142] As was mentioned previously, the opinions of a number of obscure Sarvāstivādin figures who are all but unknown elsewhere in Vaibhāṣika literature are also mentioned. Often, these accounts appear to be verbatim citations from specific works by these *ācāryas*; this is specially the case with the four great Ābhidharmikas.[143] This may suggest that the compilation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* was carried out while consulting actual treatises by these teachers, either in written form, or as orally recited by adherents of those masters. This would also account for the fact that the same teachers are represented time and again throughout the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, for they were the authors of treatises that had achieved some degree of currency among the Sarvāstivādins of the era. Each issue commonly concludes with the "definitive critique" (*p'ing-yüeh*, "our view") of the Vibhāṣāśāstrins. This "critique" will sometimes appear after a series of

anonymous opinions,[144] indicating that there may have been considerable divergence of opinion among the compilers themselves. By some process of evaluation—concerning which, unfortunately, no information is provided—the controversies were resolved and the definitive view recorded. At other times, however, this "critique" appears after a specific statement by one of the recognized teachers. This suggests that the compilers were attempting to define a coherent, orthodox position for the Vaibhāṣika school by assessing the views of rival teachers within the school. Of the four principal Ābhidharmikas, it is Vasumitra's views that are usually (though not invariably) accepted.

Three different *Vibhāṣās* are extant in Chinese translation. The definitive text is the two-hundred fascicle *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā* (*T* 1545), translated by Hsüan-tsang between 656-59. An earlier recension of this same work was translated by Buddhavarman in 437 A.D. as the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā* (*T* 1546); only sixty fascicles of what originally was probably a hundred-fascicle work are now extant, the end of its sixtieth fascicle corresponding to fascicle 101 of Hsüan-tsang's text. Because of the early date of Buddhavarman's recension of the text, it would seem reasonable to assume that it more closely represented the original form of the text, which by Hsüan-tsang's time had undergone a considerable expansion in scope and death of coverage; more research is needed before the precise process of its textual development can be ascertained, however. There is finally a completely independent *Vibhāṣā* (*T* 1547), translated in 383 A.D., which is attributed to Sītapāṇi.[145] It is not a variant translation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, but seems to have been an independent exposition of the *Jñānaprasthāna*.[146]

The primary concern of the Vibhāṣāśāstrins was to undertake an analysis of all known solutions to specific Abhidharma problems and arrive at a consensus view that would thenceforth represent the orthodox Vaibhāṣika position. In one illuminating passage,[147] the Vibhāṣāśāstrins compress all of Abhidharma into fourteen principal topics: the six causes, four conditions, summary (*saṃgraha* or *anugraha*, *adhikāra*, etc.), connected (*saṃprayukta*), ordered (*samanvāgama*), and unordered (*asamanvāgama*). Alternatively, other masters summarize these instead as seven dyads: the skillful knowledge of causes, conditions, specific characteristrics, general characteristics, connection and disconnection, connected and disconnected, and finally ordered and unordered. As will be seen, these topics are convenient rubrics for a number of the issues raised in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. While many of them have been discussed previously, especially in the *Jñānaprasthāna*, considerable expansion in the scope of coverage has taken place in the *Mahā-*

vibhāṣā, for rather than culling its information only from the *Jñānaprasthāna*, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins have incorporated elements drawn from both the six *pādaśāstras* as well as the writings of a number of Abhidharma masters.

One of the most important developments in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* is its treatment of dependent origination. Four different types of dependent origination are outlined in the text: momentary (*kṣaṇika*) causation, as when all twelve moments of the chain are realized in a single moment of action; serial (*sāmbandhika*) causation, in which dependent origination is viewed in reference to the relationship between cause and effect; static (*āvasthika*) causation, in which dependent origination involves twelve distinct periods of the five aggregates; and prolonged (*prākarṣika*) causation, in which that sequence of causation occurs over three lifetimes. The Vibhāṣāśāstrins accept only static dependent origination, as will be reiterated later in *Abhidharmakośa* iii.25 and in the *Abhidharmahṛdaya*.[148] This type of dependent origination is most involved in the interplay between karmic cause and retribution,[149] and points out the persistent soteriological import of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of causation: through the present fruition moments of dependent origination (consciousness, name and form, six sense-bases, contact, and feeling), one can know the past causes (ignorance and conditioning factors) that led to that fruition; and through the present causes (desire, grasping, being and birth) one can know the future fruition (old age and death). Hence, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins explicitly interpreted dependent origination in terms of its role in bringing about liberation from the round of birth and death, rather than as an ontological principle, as some Buddhist schools were wont to do.

Cosmogony, and especially the role of the individual in that creation, are also examined in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.[150] The Vibhāṣāśāstrins raise the premise that sentient beings bring about the diversity of the world and undertake a corollary discussion of the reasons why an individual's final liberation and consequent disappearance from the world would not cause that diversity somehow to be diminished. There was some controversy over whether "world" referred to the physical environment itself or the karmic state of the individual being in that world. In the *Kathāvatthu*[151] the Theravādins include a vehement criticism of the Andhaka claim that the physical world was created by the karma of individual beings. In later discussions of this issue as it concerned the Sarvāstivādin school, both Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośa*[152] and Yaśomitra in his corresponding commentary in the *Sphuṭārtha* vacillate on which of the two kinds of world is meant. Elsewhere in the *Vibhāṣā*, however, it is clear that at least some faction of the Vaibhāṣikas regarded both

types of worlds as being products of karma, for we find the explicit statement, "the predominant force of the karman (*karmādhipatya; ye tseng-shang li*) of classes of sentient beings causes the formation of the world (*ling shih-chieh ch'eng*)."[153] This discussion will have implications for the later Mahāyāna-Yogācāra teaching that the world is created by mind alone (*Daśabhūmika, Pañcaviṃśati*, etc.).

The *Mahāvibhāṣā* also includes the most extensive discussion on another characteristic teaching of the Sarvāstivādin school: the intermediate state between existences. Some means of accounting for the transfer of karmic effects from one lifetime to the next was essential if the fundamental principle of karmic cause and effect was not to be controverted. This teaching would be a matter of considerable controversy between the Buddhist schools—the Pūrvaśaila, Sammitīya, Vātsīputrīya, and later Mahīśāsaka agreeing with the Sarvāstivādins in accepting it, and Theravāda, Vibhajyavāda, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, and the *Śariputrābhidharmaśāstra* of the Dharmaguptakas rejecting it. Vehement criticism of the intermediate state is found in the Theravādin *Kathāvatthu*, along with an equally spirited debate in the *Abhidharmakośa*.[154] The Vibhāṣāśāstrins, for their own part, accept the fact of an intermediate state between death and rebirth in the next life. The occupant of that state is called a *gandharva*, a special type of subtle-form body that is produced by the same karman that produced the physical body and which feeds on scent.

The categorization of associated mental factors is also explicitly subordinated to soteriological concerns pertaining to the path in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, a tendency that persists from the *Jñānaprasthāna*. Fiftyeight mental factors are listed in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*[155] in seven major groups, a grouping parallel to that found in the *Dhātukāya* and *Prakaraṇapāda*. In the *Vibhāṣā*, however, the mental factors are categorized in such a way as to allow a detached analysis of the processes by which defilements are overcome and liberation attained.[156] The soteriology of the Abhidharma commonly focuses on the thirtyseven factors of enlightenment, as has been seen already several times above. Seven factors which bear on liberation that are not, however, mentioned in that standard listing receive attention in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*: pride (*māna*, Chinese *man*), sleepiness (*middha*, Ch. *sui-min*), regret (*kaukṛtya*, Ch. *o-tso*), fear (*bhaya* or *udvega*; Ch. *pu*), perplexity (*vicikitsā*, Ch. *i*), aversion (*nirveda*, Ch. *yen*), and delight (*praharṣa*, Ch. *hsin*). While the latter two of these mental factors are solely good (*kuśala*) in content, several of the others are twofold—perplexity, for example, being both bad and neutral. In the *Mahāvibhāṣā* outline of the processes leading to liberation, much will be made of the relationship between perplexity and fear.[157] This

process begins with doubt. Doubt in most Buddhist schools is generally considered to refer to skepticism concerning the three jewels of Buddhism, the efficacy of the teaching, and so forth—in other words, it is a negative force that leads to wrong views. However, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins accept also that there is a type of doubt—something akin to informed curiosity or the intellectual passion to know—that can lead to correct view.[158] Due to this sort of positive doubt about the value of one's present lot, there arises apprehension about one's state in life, which brings in turn a desire to leave behind the defilements (*virati*; Ch. *yüan-li*) and finally results in complete disgust with the world (*nirveda*; Ch. *yen*), which leads ultimately to liberation. Much discussion will also ensue on the precise definition of the disgust, which in many ways is the essential mental factor in catalyzing the transition from ordinary person to saint.[159]

In its treatment of another distinctively Sarvāstivādin category, the forces dissociated from awareness (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*), the *Mahāvibhāṣā* makes singularly important contributions to Buddhist factor-theory. According to the *Kathāvatthu*, forces dissociated from mind are known in a number of early schools, including the Andhakas, Uttarāpathakas, Mahāsāṅghikas, Sammitīyas and Vātsīputrīyas. However, it was the Vaibhāṣikas in particular who took the classification to heart and employed them to make detailed theoretical analyses of Abhidharma problems. Acquisition-force (*prāpti*), for example, is demonstrated to be the principal agent in establishing the individual in either bondage (*saṃyoga*) or liberation (*visaṃyoga*). This focus on dissociated factors in the description of soteriological events is a peculiar characteristic of the Sarvāstivādin treatment of the category. In the later Vaibhāṣika manuals, such as the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Abhidharmadīpa*, standard lists include only thirteen such factors. The flexibility in the Vaibhāṣika use of this type of factor in order to account for complex moral and mental processes can only be gleaned by an examination of their treatment in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. There, it becomes clear that the Vaibhāṣikas resorted to this peculiar type of force on a scale heretofore unsuspected, in order to explain a variety of anomalous events, including *samucchinnakuśalamūla* ("serving the good roots"), *mūrdhāpatita* ("backsliding from the stage of 'summit'"), *arhattvaparihāna* ("regression from sainthood"), and even *saṅghabheda* ("causing schism in the order"). In such cases, descriptive difficulties inherent in accounting for the processes underlying such events made the dissociated factors classification a particularly attractive heuristic device for resolving such problems.

The *Mahāvibhāṣā* is a major source of material on early Mahāyāna developments. The term "three vehicles" (*triyāna*)—the vehicle of

the disciples (*śrāvakayāna*), the vehicle of the solitary Buddhas (*pratyekabuddhayāna*), and the Bodhisattva vehicle—does not appear in any of the six *pādaśāstras*, but these three are clearly delineated in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. Even adherents of these three vehicles are carefully distinguished from the Buddhas, however, because the Buddhas are enlightened first, and have all-encompassing enlightenment.[160] The relationship between these different soteriological ideals and the concept of spiritual lineage (*gotra*) also received extensive discussion in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, where six different lineages are outlined.[161] There, the notion of "evolution of the locus" (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*; Ch. *chuan-ken*) is also covered, in order to account for possible cases of a practitioner of a lower lineage evolving to the point of being able to assume a totally new lineage, such as the transformation of the *śrāvakagotra* into the *pratyekabuddhagotra*. Some of the most extensive treatments of these different lineage ideals are found in the works of rival schools, such as the *Śāriputradharmaśāstra*,[162] which also includes an eightfold lineage scheme, and the *Puggalapaññatti*, which discusses a fourfold lineage outline.

Doctrinal elements that have apparent affinities with those that are now regarded as Mahāyāna abound in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. In particular, descriptions of the levels of the path found in various places in the *Vibhāṣā* adumbrate subsequent Mahāyāna developments. Kātyāyanīputra, for example, has outlined a scheme of spiritual development in ten stages, explicitly called *bhūmis*, in five major segments. The (*laukika*) *bhāvanābhūmi* is comprised of six levels of practice: restraint of the organs (*indriyasaṃvara*, *ken li-i*), care in precepts (*śīlasaṃvara*, *chieh li-i*), nonregret (*akaukṛtya*; *wu-hui*), joy (*prīti*, *huan-hsi*), satisfaction (*sukha*; *an-lo*), concentration (*samādhi* or *cittaikāgratā*; *teng-chih*). This is followed by *darśanabhūmi* (*chieh-ti*), which is defined as knowledge and vision according to reality (*yathābhūtajñānadarśana*); *samatvabhūmi* (*po-ti*), defined as disgust (*nirveda*); *kāmavītarāgabhūmi* (*li-yu ti*), defined as fading away (*virāga*; Ch. *li-jan*); and *aśaikṣabhūmi*, defined as liberation (*vimokṣa*). *Nirvāṇa* is defined as the fruit of all these *bhūmis*.[163] This outline resonates with various rival ten-*bhūmi* schemes, as found in the *Mahāvastu* and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. Elsewhere in the *Vibhāṣā*, Ghoṣaka also outlines a ten-stage schema of development: (1) analyzing the truth of suffering; (2) analyzing origination; (3) analyzing cessation, (4) analyzing the path; (5) the path of application (*prayogamārga*, Ch. *chia-hsing tao*), in which virtues are amassed and the four aids to penetration cultivated in order to perfect the three precepts; (6) the noninterrupted path (*ānantaryamārga*, Ch. *wu-chien tao*), in which right knowledge

appears and eradicates the defilements; (7) liberation (*vimokṣa*, Ch. *chieh-t'o tao*), which is the one moment of right knowledge following the liberation path, which brings about the awakening to truth; (8) the advantageous path (*viśeṣamārga*, Ch. *sheng-chin tao*), which builds the efficacy of contemplation and wisdom; (9) *pratipannaka-mārga* (Ch. *hsiang-tao*), which "tends towards" the state of ultimate fruition; and finally (10) the fruits of attainment (*prāptaphala*, Ch. *te-kuo*), which is the state of ultimate fruition. Even the names and placement of the various stages of this schema seem to adumbrate the five-stage Yogācāra outline of the path: *sambhāramārga*, *prayogamārga*, *darśanamārga*, *bhāvanāmārga*, and *niṣṭhāmārga*.[164]

The analysis of materiality (*rūpa*) in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* is the most thorough such treatment found in any of the Vaibhāṣika treatises. In its system, there are basically three different classifications of *rūpa*: (1) the four great elements, consisting of earth (solidity), water (cohesion or fluidity), fire (maturation), and wind (motion); (2) the derivative materiality, comprised of the five internal sense-bases and the five external sense-objects; and (3) a peculiar type of unmanifest materiality (*avijñaptirūpa*), which provides for the continued efficacy of all physical acts, whether bodily or vocal, which do not have an obvious, immediate result. This later type of matter was posited by the Vaibhāṣikas in order to account for the continuity of karmic cause and effect, and was a matter of considerable controversy between the Buddhist schools.

Materiality is generally defined as that which has resistance;[165] this definition will, however, raise considerable problems for the Vaibhāṣikas. As the interlocutor in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* asks, "If that which involves the characteristic of resistance (*pratigha*) is called the defining mark of matter, then past, future, subtle, and unmanifest [types of materiality] would be without resistance and thus would not involve the mark of matter. And were they not to involve the mark of matter, they would not be material."[166] This premise is rejected by the Vibhāsāśāstrins: "Although past matter now has no resistance, it previously did have resistance. Although future matter now has no resistance, it will have resistance. Although each individual subtle [matter] does not have resistance, as a mass they do have resistance. Although the own-nature (*svabhāva*) of unmanifest (matter) is free from resistance, its locus (*āśraya*) has resistance; hence [unmanifest materiality] is also said to involve resistance. What is its basis? The four elements. Because that basis has resistance, the unmanifest [matter] can also be said to involve resistance, like the shadow that moves when the tree sways."[167]

Matter and karman were closely related in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. The five sense-bases are said to be produced in direct association with

karman,[168] a notion that is also found in the *Tattvasiddhi.*[169] For example, due to action that is done with seeing as cause, the eye-faculty is obtained as result; due to the action that is done with hearing as the cause, the ear-faculty is obtained as result, and so forth. This is one of a number of areas in which the *Mahāvibhāṣā* seems to have exerted an important influence on Harivarman, the author of the *Tattvasiddhi.* Another is the twenty implications of the meaning of *rūpa* given by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins,[170] which can be compared with five parallel implications found in the *Tattvasiddhi.*[171] *Avijñaptirūpa* is a peculiar type of matter, which, being invisible and unmanifest, is included in the *dharmāyatana* along with feeling, identification, and conditioning factors, as well as with the unconditioned factors.[172] While it was also accepted by the Mahāsāṅghikas and Dharmaguptakas,[173] it is most commonly associated with the Vaibhāṣika school. The term received various designations in later strata of Vaibhāṣika materials. The *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* refers to it as *akriya* (Ch. *wu-tso*),[174] while the *Nyāyānusāra* calls it *virati* (Ch. *yüan-li*).[175] This unmanifest matter is said to involve two varieties of loci: *āśrayaparivṛtti* (Ch. *chuan-i*), which is the power of transformation wrought by the four great elements of the present; and *upādāyaparivṛtti* (Ch. *tsao-i*).[176]

These few selective topics will have to suffice to illustrate the rich and varied coverage of philosophical issues that appear in this treasure trove of Abhidharma material. Detailed treatment of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* will be found in the summary of the text below.

4

A FEW EARLY ABHIDHARMA CATEGORIES

Karl H. Potter

In Buddhism, where there are no persistent entities, one may well question whether the question "what (things) are there?" can or should even be allowed to be asked. Nevertheless, it is asked, even in the canon itself, and since it is difficult to ask it without a terminology to talk about "things" a basic term is found in use right from the start to speak of the (kinds of) things there are. That term is *dharma*.

It is virtually impossible to give an acceptable translation of *dharma*. We have rendered the term as "factor", with thanks to Collett Cox for the suggestion. *Dharmas* are obviously not "things" in the usual sense, since they do not persist. Whether they are independent of the mind is a vexing question about which we shall have more to say when we consider the differences among the several schools. Whether they are real or not is also unclear. Sanskrit has terminology which is used suggestively when an author wishes to affirm the existence of something—terms such as *vastu* or *sat* come to mind here. But when lists of factors are catalogued—and Abhidharma literature is largely comprised of such lists—one can question whether a metaphysical analysis is being proposed.

Johannes Bronkhorst has attempted to trace the origins of this terminological choice of *dharma* as the word most closely functioning in Buddhism as our English "thing" does.

> The items listed in *mātṛkās* came to be known as *dharma*... The items enumerated in list I can all be described as "psychic characteristics"... We may conclude that in this earliest list, which stands at the beginning of all later Abhidharma, *dharma* has a meaning which is in no way peculiarly Buddhist.
>
> The fact that... later *mātṛkās* developed out of, or were inspired by, our "list I" would explain the fact that the items

> contained in these later *mātṛkās* came to be designated *dharma* as well. Another factor may also have supported this expansion of the meaning of *dharma*. We know that the teaching of the Buddha is frequently called *dharma*. This use of the term would be acceptable to Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike. The *mātṛkās* were intended to contain the teaching (*dharma*) of the Buddha in a nutshell. Moreover, they were extension of an original list of "psychic characteristics" (*dharma*). These two factors may jointly be responsible for the fact that all the items enumerated in *mātṛkās*, i.e. all the "elements of existence", came to be designated *dharma*.[1]

What is Bronkhorst's "list I"? It is the list of thirtyseven that "occurs in a number of Buddhist *sūtras* and *vinaya* texts"[2] and consists of the following:

> 4 applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*)
> 4 right exertions (*samyakpradhāna*)
> 4 supernatural powers (*ṛddhipāda*)
> 5 faculties (*indriya*)
> 5 powers (*bala*)
> 7 limbs of enlightenment (*bodhyaṅga*)
> 8 members of the noble eightfold path.

Bronkhorst adds:

> It seems clear that this is an early, perhaps the earliest, list of the type that came to be called *mātṛkā*/P *mātikā* and formed the basis for the later Abhidharma works.[3]
> An independent development of this *mātṛkā* was used in the original Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga, which may date from less than fifty years after the death of the Buddha...[4]

Bronkhorst goes on in his article to trace the development of this *mātṛkā*, showing that it gradually incorporated groups of meditative states which swelled the number of *dharmas* to numbers of the sort we find in the texts summarized below. For example, the *Vibhaṅga* works with a list of *dharmas* numbering 44, noting (following Frauwallner) that it and the *Dharmaskandha* must have had a common source in a lost version dating to prior to 200 B.C., and perhaps "*long* before 200 B.C."[5]

Whatever the history of its origins in the period prior to the first Abhidharma texts, treatment of the Abhidharma literature here covered must center on these matrices. It is impossible here to try to lay out even in summary fashion the variety of ways our literature finds to organize factors. The most thorough study to date of the

matrices, showing which groups are located in which texts and belong to which schools, is found in the Introduction to André Bareau's LL.D. thesis at the University of Paris of 1950, which mainly contains a translation into French of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. He rates the three oldest lists as those found in the *Vimuktimārgaśāstra*, the *Vibhaṅga* and the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, and identifies in addition different lists found in the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* and in Sarvāstivāda texts. He proposes dates, however, which have not been found acceptable by more recent scholarship. The other notable study of the topic of matrices is found in A.K. Warder's Introduction to Nanamoli's translation of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*.[6] We quote from this study:

> It appears that after the First Schism, with the Mahāsāṃghikas (probably in B.C. 349...) the Theravāda Schools had an *Abhidhamma* in 4 sections, namely (1) With Questions, (2) Without Questions, (3) Conjunction and Inclusion and (4) Basis (conditions, sources). The first two of these correspond in content to the extant *Vibhaṅga*, the third to the *Dhātukathā*, and the fourth to the *Paṭṭhāna*, though no doubt with comparatively little of the elaboration we now find in all these texts... The distinction of with and without questions is purely formal. Thus the topics of the groups or aggregates, the sense-spheres, elements.... and some others were elaborated in the form of questions and answers by applying to their *dhammas* some at least of the dyads... and triads... much as we still find done... On the other hand, the topics of the four bases of... mindfulness, the exertions, bases of power (*iddhi*), the way (path) and so on were expounded by quoting relevant passages from the *suttas*...
> Only three Abhidhammas of schools developed from this original Theravāda seem now to be extant: the Pali of the Mahāvihāravāsins or Theravāda in the narrow sense of the school which retained the original name; the Sabbatthivādin (for) seven texts of which some fragments are available in Sanskrit and the whole in Chinese and Tibetan translations; and the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* in a Chinese translation... which is conjectured to belong to the Dhammaguttaka school.[7]

In principle it should be possible to take a list of factors proposed in an Abhidharma text and to subdivide it into groups corresponding to those identified in our texts. To attempt this project leads quickly to considerable frustration. There does not seem to have been a basic set or even a canonical number of factors that are to be found in all the lists. Even to find a common core relating any two lists is difficult and probably impossible. Furthermore, it is extremely hard

to recapture what, if any, plan the creators of these lists had in mind.

One English-writing scholar, Nyanaponika Thera, has indeed attempted the sort of thing called for. His list is the one proposed in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and the authority for his classification arises from Buddhaghoṣa's *Aṭṭhasālinī* (a text later than the period here summarized). Finding 56 kinds of good *dharmas* given in that text, he is able to identify classifications of them as follows:[8]

1. Contact (*sparśa*)	
2. Feeling (*vedanā*)	Pentad of Sense
3. Identification (*saṃjñā*)	Impression
4. Thinking (*cetanā*)	(*sparśapañcaka*)
5. Consciousness (*citta*)	
6. Initial Thought (*vitarka*)	
7. Sustained Thought (*vicāra*)	Factors of
8. Joy (*prīti*)	Absorption
9. Satisfaction (*sukha*)	(*dhyānāṅga*)
10. Mental One-pointedness (*cittass'ekaggatā*)	
11. Faculty of Faith (*śraddhā*)	
12. Faculty of Energy (*vīryendriya*)	
13. Faculty of Mindfulness (*smṛtīndriya*)	
14. Faculty of Concentration (*samādhīndriya*)	
15. Faculty of Wisdom (*prajñendriya*)	Faculties
16. Faculty of Mind (*manas indriya*)	
17. Faculty of Joy (*saumanasyendriya*)	
18. Faculty of Vitality (*jīvitendriya*)	
19. Right View (*samyagdṛṣṭi*)	
20. Right Conceptualizing (*samyaksaṅkalpa*)	Path
21. Right Effort (*samyak vyāyāma*)	Factors
22. Right Mindfulness (*samyak smṛti*)	(*mārgāṅga*)
23. Right Concentration (*samyak samādhi*)	
24. Power of Faith (*śraddhābala*)	
25. Power of Energy (*vīryabala*)	
26. Power of Mindfulness (*smṛtibala*)	Powers
27. Power of Concentration (*samādhibala*)	(*bala*)
28. Power of Wisdom (*prajñābala*)	
29. Power of Shame (*hrībala*)	
30. Power of Scruples (*apatrapābala*)	
31. Absence of Greed (*alobha*)	Good
32. Absence of Hatred (*adveṣa*)	Roots
33. Absence of Delusion (*amoha*)	(*kuśalamūla*)
34. Absence of Covetousness (*anabhidhyā*)	Good
35. Absence of Malice (*avyāpāda*)	Paths of Action
36. Right View (*samyagdṛṣṭi*)	(*kuśalakarmapātha*)

37. Shame (*hrī*)	Guardians of the World
38. Scruples (*apatrapā*)	(*lokapāla*)
39. Bodily Serenity (*kāyaprasāda*)	
40. Serenity of Awareness (*cittaprasāda*)	
41. Bodily Lightness (*kāyalaghutā*)	
42. Lightness of Awareness (*cittalaghutā*)	The
43. Bodily Pliancy (*kāyamṛdutā*)	Six
44. Pliancy of Awareness (*cittamṛdutā*)	Pairs
45. Bodily Adaptability (*kāyakarmaṇyatā*)	(*yugalaka*)
46. Adaptability of Awareness (*cittakarmaṇyatā*)	
47. Bodily Proficiency (*kāyapraguṇatā*)	
48. Proficiency of Awareness (*cittapraguṇatā*)	
49. Bodily Straightforwardness (*kāyarjukatā*)	
50. Straightforwardness of Awareness (*cittarjukatā*)	
51. Mindfulness (*smṛti*)	Helpers
52. Comprehension (*samprajanya*)	(*upakāraka*)
53. Peace (*śamatha*)	Pairwise Combination
54. Insight (*vipaśyanā*)	(*yuganaddha*)
55. Determination (*pragraha*)	The Last Dyad
56. Undistractedness (*avikṣepa*)	(Pali *piṭṭhi-duka*)

While this is instructive as a sample, we must immediately note that not only is this list *not* adopted in its entirety by any other text covered here, but even in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* itself one finds a slightly different alternative list. Furthermore, the terms provided by Nyanaponika as classification of various groups within this list are not necessarily used elsewhere to pick out just this number of factors or just these factors. Clearly the circumstances call for a commentarial tradition to pull together disparate lists, contrasting terminologies, and indeed such a commentarial tradition does develop, but largely after the period here surveyed.

Under these circumstances to try to streamline these lists of factors into a manageable common format will necessarily require writing a new commentary on the texts, something it is precisely not our intention to provide here. About all we can do at this juncture is to indicate some of the most recurrent classifications of *dharmas* found in the literature under surveillance in this volume. Even to do this will be no more than a wave of the hand toward the direction of a task that must be performed by proponents of the tradition, since only they can bring to the effort the necessary sympathetic understanding of Abhidharma required for the serious contribution such a task would represent.

We shall confine our efforts here to an attempt to indicate a few of the many classifications of factors found in the summaries below.

Quite a number of such matrix-type lists have been treated already in this Introduction. For example, the four noble truths appear in most matrices in one fashion or another, as do the twelve members of the chain of dependent origination. The six higher faculties, the intoxicants, the components of the noble path—whether eightfold or otherwise, the elements on a path (e.g. practice, meditation, insight, wisdom), the five "precepts" or moral practices, the five hindrances and their abandonment, the four meditative trance states, the seven purifications, the four aspirants (stream-enterer, once-returner, nonreturner, perfected being), the ten hindrances, and the seven factors of enlightenment, all of which have already been referred to in these introductory essays, appear in many lists of factors, though under differing terminology, in different numbers in irregular amounts. Besides these there are a few more that appear regularly in the works reviewed.

The Five Aggregates. A useful translation of *skandha* is hard to find. The usual rendition is "aggregate", which we have adopted here. In later Abhidharma works there are regular efforts to match groups of factors to each of the five aggregates—an exercise which is of dubious help to us who are trying to understand the notions themselves. At least it is always the same five (types of) things which are listed as the five aggregates. These are matter (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), identification (*saṃjñā*), conditions (*saṃskāra*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*).

1. *Matter.* Though we have adopted the standard translation of the term *rūpa* as "matter", it is quite clear that, as with many Buddhist terms, neither this translation nor any other easily found is adequate for the purpose. "Matter" for us means stuff, and there is no stuff in Buddhism, for nothing persists.[9] It is said to be of four basic sorts—earth, fire, air and water, and to include also those things grasping (*upādāna*) them. Specifically so included are the parts of the body, including the sense organs, and the external material things grasped by those organs, which are not substances but rather fleeting sensations or "sense-data".

The classification of four basic sorts of matter, termed *mahābhūta* in Buddhism, is much like that found in other early schools with the absence (for the most part) of *ākāśa* (found in all comparable list of other Indian systems except that of the Jains who, like the Buddhists, list the four of earth, air, fire and water alone). In earliest passages this aggregate seems not to have been subdivided further, though it certainly is later, e.g. into 27 varieties in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi.* However, Gethin points out,

What is clear... is the extent to which the early Buddhist account

> of *rūpa* focusses on the physical world as experienced by a sentient being—the terms of reference are decidedly body-endowed-with-consciousness (*saviññānaka kāya*).[10]

Thus "matter", associated by Westerners with inert stuff independent of humans, is not at all acceptable as a translation of the word *rūpa*, which in fact rather means "color" or "form" (i.e. shape).

Though there are four basic sorts of *rūpa*, we find in Abhidharma the important and peculiar notion that every "material" thing has aspects of all four elements in it. Thus the translations of the respective Sanskrit terms as "earth", "water", "air" and "fire" only refer to the distinguishing aspects of certain factors, the peculiar ways in which each respective element behaves along with other ways. In the case of a factor of earth, therefore, it has certain features which it possesses in virtue of its being an earthy factor, but it does not occur independently (as other systems such as Vaiśeṣika view an earth-atom as occurring independently of a water-atom); rather, it must occur in the company of the features of watery, airy and fiery factors. These aggregates, then, are not atomic entities, as in Vaiśeṣika, but rather aspects of fleeing experiences, numbers of which flash at any moment of occurrence. And when we speak, e.g. of an "earth *rūpa*" we are only calling attention to the aspects of the experience which is (or would be) occasioned by (or constituted?) by the flashings. Such flashings come in groups, not singly.

The aspects peculiar to earth flashings are said in the *nikāyas* to be hardness, rigidity, spreading out and occupying space. But these features do not occur independently. Rather, they represent the earthy aspects of any material experience, occurring with watery, airy and fiery aspects. Watery aspects are such as viscidity and cohesion, flowing in streams. Fiery aspects are especially heat (with cold touch counting a lowgrade type of heat)[11] which is connected with the ripening and maturing of things. And airy aspects include inflation, fluctuation, motion, lightness (i.e. airiness).

These four aspects of matter always arise together and disappear together. One cannot exist without the other three. And they always occur together in equal portions; one of the four cannot "outweigh" the others. How is it, then, that we have qualitatively different experiences, in one of which the visual element is paramount, in another the tangible, and so on? The answer given is that one of the four can be more intense than some or all of the others. A solid thing has earth predominant in intensity, a fiery thing water, and so on. Later on in Buddhism other ideas will arise on this topic.

2. *Feeling* (*vedanā*). The classifications here are simply into satisfying (*sukha*), frustrating (*duḥkha*) and neutral (*avyākṛta*). Feelings are also divided into bodily and mental. There is little attempt during this period to classify feelings.

3. (*Conceptual*) *identification* (*saṃjñā*). Still one more term that appears to defy happy translation by any single English term is *saṃjñā*, the third aggregate. La Vallée Poussin writes:

> Consciousness (*vijñāna*) knows blueness, but does not know that "this (object) is blue". It is perception (*saṃjñā*) which identifies the external object with the internal object.[12]

Karunadasa suggests "perception" as a translation of *saṃjñā*, but the way speakers of English use "perception" confines it closely to sensory grasping, and it is not sensation that is uniquely important here: many of the factors making up these aggregates are mental, not physical or sensory. Gethin suggests that

> a *saññā* of, say, "blue" then becomes, not so much a passive awareness of the visual sensation we subsequently agree to call "blue", but rather the active noting of that sensation, and the recognising of it as "blue"—that is, more or less, the idea of "blueness".[13]

The translation suggested here, "(conceptual) identification", is not a happy one for easy speech but seems to capture the notion intended as closely as any English term can.

The term *saṃjñā* strongly suggests the presence of linguistic aspects. Paul Williams has explored the relationship between *saṃjñā* and *nāman*, another term that is suggestive of language. His discussion relates to a somewhat later period in Buddhism, but the discussion is pertinent to the earlier period as well.

> *Saṃjñā*... becomes the principal element in the creation of a single term for a multitude of changing factors, and thus by virtue of the requirement of a single referent, *saṃjñā* creates *prajñaptisat* entities...[14]

Prajñaptisat or *saṃvṛtisat* entities are those which have no real essence. They are "secondary entities",

> ... elements which are common to a number of spatial and temporal points and therefore cannot be uniquely described, they involve universals which necessarily transcend spatio-

temporal momentariness and therefore cannot themselves be ultimately real.[15]

4. *Conditioning Factors* (*saṃskāra*). A large number of factors in our texts belong to the general class of *saṃskāras*. What do *saṃskāras* have in common that warrants their being so termed?

> The *nikāyas* define *saṃkhāras* primarily in terms of will or volition (*cetanā*); they also describe them as putting together (*abhisaṃkharanti*) each of the *khandhas* in turn into something that is put-together (*saṃkhata*). In this way *saṃkhāras* are presented as conditioning factors conceived of as active volition forces. *Cetanā* is, of course, understood as *kamma* on the mental level, and in the early *abhidhamma* texts all those mental factors that are considered to be specifically skilful (*kuśala*) or unskilful (*akuśala*) fall within the domain of *saṃkhāra-khandha*.[16]

Thus these factors correspond to a number of items which condition our doings and thinkings; their involvement in the karmic conditioning process is suggested by the term "conditioning factor". In the summaries following we also use the more manageable term "condition" to indicate this aggregate.

5. *Consciousness* (*vijñāna*). A question may have occurred to the reader which threatens to reduce to obscurity the very context in which discussion of aggregates arises. That is this: if a person is an aggregate of aggregates, and these aggregates are themselves factors which are momentary, what happens when these streams of factors come to an end with the death of the individual person? Buddhists talk, as other Indians do, of karma and rebirth, but how is that possible given the overarching conception of the momentariness of all things? The analysis of the person into physical (*rūpa*), emotional (*vedanā*), conceptual (*saṃjñā*) and conditioning (*saṃskāra*) elements doesn't help explain how a person can even *seem* to persist from death to rebirth, since the physical body withers and dies, the emotions cease at death, concepts and volitions also cease. Under the circumstances, what is the connection between Ms. or Mr. A, who dies at *t*, and Mr. or Ms. B, who is born at $t + n$? Surely the identity of the individual person needs to be included among the factors into which that person is analysed.

It is presumably the need for an answer to this question which leads to the fifth factor. This fifth *skandha* plays several roles. On the one hand, since it is clear that there is an important difference between the consciousness which arises when a sense-organ contacts an object and the mere sensing of a datum or even the mere identifying

of it as (e.g.) "blue", we find in the lists of factors sensory awarenesses (*cakṣurvijñāna*, etc.) listed in addition to the sensings (*cakṣus*, etc.) and identifyings themselves. But, beyond this, consciousness is that type of factor the stream of which persists beyond bodily demise.[17] It is evidently this stream that maintains individual identity through the intermediate state and on into the next life.

The term *vijñāna* is also used in still another connection, to explain what it is that is still there (as stream) in the higher meditative states that Buddhist meditation theory describes. Wijesekere pertinently points out that the descriptive terms for these higher meditative states regularly incorporate the presence of consciousness if nothing else into the descriptions of these states.[18]

A number of distinctions have been rather hurriedly proposed in the previous paragraphs, relating to distinctions which might be suspected to be introduced for expository ease rather than any concern to report Buddhist tenets accurately. So we should point out immediately that besides the five aggregates there are other classifications of factors, accepted from the outset in the Buddha's own accounts, which are based on these distinctions. We have, besides the aggregates, three sets of classifications dealing with the ways in which factors are cognized.

Faculties, Bases and Elements. These classifications take account of the ways in which factors are grasped. There are five external faculties (*indriya*): the visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory and tactile faculties. These are not to be confused with the *physical* organs—eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin—which we ordinarily think to perform the functions these "faculties" name. Rather, the reference is to momentary, possibly atomic-sized factors scattered over the ball of the eye and possessed of the faculty of vision, etc. Added to these is a sixth faculty, the internal faculty of "mind", which grasps factors that do not involve external sensory elements.

Each of these six faculties has a type of factor it is capable of grasping. As we saw, these factors flash together with factors of the other three material kinds. The flashing is constituted by graspings of the five sensory sorts. Corresponding to the sixth, internal faculty there is a mental kind of object grasped by it.

The twelve types of factors making up the list of faculties together with the things grasped by them is called the list of bases (*āyatana*). Everything that is grasped is comprised of bases, including the faculties themselves.

A third list presents eighteen elements (*dhātu*). These are the twelve bases plus six more factors, identified as the consciousness (*vijñāna*) of each of the five sensory kinds plus, again, a sixth called the element of mental consciousness or (as we have translated it here) "represen-

tative cognition" (a translation felt to give a bit more of an idea what is being talked about). McGovern describes the function of representative cognition in this manner:

> ... Each of six *vijñānas* has only a momentary existence. Nevertheless, there is karmic or causal affinity between the various groups of consciousness of one moment and the next. The group of this moment inherits the tendencies, etc., of the immediately preceding group, and as the chief function of *manovijñānas* is memory and reason, both separately connected with the continuity of the mental process, it is said that the constantly dying away *vijñānas* of the past moment constitutes the base or organ for the activity of the *manovijñāna* of the present moment. Just as the activity of the *cakṣur* or *indriya* brings about the arising of *cakṣur-vijñāna* or the visual consciousness, so does the transmitted energy of all the immediately preceding *vijñānas* bring about the arising of the *manovijñānas*.[19]

Time. Early Buddhist ideas about time have been mentioned already. Generally, Buddhism takes it as canonical that things are fleeting, lasting for only a moment. But how long is a "moment"? And in particular, are there "things" which occupy moments—past, present and future—or is a *dharma* confined to the present only?

The most natural interpretation of "momentary" would seem to favor the last mentioned view, that things exist for only a moment, that a thing has no "history". The only existents are now. Apparently this was indeed the view of early Abhidharmists of the Sthaviravāda persuasion, who are sometimes termed *vibhajyavādins*, i.e. "distinctionists", since they divide factors into two kinds, those which "exist" and those which do not. But it was not the only view held in early Buddhism.

Most of the earlier stratum of Sarvāstivādin texts do not treat time distinctly. But the very name of the movement suggests that their view is different from that of the distinctionists. Given our tentative reconstruction of the development of Abhidharma thought, the first text we have that presents the Sarvāstivāda side of the picture is the *Vijñānakāya*, which criticizes Maudgalyāyana's view that the present, but not the past or future, exists as incoherent, involving self-contradiction. Whether this was the view of the northern, Sarvāstivāda Buddhists from the beginning is not entirely clear, though the name 'Sarvāstivāda' itself suggests that it was and that this was indeed the main point of distinction of their position. In any case, the *Vijñānakāya*, while it criticizes distinctionism, does not choose to offer a positive account of time. Indeed, a well-deve-

loped account of this theory seems only to occur after our time period.

Nevertheless, it is probable that the general lines of the Sarvāstivāda account of time extend back into our period. Collett Cox has summarized the views of two traditions of the time, the traditions of the Sarvāstivādins and a view which will grow in importance later, that of the Sautrāntikas (or, as Cox terms them, the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas).[20]

> The Sarvāstivādins argue that factors exist as real entities (*dravya*) in the three time periods of past, present and future. As such, they are defined as intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), characterized by a particular inherent characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*). Given appropriate causes and conditions, there existent factors manifest a particular activity (*kāritra*), which then defines them as present. However, since factors also exist as past or future they are capable of serving as conditions in those times as well... By contrast, the Dārṣṭāntikas equate a factor's existence with its present activity. One cannot meaningfully distinguish a factor's intrinsic nature from its activity, and thereby speak of its existence in the past or future. Further, they argue, factors do not exist as isolated units of intrinsic nature that manifest a particular activity through the influence of other isolated conditions. For the Dārṣṭāntikas, the process of causal interrelation is the only fact of experience; the fragmentation of this process into discrete factors possessed of individual existence and unique efficacy is only a mental fabrication.[21]

Other Categories. Besides the many sets of factors that have now been discussed there are still more that deserve at least brief mention, in no particular order of importance.

(*a*) Four Immaterial States (*brahmavihāra*). These are listed as friendship, compassion, sympathy and equanimity, and are alternately referred to on occasion as 'boundless' states of 'unlimited scope'.

(*b*) Four Knots (*grantha*) or Floods (*ogha*) or Bonds (*yoga*). In *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* the same list is called by all three names, and includes (1) ignorance, (2) covetousness, (3) malice and (4) addiction to moral precepts and vows. However, in the *Saṅgītiparyāya* a different list appears as the four 'floods'—(1) sensual pleasure, (2) existence, (3) (wrong) views and (4) ignorance.

(*c*) Four Discriminations (*pratisaṃvid*), P. *paṭisambhidā*). In the *Vibhaṅga* these comprise discrimination (1) as to the results of one's actions, (2) as to factors, (3) as to the appropriate choice of words,

(4) as to one's awareness of others. But in *Saṅgītiparyāya* the four concern (1) factors, (2) consequence, (3) awareness of others and (4) convention. A still different four are found in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*: discrimination of (1) things (or meanings) (*artha*), (2) factors, (3) language (*nirukti*) and (4) perspicaciousness (*pratibhāna*).

(*d*) Five or Six Hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*). The list of these given in *Dharmasaṃgraha* comprises six: (1) sexual interest, (2) malice, (3) stolidity and torpor, (4) distraction and worry, (5) perplexity and (6) ignorance. There are only five of these listed in *Saṅgītiparyāya*—ignorance is not counted there as a hindrance.

(*e*) Fetters (*saṃyojana*). Different texts list different numbers of these, and one finds different numbers listed under this rubric in different places in the same text. For example, at *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* III.1.1(8) there are three fetters—(1) belief that the body is real, (2) perplexity about the master, the *dharma*, the order, and (3) addiction to moral precepts and vows. But at III.1.2.4 the fetters number ten, these three being joined by (4) passionate desire, (5) repulsiveness, (6) pride, (7) passion to be reborn, (8) envy, (9) meanness, and (10) ignorance. Subsequent lists in *Vibhaṅga*, *Saṅgītiparyāya* and elsewhere overlap these, not always numbering ten.

We need not prolong this exercise. It is not intended as in any way definitive of anything, but merely suggests that, despite the apparent repetitiveness of these texts the actual content is different with each new author. We do not yet have a fixed, dogmatic account to contend with.

PART TWO

SUMMARIES OF WORKS
(Arranged chronologically)

1

DHAMMASAṄGAṆI

Summary by Karl H. Potter

In the list of seven Abhidharma treatises accepted by Theravāda tradition the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* stands at the head. Tradition tells us that the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* was recited at the Second Council, held around 386 B.C. according to Warder.[1] This agrees with the date assigned by Mrs. Rhys Davids in T and accepted by many other scholars, a date which would make the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* about the oldest of the Abhidharma texts of either the Theravāda or Sarvāstivāda traditions. There are close connections between portions of this text and passages in the *Vibhaṅga* and *Puggalapaññatti*, which leads many scholars to assign all three texts to an early period.

André Bareau, however, points out that some passages of *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* are found in the *Prakaraṇapāda* and *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* and he dates all of these materials later, in the 2nd century B.C. Part of the discrepancy turns on whether we are speaking of the dating of the headings or of the rest of the work. Bareau states: "It is probable that the composition of *Kathāvatthu* was started well before that of *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (*mātikā* excepted)... and that the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* was terminated after (the *Kathāvatthu*) has been definitely fixed."[2] Thus we find general agreement that the *mātikā*—or perhaps more than one such—found in this work represents an early stage of development of Abhidharma thought. Whether it was the "original" *mātikā* is questioned by Warder, who distinguishes three "separate (Abhidharma) lists of topics, or matrices", of which the list of *dharmas* grouping them into aggregates, sense-organs and elements, etc. may have been the oldest list and the classification of *dharmas* into 22 triplets, 100 pairs and further subordinate groups represents a "refinement on the part of the Theravāda school".[3]

This work lists and classifies *dharmas* under 122 matrices. The first 22 matrices involve a tripartite division, the remaining 100 are divided into two aspects. The style of exposition is in question and

answer form, the question invariably being "which are the ...?", in answer to which the item in question is identified under various rubrics. In the following summary, more an outline, this dialogue style is not followed in the interest of the clarity and economy one can derive from a tabular account is provided.

"E" references are to the edition by J. Kashyap in the Nalanda-Devanagari Pali Series, Nalanda 1960 (RB19). 'T' references are to Mrs. Carolyn A. F. Rhys Davids' translation under the title *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics* (London 1900, 1923; New Delhi 1975) (RB15).[4]

(E3–17; TCV–CXIII) The work begins with the bare listing of the headings explained in Book III below.

BOOK ONE: ON THE ARISING OF AWARENESS[5]
Chapter One: Good Factors
Section One: Relating to the Sensuous Universe
First (Type of) Awareness

(A) Analysis of Terms

(I.1.1.1A) (E18–27; T1–23)[6] Good awarenesses relating to the sensuous universe which are accompanied by contentedness, connected with knowledge, and have as their supporting object something visual (i.e. material) or auditory or gustatory or olfactory or tactual or a *dharma*, are accompanied or followed by:

1. Contact, the relating of the idea to the content,
2. Feeling, the pleasant sensation which arises from that contact,
3. Conceptual identification, the cognitive awareness of the contact,
4. Thinking, purposefulness toward action,
5. Consciousness, mental consideration of the content,
6. Initial thought on the nature of the content,
7. Sustained thought on that nature,
8. Joy, a happy emotional response,
9. Satisfaction in the achievement of positive thought,
10. One–pointed awareness, meditative concentration on the content,
11. The faculty of faith, confidence in what one is doing,
12. The faculty of energy, sustained ardent effort,
13. The faculty of right mindfulness,
14. The faculty of concentration (explained in the same words as 10 above),
15. The faculty of wisdom,
16. The faculty of mind (explained as 5 was),

17. The faculty of contentedness (explained as 9 was),
18. The faculty of life, the preservation of the above faculties,
19. Right view (explained as 15 was),
20. Right conceptualizing (explained as 6 was),
21. Right effort (explained as 12 was),
22. Right mindfulness (explained as 13 was),
23. Right concentration (explained as 10 was),
24. The power of faith (explained as 11 was),
25. The power of energy (explained as 12 was),
26. The power of mindfulness (explained as 13 was),
27. The power of concentration (explained as 10 was),
28. The power of wisdom (explained as 15 was),
29. The power of shame, feeling disgrace at bad states,
30. The power of modesty when bad states have occurred,
31. Absence of greed,,
32. Sympathy, the absence of hatred or malice,
33. Understanding, literally the absence of delusion (explained as 15 was),
34. Noncovetousness (explained as 31 was),
35. Absence of malice (explained as 32 was),
36. Right views (explained as 15 was),
37. Shame (explained as 29 was),
38. Modesty (explained as 30 was),
39. Serenity of the group of factors, i.e. the tranquility of feeling, identification and conditioning,
40. Serenity of awareness, the tranquility of consciousness,
41. Lightness of the group of factors, alertness in feeling, identification and conditioning,
42. Lightness of awareness, alertness of consciousness,
43. Pliancy of the group of factors, absence of rigidity in feeling, identification and conditioning,
44. Openminded awareness, pliancy in consciousness,
45. Adaptability of the group of factors, the serviceability for good actions of feelings, identification and conditioning,
46. Adaptability of awareness, the serviceability of consciousness for good actions,
47. Proficiency of the group of factors, efficiency of feelings, identification and conditioning to accomplish good,
48. Proficiency of awareness, efficiency of consciousness to accomplish good,
49. Fitness of the group of factors, absence of deceit in feelings, identification and conditioning,
50. Fitness of awareness, absence of deceit in consciousness,
51. Memory (explained as in 13),

52. Comprehension (explained as in 15),
53. Peace (explained as in 10),
54. Insight (explained as in 15),
55. Determination (explained as in 12),
56. Undistractedness (explained as in 10).

(B) Aspects under which the good *dharmas* can be viewed

(I.1.1.2) (E27–37; T24–33) 1. Under the four aggregates, viz., feeling, identification, conditioning and consciousness. States 2, 3 and 5 of the aggregates listed in Part One above correspond to feeling, identification and consciousness aggregates respectively; all the others correspond to conditioning.

2. Under the two sense-bases, viz. the basis of awareness (explained as in item 5 in the list in Part One above) and the basis of factors, explained as the aggregates of feeling, identification and consciousness aggregates respectively; all the others correspond to conditioning.

3. Under the two elements, viz., the element of mental consciousness (explained as under item 5 in Part One) and the element of *dharmas* (corresponding to the aggregates of feeling, identification and conditioning).

4. Under three nutriments, viz., as the nutriment of contact (explained under item 1 of Part One), as the nutriment of representative cognition or purposefulness, as the nutriment of consciousness or awareness.

5. Under eight faculties (cf. items 11-18 of Part One).

6. Under the five aspects of meditation (see items 6-10 in Part One).

7. Under the fivefold path (cf. items 19-23 of Part One).

8. Under seven powers (cf. items 24-30 of Part One).

9. Under three causes of moral behavior, viz., items 31-33 of Part One.

10. Or each as a single factor, whether one of the 56 *dharmas* listed in Part One, or one of the aggregates, or a sense-organ, etc.

(C) Emptiness

(I.1.1.3) (E37–39; T30–32) All these things—factors, aggregates, organs, etc.—that have been discussed are no more than immaterial causally dependent factors.

Thus the first type of good awareness.

Second (Type of) Awareness

(I.1.1.4) (E39; T32–33) The second type is described precisely

as the first is, except that it is characterized as having arisen from instigation.

Third (Type of) Awareness

(I.1.1.5) (E39–41; T33–35) The third type differs from the first in that whereas they were connected with knowledge, this type is disconnected from knowledge, so that items 15, 19, 33, and 36 are missing from the list of factors given here, and there is reference to a fourfold rather than a fivefold path, since item 19 is missing.

Fourth (Type of) Awareness

(I.1.1.6) (E41; T35–36) This type is like the third type except that it arises from prompting like the second type.

Fifth (Type of) Awareness

(I.1.1.7) (E41–43; T36–38) Here the good awareness is connected with knowledge and accompanied by equanimity. Items 8 and 9 in Part One are replaced respectively by one new item, viz., equanimity, and item 17 is replaced by the faculty of equanimity.

Sixth (Type of) Awareness

(I.1.1.8) (E43; T38) Like type five with the addition of the presence of prompting.

Seventh (Type of) Awareness

(I.1.1.9) (E43–44; T38–39) Like type five, except that the characteristic of being disconnected from knowledge replaces its opposite.

Eighth (Type of) Awareness

(I.1.1.10) (E44–45; T39) Like type six, except that it is disconnected from knowledge.

Section Two: Relating to the Material World
Part One: Earth-gazing as Meditative Device

(A) Fourfold and Fivefold Aspects of Meditation

(I.1.2.1A) (E45–51; T40–48) One who, to attain the material world, taking leave of desires and bad thought, by earth-gazing gets

to and stays in the first meditative state, which is the one involving initial and sustained thought in solitude and is accompanied by joy and satisfaction, is visited by the 56 good factors (listed in I.1.1.1A).

When he suppresses initial and sustained thought and enters the second meditative state through earth-gazing, then his mind, free from discursive thought, becomes tranquil and "dwells on high", then he is visited by the good factors of I.1.1.1A excepting items 6, 7, 20. Likewise, the lists of aspects are revised so as to exclude items involving initial and sustained thought, so that there are only three aspects of meditation and a fourfold path.

When he becomes indifferent through losing desire for joy, being self-aware, and by earth-gazing gets to and stays in the third meditative state, then he is visited by the good factors of I.1.1.1A excepting for items 6, 7, 8. Likewise, the lists of aspects are revised from the previous paragraph to exclude items relating to joy, so that there are only two aspects of meditation and fourfold path.

When he takes leave of both satisfaction and frustration as well as of both a contented or depressed mind, and by earth–gazing gets to and stays in the fourth meditative state, involving pure memory arising from equanimity with no feelings of satisfaction or frustration, then he is visited by the good factors of I.1.1.5. Likewise the lists of aspects are revised as in the previous paragraph.

The foregoing account is reviewed with five, rather than four, meditative states involved, but to the same effect.

(B) The Four Modes of Progress

(I.1.2.1B) (E51-52; T49–50) When the aspirant of the foregoing section A by earth-gazing gets to and stays in first meditative state, his progress filled with frustrations and his higher faculties slow, the 56 factors of I.1.1.1A are good. They are also so whether his progress is satisfying and his higher faculties quick, or his progress frustrating and his higher faculties quick, or his progress satisfying and his higher faculties slow. These four possibilities are rehearsed with respect to the second, third and fourth meditative states utilizing the appropriate lists of factors as indicated in I.1.2.1A.

(C) The Four Supporting Objects of Awareness

(I.1.2.1C) (E52; T50–51) When the aspirant of I.1.2.1A by earth-gazing gets to and stays in the first meditative state, which state is limited in scope and has a supporting object that is limited, the 56 factors of I.1.1.1A are good. They are also so whether his state is boundless and the supporting object bounded, the state bounded and the supporting object boundless, or the state bounded

and the supporting object bounded. These four possibilities are rehearsed with respect to the second, third and fourth meditative states utilizing the appropriate lists of factors as indicated in I.1.2.1A.

(D) The Combination of Sixteen

(I.1.2.1D) (E53–56; T51–52) The descriptions gotten by permuting the possible combinations of I.1.2.1B and I.1.2.1C above constitute sixteen cases.

Part Two (acc. to E); 1E (acc. to T): The Remaining Seven Devices

(I.1.2.2) (E56; T52–53) A like sixteen cases can be derived following the pattern of I.1.2.1 for seven more meditative devices, which are identified as (2) water, (3) fire, (4) air, (5) dark, (6) yellow, (7) red and (8) white.

Part Three (of E; Two of T): The Bases of Mastery

(A) Limited Forms

(I.1.2.3A) (E56–57; T53–54) When the aspirant for the material world who, not identifying his body as his body but seeing external objects as limited gets mastery by thinking 'I am aware of (it), I see (it)' and who then gets to and stays in the first meditative state is visited by the good 56 factors of I.1.1.1A. This is then expanded to cover the four or five meditative states following the pattern of I.1.2.1A.

(B) Four Modes of Progress

(I.1.2.3B) (E57–58; T54) Follows I.1.2.1B with the substitution of the mastery-formula of I.1.2.3A for "earth-gazing",

(C) Two Supporting Objects of Awareness

(I.1.2.3C) (E58–59; T54–55) Follows I.1.2.1C with the substitution of the mastery-formula for "earth-gazing", and reading "which state is unlimited but whose supporting object is limited",

(D) The Combination of Eight

(I.1.2.3D) (E59–61; T55) Like I.1.2.1D, except that since only

one of the two possibilities of I.1.2.1C are found in I.1.2.3C there are only half as many combinations, viz., eight.

(E) Limited but Beautiful or Ugly Forms

(I.1.2.3E) (E61; T55–56) The routine of I.1.2.3A–D is repeated, except that the aspirant sees the external objects as beautiful or ugly as well as limited.

(F) Forms of Unlimited Scope

(I.1.2.3F) (E61–66; T56) The routine of I.1.2.3A–D is repeated, except that the aspirant sees the external objects as unlimited in scope.

(G) Unlimited but Beautiful or Ugly Forms

(I.1.2.3G) (E66; T57) Routine of I.1.2.3E is repeated, except that the aspirant sees the external object as unlimited in scope.

(H) Dark Form, Yellow Form, Red Form, White Form

(I.1.2.3H) (E66–67; T57–58) Follows routine of I.1.2.3A–D, except that the external objects are seen in turn as dark, yellow, red or white. Sixteen combinations result.

Part Four (of E; Three of T):
The Three Liberations

(I.1.2.4) (E67; T58–59) This time the aspirant contemplates some part of his body and depending on whether he identifies it as a part of his body or not or finds it beautiful, in entering and remaining in the first meditative state produces the 56 factors of I.1.1.1A.

Part Five (of E; Four of T):
The Four Sublime Meditative States

(I.1.2.5) (E67–68; T59–63) The pattern as usual, except that his states are accompanied by friendship, compassion, sympathy or equanimity.

Part Six (of E; Five of T):
The Meditation on Foul Things

(I.1.2.6) (E69; T63–64) Here only the first meditative state is involved, and the aspirant meditates on a corpse in various stages of decay.

Section Three: Relating to the Immaterial World
Part One: The Sense of Endless Space

(I.1.3.1) (E70; T65–67) When the aspirant, to attain the immaterial world, by losing all awareness of matter, by ceasing to have any sensations, by identifying everything as a unity, gets to and stays in the fourth meditative state accompanied by awareness of the sense of endless space involving equanimity, the 56 factors resulting are good ones.

Part Two: The Sense of Endless Consciousness

(I.1.3.2) (E70; T67) When the aspirant, having passed through the sense of endless space, gets to and stays in the fourth meditative state which is accompanied by awareness of the sense of endless consciousness, then the 56 factors are good.

Part Three: The Sense of Nothingness

(I.1.3.3) When the aspirant passes through the sense of endless consciousness and gets to and stays in the fourth meditative state accompanied by the awareness of the sense of nothingness, then the 56 factors are good.

Part Four: The Sense-basis of Neither Identification nor Nonidentification

(I.1.3.4) When the aspirant passes through the sense of nothingness and gets to and stays in the fourth meditative state accompanied by that awareness which neither identifies nor fails to identify (a content), then the 56 factors are good.

Section Four: Stages of Good Awareness
Part One: In the Sensuous Universe

(I.1.4.1) (E70–71; T69–72) When a good awareness has arisen in respect to the sensuous universe, and it (a) involves satisfaction and (b) is connected with knowledge and has (c1) inferior or (c2) medium or (c3) superior efficacy or has as its dominant factor (d1) interest or (d2) energy or (d3) awareness or (d4) investigation, any of which may be of inferior, medium or superlative efficacy, then the 56 factors of I.1.1.1A are good.

A second case is where such a good awareness involves satisfaction, is connected with knowledge, and is prompted. A third

case involves satisfaction, is disconnected from knowledge, and a fourth case is likewise and is prompted. Four more cases are created by varying the three parameters of satisfaction-involvement, knowledge-connectedness and the presence of prompting.

Part Two: In the Material Universe

(I.1.4.2) (E71–72; T72) When, to reach the material heaven, one without desires or bad thoughts by earth-gazing gets to and stays in the first trance which features one of the three degrees of (c) or (d) (of I.1.4.1) above, then the 56 factors are good. The formula is then repeated so as to apply to the remaining three or four trances.

Part Three: In the Immaterial Universe

(I.1.4.3) (E72–73; T73) When the aspirant, to attain the immaterial heavens, losing all awareness of matter, ceasing to have any sensations, by identifying everything as a unity, gets to the fourth trance accompanied by awareness of the sense of endless space involving indifference, and which has some degree of (c) or (d) of I.1.4.1 above, then the 56 factors are good.

The description of the states of I.1.3.2–4 are likewise described with the addition of the degree of (c) or (d) of I.1.4.1.

Section Five: Relating to the Supramundane
Part One: The First Path: The 20 Great Aspects

(I.1.5.1) (E74–90; T74–87) When the aspirant comes to the higher world trance through which he may go on to the termination of rebirths and aiming at the first stage, having abandoned views, gets to and remains in the first trance, then there are the following good factors (identified by their number in the list at I.1.1.1A): Items 1–5 are as before.

6. Initial thought now means a component of the eightfold path (viz., right conceptualizing).

Item 7 is as before.

8. Joy is said to be one of the (seven) limbs of enlightenment, i.e. a factor in the awakening to liberation.

Item 9 is as before.

10. One-pointed mind is now another of the factors in awakening to liberation as well as an item in the (eightfold) path.

11 is as before.

12. Energy and

13. Memory are factors of awakening and items in the path.

14. Concentration is described as one-pointed mind was.

15. Wisdom is a factor in awakening and an item in the path.

16–18 are as before.

A new 19 is described as the faculty of perfect knowledge, a kind of wisdom described under 15 above.

20. Right view is described as 15 above is.

21. Right conceptualizing is described as 6 above is.

22. Right speech is the avoidance of the four errors of speech, viz., slanderous, dishonest, rude or frivolous language; it is an item in the path.

23. Right action is avoidance of the three errors of conduct (murder, theft and unchastity), and is an item in the path.

24. Right living is abstention from wrong modes of living, and is an item in the path.

25–27 correspond to 21–23 of the list in I.1.1.1A.

28–32 are the powers of faith, energy, memory, concentration and wisdom, and are explained as are 11–15 of the present list above.

33. The power of shame and 34, the power of modesty are explained as 29–30 of the list in I.1.1.1A are. Likewise 35. absence of greed and 36. sympathy, corresponding to 31 and 32 of the list in I.1.1.1A.

37. Understanding is explained as 33 in this list is.

38. Noncovetousness, 39. absence of malice correspond to 34 and 35 respectively of I.1.1.1A.

40. Right view is explained as wisdom, 15 above, is.

41. Shame and 42. modesty correspond to 37 and 38 respectively of I.1.1.1A.

43. Serenity of the group of factors, and 44. serenity of awareness, correspond to 39 and 40 of I.1.1.1A, and are identified as factors of awakening.

45. Lightness of the group, 46. lightness of mind, 47. pliancy of the group, 48. pliancy of awareness, 49. adaptability of the group, 50. adaptability of awareness, 51. proficiency of the group, 52. proficiency of awareness, 53. fitness of the group and 54. fitness of awareness correspond to 41–50 of I.1.1.1A. 51. memory, 52. comprehension, 53. peace, 54. insight, 55. determination and 56. undistractedness are explained as under the explanations of memory, wisdom and energy in the present list.

The review of aspects under which these factors can be viewed follows the pattern of I.1.1.1B with variations corresponding to the present list of 56 factors. The modes of progress are reviewed as under I.1.2.1B, and the pattern extended to cover the remaining stages of meditation as under I.1.2.1A. There is an emptiness section showing that each of the four meditative states as well as the mode

of progress to it is empty. An additional two sections indicate that these states are aimless and not aimed at.

The twenty great aspects are now listed; they all relate to the higher world:

1. The meditative state (of the higher world)
2. The path (of the higher world)
3. The advance in remembering (or mindfulness)
4. Right efforts
5. The supernatural powers
6. The faculty of the higher world
7. The power of the higher world
8. The awakening...
9. The truth...
10. The peace...
11. The doctrine (*dharma*)...
12. The aggregate...
13. The sense-organ...
14. The element...
15. The nutriment...
16. Contact...
17. Feeling...
18. Identification...
19. Volition...
20. Awareness...

The dominant factors ((d1–4) of I.1.4.1) are permuted through the meditative states and the 20 great aspects.

Part Two: The Second Path

(I.1.5.2) (E90–91; T87–99) The aspirant is described as before, only this time he is aiming at the second stage by diminishing the strength of desire and passion.

Part Three: The Third Path

(I.1.5.3) (E91; T88) Here he aims at the third stage by completely abandoning desires and passions.

Part Four: The Fourth Path

(I.1.5.4) (E91; T88–89) And here he aims at the fourth stage by abandoning passion for the immaterial as well as the material, and has lost his ignorance.

Chapter Two: Bad Factors
Section One: Twelve Types
First Type of Awareness

(I.2.1.1) (E92–97; T90–95) Bad awareness accompanied by joy, connected with views about things, which have as their contents something visual or auditory or gustatory or olfactory or tactual or a factor, are accompanied or followed by:

1–10. Contact, feeling, identification, volition, initial or sustained thought, joy, satisfaction, one-pointed awareness as in the list of factors under I.1.1.1A.

11–15. The faculty of energy, the faculty of concentration, the faculty of awareness, the faculty of contentedness, the faculty of life corresponding to 12, 14, and 16–18 respectively of the list in I.1.1.1A.

16. Wrong views, described by a set of metaphors indicating the wrongness of the views.

17–19. Wrong conceptualizing, wrong effort, wrong concentration which are described as are items 7, 11 and 10, respectively in the present list.

20–21. The power of energy and the power of concentration, explained as items 18 and 19 in the present list.

22. Lack of shame, not feeling modest at bad states.

23. Not being ashamed when bad states have occurred.

24. Greed, passion or covetousness.

25. Delusion, lack of understanding, deriving from ignorance.

26–32. Covetousness, wrong views, lack of shame, immodesty, serenity, determination, and steadiness, explained respectively as items 24, 16, 22, 23, 10, 11 and 12 are in the present list. (I.2.1.2) Aspects corresponding to I.1.1.2 are listed for the present set of factors, except that there are only five faculties, a fourfold path, four powers, and there are two causes (of immoral behavior).

Second Type of Bad Awareness

(I.2.1.3) (E97; T96–97) Involving instigation and views (cf. I.1.1.4).

Third (Type of) Bad Awareness

(I.2.1.4) (E98; T97) Not connected with views. Items 16 and 27 are omitted.

Fourth (Type of) Bad Awareness

(I.2.1.5) (E99; T97–98) Involving instigation but not involving views (cf. I.1.1.6).

Fifth (Type of) Bad Awareness

(I.2.1.6) (E99–110; T98–99) Accompanied by indifference, parallel to I.1.1.7 above.

Sixth (Type of) Bad Awareness

(I.2.1.7) (E100; T99–110) Indifference plus instigation (cf. I.1.1.8).

Seventh (Type of) Bad Awareness

(I.2.1.8) (E100–101; T100) Parallel to I.1.1.9 above.

Eighth (Type of) Bad Awareness

(I.2.1.9) (E101; T100) Like the seventh type in the present list, plus the presence of instigation.

Ninth (Type of) Bad Awareness

(I.2.1.10) (E102–103; T101–103) This type involves unsettled mind and repugnance. The list of factors is somewhat modified, including frustration in place of joy and satisfaction, the faculty of discontent in place of the faculty of contentedness, hate for selfishness, malice for covetousness, and omitting the two mentions of wrong views. Under aspects the list is as before except that a threefold path is specified.

Tenth (Type of) Bad Awareness

(I.2.1.11) (E103; T104) Like the ninth type plus the presence of instigation.

Eleventh (Type of) Bad Awareness

(I.2.1.12) (E104–105; T104–109) This type is accompanied by indifference and perplexity. Perplexity is explained by a series of terms implying hesitation and uncertainty. In the sets of aspects here there is only one cause (of immoral behavior), four faculties and three powers.

Twelfth (Type of) Bad Awareness

(I.2.1.13) (E105–106; T109–113) This type involves indifference

and excitedness; this last appears instead of selfishness (of the list in I.2.1.1).

Chapter Three: Neutral Factors
Section One: Maturation
Part One: Good Karmic Results

(A) Sensation

(I.3.1.1A) (E107–111; T114–119) Visual awarenesses arising from the maturation of good karma stored up in the sensuous universe and accompanied by equanimity are accompanied or followed by:

1–5. Contact, feeling, identification, volition and awareness, the descriptions of which resemble those of I.1.1.1A except that accompanying sensations involve equanimity rather than satisfying.

6. Equanimity
7. One-pointedness of awareness
8. The faculty of mind
9. The faculty of equanimity
10. The faculty of life.

Aspects are specified as before.

Corresponding treatment is then applied to the remaining four types of sense-awareness (auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual), except that satisfactoriness has replaced equanimity in the list of factors.

(B) The Mental Element

(I.3.1.1B) (E111–113; T119–122) Representative cognitions arising from the maturation of good karma stored up in the sensuous universe and accompanied by equanimity and pertaining to a visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory or tangible content, are accompanied or followed by the 10 factors listed under I.3.1.1A in addition to initial and sustained thought, a total of 12.

(C) The Element of Representative Cognition

(I.3.1.1C) (E113–117; T122–125) Representative cognitions (e.g., memories, etc.) arising from the maturation of good karma stored up in the sensuous universe, etc. (as in the previous paragraph), accompanied by contentedness, etc., are accompanied by 13 factors, viz., the 12 in the preceding section minus equanimity and the faculty of equanimity and plus joy, satisfaction and contentedness.

Similarly, if the same situation is accompanied by equanimity rather than contentedness precisely the 12 factors of I.3.1.1B result.

(D) Eight Main Types of Maturation

(I.3.1.1D) (E117–118; T125–126) This section classifies representative cognition according to whether it is, as a result of good karma, (1) accompanied by (a) contentedness and (b) knowledge; (2) (a), (b) and (c) instigation; (3) (a) and lack of (b); (4) (a), lack of (b) and (c); (5) (d) equanimity plus (b); (6) (d), (b) and (c); (7) (d) lack of (b); and (8) (d) lack of (b) and (c).

(E) In the Material Realm

(I.3.1.1E) (E118; T126–127) In contrast to the aspirant described at I.1.2.1A, whose factors are good, one who gets to and stays in each of the four trances as a result of good karma stored up in the material realm is visited by neutral factors.

(F) In the Immaterial Realm

(I.3.1.1F) (E119–120; T127–128) This section relates to I.1.3.1 above as the previous section did to I.1.2.1.

(G) In the Higher Realms

(I.3.1.1G) (E120–132; T128–140) When the aspirant of I.1.5.1 arrives at the first stage by the methods described there, he is visited by the 56 neutral factors plus the faculty of perfect knowledge. These are then developed following the pattern of emptiness, modes of progress, etc., as in I.1.5.1. The twenty great aspects are described as before, and one dominant factor, viz. desire is permuted.

Part Two: Bad Karmic Results

(I.3.1.2) (E132–141; T141–144) This section follows I.3.1 except that here we are dealing with the results of bad karma.

Section Two: Inoperative Awarenesses

(I.3.2) (E141–146; T145–152) Inoperative sensuous conceptions which are neither good nor bad nor the results of karma, and which are accompanied by equanimity, and have visual or auditory or olfactory or gustatory or tangible contents, are accompanied by or followed by the neutral 12 factors of III.1.1B.

This formula is repeated for representative cognitions following III.1.1C, but 15 neutral factors are the outcome: the 13 of III.1.1C plus the faculties of energy and of contentedness. Again, if equanimity rather than joy is present then there are 14 factors (the above-mentioned 15 minus joy).

The eight main types of maturation are reviewed accordingly (cf. I.3.1.1D), and the formula worked through for the material, immaterial and higher realms.

BOOK TWO: MATTER
Chapter One: Introduction[7]

(II.1) (E147; T153–154) The neutral factors are good and bad, the maturations (of karma) occurring in the sensuous realm, the material realm, the immaterial realm, or in the unincluded realm beyond these in connection with the aggregates of feeling, identification, conditioning and consciousness; also those inoperative factors which are neither good nor bad nor the result of karma; also all matter, and also the unconditioned element.

The present Book provides a classification under headings of matter.

Chapter Two: Classification According to Single Concepts

(II.2) (E147; T155–157) Matter is not morally causative or associated with a moral cause, but causally related, conditioned; it is worldly, an intoxicant of bondage and defilements, perverse, favorable to grasping, neutral, without supporting object or mentality, amoral, without joy, satisfaction or equanimity, not the kind of thing that can be destroyed by insight or by discipline, not contributing to the karmic accumulations, belonging to the realm of sense but not to the material nor to the immaterial realm, nor to the unincluded realm, not involving regularity (of karmic results?), present (in time), the contents of the six types of awareness, noneternal.

Chapter Three: Classification by Pairs (of Attributes)

(II.3.1) (E160–176; T158–184) Derived vs. nonderived matter. Derived matter includes:

(1) the visual sense, a sentient organ, invisible and responsive, by which one sees matter that is visible and responsive; it is derived from the four great elements and reacts to them; it is that on dependence on which feelings, identifications, volitions and visual consciousness arise.

(2) the auditory sense..

(3) the olfactory sense...

(4) the gustatory sense...

(5) the bodily sense (i.e. touch)...

(2) to (5) are treated in parallel fashion to (1)

(6) the sense of material form, which comprehends colors and shapes, is derived from the four great elements, reacts with them, and is that on dependence on which feelings, identifications, volitions

and visual consciousness arise.

(7) the sense of sound...

(8) the sense of smell...

(9) the sense of taste...

(7) to (9) are treated in parallel fashion to (6).

(10) the female-faculty, the characteristics distinguishing the female, including appearance, occupation, deportment.

(11) the male-faculty, the characteristics distinguishing the male, including appearance, occupation, deportment.

(12) the life–faculty, the maintenance of life.

(13) bodily manifestations, the way in which a person moves in indicating his awareness, his intentions, etc.

(14) linguistic manifestations, by which one likewise indicates his awareness, etc.

(15) the element of space, which is found in the sky and in a vacuum, is not in contact with the four great elements.

(16) lightness of material form, its capacity for changing easily.

(17) pliancy of material form, its softness and smoothness.

(18) the adaptability of material form, a thing's capacity for being worked up.

(19) the growth of material form, through accumulation.

(20) the maintenance of growth of material form.

(21) the decay of material form, as it (i.e. we) grow(s) old.

(22) noneternality of material form, its destruction.

(23) solid food, by which living beings are kept alive.

Nonderived matter is classified as (24) tangible sense-basis or (25) fluid element.

(II.3.2) (E176–190; T185–201) Grasped at vs. not grasped at. (1)–(5), (10)–(12) or whatever form that results from karmic maturation of (6)–(9), (24), (15), (25), (19) and (23) are grasped at. Not grasped at are (7), (13)–(14), (16)–(18), (21)–(22), or whatever material form sort which does not result from karmic maturation in the areas of (1)–(3), (24), (15), (25), (19) and (23).

(II.3.3) Both grasped at and favorable to grasping vs. not grasped at but favorable to grasping. Satisfying the first description are the group described as 'grasped at' under II.3.2. Satisfying the second description are the rest.

(II.3.4) Visible (6) vs. invisible (all the rest).

(II.3.5) Responsive (or reactive) ((1)–(9), (24)) vs. nonresponsive (the rest excluding (25)).

(II.3.6) Faculties ((1)–(5), (10)–(12)) vs. what are not faculties (6)–(23).

(II.3.7) Great elements include (24) and (25); all the rest are not.

(II.3.8) Language includes (13) and (14); the rest are not.

(II.3.9) Arising from awareness are (13)–(14) and whatever is caused to arise through mental activity in the areas of (6)–(9), (24), (15), (25), (16), (23). The rest are not.

(II.3.10) Coming to be along with awareness includes the same set as under 'arising from awareness' in II.3.9; the rest do not come to be along with awareness.

(II.3.11) Likewise with the material form which follows upon awareness.

(II.3.12) Confined to persons are (1)–(5); the rest are found outside of persons.

(II.3.13) Gross includes (1)–(9) and (24), while subtle includes the rest exclusive of (25).

(II.3.14) Hard (to be aware of) are all those other than (1)–(9) and (24), which are patent to awareness.

(II.3.15) Matter which is the actual basis of visual contact is (1). The rest are not.

(II.3.16) (1) is the actual basis of feeling, identification, volition and awareness born of visual contact. The rest are not.

(II.3.17) Likewise (2) is the actual basis of auditory contact, and so forth for olfactory, gustatory and tangible contacts, with the contrast as before.

(II.3.18) Similarly for feeling, etc., following II.3.16 in the natural progression.

(II.3.19) (6) is the content of visual awareness, and the rest aren't.

(II.3.20) Similarly for the other four aggregates, parallel to II.3.16.

(II.3.21) Likewise (7) is the content of auditory awareness, etc., parallel to II.3.17.

(II.3.22) Parallel to II.3.18.

(II.3.23-26) The senses (i.e. (1)–(9) and (24)) are contrasted with what are not senses.

(II.3.27–30) The elements ((1)–(5)) are contrasted with what are not elements.

(II.3.31–35) The faculties (1)–(5), (10)–(12) are contrasted with what are not faculties.

(II.3.36–37) The kinds of 'language' are contrasted with the rest.

(II.3.38) Space is contrasted with the rest.

(II.3.39) The fluid element is contrasted with the rest.

(II.3.40–47) The remaining items viz., (16)–(23), are contrasted with the others.

Chapter Four: Classification by Triples

(II.4) (E191–210; T202–213) The 47 pairs of Chapter 2 preceding are now grouped into triples. Since the material is the same we here give only the method of classification in illustration. The first triplet is three possible permutations of (12) confined to persons and (1) derived. Thus the triplet is (a) confined to persons and derived, (b) not confined to persons, (c) not confined to persons and not derived. The twenty-five forms of matter are classified into (a)–(c). The second triplet arises from the pair (12) confined to persons and (2) grasped at, generating three possibilities. The pattern is as follows: given the ordered pair x/y, generate three possibilities (a) x and y, (b) not x and y, (c) not x and not y.

Chapter Five: Classification by Quadruples

(II.5) (E211–224; T214–221) The pair is this time allowed to generate all four combinations: thus given x/y, one gets (a) x and y, (b) x and not y, (c) not x and y, (d) not x and not y. The substituents for x/y listed and permuted are: (1)/(2),(1)/(3), (1)/(5), (1)/(13), (1)/(14), (2)/(4), (2)/(5), (2)/(7), (2)/(13), (2)/(14), (3)/(4), (3)/(5), (3)/(7), (3)/(13), (3)/(14), (5)/(6), (5)/(7), (6)/(13), (6)/(14), (7)/(13), (7)/(14).

Chapter Six: Classification by Fives

(II.6) (E224–225; T222–223) The earth element, water (i.e. the fluid element), the fire element, the air element, and the derived, i.e., all the rest of the 25 forms of matter, make up the fivefold classification.

Chapter Seven: Classification into Six

(II.7) (E225; T224) The six are (6), (7), (8), (9), (24), each cognizable by a sense-organ, and the rest, which are cognizable by the mind.

Chapter Eight: Classification into Seven

(II.8) (E225; T225) This comprises the sense of types (6)–(9) and (24), plus the representative conception of those five senses, plus the conception of all the rest of the material forms.

Chapter Nine: Classification into Eight

(II.9) (E226; T226) These are the senses of (6)–(9), two varieties

of bodily contact—pleasant and unpleasant—plus conceptions of those, plus conceptions of all the rest.

Chapter Ten: Classification into Nine

(II.10) (E226; T227) These are (1)–(5), (10)–(12)—i.e. the faculties—plus everything else, which are not faculties.

Chapter Eleven: Classification into Ten

(II.11) (E226–227; T228) The first eight of II.10, plus what is not a faculty but responsive, viz., (6)–(9) and (24), plus what is not a faculty and not responsive, viz., all the rest.

Chapter Twelve: Classification into Eleven

(II.12) (E227–228; T229) (1)–(9), (24), and everything else, described as what are invisible, nonresponsive, and objects of conceptual awareness.

BOOK THREE: SUMMARY (OF THE MATRICES)[8]

Chapter One: Classifications

Section One: (The 22) Triplets

(III.1.1.1) (E229–239; T230–251) 1. The good factors are: the three roots of good karma—absence of greed, absence of hate, absence of delusion; the aggregates of feeling, identification, conditioning and consciousness when associated with these (roots); the actions, bodily, vocal or mental, arising from these (roots). The bad factors are: the three roots of bad karma—greed, hate and delusion; the defilements united with them; the four aggregates mentioned when associated with these (roots); and the actions associated with them. The neutral factors are: the maturations of good and bad factors in the sensuous, material and immaterial realms, or in the unincluded realm; the four aggregates exclusive of matter; inoperative factors that are not good or bad or the results of actions; all matter; and the unconditioned.

2. Divisions into factors that are associated with a satisfying feeling, with a frustrating feeling, with neither kind of feeling.

3. Division into factors that are maturations, factors which have results, and factors which are neither.

4. Division into factors (a) that are grasped at and favorable to grasping, (b) that are not grasped at but favorable to grasping, and (c) that are neither grasped at nor favorable to grasping.

5. Division into factors (a) that are defiled and defiling, (b) that are not defiled but defiling, (c) that are neither defiled nor defiling.

6. Factors (a) that involve initial and sustained thought, (b) that involve sustained but not initial thought, (c) that involve neither.

7. Factors (a) that are joyful, (b) that are satisfying, (c) that are equanimous.

8. Division into (a) factors that are to be eliminated by vision, viz., the three fetters, which are the view that there is an individual or personal self; perplexity about the Buddha, the doctrine, the order, etc.; and attachment to precept and ritual, which is the theory, held by those outside (our doctrine), that purity is gotten by observing rules of moral conduct or by ritual (sacrifice), etc.; (b) factors that are to be eliminated by spiritual practice; and (c) factors that are to be eliminated by neither seeing nor practice.

9. Division into factors whose causes are to be eliminated (a) by seeing, (b) by practice, or (c) by neither.

10. Division into factors that (a) lead to accumulation (of rebirths), (b) that lead to the elimination of rebirths, (c) which do neither.

11. Factors that relate to training—the four paths that are the unincluded, and the three lowest results of the recluse's life; factors that do not relate to training—the result which is being a perfected being; factors that neither relate nor do not relate to training—everything else.

12. Factors (a) that are limited (in scope), (b) that are "going to greatness", (c) states that are unlimited (in scope).

13. Factors whose contents are limited, whose contents are "gone to greatness", whose contents are unlimited.

14. Factors that are low, middling, and superior.

15. Division into (a) factors whose wrongness is regulated (as to their results)—viz., the five kinds of action which have immediate consequences, and those wrong views which are regulated as to their results; (b) factors whose rightness is regulated as to their consequences—the four paths that are the unincluded; and (c) factors which are neither—all the rest.

16. Factors (a) which have the path as their content, (b) which have the path as their moral cause, (c) which are dominated by the path.

17. Factors which have arisen, factors which have not arisen, factors which will arise.

18. Past factors, future factors, present factors.

19. Factors with past contents, with future contents, with present contents.

20. Factors that are confined to persons, factors that are external to persons, factors that are both.

21. Factors whose contents are confined to persons, which are outside persons, which are both.

22. Factors that are both visible and responsive, that are invisible but responsive, that are invisible and nonresponsive.

Section Two: (The 100) Pairs[9]
Part One: Moral Causes

(III.1.2.1) 1. There are three moral causes of good (karma)—lack of greed, sympathy, understanding; three of bad (karma)—greed, hate, delusion; and three moral-causes of what is neutral—absence of greed, hate and delusion which are maturations of good factors or of inoperative neutral factors. Greed, hate and delusion are fully explained using many synonyms. The moral causes of the third, neutral sort are also identified as operative in the sensuous, material and immaterial worlds and the unincluded one.

The factors that are not moral causes are all factors except the four aggregates, matter and the unconditioned.

2. The factors that occur with moral causes are the four aggregates. The factors that do not occur with moral causes are matter and the unconditioned.

3. The factors that are associated with moral causes are similarly contrasted with those that are not.

4. Factors that are both moral causes and occur with moral causes (essentially, those listed as moral causes of bad karma under (1) of this section) are contrasted with factors which occur with moral causes but are not themselves moral causes (viz., the four aggregates when they occur with the three factors mentioned).

5. Similarly for factors that are both moral causes and associated with moral causes vs. those that are associated but are not themselves such.

6. Factors which are not moral causes but are associated with them vs. those which are neither moral causes nor associated with them.

Part Two: Short Intermediate Pairs

(III:1.2.2) (E244–246; T265–267) 1. Factors that have causal conditions vs. those that don't (viz., the unconditioned).

2. Conditioned vs. unconditioned factors

3. Visible vs. invisible factors

4. Resisting vs. nonresisting factors

5. Material vs. nonmaterial factors

6. Worldly vs. other-worldly factors

7. Factors that are cognizable in one way but not in another—e.g., what is visually cognizable is not auditorily so, etc.

Part Three: Intoxicants

(III.1.2.3) (E247–249; T268–273) The intoxicants are of four kinds: (1) the intoxicant of desire, i.e. sensual passion; (2) the intoxicant of rebirth, i.e. the thirst for life; (3) the intoxicant of views, i.e. theories such as that the world is eternal or that it is not, that the soul is different from the body or not, or that the Buddha exists or does not exist after death, etc.; (4) the intoxicant of ignorance, i.e. delusion.

Nonintoxicant states are listed, as well as those that have or are associated with intoxicants and the permutations of those possibilities, parallel in manner to III.1.2.1.

Part Four: Fetters

(III.1.2.4) (E249–254; T274–280) There are ten fetters: (1) passionate desire, (2) repulsiveness, (3) pride, (4) (wrong) views, (5) perplexity, (6) perversion as to rule and ritual, (7) passion for rebirth, (8) envy, (9) meanness, and (10) ignorance. These are explained.

The factors that are not fetters, as well as those that are not fettered, along with those that are favorable to or not favorable to the fetters, are listed and permuted as above.

Part Five: Knots

(III.1.2.5) (E254–257; T281–284) The four knots are (1) ignorance, (2) covetousness, (3) malice, and (4) perversion as to rules and rituals, all of which operate through the body. Factors which are not knots, knotted or not, associated with knots or not, are permuted as above.

Part Six: Floods

(III.1.2.6) (E258; T285) These are the same as the knots.

Part Seven: Bonds

(III.1.2.7) (E258; T286) These are also the same as the knots.

Part Eight: Hindrances

(III.1.2.8) (E258–262; T287–292) There are six hindrances: (1) sensual interests, (2) malice, (3) stolidity and torpor, (4) distraction

and worry, (5) perplexity, (6) ignorance. These are explained, as well as the factors which are not hindrances, those favorable to or associated with hindrances and their opposites and the permutations thereof.

Part Nine: Perversion

(III.1.2.9) (E262-264; T293-294) Perverse factors are those involving (wrong) views.

Part Ten: Large Intermediate Pairs

(III.1.2.10) (E264–267; T295–298) 1. Factors which have a content vs. have no content.

2. Factors that are awarenesses vs. those that are not.

3. Factors which are properties of awarenesses vs. those that are not.

4. Factors that are associated with awareness vs. those that are not.

5. Factors that are conjoined with awareness vs. those that are disjoined.

6. Factors that have arisen from awareness vs. those that have not.

7. Factors that come into being with awareness vs. those that do not.

8. Factors that follow on awareness vs. those that do not.

9. Factors that are conjoined with and arisen from awareness vs. those that are not.

10. Factors that are conjoined with, arisen from, and come into being with awareness vs. those that are not.

11. Factors that are conjoined with, arisen from, and follow on awareness vs. those that don't.

12. Factors which belong to persons vs. those that don't.

13. Factors which are derived vs. those that aren't.

14. Factors that are grasped at vs. those that aren't.

Part Eleven: Grasping

(III.1.2.11) (E267–270; T299–302) There are four kinds of grasping: (1) of desires, (2) of views, (3) of rule and ritual, and (4) of the theory of a self. The factors that are not graspings, favorable and unfavorable to grasping, associated with or disconnected to and the permutations thereof are set forth as before.

Part Twelve: Afflictions

(III.1.2.12) (E270–276; T303–306) Ten bases of affliction are listed: (1) selfishness, (2) hate, (3) stupidity, (4) pride, (5) (wrong) views, (6) perplexity, (7) stolidity, (8) distraction, (9) lack of shame, and (10) immodesty. Then those factors which are not afflictions are listed, along with those that are associated with affliction, that are not, etc.

Part Thirteen: Supplementary Pairs

(III.1.2.13) (E276–283; T307–313) 1. Factors that are to be eliminated through seeing vs. those that are not.

2. Those that are to be put away by spiritual practice vs. those that aren't.

3. Those whose causes are to be put away by seeing vs. those not.

4. Those whose causes are to be put away by practice vs. those not.

5. Those accompanied by initial thought vs. those not.

6. Those accompanied by sustained thought vs. those not.

7. Those which are joyful vs. those not.

8. Those accompanied by joy vs. those not.

9. Those accompanied by satisfaction vs. those not.

10. Those accompanied by equanimity vs. those not.

11. Those that relate to the sensuous realm vs. those that don't, that relate to the material realm vs. those that don't, etc., through the other two realms.

12. Factors which lead on (to liberation) vs. those that don't.

13. Those that have regulated results vs. those that don't.

14. Those that have something beyond (or higher) vs. those that don't.

15. Those that are harmful vs. those that aren't.

Chapter Two: *Suttanta* Pairs

(III.2) (E283–294; T314–333) 1. Factors that partake of understanding vs. those which partake of ignorance.

2. Factors that are like lightning vs. those that are like a thunderbolt.

3. Factors that are childish vs. those that are erudite.

4. Factors that are dark vs. those that are bright.

5. Factors that conduce to remorse vs. those that don't.

6. All factors are expressible, explainable, designatable.

7. Factors that are name (viz., the four aggregates and the uncondi-

tioned) vs. those that are matter (viz., the four great elements and the matter that is derived from them).

8. Ignorance vs. desire for rebirth.

9. Views about rebirth vs. views about lack of rebirth.

10. The view of eternalism vs. the view of nihilism.

11. The view that the world and the self have an end vs. the view that they are endless.

12. The view that what has a beginning has an end vs. the view that they exist in the future.

13. Lack of shame vs. immodesty.

14. Sulkiness vs. friendship with bad (people).

15. Suavity vs. friendship with good people.

16. Skill in (identifying the) offences vs. skill in gaining release from the offences.

17. Skill in (identifying the) meditative attainment vs. skill in gaining release from those stages to go on to higher ones.

18. Skill in the (identification of) the elements vs. skill in attention, explained as involving insight, etc.) to them.

19. Skill in the senses vs. skill in the chain of dependent origination.

20. Skill in identifying the causes of things vs. skill in what are not the causes of things.

21. Sharpness vs. mildness.

22. Patience vs. restraint.

23. Courteousness in speech vs. considerateness.

24. Lack of vigilance in the use of one's faculties vs. lack of vigilance in what one eats.

25. Vigilance in the use of one's faculties vs. vigilance in what one eats.

26. Forgetfulness vs. lack of comprehension.

27. Memory vs. comprehension.

28. The power of calculation vs. the power of spiritual practice.

29. Peace vs. intuition.

30. The occasions for peace vs. the occasions for grasp.

31. Grasp vs. steadiness.

32. Deviation from moral rule defined as excess in word and action or both vs. deviation in view.

33. Accordance with right moral rules vs. accordance with right views.

34. Purity in moral rule vs. purity in view.

A few technical terms from the *sūtras* are explained in the conclusion of this work.

BOOK FOUR: ELUCIDATION[10]

(IV) (E294–332; T334–344) Some 230 questions and answers go over in briefer fashion the same material as dealt with in the previous three Books. Kashyap provides in E a key to relate the questions of Book Four with the corresponding questions in the previous three Books. Mrs. Rhys Davids (at T335–344) provides two appendices in which she discusses differences in diction between Book Four and the prior treatment.

2

VIBHAṄGA

Summary by Karl H. Potter

A text of the Sthaviravāda tradition complementary and contemporaneous to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the *Vibhaṅga* has been edited several times: by Carolyn Rhys Davids in the Pali Text Society Series 55, 1904, and by D.S. Mahathera and V. Sarman in J. Kashyap's series of editions of Pali materials from Nalanda in 1960. This last edition is designated "E" in the present summary. "T" references are to the translation by U Thittila in the Pali Text Series, London 1969. According to Hajime Nakamura there exists a Japanese translation by Mitsuyu Sato in Nanden Daizokyo in 65 volumes of 70 fascicules (Tokyo 1935–41). J. Kashyap gives a 39 page English summary in his *Abhidharma Philosophy* (Sarnath, 1943).

The word "*Vibhaṅga*" means an analysis, and this work provides extensive analyses of many of the basic notions of Abhidharma. The work is divided into 22 books, titled "Analyses". In several of these books there is a division into a section which analyzes following the method of the *sūtras*, and one which analyzes according to what is termed the 'Abhidhamma-method'. In some cases these two sections are followed by a third called "Interrogation", which consists of classifications into triplets and couplets. The style is question and answer as in *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*; again we make no attempt to reproduce or characterize this style.[1]

BOOK ONE: ANALYSIS OF THE AGGREGATES

Section One: By the Method of the *Sūtras*

(I.1.1) (E3–5; T1–3) 1. The material aggregate is analyzed into (a) past, (b) future, (c) present, (d) confined to persons, (e) outside of persons, (f) gross, (g) subtle, (h) inferior, (i) superior, (j) distant, and (k) patent to awareness. The explanations provide synonyms for the description, indicating nuances of meaning.

(I.1.2) (E5–8; T3–6) 2. The aggregate of feeling is analyzed into the same headings, as are:

(I.1.3) (E8–11; T6–9) The aggregate of identification.

(I.1.4) (E11–14; T9–13) The aggregate of conditioning.

(I.1.5) (E14–17; T13–16) The aggregate of consciousness.

Section Two: By Abhidharma Method

(I.2.1) (E17–20; T16–20) The material aggregate is explained following the classifications of *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*: first all the relevant classifications are provided (e.g. not moral cause, not accompanied by a moral cause, not associated with a moral cause, is caused, ... is worldly, is the content of the bondage-breeders, etc. ...), then they are paired, permuted into triplets, quadruples, etc., up to an elevenfold permutation.

(I.2.2.) (E20–33; T20–33) An even more complex method is followed for the aggregate of feeling, a series of ten permutations being repeated with variations several times, followed by a lengthy section of pairs and triplets of classifications, and in conclusion some classifications involving up to 30 or more possibilities.

(I.2.3) (E33–45; T34–47) Similarly, the complex method is applied to the aggregate of identification.

(I.2.4) (E45–57; T47–62) And to the aggregate of conditioning.

(I.2.5) (E58–69; T62–75) And to the aggregate of consciousness.

Section Three: Interrogation

(I.3) (E70–82; T76–88) The same information is now expounded succinctly in terms of contrasts drawn up by triplets, and then in a longer section in contrasts drawn up by pairs.

BOOK TWO: ANALYSIS OF THE SENSES
Section One: By the Method of the *Sūtras*

(II.1) (E83; T89) There are 12 senses: (1) the visual-organ sense, (2) the visible sense, (3) the auditory-organ sense, (4) the sound sense, (5) the olfactory-organ sense, (6) the smell sense, (7) the gustatory-organ sense, (8) the taste sense, (9) the tactual sense, (10) the tangible sense, (11) the mind sense, (12) the *dharma* sense. All 12 are described as impermanent, frustrating, lacking in self and changeable.

Section Two: By the Abhidharma Method

(II.2) (E83–88; T89–94) The first five sense-organ bases are characterized as organs which are responsible for our having awareness of a sensory nature. The mind sense receives a more complicated

analysis into many permutations found in I.2.2, etc., above. Then the five senses (visible, etc.) corresponding to the organs are analyzed and illustrated—lists of kinds of colors, sounds, smells, tastes and touches. The *dharma* sense-basis (12) is analyzed as including the three aggregates of feeling, identification and conditioning, the female and male faculties, and the unconditioned element.

Section Three: Interrogation

(II.3) (E88–101; T95–106) Again, the information about these 12 senses is now marshalled under triplets of classification, and following that under pairs.

BOOK THREE: ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS
Section One: By the Method of the *Sūtras*

(III.1.1) (E102–106; T107–110) First set of six elements: (1) the earth element, (2) the water element, (3) the fire element, (4) the air element, (5) the space element, and (6) the consciousness element. Each of the first five is divided into the type confined to persons (i.e. the parts of the body made of the element) and the type external to persons—i.e. objects. The consciousness element is divided into six varieties corresponding to the five sense-organs plus the mind.

(III.1.2) (E106–107; T110–111) Second set of six elements: (7) the satisfaction element, (8) the frustration element, (9) the element of contentedness, (10) the element of depression, (11) the equanimity element, (12) the ignorance element. Each is elucidated through synonyms.

(III.1.3) (E107–108; T111–112) Third set of six elements: (13) the desire element, (14) the malice element, (15) the cruelty element, (16) the renunciation element, (17) the element of absence of malice, (18) the element of absence of cruelty. Again these are explained by synonyms.

Section Two: By Abhidharma Method

(III.2) (E108–112; T112–116) There are 18 elements: (1) the visual organ element, (2) the material form element, (3) the element of visual consciousness, (4) the auditory organ element, (5) the sound element, (6) the auditory consciousness element, (7) the olfactory organ element, (8) the smell element, (9) the olfactory consciousness element, (10) the gustatory organ element, (11) the taste element, (12) the gustatory consciousness element, (13) the tactual organ

element, (14) the tangible element, (15) the tactual consciousness element, (16) the mental element, (17) the element of factors, (18) the mental consciousness element. Items (3), (6), (9), (12) and (15) comprehend types of consciousness which depend on the relevant organ in each case. (17) is explained as comprehending the three aggregates of feeling, identification, and conditioning, together with invisible nonresponsive matter and the unconditioned. (18) is an awareness which arises immediately after a type (16) element has ceased (which in turn has arisen immediately after one of the awarenesses associated with a sense-organ has ceased).

Section Three: Interrogation

(III.3) (E112–125; T116–129) As before, classifications by triplets and pairs.

BOOK FOUR: ANALYSIS OF THE TRUTHS

Section One: By the Method of the *Sūtras*

(IV.1.1) (E126–129; T130–133) The first noble truth, of frustration, is explained as involving birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, frustration, depression, irritation, frustration that is connected with what is disliked, frustration that is disconnected from what is liked, not getting what one wishes, and in short the frustrations arising from the five aggregates as objects of attachment.

(IV.1.2) (E129–139; T133–135) The second noble truth, of the cause of frustration, is explained as stemming from desire which arises from and settles on things which are lovely and pleasant (examples of such things are provided).

(IV.1.3) (E131–133; T135–137) The third noble truth, of the cessation of frustration, is explained as concerning the abandonment of the desire for those same pleasant things, which are again reviewed.

(IV.1.4) (E133–135; T138–139) The fourth noble truth, of the path, is reviewed: right views, right conceptualizing, right speech, right action, right living, right effort, right mindfulness (lit., right memory), right concentration.

Section Two: By the Abhidharma Method

(IV.2) (E135–143; T139–146) Each of the key terms in the foregoing are explained and associated with other technical terms of the system. The process is gone through several times, each time

developing a deeper analysis of the components, e.g., of the cause of frustration, the nature of frustration, etc.

Section Three: Interrogation

(IV.3) (E143–155; T146–158) The noble truths and their elements are now treated in triplets and pairs as before.

BOOK FIVE: ANALYSIS OF FACULTIES
Section One: According to Abhidharma

(V.1) (E155-159; T159–163) Twenty–two faculties are identified and explained: (1) the visual faculty, (2) the auditory faculty, (3) the olfactory faculty, (4) the gustatory faculty, (5) the tactual faculty, (6) the mental faculty, (7) the female faculty, (8) the male faculty, (9) the life faculty, (10) the (bodily) satisfaction faculty, (11) the (bodily) frustration faculty, (12) the faculty of contentedness, (13) the faculty of depression, (14) the faculty of equanimity, (15) the faculty of faith, (16) the energy faculty, (17) the memory (or mindfulness) faculty, (18) the concentration faculty, (19) the insight faculty, (20) the faculty of "I am knowing what was unknown", (21) the faculty of knowledge being perfected, (22) the faculty of perfected knowledge.

Section Two: Interrogation

(V.2) (E160–172; T163–179) Classification of these faculties into triplets and pairs.

BOOK SIX: ANALYSIS OF DEPENDENT ORIGINATION
Section One: By the Method of the *Sūtras*

(VI.1) E173–177; T180–184) The twelvefold chain of dependent origination is set forth in terms of the causal relation between each member of the chain and its successor. Ignorance, then, is the condition of conditioning, which is explained to be of six sorts: (a) those producing merit on the sensuous level, (b) those producing demerit on the sensuous level, (c) those producing unshakeable results on the material level, (d) bodily conditioning, (e) vocal conditioning, (f) mental conditioning. The last three are equated to bodily, vocal and mental volitions respectively. Conditionings are the conditions of the six sorts of consciousness (corresponding to the five sense–organs and the mind). Consciousness is the condition for "name and form", where "name" is explained as the three

aggregates of feeling, identification and conditioning, and "form", i.e. matter is explained as the four great elements and the qualities derived from them. From "name and form" the six senses arise, and from them contact (of senses with objects) arises. From contact feelings of the six sorts arise, and from these feelings in turn thirst for the six kinds of objects. From thirst comes grasping—of desires, of wrong views, of rules and rituals, and of the theory of a self. And from grasping come states of existence (of two sorts—those resulting from actions producing good, bad or unshakeable results, and those not resulting from actions, which occur in the three levels of sensuous, material and immaterial realms, which may be perceptual or not, and which may involve one aggregate, or four or five aggregates. From these states of being come (re)birth, and from that comes old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, frustration, both bodily and mental, and despair.

Section Two: By Abhidharma Method

(VI.2.1) (E177–181; T184–189) This analysis considers the relationships among the twelve members in terms of: (1) which are causal conditions of which, (2) which are the roots of which, (3) which are associated with which, and (4) which are reciprocally related with which. In this first section the dependent origination formula is repeated to show these relationships, and once more summarized.

It is perhaps significant that in some formulae of the present section the fifth member in the chain is not "six sense-bases" (*ṣaḍāyatana*), but "the sixth *āyatana*" (*ṣaṣṭhāyatana*). Furthermore, in some rehearsals of the 12 members this fifth one is omitted.

(VI.2.2) (E181–187; T189–194) This section resembles VI.1 closely, explaining the key terms for the members and their causal relationships.

(VI.2.3) (E187–192; T194–200) The same explanations are repeated, replacing "causally conditioned by" with "morally caused by" in the relations between successive members.

(VI.2.4) (E192–198; T200–206) This time the connecting phrase is "associated with".

(VI.2.5) (E198–207; T206–215) Here the twelvefold chain is complicated by indicating that each of the members up to grasping is both the condition of its successor and conditioned by it.

(VI.2.6) (E207–212; T215–221) Here the cause of ignorance is located in bad factors, which are identified, and there is some modification in the items in the chain, specifically, desire leads to craving which in turn leads to resolve, which then leads to states

of existence. In another version feeling causes doubt, which in turn causes states of existence, while in the last in this section feeling causes excitedness, which causes decision, which causes states of existence.

(VI.2.7) (E212–218; T221–228) From good factors the following chain ensues: conditioning, consciousness, name (but not form), the sixth sense (viz., mental-consciousness), contact, feeling, serenity, decision, existence, birth, old age and death. This chain is conditioned by good roots—absence of greed, hate and delusion.

(VI.2.8) (E218–226; T228–240) Factors which are neither good nor bad, being characterized by neutrality, lead to the following chain: activity, consciousness, name, the sixth sense, contact, feeling, existence, birth, old age and death. This chain is then revised successively to include faith and/or decision as links between feeling and existence.

(VI.2.9) (E229–232; T240–244) In this section good factors together with ignorance lead to the chain with variations involving faith and decision as before.

(VI.2.10) (E232–235; T244–247) Here the condition for activity is the maturation of good actions.

(VI.2.11) (E235–237; T247–250) And here the condition for activity is the maturation of bad actions.

BOOK SEVEN: ANALYSIS OF THE CONDITION(ING) OF MEMORY/MINDFULNESS

Section One: By the Method of the *Sūtras*

(VII.1) (E238–249; T251–263) The four conditionings of memory/mindfulness are: (1) contemplating the body, (2) contemplating feelings, (3) contemplating awarenesses, and (4) contemplating factors. Each of these can be done with respect to one's body, etc., another's body, etc., or both. Contemplation is explained as involving insight. These contemplations should be undertaken while maintaining an appropriate posture, etc., and should be accompanied by ardour and comprehension, without covetousness and with contentedness. In each case one catalogues to himself, e.g., the parts of the body, the affective quality of feelings, the concomitants of awareness, or the presence of various factors in oneself or others.

Section Two: By Abhidharma Method

(VII.2) (E249–252; T263–267) The practices described here are described from the point of view of the aspirant—he is in the first

trance state and developing an otherworldly state through practice and slow acquisition of understanding.

Section Three: Interrogation

(VII.3) (E252–254; T267–270) Triplets followed by pairs showing the properties and relations of the conditionings of memory/mindfulness.

BOOK EIGHT: ANALYSIS OF RIGHT EXERTION

Section One: By the Method of the *Sūtras*

(VIII.1) (E255–258; T271–274) There are four right exertions: (1) when a monk strives for the nonarising of bad factors that have not yet arisen, (2) when he strives for the destruction of bad factors that have already arisen, (3) when he strives for the arising of good factors not yet arisen, (4) when he strives for the development and completion of good factors that have already arisen. Each of the key terms in this account are then explained.

Section Two: By Abhidharma Method

(VIII.2) (E258–262; T275–279) As the previous section, with somewhat more complex explanations.

Section Three: Interrogation

(VIII.3) (E262–263; T279–281) Triplets and pairs as before.

BOOK NINE: ANALYSIS OF BASES OF SUPERNATURAL POWERS

Section One: By the Method of the *Sūtras*

(IX.1) (E264–268; T282–287) There are four bases of supernatural power: (1) the monk by exertion of desire gains concentration, and thus striving and conditionings; (2) he gains concentration, and thus striving and conditionings, by exertion of energy; (3) he does so through awareness; (4) he does so through investigation.

Section Two: By Abhidharma Method

(IX.2) (E268–273; T287–293) This section stands to the previous one as VII.2 does to VII.1, i.e. it develops the same four bases in the light of the view of the aspirant's progress.

Section Three: Interrogation

(IX.3) (E273–275; T293–296) Triplets and pairs.

BOOK TEN: ANALYSIS OF THE CONDITIONS OF ENLIGHTENMENT

BOOK ELEVEN: ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS OF THE PATH

Section One: By the Method of the *Sūtras*

(XI.1) (E285–287; T308–310) The eightfold path (cf. IV.1.4) is set forth.

Section Two: By Abhidharma Method

(XI.2) (E287–291; T310–315) The same, in light of the aspirant's progress toward and achievement of the first meditative state. The five consisting of right view, right conceptualizing, right effort, right memory, and right concentration are called the "path with five factors".

Section Three: Interrogation

(XI.3) (E291–293; T315–318) Triplets and pairs.

BOOK TWELVE: ANALYSIS OF MEDITATIVE STATES

Section One: By the Method of the *Sūtras*

(XII.1) (E294–316; T319–343) This section opens with a lengthy description of the kinds of practices a monk should undertake to attain each of the four meditative states. The description ranges over such matters as how he should behave, from whom he should beg, what he should allow himself to see, hear, etc., what food he should eat, and how much, how he should be vigilant, mindful (exercising his memory), and insightfully aware, where he should sleep and how, the virtues of comportment he should cultivate, the kinds of mental states he should cultivate, the factors he should cultivate and those he should avoid. Having achieved the first meditative state by these means, he should now proceed to reflect with a joy and satisfaction born of concentration on what he understands, such concentration leading to the second meditative state. After this, he should practice means of concentration which will calm agitation produced by joy and satisfaction, and will lead to equanimity without losing what he remembers and knows, thus attaining the third meditative state. Finally, by abandoning both frustration and satisfaction, his memory

becoming unobstructed through his equanimity, he arrives at the fourth meditative state and dwells there, and having passed beyond perceptions of material form, of sensory objects, he achieves the state of spatial infinity, leading to infinite consciousness, leading to nothingness and finally passes on to the state which is neither perceptual nor nonperceptual.

Section Two: By the Abhidharma Method

(XII.2) (E316–323; T344–352) The explanation here starts by defining each of the four meditative states according to the good factors associated with them in the material realm. This is followed by a parallel account according to the good factors of the immaterial, and then according to the good factors of the otherwordly realm. Next, an analysis is conducted of the maturations associated with the first and second states in the material realm, and with the fourth state in the immaterial realm. Then a section on otherwordly maturations in the first two states, followed by a review of inoperative states of both material and immaterial realms associated with the first two meditative states.

Section Three: Interrogation

(XII.3) (E323–326; T352–356) Triplets and pairs.

BOOK THIRTEEN: ANALYSIS OF THE BOUNDLESS

Section One: By the Method of the *Sūtras*

(XIII.1) (E327–332; T357–363) A monk dwells suffusing all the four directions by his volitional awareness associated with each of four things of unlimited scope, viz., (1) friendship, (2) compassion, (3) sympathy, (4) equanimity.

Section Two: By Abhidharma Method

(XIII.2) (E332–338; T363–372) These four things of unlimited scope are now explained in the light of the aspirant's progress in the material realm and through all four of the meditative states.

Section Three: Interrogation

(XIII.3) (E339–341; T372–375) Triplets and pairs.

BOOK FOURTEEN: ANALYSIS OF SPIRITUAL TRAINING
Section One: By the Abhidharma Method

(XIV.1) (E342–348; T376–384) There are five precepts, involving abstention from (1) killing, (2) stealing, (3) sexual misconduct, (4) dishonesty, and (5) drunkenness. These are explained in terms of their associated factors.

Section Two: Interrogation

(XIV.2) (E348–349; T384–386) Triplets and pairs.

BOOK FIFTEEN: ANALYSIS OF DISCRIMINATION
Section One: By the Method of the *Sūtras*

(XV.1) (E350–352; T387–389) There are four kinds of discrimination: (1) as to results, (2) as to factors, (3) as to etymology, (4) as to awareness. In the present section these are applied to several subject-matters and the results identified. So: applied to truth, awareness of frustration is a (1), awareness of the causes of frustration is a (2), awareness of the cessation of frustration is a (1), awareness of the way leading to cessation of frustration is a (2), awareness of the philological derivation of these is a (3), awareness of these awarenesses is a (4). Applied to dependent origination awareness of old age and death is a (1), awareness of the causes of those is a (2), and so forth. A monk is said to have discrimination when he knows the *sūtras*, the discourses in prose and verse, the passages beginning "thus it was said", the birth stories, miracle-stories, and miscellanies, and understands and can explain the meanings of these passages.

Section Two: By Abhidharma Method

(XV.2) (E352–362; T389–401) Here the four discriminations are applied to a different set of subject-matters. A first portion applies them to the good factors, a second to the bad factors, a third to those that are neither good nor bad, and a fourth to those that are inoperative. The explanation is, as usual, in terms of the aspirant's progress through the meditative stages.

Section Three: Interrogation

(XV.3) (E362–365; T402–406) Triplets and pairs.

BOOK SIXTEEN: ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE
Section One: Headings

(XVI.1) (E366–377; T407–416) This section classifies all the kinds of knowledge mentioned in the Abhidharma system. First there is a list of these items, then they are summarized in pairs, triplets and so on up to a tenfold division setting forth ten powers called the "Tathāgata-powers" which enables the Buddha to take the role of leadership, "to roar the lion's roar in the assemblies, and to set the wheel of Brahma rolling". The ten things the Buddha knows are (1) causes, (2) results, (3) what comes about from (1) and (2), (4) factors, (5) the various determinations (or natures) of beings, (6) the tendencies of the faculties of beings to improve or fail, (7) meditation, (8) previous existences of beings, (9) the nature of death and rebirth, (10) the intoxicants which destroy the defilements.

Section Two: Exposition

(XVI.2) (E377–408; T417–451) Following the same ten divisions, this section proceeds to explain the terminology used in the summary. The tenth portion is especially interesting once again, providing examples of the Buddha's understanding instead of the standard review in the light of the aspirant's progress, which is utilized in some of the earlier portions. For example, illustrations of what the Buddha understands about causes includes that a person of right views cannot do or believe things which go against the teaching, whereas an ordinary person may; that only one, but not two, Buddhas should arise at the same time in the same world; that a man may, but a woman may not, be an enlightened perfected being or a universal ruler; that only good, not bad, results will accrue from right actions, and vice versa. The explanations under (2) results include a series of exceptions to the regularity of the working of the karmic law, so that we are told that the Buddha knows that some bad acts do not mature because prevented by a favorable birth or body or time or effort, whereas other bad acts do mature because these kinds of circumstances are unfavorable.

Under (6) the tendency of the faculties there is presented a list of seven latent dispositions: the tendencies toward sensual pleasures, toward being repelled, toward pride, toward wrong views, toward doubt, toward hanging on to life, and toward ignorance.

Under (7) eight liberations are distinguished: (1) one possessing matter sees material qualities (color?); (2) one not identifying material qualities as his own sees external things; (3) one becomes

intent on clean things (through meditation); (4) one who attains the infinity of space by going beyond perceptions; (5) one who attains the infinity of consciousness by passing beyond (4); (6) one who attains the state of nothingness by passing beyond (5); (7) one who achieves a state that is neither perception nor nonperception; (8) one who attains a state where there is no perception or feeling.

BOOK SEVENTEEN: ANALYSIS OF SMALL ITEMS
Section One: Headings

(XVII.1) (E409–414; T452–455) A list of specific vices is given here—kinds of things one might be proud of, such items as "vanity", "foppery", "drowsiness after a meal", not knowing who one's betters (or inferiors) are, being moved by sympathy, gain, fame, etc., some 73 items in all. This list is then followed by portions in which pairs, triplets, etc., up to tens of such items are classified. A concluding portion details 108 kinds of thirst.

Section Two: Exposition

(XVII.2) (E414–479; T455–513) Each of these items is now explained. So, we have here brief explanations of the three roots, the four defilements, the five defilements, six roots of contention, the seven latent tendencies, eight bases of corruption, nine bases of vexation, ten fetters—these being only one example from each of the portions.

BOOK EIGHTEEN: ANALYSIS OF THE HEART OF THE DHARMA
Section One: All-Inclusive Headings

(XVIII.1) (E480–482; T514–516) Here are listed the five aggregates, the 12 senses, the 18 elements, the 4 truths, the 22 faculties, the 9 roots, the 4 nutriments, 7 types of contact, 7 types of feeling, 7 types of perception, 7 types of volition, 7 types of consciousness—in short, all the factors of the system.[2]

Section Two: Where They Arise

(XVIII.2) (E482–488; T516–523) We are now told how many of each of the above listed kinds of things are found in the sensuous, material and immaterial realms as well as in the unincluded realm.

Section Three: Where They are Included

(XVIII.3) (E488–491; T523–527) On each of the four planes,

which of the items under discussion are included in which.

Section Four: When They Appear

(XVIII.4) (E492–502; T527–538) Which of these items are present at the moment of conception in each of the four realms.

Section Five: The Stages

(XVIII.5) (E502–503; T538–539) Which are, and which are not, characteristic of each of the four realms.

Section Six: Types of Birth and the Limits of Age

(XVIII.6) (E503–509; T540–544) 1. Three kinds of divinities are identified: those who are termed "gods" by convention, i.e. royal persons; those who were born gods; and those who became gods by purification, i.e. perfected beings. All three kinds of gods got their birth as such in virtue of moral practices and right observances. A catalogue of types of divine birth is provided.

2. *Age limit.* The length of life of human beings (100 years), and those of various types of deities, calculated in terms of very large numbers of years and eons.

Section Seven: Things to be Understood, etc.

(XVIII.7) (E509–511; T544–546) Which factors are to be understood, which to be avoided, which to be developed.

Section Eight: *Dharmas* With and Without Contents

(XVIII.8) (E511–512; T546–548) As the title suggests.

Section Nine: Which Factors Seen, Which Heard, etc.?

(XVIII.9) (E512–513; T548–549) As the title suggests.

Section Ten: Triplets, etc.

(XVIII.10) (E513–521; T549–559) Triplets and pairs.

3

DHARMASKANDHA

Summary by Fred Greiner and Karl H. Potter

This collection of *sūtras* appears to be the earliest of the seven canonical Abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivādins. Like the others, it is preserved in Chinese translation, specifically in a translation by the pilgrim Hsüan-tsang that was completed in 659 A.D. Jikido Takasaki has noticed Sanskrit fragments in manuscripts at Ujjain coming originally from the Gilgit area.[1] It is printed as *T* 1537 in the Chinese Tripitaka. The Chinese tradition attributes the work to (Mahā) Maudgalyāyana, whereas Yaśomitra ascribes it to Śāriputra.

The original of the headings utilized in the *Dharmaskandha* is to be found in the *Chachakkasutta* (*Majjhimanikāya* III, 280–287). Fumimaro Watanabe compares the headings of the *Dharmaskandha* with those of the *Vibhaṅga* and the first 21 headings of the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*, noting the considerable matching of the headings despite their being ordered entirely differently in each of the three texts.[2]

Warder states that this text is parallel to the *Vibhaṅga* of the Sthaviravādin tradition and was probably elaborated about the same time as the *Vibhaṅga*, i.e. in the first two centuries after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*.[3] Hajime Nakamura reports differing opinions among Japanese scholars, citing B. Shiio as thinking the text was composed at least 400 years after the *parinirvāṇa* and Baiyu Watanabe as having it after the *Saṅgītiparyāya* and prior to the other Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts.[4] However, since it is known that passages of the *Dharmaskandha* are cited at least 15 times in the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, we assume here that it was written just prior to the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, around 300 B.C.

There exists a Japanese translation by Baiyu Watanabe.[5] Jikido Takakusu has summarized the work briefly.[6] No translation into Western languages is known.

Erich Frauwallner discusses the work in his *Abhidharma-Studien*,[7] emphasizing the close resemblance of the treatment of topics in this text to that in Pali *Vibhaṅga*. Frauwallner believes that these were two versions of the very same work.

The following summary is partly based on the material in Watanabe, Takakusu and Frauwallner. The summary of Chapters 2–4 is by Fred Greiner.

CHAPTER I: FIVE PRECEPTS OF SPIRITUAL TRAINING

(E453c6–458b21) (The first fifteen Chapters of the work present an extended matrix comprised of ideas bearing on liberation.[8] In this and the succeeding chapters we are provided with a *sūtra*-like text (referred to as "scripture" by Greiner, below), followed by an explanation of each term in the text.)

The subject of the first chapter corresponds to Book Fourteen of the *Vibhaṅga*. The five precepts require the adept to avoid (1) killing, (2) stealing, (3) sexual misconduct, (4) dishonesty and (5) drunkenness.

CHAPTER II: CONSTITUENTS OF STREAM-ENTRANCE

(E458b22–460a16) *Scripture*: At one time the Lord... said: There are four factors which should be cultivated with correct effort, viz., serving a good person, hearing the good *dharma*, thorough attention and practice of *dharma* and *anudharma*.[9]

Explanation: (A1) "Good person" (*satpuruṣa*) means the Buddha, one of his disciples or a person who practices moral precepts, the good *dharma*, the 37 limbs of enlightenment, etc.; is separated from bad factors of attachment, hatred, delusion, etc.; and can teach sentient beings.

(A2) "Serving a good person" means to respect, do homage to, etc. such a person.

(B) "Hearing the good *dharma*" means that the above-mentioned good person, in order to enlighten others, correctly expounds the four noble truths of (a) frustration, (b) arising, (c) cessation and (d) path by means of countless modes of expression, i.e. that (1) birth, old age, sickness, death, association with what is frustrating, separation from what is satisfying, not obtaining what is desired, in short, all the five grasping aggregates are frustrating; (2) desire for rebirth, desire associated with delight, etc., in the past, present and future is the cause, source, etc., which can produce frustration in the present life and in the future; (3) the above-mentioned desire, etc., is destroyed, abandoned, etc., without remainder and this destruction

is called refuge, without frustration, tranquility, most excellent, liberation, etc.; (4) the path which can destroy, etc., the past, present and future mass of frustration is correct view, aspiration, speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness and concentration; and one delights in listening to, reflecting on, etc., this is good *dharma*.

(C) "Thorough attention" means taking up, correctly considering, etc., the profound meaning of the good *dharma*, after having heard it.

(D) "Practice of *dharma* and *anudharma*" means after correctly considering the meaning of the good *dharma*, one produces the five good *dharmas* which arise from departure from the household life: faith, effort, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom, cultivates these continually and with effort, and then enters the fixing of rightness (*samyaktvaniyama* = *darśanamārga* = entering the stream).

CHAPTER III: PERFECT SERENITY*

(E460a17–464c15) *Scripture*: At one time the Lord . . . said: There are four kinds of perfect serenity which should be undertaken, made firm, etc., i.e. serenity in the Buddha, the Dharma, the Assembly, and the moral conduct which is cherished by the noble ones.[10]

Explanation: (A) "Perfect serenity in the Buddha" means, as the Lord has said: Here the noble disciples by means of the following characteristics bear in mind the Buddha as Tathāgata, perfected being, rightly enlightened one, accomplished in the three knowledges, well-gone one, knower of the world, superior one, guide of persons to be trained, teacher of gods and men, enlightened one, and Lord.[11]

(A1) "Here" means this realm of sensual desire, this world or the Jambūdvīpa continent, or this body; etc. or in this place where the Buddha, his disciples, sages, etc. are born; or in regard to this *dharma* which is taught, etc.

(A2) "Noble disciples" means those who take refuge in the Buddha, Dharma and Assembly.

(A3) "By means of the following characteristics they bear in mind the Buddha" means by means of the following aspects, modes, etc. they produce mindfulness, nonforgetfulness, etc., of him.

(A4) "Tathāgata" means that from the night of his realizing perfect, complete enlightenment up to the night of his entering final liberation all of his teaching was true, without perversion, etc., and that he has seen by means of wisdom which is "thus" and according to reality.

(A5) A perfected being is of two types:

(a) The conditioned perfected being has obtained his fruit, the

acquisition of that acquistion-force (*prāptiprāpti*), the adept's faculties, powers, moral conduct, good roots, and the ten adept factors [the eightfold path constituents plus correct liberation and correct knowledge, etc.

(b) The unconditioned perfected being has destroyed all the afflictions of passion, etc., transcended all destinies, attained liberation, etc. The Buddha possesses all these attributes and so is worthy of receiving the best clothes, food, homage, etc.

(A6) "Rightly enlightened one" means that the Buddha possesses omniscience, understanding, etc., of the true nature of all factors, and can realize the four truths, the four fruits of stream-enterer, etc., and the six higher faculties.

(A7) "Accomplished in understanding and career" means that the Buddha possesses the three knowledges of an adept, viz., knowledge of past births, knowledge of births and deaths of other sentient beings and knowledge of the destruction of the evil influences and practices, the adept's restraints of body and speech, pure eating habits, and strictly regulated deportment.

(A8) "Well-gone one" means that the Buddha possesses the faultless good *dharma* which leads to liberation, has destroyed all the afflictions of the courses of rebirth and like the past Buddhas has travelled the true path and gone beyond the world.

(A9) "Knower of the world" means that the Buddha knows, sees, understands, etc., the world, i.e. the five aggregates, the five courses, the six sense-bases, the various places in the three realms and from what causes they are produced, etc.

(A10) "Superior one" means that among all sentient beings, those with no feet, two feet, etc., the Buddha is the best, most honored, etc.

(A11) "Guide of persons to be trained" means that the Buddha employs three ways of training sentient beings which cause them to destroy all their afflictions, etc.: (a) mild— explaining good bodily, vocal and mental actions, their retributions, the good destinies (birth as a god or a man) and liberation, etc.; (b) strong—explaining evil bodily, vocal and mental actions, their retributions, the evil destinies (birth as an animal, hungry ghost or hell being), etc.; (c) both (a) and (b).

(A12) "Teacher of gods and men" means that the Buddha is the best teacher, guide, etc., for monks, nuns, etc., and Māra, Brahmā, etc.

(A13) "Enlightened one" means one who possesses, produces, etc., the adept knowing, seeing, wisdom, etc., of a *tathāgata*.

(A14) "Lord" means one who possesses the superior good factors,

has cultivated them, has perfected bodily moral conduct and mental wisdom, possesses infinite magnanimity, limitless factors and great majesty.

(B) "Perfect serenity in the *dharma*" means, as the Lord has said: The noble disciples bear in mind the good *dharma* which is well-explained, present, non-burning, timely, conducive, open to all, and to be known personally.[12]

(B1) "Well-explained" means that four truths taught by the Buddha are true and not otherwise.

(B2) "Presented" means that when one cultivates correctly the path of direct realization of the four truths, one enters into the higher realization of them [= the path of vision in this present life, and the same for the path of practice.]

(B3) Non-burning means that the eightfold path is without afflictions.

(B4) "Timely" means that the eightfold path is so because if one cultivates correctly the path of direct realization of the four truths, just at that time one will enter into the direct realization of them, and the same for the path of spiritual practice.

(B5) "Conducive" means that the cultivation of the eightfold path can lead to the direct realization of the four truths.

(B6) "Open to all" means that by cultivating the eightfold path one can know and see the four truths as they are.

(B7) "To be known personally" means that the Buddha and his disciples know, see, etc., the four truths by themselves.

(C) "Perfect faith in the assembly" means as the Buddha has said: The noble disciples bear in mind the assembly, i.e. the Buddha's disciples possess good mode of progress, straightforward mode of progress, proper progress, progress in *dharma* and *anudharma*, appropriate progress, progress in *anudharma*; they, the stream-enterer candidate, the stream-enterer, the once–returner candidate, the once–returner, the non-returner candidate, the non–returner, the perfected being candidate and the perfected being (thus, the eight noble persons) possess moral conduct, concentration, wisdom, liberation, and knowing and seeing liberation; they are to be offered gifts, given hospitality, respectfully saluted; they are supreme, a field of merit, and worthy of the veneration of the world.

(C1) "Good mode of progress" means (a) by difficult practice one attains higher faculties slowly, (b) by easy practice one attains higher faculties quickly, (c) by difficult practice one attains higher faculties quickly, and (d) by easy practice one attains higher faculties slowly.

(C2) "Straightforward mode of progress" means that the eightfold path is not circuitous, not deviating, etc.

(C3) "Proper progress" means that the eightfold path is fit and includes the 37 aids to enlightenment.

(C4) "Progress in *dharma* and *anudharma*" means the practice of liberation and the eightfold path, the code of discipline and the restraint of the code of discipline, the bodily and vocal restraints and pure eating habits and the undertaking of these, respectively.

(C5) "Appropriate progress" means that the assembly has one moral conduct, one teaching, etc., for all monks and that the monks mutually greet each other, do appropriate homage, etc.

(C6) "Progress in *anudharma*" means the practice of the eightfold path.

(C7) "Stream-enterer candidate" means one who has obtained the noninterrupted path, i.e. is capable of immediately realizing stream entrance, but has not yet destroyed most of the passion and hatred of the sensual desire realm and is currently cultivating the direct realization of the four truths.

(C8) "Stream-enterer" means one who has destroyed and completely known the three fetters, the view of the individual as real, doubt and addiction to moral precepts and vows, but cannot yet seek to realize the once-returner fruit.

(C9) "Once-returner fruit candidate" means one who is capable of immediately realizing the once-returner fruit, has destroyed most of the attachment and hatred of the sensual desire realm and is currently cultivating the direct realization of the four truths.

(C10) "Once-returner" means one who has destroyed the above-mentioned three fetters and most of the attachment and hatred of the sensual desire realm, but cannot yet seek to realize the non-returner fruit.

(C11) "Non-returner fruit candidate" means one who is capable of immediately realizing the non-returner fruit, has destroyed the attachment and hatred of the sensual desire realm, and is currently cultivating the direct realization of the four truths.

(C12) "Non-returner" means one who has destroyed the five lower fetters, i.e. the three above-mentioned and the attachment and hatred of the sensual desire realm but cannot yet seek to realize the worthy one fruit.

(C13) "Perfected being fruit candidate" means one who is capable of immediately realizing the fruit of being perfected.

(C14) "Perfected being" means one who has destroyed all of the afflictions in this present life.

(C15) "Those who possess moral conduct, concentration, wisdom, liberation, and knowledge and vision of liberation" are the non-adepts and adepts.

(C16) "To be offered gifts" means worthy to receive offerings, homage, etc.

(C17) "To be given hospitality" means worthy to receive offerings, etc., because for even a small good deed done (for the assembly), one obtains a great benefit.

(C18) "To be respectfully saluted" means worthy to be welcomed, bowed to, etc., by everyone.

(C19) "Superior" means that among all groups the assembly is the best, most honored, etc.

(C20) "Field of merit" means that even if a small gift is given, etc., to the assembly, one obtains a great beneficial result from that.

(C21) "Worthy of the veneration of the world" means that the noble disciples should be honored by the world because they have practiced the pure path and possess the three pure actions (of body, speech and mind) which are venerated.

(D) "Moral conduct cherished by the noble one's" means the undefiled bodily and vocal restraints and the pure eating habits which are cherished, followed, etc. by them.

CHAPTER IV: FRUITS OF MONKHOOD

(E464c16–465a2) *Scripture*: At one time the Lord ... said: There are four fruits of the monk: stream-entrance fruit, once-returner fruit, non-returner fruit, and perfected being fruit.[13]

Explanation: (A) "Stream-entrance fruit" is of two types: (1) Conditioned means the acquisition of that fruit, the acquisition of that acquisition, the non-adept faculties, powers, moral conduct, good roots, the eight non-adept factors (= the eight limbs of the path), etc. (2) Unconditioned means the destruction of the three fetters (view of the individual as real, etc.), etc., and 88 latencies, etc.

(B) "Once-returner fruit" is of two types: (1) Conditioned means the same as for (A). (2) Unconditioned means the destruction of the greater part of attachment, hatred, delusion, etc.

(C) "Non–returner fruit" is of two types: (1) Conditioned means the same as for A. (2) Unconditioned means the destruction of the five lower fetters, etc., and 92 latencies, etc.

(D) "Perfected-being fruit": defined at Chapter II, A 5.

CHAPTER FIVE: FOUR MODES OF PROGRESS

(E465a22–466b14) This Chapter "is devoted to the mental experience of an adept, as he proceeds from lower to higher stages of spiritual progress. In short, he acquires six transcendent powers."[14]

CHAPTER SIX: FOUR TRADITIONAL PRACTICES OF MONKS

(E466b15-467c22)

CHAPTER SEVEN: FOUR RIGHT EXERTIONS

(E467c23-467c11) This Chapter corresponds to Book Eight of the *Vibhaṅga.*

CHAPTER EIGHT: FOUR SUPERNATURAL POWERS

(E471c12-475e23) These involve the gaining of concentration, striving and conditioning through (1) desire, (2) energy, (3) awareness, and (4) investigation. It corresponds to Book Nine of the *Vibhaṅga.*

CHAPTER NINE: FOUR APPLICATIONS OF MINDFULNESS

(E475e24-479b23) This Chapter corresponds to Book Seven of the *Vibhaṅga.*

CHAPTER TEN: FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS

(E479b24-482a25) Corresponds to Book Four of the *Vibhaṅga.*

CHAPTER ELEVEN: FOUR TRANCES

(E482a26-485b17) Corresponds to Book Twelve of the *Vibhaṅga.*

CHAPTER TWELVE: FOUR BOUNDLESS STATES

(E485a26-488b17) Corresponds to Book Thirteen of the *Vibhaṅga.*

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: FOUR IMMATERIAL STATES

(E488b18-489a28) Also treated in Book Twelve of the *Vibhaṅga.*

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THREE SPIRITUAL PRACTICES OF CONCENTRATION

(E489a29-491b7) These are (1) worship, (2) reverence, and (3) offering.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: SEVEN CONDITIONS OF ENLIGHTENMENT

(E491b8–494b end) Corresponds to Book Ten of the *Vibhaṅga*.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN: MISCELLANEOUS

(E494c1–498b7) A long list of factors is divided into defilements and afflictions, and explained. The list closely matches the list of small items in Book Seventeen of the *Vibhaṅga*.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: TWENTYTWO FACULTIES

(E498b12–499c24) Corresponds to Book Five of the *Vibhaṅga*.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: TWELVE BASES

(E499c26–500c25) Corresponds to Book Two of the *Vibhaṅga*.

CHAPTER NINETEEN: FIVE AGGREGATES

(E500c26–501b23) Corresponds to Book One of the *Vibhaṅga*.

CHAPTER TWENTY: SIXTYTWO ELEMENTS

(E501b24–505a8) Corresponds to the *Vibhaṅga* Book Three.

CHAPTER TWENTYONE: TWELVE-FOLD CHAIN OF DEPENDENT ORIGINATION

(E501b25–505a9) Corresponds to Book Six of the *Vibhaṅga*.

PUGGALAPAÑÑATTI

Summary by Karl H. Potter

Another work in the Theravāda Abhidharma list, it is likely that the *Puggalapaññatti* belongs to the same time period as the others reviewed so far, perhaps a couple of decades later.

This work was first edited by Richard Morris for the Pali Text Society, London in 1883, and again with an edition of Buddhaghoṣa's commentary by Georg Landsberg and Carolyn Rhys Davids in the *Journal of the Pali Text Society* for 1913–14, pp. 170–254. Still another edition is by Mahesh Tiwari, in *The Pañcappakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā* (Patna 1968). However, in the "E" references to follow we refer to the edition by J. Kashyap from Nalanda, 1960. The work has been translated by Nyanatiloka into German as *Das Buch der Charaktere* (Breslau 1980) and by Bimala Churn Law into English as *A Designation of Human Types* (Pali Text Society Translation Series 12, London 1924). It is this latter translation that is indicated by "T" below. There is also a Japanese translation by Tomotsugu Hiramatsu in Nanden Daizokyo, volume 47. The work has been summarized by Kashyap and by Tiwari in their respective editions above.

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(E1-18; T1-16) There are six kinds of nominal designations (*prajñapti*): (1) nominal aggregates; (2) nominal sense-bases; (3) nominal elements; (4) nominal truths; (5) nominal faculties; and (6) nominal personalities. There are 5 aggregates, 12 senses, 18 elements, 4 truths, 22 faculties, and these are listed. The present work deals with the types of personality.

The chapters take up the topic, grouping personalities by ones, twos, threes, etc., up to ten. In this Table of Contents are 54 classed by ones, 26 by twos, 17 by threes, 29 by fours, 14 by fives, 1 by

sixes, 2 by sevens, and 1 each by eights, nines and tens. To save repetition we shall omit a separate listing of these here.

CHAPTER ONE: BY ONES

(E19-28; T17-27) (1) A person liberated at times is one who experiences the eight kinds of liberation from time to time, and for whom through such wisdom some of his intoxicants are completely destroyed.

(2) A person not liberated at times is one who experiences the eight kinds of liberation all the time, and whose intoxicants are completely destroyed. He is a noble personality.

(3) A person of perturbable nature is one who enters the trances of the material and immaterial worlds, but with difficulty, much effort, and only occasional success; being subject to laziness.

(4) A person of imperturbable nature enters the trances of the material and immaterial worlds easily and with complete success, not being visited by laziness. He is a noble personality.

(5) A person of fallible nature is one who doesn't achieve the trances of the material and immaterial worlds, or doesn't succeed as he desires or as long as he desires, or has great difficulty, because of his laziness.

(6) A person of infallible nature is one who achieves the trances of the two worlds as he desires, without difficulty, and as long as he desires, and is not lazy. He is a noble person.

(7) A person who is competent in thinking is one who achieves the trances as above, but only when he wills to and as along as he wills to; whenever he is not willing he falls away from them.

(8) A person who is competent in watchfulness is one who achieves the trances as long as, but only as long as, he is watchful.

(9) An ordinary person is one who is not putting the three fetters aside.

(10) A person born of the lineage is one who has those factors which immediately proceed from the having of the noble nature.

(11) One restrained by fear is one of the seven kinds of learners as well as ordinary persons.

(12) One not restrained by fear is a perfected being.

(13) One who is incapable of progress is one who is covered by karma, defilements and maturations, who is without faith, insufficient in desire, stupid, incapable of following the path of good factors.

(14) One who is capable of progress has the opposite features to the above.

(15) Those with a fixed destiny include five types going to hell, eight types of noble persons, and persons with false views.

(16) Those without regulated destiny are the rest.

(17) There are four kinds of path-walkers.

(18) There are four kinds who are fixed in the fruits.

(19) One who is equal-headed is one whose life ends as soon as his intoxicants are terminated.

(20) One for whom an eon endures is one for whom an eon that is scheduled to end continues on until he achieves liberation.

(21) There are eight kinds of noble persons.

(22) The rest are not noble persons.

(23) A learner is one of four kinds who follow the path or three who have the result.

(24) A nonlearner is a noble person.

(25) The rest are neither learners nor nonlearners.

(26) The one who has three understandings.

(27) Possessors of six superknowledges.

(28) A perfectly enlightened one understands all the truths regarding all doctrines as yet unknown, and has the power of the results.

(29) A person enlightened for himself is one who understands truths regarding doctrines as yet unknown, but not all of them, and doesn't have the power of the results.

(30) A person liberated in both ways is one who experiences the eight stages of liberation and all of whose intoxicants are destroyed by his wisdom.

(31) One liberated through wisdom is one who has not experienced the eight kinds of liberation but knows them by wisdom and all of whose intoxicants are destroyed.

(32) An eye-witness is one who has both experienced the eight stages of liberation and knows them by wisdom and has some of its intoxicants destroyed.

(33) One who has won vision understands the four noble truths and the Buddha's doctrines and practices them and has some of his intoxicants destroyed.

(34) The person liberated by faith is like (33) but his intoxicants are destroyed in a different way.

(35) A *dharma*-follower is one whose faculty of wisdom is developing as a stream-enterer, who cultivates the noble path with wisdom. The person who has completed the development of this sort is the one who has won vision (33).

(36) A faith-follower is like (35) except that he cultivates the noble path with faith. The completion of this cultivation makes him a person liberated by faith (34).

(37) One reborn not more than seven times is a stream-enterer

who has completely destroyed the three fetters; he will transmigrate seven times among gods and men and then his frustrations will end.

(38) One who transmigrates from family to family is a stream-enterer who has destroyed the three fetters, who will transmigrate through two or three good families until his frustrations end.

(39) A single-seeded person is a stream-enterer who has destroyed the three fetters and who will be liberated in one lifetime.

(40) A once-returner is one who will only return once to the world before his frustrations will cease.

(41) A nonreturner is one who has completely destroyed the five fetters which cause rebirth in hell and who has been reborn (as a god) without parents; achieving liberation in this state he does not return again to this world.

(42) One whose final liberation will occur before the next life is a nonreturner before reaching the middle of his appointed span of years in heaven.

(43) A term-curtailing decedent is a nonreturner who is in the later half of his appointed span in heaven.

(44) An automatically decedent person is a nonreturner who automatically achieves liberation.

(45) One who is liberated through effort is a nonreturner who liberates himself through effort.

(46) A person going upstream to Akaniṣṭha is a nonreturner who goes from heaven to heaven to achieve liberation.

(47) A person trying to destroy the three fetters is a path-enterer.

(48 in E; 47 (b) in T) A stream-enterer is one who has destroyed the three fetters.

(49 in E; 48 (a) in T) A person trying to destroy his attachment to the senses and malice is one trying to become a once-returner.

(50 in E; 48 (b) in T) A once-returner is one who has succeeded in destroying attachment to the senses and to malice.

(51 in E; 49 (a) in T) A person trying to destroy attachment to senses and malice without residue is trying to become a nonreturner.

(52 in E; 49 (b) in T) A person who has succeeded in destroying attachment to senses and malice without residue is a nonreturner.

(53 in E; 50 (a) in T) One trying to destroy attachment to the material and immaterial worlds, to pride, excitedness and ignorance is one trying to be a noble person.

(54 in E; 50 (b) in T) One who has succeeded in destroying attachment to material and immaterial things, to pride, excitedness and ignorance is a noble person.

CHAPTER TWO

(E28-43; T28-39) (1) Angry and vengeful. Synonyms are provided for the two terms, as with the others below.

(2) Hypocrite and quarrelsome.

(3) Envious and selfish.

(4) Crafty and deceitful.

(5) Shameless and immodest.

(6) Sulky and a friend of evil people.

(7) With unguarded faculties and with unwise eating habits.

(8) Forgetful and uncomprehending.

(9) Infringer of precepts and holder of (wrong) views.

(10) One with internal fetters and one with external fetters. The former's fetters tie him to lower realms, the latter's to upper realms.

(11) Nonangry and unvengeful.

(12) Without hypocrisy and nonquarrelsome.

(13) Unenvious and unselfish.

(14) Noncrafty and undeceitful.

(15) Conscientious and modest.

(16) Obedient and a friend to good people.

(17) With guarded senses and wise food habits.

(18) Alert and comprehending.

(19) Observer of law and upholder of right view.

(20) Two kinds of persons hard to find in this world—one who does good first and one who recognizes it.

(21) Two persons hard to satisfy: a miser and a profligate.

(22) Two kinds of persons easily satisfied—one who is not a miser and one who is not a profligate.

(23) Two kinds of persons whose intoxicants increase—one who doubts where he shouldn't and one who is not suspicious where he should be.

(24) Two kinds of persons whose intoxicants do not increase—one who does not doubt where he ought not to do so, and one who doubts where he ought to do so.

(25) Persons with low inclinations and persons with superior inclinations.

(26) The to-be-liberated—viz., the perfected beings and the one who is enlightened for himself—and the liberated—the Buddha.

CHAPTER THREE

(E44-58; T40-54) (1) (a) A person is without hope who is immoral, impure, and does not aspire for liberation even when he hears of those who have attained it.

(b) A person is hopeful who is moral and who, when he hears of those who have attained liberation, hopes he may attain it too.

(c) A person who has lost hope is one who, though he has himself attained those liberations that are gained through insight and thought and is thus without evil tendencies, nevertheless has lost desire for (final) liberation.

(2) Three kinds of persons who are as if sick: (a) One kind of sick person fails to recover regardless of treatment; likewise, some people fail to practice good regardless of whether they hear the doctrine, see the Buddha or not. (b) A second kind of sick person recovers regardless of his treatment. Likewise, there are those who practice good regardless of the doctrines and disciplines they may or may not have been taught. (c) A third kind of sick person depends upon treatment to recover. Likewise, there are those who require doctrines and disciplines in order to practice good, and for them the Tathāgata has provided his teachings which should be imparted to others of this third type.

(3) This triad consists of the eye-witnesses (1.32 above), those who have won vision (1.33 above) and those liberated by faith (1.34 above).

(4) (a) Foul-mouthed are those who lie. (b) Flower-speakers are those who speak the truth. (c) Honey-tongued are those whose speech is felicitous and attractive.

(5) (a) Cancer-minded persons are those who are always out of sorts, full of anger and suspicion. (b) Lightning-minded are those who understand truly the noble truths. (c) Diamond- or thunderbolt-minded are those who have achieved the liberations of thought and wisdom with their intoxicants destroyed.

(6) (a) Blind persons are those who cannot see their way to worldly success and cannot tell good from bad. (b) One-eyed persons are those who can see their way to worldly success but cannot distinguish good from bad. (c) Two-eyed persons can see their way to worldly success and can also tell good from bad.

(7) (a) A person of stooping wisdom is one who, though he hears beneficial advice and doctrine, pays no attention to it. (b) A person of unawakened wisdom hears beneficial advice and doctrine and pays attention to it as long as he is seated, but having gotten up and gone away forgets it and does not practice it. (c) A person of abundant wisdom hears beneficial advice and doctrine, pays attention both during the discussion and afterwards.

(8) (a) Persons who are attached to sense-desires and births include stream-enterers as well as once-returners. (b) Those who are non-attached to sense-desires but not to rebirths are the nonreturners.

(c) The person who is nonattached to both sense-desires and births is a perfected being.

(9) (a) Those like a mark on stone are those whose anger endures for a long time, like a mark in stone which is not soon eroded by wind or water. (b) Those like a mark in the earth are those whose anger does not last long, like the easily-eroded scratch in dirt. (c) Those like a mark in the water are those who, even though they speak harshly, are immediately agreeable.

(10) (a) One like new but rough hempen cloth is the young Buddhist monk who leads his pupils astray through his immorality and lack of grace. (b) A middle-aged monk who does so is like a cheap older piece of hempen cloth, since his advice likewise leads his followers astray through his immorality and lack of grace. (c) A third kind of monk is like the old tattered cloth that is used to clean the pots and then thrown away; his words are rejected by other monks and he is ousted from the community.

(11) There are three kinds of Banaras silk—one new, beautifully colored, smooth and valuable; a second not new, though not old, of fine color, smooth and valuable; a third old yet beautiful and pleasant to the touch, used for wrapping jewelry and thrown into the chest. Likewise there are three kinds of monks—(a) those who are young, virtuous, an advantage to learn from; (b) those who are middle-aged, virtuous, an advantage to learn from; (c) a senior monk, whose words will be taken to heart as the cloth is placed in the perfumed chest.

(12) (a) Easily measured is one whose speech and mind are proud and confused. (b) Hard to be measured is one whose speech and mind are to the point and collected. (c) Immeasurable is one who is liberated.

(13) (a) One who should not be served is one whose morality, concentration and wisdom are inferior, and should not be waited on except from compassion. (b) One who should be served is one whose morality, concentration and wisdom are equal to one's own, so that discussion between them will be beneficial. (c) One who should be honored and served is one whose virtue, concentration and wisdom is superior to one's own, so that one can learn from him.

(14) (a) One who is to be avoided and not served is one who is immoral, corrupt, for association with him will give oneself bad repute. (b) One who should be treated with indifference and not served is one who is easily angered, for the same reason. (c) One who is to be served is one of virtue and good disposition, for, even though such a one may hold a wrong view, association with him will still bring one good fame.

(15) (a) One who observes morality but whose concentration and wisdom are incomplete is the stream-enterer or the once-returner. (b) The person whose morality and concentration are complete but not his wisdom is the nonreturner. (c) The person whose morality, concentration and wisdom are all complete is the perfected being.

(16) There are three teachers: (a) one who provides understanding of sense-desires but not of objects or feelings; he has attained the meditative state in the material world. (b) A second one provides understanding of desires and objects but not of feelings; he has attained the meditative state in the immaterial world. (c) A third teacher sets forth understanding of all three—desires, objects, feelings; he is perfectly enlightened.

(17) Another set of three teachers: (a) one who preaches eternalism; (b) one who preaches destructionism; (c) one who does not teach any real or permanent entity in regard to the present or the future life—this last is perfectly enlightened.

CHAPTER FOUR

(E60-94; T55-88) (1) (a) Not a good man; (b) an even worse man; (c) a good man; (d) an even better man.

(2) (a) Bad; (b) worse than that; (c) good; (d) better than that.

(3) (a) One whose *dharma* is bad; (b) one whose *dharma* is worse than bad; (c) one whose *dharma* is good; (d) one whose *dharma* is better than good.

(4) (a) One who is blameworthy in conduct, speech and thought; (b) one who is very blameworthy; (c) one who is only a little blameworthy; (d) one who is blameless.

(5) (a) One who understands the doctrine upon hearing it; (b) one who understands it upon analysis; (c) one who requires discussion and service to understand it; (d) one who will not understand it in this life.

(6) (a) One who answers correctly but not quickly; (b) one who answers quickly but not correctly; (c) one who answers both correctly and quickly; (d) one who answers neither correctly nor quickly.

(7) (a) One who in teaching the *dharma* speaks little and only what is irrelevant, so that the audience may fail to understand; (b) one who in teaching the *dharma* speaks little but what he says is relevant, so that the audience is able to understand; (c) one who in teaching the *dharma* speaks much irrelevancy, so that the audience cannot tell what the doctrine is; and (d) one who in teaching the *dharma* speaks much and what is relevant, so that the audience can understand.

(8) There are four kinds of clouds, and four kinds of persons

comparable to them: (a) those who speak but do not act, who are like a cloud that thunders but does not rain; (b) those who act but do not speak, like a cloud that rains but doesn't thunder; (c) those who both act and speak, like a cloud that rains and thunders; (d) those who neither act nor speak, like a cloud that neither thunders nor rains.

(9) There are four kinds of mice, and four persons comparable: (a) Like a mouse that digs a hole but does not live in it, a person who masters the doctrine in the scriptures (9 names listed) but does not learn from them. (b) Like a mouse that lives in a hole he did not dig, a person who understands the doctrine even though he has not mastered the doctrine from the scriptures. (c) Like a mouse that lives in the hole he dug, the person who learns the doctrine from the scripture and lives it. (d) Like a mouse that neither lives nor digs in holes, a person who neither learns the doctrine from scripture nor understands it.

(10) There are four kinds of mangoes, and four persons comparable. (a) Like an unripe but ripe-looking mango, some persons who do not understand the four truths behave as if they do. (b) Like a ripe mango which does not yet look ripe, a person may not look as if he does but actually understands the noble truths. (c) Like an unripe mango which does not yet look ripe, one may neither understand the truths nor look as if one does. (d) Like a ripe mango that looks ripe, some persons who look as if they understand the noble truths do indeed do so.

(11) There are four kinds of persons who can be compared to a jar. (a) Like a jar that is empty but covered, some persons who do not understand the four truths behave as if they do. (b) Like a full and uncovered jar, some persons may not look as if they understand the truths but actually do so. (c) Like an empty and uncovered jar, some persons neither understand nor look as if they understand the truths. (d) Like a full and covered jar some persons understand the truth and look as if they do so.

(12) Four types of persons comparable to a pool of water are distinguished: they are the same four kinds and distinguished in (10) and (11), but (a) is likened to a jar that is shallow but appears deep, (b) to a jar that is deep but appears shallow, (c) to a jar that is shallow and appears to be shallow, (d) to a jar that is deep and appears deep.

(13) There are four kinds of oxen—those that are a pest to their own herd but not to another, those that are a pest to another herd but not to their own, those that are a pest to both their own and other herds, and those that are pests to neither their own nor other herds. Like the first kind of ox is the person who creates trouble to his own congregation but not to that of others. Like the second

is the person who creates trouble to others' congregations but not his own. Etc.

(14) Four kinds of persons are like snakes—(a) like a quick but not very poisonous snake, is one of quickly-dying anger; (b) like a poisonous but not very quick snake, is one slow to anger but stays angry a long time; (c) like a quick poisonous snake, is one often angry and for a long time; (d) like a slow nonpoisonous snake, is one infrequently angry and his anger does not endure.

(15) (a) Some persons praise those unworthy of praise without examining them. (b) Some condemn those worthy of praise without examining them. (c) Some take satisfaction in what is not satisfactory without examining it. (d) Some find dissatisfaction in what is satisfactory without examining it.

(16) (a) Some, after examining them, rightly condemn those unworthy of praise. (b) Some, after examining them, rightly praise those worthy of praise. (c) Some, after examining it, find dissatisfaction in what is not satisfactory. (d) Some, after examining it, find satisfaction in what is satisfactory.

(17) (a) Some condemn what is unworthy of praise in a person but fail to praise what is worthy of praise in him. (b) Some praise what is praiseworthy in a person but fail to condemn what is not worthy of praise in him. (c) Some praise what is praiseworthy and condemn what is not praiseworthy. (d) Some neither praise what is praiseworthy nor condemn what is not praiseworthy.

(18) (a) Some live on their present efforts and not on their (previously earned) merit. (b) Others live on their (previously earned) merit and not on their present efforts (the gods inhabiting the five pleasurable worlds). (c) Still others live on both present efforts and (previous) merit. (d) And still others live on neither (viz., those in purgatory).

(19) (a) Some, such as Cāṇḍālas, basket-weavers, etc., who are poor, ugly, and blind, and who do evil things, are reborn into misery, doom and disaster. (b) Some others of the same sort but who do good deeds are reborn into a good destiny. (c) Others, who are born of noble family, rich, good-looking but do evil things are reborn to misery, doom and disaster. (d) And others of that sort (like (c)) but who do good deeds are born into good destinies.

(20) The above four types are also respectively like a person who stoops down and does not progress, a person who stoops down but progresses, a person who prospers yet doesn't progress, a person who prospers and progresses.

(21) Like trees, (a) some persons are weak (immoral) but surrounded by the strong (moral), (b) others are strong (moral) surrounded by weak (immoral), (c) others are weak and surrounded

by the weak, and (d) others are strong and surrounded by the strong.

(22) (a) One kind of person is satisfied by externals, (b) another satisfied by the words of others, (c) another satisfied by mere performance of austerities, (d) but others are satisfied by morality, meditation or wisdom.

(23) (a) Some strive after their own welfare but not that of others, (b) others seek others' welfare but not their own, (c) others seek not after welfare at all, and (d) still others seek for both their own and others' welfare.

(24) (a) One type of person is self-mortifying (a long description of behavior indicative of this), (b) another kind torments others, (c) a third is both self-mortifying and tormenter of others, and (d) others who have heard or seen the Buddha are neither self-mortifiers nor tormenters of others (long description of the way of life of a Buddhist monk here).

(25) (a) Some have not abandoned passion, (b) others still have hatred, (c) still others have delusion, and (d) others are proud.

(26) (a) Some attain internal peace of mind but not wisdom, (b) others attain wisdom but not peace of mind, (c) others attain both, and (d) others neither.

(27) (a) Some go with the stream through enjoying sensual pleasures and committing sinful deeds, (b) others go against the stream through doing neither, (c) others having destroyed the five fetters become gods and are liberated in heaven, (d) others who have destroyed their intoxicants and who have achieved realization in this life are brahmins who have crossed the stream and gone to the other shore and are established in results.

(28) (a) One who knows little and does not act up to what little he knows, (b) one who knows little but acts up to it, (c) one who knows lots but does not act up to it, (d) one who knows lots and acts up to it.

(29) (a) The stream-enterers, who have destroyed three fetters and are destined for enlightenment, are called recluses with firm footing; (b) the once-returners are called "red-lotus-like recluse"; (c) one who has become a god through destroying five fetters is called a "white-lotus-like recluse"; (d) one who has realized liberation in this life is a delicate recluse.

CHAPTER FIVE

(E94-103; T89-96) (1) (a) One man does wrong and becomes remorseful but does not experience the liberation of mind and wisdom, (b) another does wrong and does not become remorseful, (c) another does not do wrong and is nevertheless remorseful, (d)

another does not do wrong and does not become remorseful, (e) but a fifth man, the Buddha, instructs all of them how to get rid of their intoxicants.

(2) (a) One despises him to whom he gives, (b) another despises him with whom he lives, (c) another becomes infatuated with him of whom he speaks, (d) another has little faith, love or contentment, (e) and a final one cannot tell good from bad and is stupid.

(3) Five kinds of soldiers who are like five kinds of monks: (a) one who, seeing a cloud of dust (i.e. merely hearing of temptation), sinks down and refuses to fight; (b) one who endures the cloud of dust but seeing the top of the flag (i.e. seeing a beautiful woman) sinks down and refuses to fight; (c) one who endures the cloud of dust and the top of the flag but on hearing the war cries (i.e. being spoken to by the woman) sinks down and refuses to fight (i.e. gives up the monastic life and returns to a householder's ways); (d) one who endures the cloud of dust, the top of the flag and the war cries but is killed in the melee (i.e. consorts with the woman); (e) one who endures the cloud of dust, top of the flag, war cries and even the melee, wins the battle (i.e. follows the Buddhist path to enlightenment).

(4) Five who live on alms: (a) one because of delusion, (b) one because of sinful desires, (c) one because he is mad, (d) one because he reflects, and (e) one who does so because his sins are eradicated but his life is needed.

(5) Five who refuse to accept food after the proper time (as in (4)).
(6) Five who use one seat (as in (4)).
(7) Five who wear rags collected from refuse heaps (as in (4)).
(8) Five who wear three garments (as in (4)).
(9) Five who dwell in the forest (as in (4)).
(10) Five who live under a tree (as in (4)).
(11) Five who live under the open sky (as in (4)).
(12) Five who rest seated (as in (4)).
(13) Five who dwell in a cremation ground (as in (4)).

CHAPTER SIX

(E104-105; T97-98) (a) The perfectly enlightened one, who understands the truths by his own effort and has omniscience as well as mastery of results. (b) The enlightened for himself, who does not have omniscience and mastery though he understands the truths. (c) A Sāriputta or Moggallāna, who ends his frustration through understanding the truths and becomes a disciple. (d) Other perfected

beings, who understand but do not become disciples. (e) The nonreturner, who understands also. (f) The stream-enterer and once-returner, who do also.

CHAPTER SEVEN

(E106-108; T99-102) (1) (a) A person of immoral qualities, once drowned, remains so. (b) A person who has good qualities but, having emerged from the water, decreases in morality, is drowned. (c) A person whose good qualities neither increase nor decrease persists after emergence. (d) A person who emerges with good qualities and destroys the three fetters becomes a stream-enterer; he looks around after emergence. (e) A person who emerges and not only destroys the three fetters but also destroys passion, hatred and delusion becomes a once-returner; he swims on after emergence. (f) A person who destroys the five fetters completely becomes a god and a nonreturner; he reaches a firm footing after emergence. (g) A person whose will and insight are liberated, whose intoxicants are destroyed, is a true brahmin who has crossed to the other shore.

(2) (a) A person who has experienced the eight liberations and has insight into them, whose intoxicants are destroyed, is liberated in both ways. (b) One who has insight into the eight liberations but has not experienced them is liberated in wisdom. (c) A person who has experienced the eight liberations and had insight into them, and some of whose intoxicants are destroyed, is an eye-witness. (d) One who understands the noble truths and who practices them, and some of whose intoxicants are destroyed, is one who has won vision. (e) One who is like (d), but whose intoxicants are destroyed in a different way, is one liberated by faith. (f) One who is like (d) but who is striving after the results of being a stream-enterer is one who conforms to *dharma.* (g) One who is like (e) but is striving after the results of a stream-enterer is one conforming to faith.

CHAPTER EIGHT

(E109; T103) The stream-enterer, the once-returner, the nonreturner, and the perfected being are four who are on the path; and those four who achieve the results of each are four who have the results.

CHAPTER NINE

(E110-111; T104-106) The nine types are: the perfectly enlightened, the one enlightened for himself, the one liberated in both

ways, the one liberated by wisdom, the eye-witness, the one who has won vision, the one liberated by faith, the one conforming to *dharma*, and the one conforming to faith.

CHAPTER TEN

(E112; T107) Five who reach liberation here are: (1.37) the stream-enterer who will only have seven rebirths, (1.38) the stream-enterer transmigrating through a few families, (1.39) the single-seeded stream-enterer, (1.40) the once-returner, and (1.54 in E) the perfected being. Five who reach liberation after leaving this world are: (1.42) one whose final liberation will occur after this life but before the next one, (1.43) a term-curtailing decedent, (1.44) an automatic decedent, (1.45) one liberated through effort, and (1.46) one who goes upstream to Akaniṣṭha.

5

SAṄGĪTIPARYĀYA

Summary by Christian Lindtner

The *Saṅgītiparyāya* (SGP) is a commentary, belonging to the Sarvāstivāda school, on the *Saṅgītisūtra* (SS), a *sūtra* which along with the *Daśottarasūtra* marks the earliest phase of Abhidharma in India. The SS is also extant in a Theravāda recension (*Saṅgītisuttanta* = *Dīghanikāya* xxxiii) and a Dharmaguptaka recension (only extant in Chinese). These three recensions differ in a number of details.

Apart from a few Sanskrit fragments the SGP is only available in a Chinese version done by the famous Hsüan-tsang. According to Chinese tradition SGP is a work of Śāriputra whereas Yaśomitra and Bu-ston ascribe its authorship to Mahākauṣṭhila. Along with the *Dharmaskandha* (which it often quotes) and the *Prajñaptiśāstra* (which is later than the SGP) it comprises the earliest stage of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.

The Chinese text is Taisho (="T") 1536. Both SS and SGP have been edited and translated into German by Valentine Stache-Rosen. References in the summary below to this work are indicated by "E". Brief summaries of the work exist by J. Takakusu and S.C. Banerjee.

Since the SGP usually follows the SS very closely in its structure and contents—it consists of ten sections (*nipāta*) dealing with 203 sets of different *dharmas*—the best way to treat it will be to provide a synopsis of these chapters and categories with an abbreviated paraphrase of the philosophically interesting parts of the commentary.

Like most other Abhidharma works the SGP has little to offer from a purely philosophical point of view. What it offers is a sort of "soteriological ontology", i.e. it deals with basic ethical and religious values from a psychological point of view. If the factors of existence are not related to this concern they are of no interest to our authors. On the other hand SS (and SGP) is of considerable historical interest. Along with the *Daśottarasūtra* the SS, as said, is an attempt to summarize all the fundamental concepts of Buddhist

tradition. In retrospect its manner of arrangement appears archaic and superficial. It is mechanical without any deeper formative principle. Nevertheless the abundance of materials collected here provided later attempts at systematization with an indispensable background and inventory. The SGP in particular is not only the most extensive commentary extant on the SS but a mine of information about early Sarvāstivāda exegesis. To compare it closely with the corresponding Theravāda SS exegesis as found above all in Buddhaghoṣa's *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* would throw interesting light on the individual development of these two early Buddhist schools.

When commenting upon the SS the SGP sometimes merely gives brief or stereotypical definitions, sometimes it refers to or quotes other sources (mainly the *Dharmaskandha* or old *sūtras*) and sometimes it gives very thorough treatments.

I. Section of Ones

(T367a1-369b9; E45-49) 1. All living beings subsist on nutriment of which there are four kinds: (i) edible, gross and fine, (ii) contact, (iii) representative cognition, and (iv) consciousness. All four are conditioned, impermanent, perishable, subject to change, produced by causes, invisible, impure and neither imperfect nor perfect. The rest of this section involves a long discussion of various subdivisions and peculiarities in regard to these four kinds.

2. All living beings subsist on conditionings. They are likewise conditioned, impermanent, etc. Moreover they are material, independent of mind and neutral. Again various subdivisions, etc.

3. Not being careless in regard to good factors.

II. Section of Twos

(T369b10-376a28; E49-63) There are 27 sets of twos:

1. Name (*nāma*), or spirit, and form (*rūpa*), or matter. The former comprises the four immaterial aggregates, space, calculated cessation and uncalculated cessation; the latter comprises the four elements and material forms derived from them.

2. Ignorance—see III.3—and desire for existence, i.e. longing, craving, etc., for the material and immaterial elements.

3. (Wrong) view about existence and about nonexistence. The former consists in believing the ego and the world to be permanent, the latter in believing in their annihilation.

4. Shamelessness and disregard.

5. Shame and consideration.

6. Sulkiness and indulging in bad company.

7. Suavity and being in good company.

8. Skill in (discerning the five) offences and skill in desisting from these offences. The five offences are named as (i) adultery, (ii) leaving the order, (iii) natural falling, (iv) falling and (v) wickedness.

9. Skill in (discerning the eight kinds of) meditative attainment and skill in desisting from these attainments.

10. Skill in (discerning thirteen different) elements and skill in reflecting upon them. A monk understands that there are eighteen elements, six elements, etc., and reflects upon their being impermanent, frustrating, empty and without self.

11. Rightness and mildness.

12. Patience and good disposition.

13. Courtesy and munificence.

14. Mindfulness and comprehension.

15. The power of calculation and the power of spiritual practice.

16. Unguardedness of one's faculties and intemperance in diet.

17. Guardedness of one's senses and temperance in diet.

18. Moral disaster and theoretical disaster.

19. Failure in morality and failure in theory.

20. Moral accomplishment and theoretical accomplishment. (The opposite of II,18)

21. Purity in morality and purity in theory. (See 19 and 20)

22. Purity in theory and thorough exertion of one having such a theory.

23. Agitation over (four) agitating circumstances and thorough exertion of one being thus agitated.

24. Discontent toward good factors and perseverance in exertion.

25. Peace and insight. These two are inseparable.

26. Knowledge—see III.50—and liberation. Each is of three kinds.

27. Cognition of destruction and cognition of nonorigination.

III. Section of Threes

(T376a29-391b10; E63-93) There are fifty sets of threes:

1. Roots of bad things, viz., (i) greed, (ii) hatred and (iii) delusion. "Delusion" is ignorance, e.g., of the past, the future, of karma, of the three jewels, of the four truths, etc.

2. Roots of good things, viz., (i) absence of greed, (ii) sympathy and (iii) understanding.

3. Bad initial thought of (i) sensual pleasures, (ii) malice and (iii) violence.

4. Good initial thought of (i) renunciation, (ii) absence of malice and (iii) nonviolence.

5. Bad conduct of (i) body, (ii) word and (iii) mind.

6. Good conduct of (i) body, (ii) word and (iii) mind.
7. Elements of (i) sensual pleasures, (ii) malice and (iii) violence.
8. Elements of (i) renunciation, (ii) absence of malice and (iii) nonviolence.
9. Elements of (i) sensual pleasures, (ii) material form and (iii) immateriality.
10. Elements of (i) material form, (ii) immateriality and (iii) cessation.
11. Periods, viz., (i) the past, (ii) the future and (iii) the present.
12. Subjects of debate belonging to (i) the past, (ii) the future or (iii) the present.
13. Classification of matter as (i) visible and resisting, (ii) invisible and resisting, and (iii) invisible and unresisting.
14. Conditionings taking form as (i) body, (ii) word and (iii) mind.
15. Awarenesses like (i) an open sore, (ii) lightning and (iii) a diamond.
16. Persons of (i) stooping wisdom, (ii) wisdom like a pouched garment or (iii) comprehensive wisdom.
17. Senior by (i) birth or rank, (ii) common consent or convention and (iii) character (*dharma*).
18. Groups (i) determined as falsehood, (ii) determined as righteousness and (iii) undetermined.
19. Grounds of reproof based on (i) something seen, (ii) something heard or on (iii) suspicion.
20. A Tathāgata does not have to conceal any impure conduct in (i) body, (ii) words or (iii) thought.
21. Desire for (i) sensual pleasures, (ii) form or (iii) formlessness.
22. Desire for (i) material form, (ii) immateriality or (iii) extinction.
23. Intoxicants (lit. "outflows" (*āsrava*)) of (i) pleasures, (ii) existence and (iii) ignorance.
24. Longing for (i) pleasures, (ii) existence and (iii) a religious life.
25. Existence as (i) the existence of sensual pleasures, (ii) the existence of material form and (iii) immaterial existence.
26. Obfuscation (*tamas*) concerning (i) the past, (ii) the future and (iii) the present.
27. Fear of (i) disease, (ii) old age and (iii) death.
28. Feelings may be (i) satisfying, (ii) frustrating or (iii) neither satisfying nor frustrating.
29. Frustrations (i) consisting in pain, (ii) due to the conditioning or (iii) due to change.
30. Kinds of conceit: (i) "I am better than...," (ii) "I am equal to..." and (iii) "I am inferior to..."
31. The fire of (i) attachment, (ii) hatred and (iii) delusion.

32. The fire (i) of being worthy of offerings, (ii) of a householder and (iii) of a good receiver of gifts.

33. Occasions for good action are provided by (i) giving, (ii) following moral precepts and (iii) spiritual practice.

34. Three kinds of rebirth in pleasure.

35. Three kinds of rebirth in satisfaction.

36. Wisdom derived from (i) traditional learning, (ii) reasoning or (iii) personal realization.

37. Wisdom of (i) a pupil, (ii) a perfected being or adept and (iii) one who is neither a pupil nor an adept.

38. The faculty (i) of coming to know the unknown, (ii) of knowing and (iii) of having fully understood.

39. The eye of (i) flesh, (ii) the divine eye and (iii) of wisdom.

40. The weapon of (i) learning, (ii) seclusion and (iii) wisdom.

41. Training as to (i) morality, (ii) awareness and (iii) wisdom.

42. Practice of (i) morality, (ii) concentration and (iii) wisdom.

43. States that are (i) divine, (ii) sublime (*brahma*) or (iii) noble (*ārya*). They are (i) the four meditational states, (ii) the four boundless things, viz., love, compassion, sympathy and equanimity and (iii) the four applications of mindfulness (see IV.1), the four right exertions (see IV.2), the four bases of supernatural power (see IV.3), the five faculties (see V.20), the five powers (see V.22), the seven factors of enlightenment (see VII.1) and the noble eightfold path (see VIII.1).

44. Concentration (i) with initial and sustained thought, (ii) without initial and only with sustained thought, and (iii) without initial or sustained thought.

45. The wonder of (i) supernatural powers, (ii) mind-reading and (iii) teaching.

46. Purity of (i) body, (ii) word and (iii) mind.

47. Sagacity in (i) body, (ii) word and (iii) mind.

48. Supremacy of (i) the world, (ii) oneself and (iii) the doctrine (*dharma*).

49. The superiority of one's (i) course, (ii) knowledge and (iii) liberation.

50. The nonlearners' knowledge manifesting itself in cognition of (i) former lives, (ii) decease and rebirth and (iii) destruction of intoxicants.

IV. Section of Fours

(T391b11-411c12; E93-130) There are fifty groups each consisting of four items:

1. Application of mindfulness as to (i) the body, (ii) feelings, (iii) thought and (iv) concepts.

2. Right exertion to (i) get rid of evil things, (ii) prevent evil things, (iii) engender good things and (iv) maintain and enhance good things.

3. The four bases of supernatural power are motivated by (i) interest, (ii) energy, (iii) awareness and (iv) deliberation.

4. The four stages of meditation. In the first, where the monk is free from desire and unwholesome thoughts, he experiences a solitary delight accompanied by initial and sustained thought, etc. (The well-known canonical phrases are given.)

5. The four noble truths, i.e. the truth of (i) frustration, (ii) its origin, (iii) its cessation and (iv) the way to achieve its cessation.

6. The identification of (i) small, (ii) big, (iii) the boundless and (iv) nothing.

7. Four boundless states, viz., (i) love, (ii) compassion, (iii) sympathy and (iv) equanimity.

8. Four immaterial states, viz., the sphere of (i) spatial infinitude, (ii) infinitude of consciousness, (iii) nothingness and (iv) neither identification nor no identification.

9. The four-fold traditional practice of a monk means that he is satisfied with any (i) robes, (ii) alms, (iii) bed and seat that he may get, and that (iv) he applies himself to abandonment and spiritual practice.

10. The four fruits of monkhood consist in (i) entering upon the stream, (ii) returning only once, (iii) returning no more and (iv) finally becoming a perfected being.

11. The four signs of entering upon the stream are (i) the company of good people, (ii) listening to the true *dharma*, (iii) proper attention and (iv) behavior in conformity to Buddhism.

12. One who has entered upon the stream firmly believes in (i) the Buddha, (ii) the *dharma* and (iii) the order. Moreover, (iv) he lives a pure life.

13. Understanding of (i) the *dharma*, (ii) consequences, (iii) the awarenesses of others and (iv) convention.

14. Understanding of (i) frustration, (ii) its origin, (iii) its extinction and (iv) the way of this.

15. The powers of (i) faith, (ii) energy, (iii) concentration and (iv) wisdom.

16. The support of (i) wisdom, (ii) truth, (iii) renunciation and (iv) inner peace.

17. The main portions of Buddhism (*dharmaskandha*) are (i) a moral precepts, (ii) concentration, (iii) wisdom and (iv) liberation.

18. Four attitudes to things, viz., deliberately to (i) use, (ii) endure, (iii) avoid or (iv) get rid of them.

19. Four items of Buddhism, viz., (i) noncovetousness, (ii) absence of malice, (iii) right mindfulness and (iv) right concentration.

20. Things to be realized by means of one's (i) body, (ii) recollection, (iii) vision or (iv) wisdom.

21. One's course may be difficult and result in (i) knowledge slowly acquired or (ii) quickly acquired, or it may be easy and result in (iii) knowledge slowly acquired or (iv) quickly acquired.

22. Otherwise one's course may imply (i) want of endurance, (ii) self-control, (iii) endurance or (iv) equanimity.

23. Careful development of concentration contributes to (i) a pleasant life here and now, (ii) intuition, (iii) analytical wisdom and (iv) extinction of intoxicants.

24. Actions may be (i) bad, (ii) good, (iii) bad and good or (iv) neither bad nor good.

25. An attitude to the *dharma* may be (i) satisfying now but frustrating later, (ii) frustrating now but satisfying later, (iii) frustrating now and frustrating later or (iv) satisfying now and satisfying later.

26. Bondage in the form of (i) sensual pleasure, (ii) existence, (iii) (wrong) views or (iv) ignorance.

27. Separation from the bondage of (i) sensual pleasure, (ii) existence, (iii) (wrong) views or (iv) ignorance.

28. Four floods, viz., that of (i) sensual pleasure, (ii) existence, (iii) (wrong) views and (iv) ignorance.

29. Clinging to (i) sensual pleasure, (ii) (wrong) views, (iii) moral precepts and rituals and (iv) beliefs in a self.

30. Four knots, viz., (i) desire, (ii) malice, (iii) clinging to precepts and rituals and (iv) confidence in and clinging to "the idea that something is true".

31. Four elements, viz., (i) earth, (ii) water, (iii) fire and (iv) wind.

32. Four kinds of nourishment. viz., (i) gross and fine food, (ii) touch, (iii) representative cognition and (iv) consciousness.

33. Four stations of consciousness, viz., (i) matter, (ii) feelings, (iii) identifications and (iv) conditionings.

34. Four sources of desire, viz., (i) robes, (ii) alms, (iii) lodging and (iv) existence and nonexistence.

35. Four wrong courses conditioned by (i) excitement, (ii) hatred, (iii) delusion or (iv) fear.

36. A question may be answered either (i) directly, (ii) with qualifications, (iii) after further interrogation or (iv) it may be left open.

37. A gift may be pure on the part of (i) the donator, not the receiver, (ii) the receiver, not the donator, (iii) neither the donator nor the receiver or (iv) the donator as well as the receiver.

38. The four grounds of conciliation are (i) liberality, (ii) kindly speech, (iii) helpfulness and (iv) a feeling of common good.

39. Four ways of birth, viz., (i) oviparous creation, (ii) viviparous, (iii) moisture-sprung and (iv) spontaneous.

40. One may obtain a body that can be destroyed (i) by oneself, not by others, (ii) by others, not by oneself, (iii) by oneself and by others or (iv) neither by oneself nor by others.

41. An individual person may (i) follow the stream, (ii) go against the stream, (iii) rest in himself or (iv) have gone to the further shore.

42. An individual person may be concerned with (i) his own good, not that of others, (ii) that of others, not his own, (iii) neither his own nor that of others or (iv) his own as well as that of others.

43. An individual person may (i) live in the dark and end in the dark, (ii) live in the dark and end in light, (iii) live in light but end in the dark, or (iv) live in light and end in light.

44. An individual person may torment (i) himself, (ii) others, (iii) neither himself nor others or (iv) himself as well as others.

45. There are four kinds of bad verbal behavior, viz., (i) to tell a lie, (ii) slander, (iii) rudeness and (iv) silly talk.

46. The four kinds of good verbal behavior consist in abstaining from (i) lies, (ii) slander, (iii) rudeness and (iv) nonsense.

47. Four ignoble modes of speech, viz., claiming to have (i) seen what one has not seen, (ii) heard what one has not heard, (iii) considered what one has not considered and (iv) understood what one has not understood.

48. Four decent modes of speech, viz., admitting not to have (i) seen what one has not seen, (ii) heard what one has not heard, (iii) considered what one has not considered and (iv) understood what one has not understood.

49. Four ignoble modes of speech, viz., claiming not to have (i) seen what one has seen, (ii) heard what one has heard, (iii) considered what one has considered and (iv) understood what one has understood.

50. Four other decent modes of speech, viz., admitting to have (i) seen what one has seen, (ii) heard what one has heard, (iii) considered what one has considered and (iv) understood what one has understood.

V. Section of Fives

(T411c13-428c15; E130-159) There are twentyfive groups each of five items:

1. Five aggregates, viz., (i) the body, (ii) feelings, (iii) identifications, (iv) conditionings and (v) consciousness.

2. Five groups of grasping: as above.

3. Five sensous constituents, viz., those objects that may be discerned by means of (i) the eyes, (ii) the ears, (iii) the nose, (iv) the tongue or (v) the body.

4. Selfishness in regard to one's (i) lodging, (ii) supporting family, (iii) beauty, (iv) gain and (v) the *dharma*.

5. Five kinds of rebirth, viz., (i) in hell, (ii) as an animal, (iii) as a hungry ghost, (iv) as a human being or (v) as a god.

6. Five obstructions in the form of (i) longing for sensual pleasures, (ii) ill-will, (iii) torpor, (iv) worry and (v) wavering.

7. Barrenness of mind consists in a monk's lack of belief in (i) the Buddha, (ii) the teaching, (iii) the instruction, (iv) the obligations and (v) the authoritative masters.

8. The five bondages of the mind are, briefly stated, a monk's (i) passion for his own person, (ii) passion for pleasure, (iii) passion for company, (iv) lack of interest in listening to the *dharma* and (v) his being satisfied by having made a minor spiritual progress.

9. Five fetters belonging to the lower world, viz., (i) longing for pleasure, (ii) malice, (iii) belief in one's own ego, (iv) clinging to precepts and rituals and (v) wavering.

10. Five fetters belonging to the upper world, viz., (i) attachment to matter (or form), (ii) attachment to immateriality (or formlessness), (iii) excitedness, (iv) pride and (v) ignorance.

11. Five disadvantages of being impatient, viz., one becomes (i) violent, (ii) unhappy and (iii) unpopular, and one gets a bad (iv) reputation and (v) rebirth.

12. Five advantages of being patient: one is not (i) violent, (ii) unhappy or (iii) unpopular, but gets a good (iv) reputation and (v) rebirth.

13. The loss of one's (i) relatives, (ii) possessions, (iii) good health, (iv) good morals and of one's (v) opinions.

14. The blessing of having (i) relatives, etc., as above.

15. An admonition may be (i) at the right or wrong time, (ii) true or false, (ii) useful or not useful, (iv) mild or rude or (v) compassionate or full of hate.

16. It is an impossibility that a pious monk (i) kills, (ii) steals, (iii) has sexual intercourse, (iv) tells a lie or (v) enjoys what does not belong to him.

17. There are five virtues of a monk exerting himself, (i) faith, (ii) honesty, (iii) good health, (iv) manly vigor and (v) wisdom.

18. Five identifications that lead to emancipation, viz., that of (i) impermanence, (ii) the impermanent being painful, (iii) there being no self, (iv) food being repugnant and that of (v) death.

19. There are five bases of emancipation, (i) hearing the *dharma*

taught by the teacher, (ii) reciting it, (iii) preaching it oneself, (iv) pondering over it or (v) understanding it.

20. Five faculties, as IV. 15 (q.v.) adding mindfulness as the third.

21. Five other faculties, viz., that of (i) satisfaction, (ii) frustration, (iii) joy, (iv) distress and (v) equanimity.

22. Five powers, as in V. 20.

23. The five kinds of nonreturners are those who pass into final extinction (i) in an intermediate state of existence, (ii) after having been reborn, (iii) with effort, (iv) without effort and (v) those who are going upwards to Akaniṣṭha in the stream.

24. There are five kinds of gods having pure abodes, viz., (i) the Avṛhas, (ii) the Atapas, (iii) the Sudṛśas, (iv) the Sudarśanas and (v) the Akaniṣṭhas.

25. There are five basic elements tending to deliverance, viz., to put it briefly, giving up (i) sensual pleasures, (ii) malice and non-malice, (iii) violence and nonviolence, (iv) form and formlessness and (v) individuality and extinction of individuality.

VI. Section of Sixes

(T428c16-435a3; E160-175) There are twentyfour groups each of six items:

1. The internal sense-bases of contact, viz., (i) eyes, (ii) ears, (iii) nose, (iv) tongue, (v) body and (vi) mind.

2. The external sense-bases of contact, viz., (i) visible matter, (ii) sounds, (iii) smell, (iv) taste, (v) the tangible and (vi) concepts.

3. The six kinds of consciousness depend on (i) the eyes, (ii) the ears, (iii) the nose, (iv) the tongue, (v) the (skin of the) body and on (vi) the mind.

4. The six kinds of contact depend on (i) the eyes, etc., as above.

5. The six kinds of feeling arise from contact with (i) the eyes, etc., as above.

6. The six kinds of identification arise from contact with (i) the eyes, etc., as above.

7. The six kinds of volition arise from contact with (i) the eyes, etc., as above.

8. The six kinds of desire arise from contact with (i) the eyes, etc., as above.

9. It is disadvantageous to show disrespect to (i) the Buddha, (ii) the *dharma*, (iii) the order, (iv) the training precepts, and it is disadvantageous to be (v) sulky or (vi) have bad friends.

10. It is advantageous to show respect to (i) the Buddha, (ii) the *dharma*, (iii) the order, and it is advantageous to be (v) affable and (vi) have good friends.

11. The six ponderings involving contentedness are concerned with (i) visible forms, (ii) sounds, (iii) odors, (iv) tastes, (v) tangibles and (vi) concepts.

12. The six ponderings involving depression are concerned with (i) visible forms, etc., as above.

13. The six ponderings involving equanimity are concerned with (i) visible forms, etc., as above.

14. The six attitudes of perseverance are expressed in a monk's equanimity and mindfulness towards (i) visible forms, etc., as above.

15. The six elements are (i) earth, (ii) water, (iii) fire, (iv) wind, (v) space and (vi) consciousness.

16. The six factors leading to liberation are expressed in a monk's getting rid of (i) malevolence, (ii) injury, (iii) disgust, (iv) longing for pleasure, (v) consciousness following outward signs, and (vi) belief in an ego.

17. The six roots of contention are expressed in a monk's being (i) angry and grudging, (ii) unfair and hypocritical, (iii) envious and mean, (iv) deceitful and crafty, (v) full of wrong and false views, and (vi) tenaciously attached to his own persuasions.

18. The six principles of fraternal living consist in a monk's showing kindness (i) in deeds, (ii) in speech, (iii) in thoughts and in (iv) sharing gifts that one has received, (v) practising good morals and (vi) living according to orthodox views.

19. The six higher faculties consist in (i) supernatural power, (ii) divine audition, (iii) reading the thoughts of others, (iv) knowing one's previous incarnations, (v) knowing decease and rebirth and (vi) knowing the destruction of evil influences.

20. The six identifications contributing to knowledge refer to one's understanding of (i) impermanence, (ii) impermanence as frustrating, (iii) lack of self as frustrating, (iv) food as disgusting, (v) the entire world as lacking delight, and (vi) death.

21. The six things to be recollected are (i) the Buddha, (ii) the *dharma*, (iii) the order, (iv) the moral precepts, (v) renunciation and (vi) the gods.

22. The six superiorities consist in (i) seeing, (ii) listening, (iii) gain, (iv) discipline, (v) serving and (vi) recollecting.

23. There are six kinds of longing for (i) matter, (ii) sounds, (iii) smell, (iv) taste, (v) tangibles and (vi) concepts.

24. There are six modes of heredity: (i) a person of bad descent doing bad things, (ii) a person of bad descent doing good things, (iii) a bad person creating extinction that is neither bad nor good, (iv) a good person creating bad things, (v) a good person creating good things, and (vi) a good person creating extinction that is neither bad nor good.

VII. Sets of Sevens

(T435a4-440c22; E175-187) There are thirteen groups each of seven items:

1. The factors of enlightenment, viz., (i) mindfulness, (ii) analysis of the doctrine, (iii) energy, (iv) joy, (v) serenity, (vi) concentration and (vii) equanimity.

2. There are seven kinds of persons, viz., (i) the follower of confidence, (ii) the follower of the *dharma*, (iii) the one freed by confidence, (iv) the one who has won the right view, (v) one who has bodily testimony, (vi) one freed by insight, and (vii) one freed in both ways.

3. The seven requisites of concentration are: correct (i) view, (ii) resolve, (iii) speech, (iv) action, (v) way of life, (vi) effort and (vii) mindfulness.

4. The seven treasures are: (i) faith, (ii) good morals, (iii) bashfulness, (iv) modesty, (v) learning, (vi) renunciation and (vii) wisdom.

5. The seven powers are those of (i) faith, (ii) energy, (iii) bashfulness, (iv) modesty, (v) mindfulness, (vi) concentration and (vii) wisdom.

6. There are seven bad qualities, viz., (i) want of faith, (ii) unconscientiousness, (iii) indiscretion, (iv) want of learning, (v) slackness, (vi) muddleheadedness and (vii) lack of wisdom.

7. There are seven good qualities, viz., (i) faith, (ii) shame, (iii) modesty, (iv) energy, (v) mindfulness, (vi) concentration and (vii) wisdom.

8. The seven bad qualities are: not to know (i) the *dharma*, (ii) the meaning of what is said, (iii) the right time, (iv) the right measure, (v) oneself, (vi) the audience, and not to know (vii) whether a person is eminent or mean.

9. The seven good qualities are: to know (i) the *dharma*, etc., as above.

10. There are seven states of consciousness, viz., physical beings (i) diverse in body and in identification, (ii) diverse in body but uniform in identification, (iii) uniform in body but diverse in identification, and (iv) uniform in body and uniform in identification. Moreover there are immaterial beings who dwell in the realm of (v) infinite space, (vi) infinite consciousness, or (vii) nothingness.

11. The seven kinds of latent dispositions are (i) sensual passion, (ii) enmity, (iii) lust for rebirth, (iv) conceit, (v) ignorance, (vi) false opinion, and (vii) doubt.

12. The seven faultless attitudes are, to put it briefly, to have (i) faith, (ii) good morals, (iii) good friends. Moreover, (iv) to enjoy

solitude and to have (v) energy, (vi) mindfulness and (vii) wisdom.

13. There are seven ways for the settlement of cases: (i) by confronting both parties, (ii) when the accused is a victim of amnesia, (iii) when the prosecuted has regained his sanity, (iv) by checking the character of the prosecuted, (v) on majority vote, (vi) confession of guilt, or (vii) by "covering with grass", i.e. by reaching a compromise.

VIII. Section of Eights

(T440c23-445b14; E187-199) There are ten groups each of eight items:

1. Eight factors of the noble way, viz., the correct (i) view, (ii) intention, (iii) speech, (iv) action, (v) livelihood, (vi) effort, (vii) mindfulness and (viii) concentration.

2. The eight persons are those who have (i) entered the stream, (ii) work for the fruit of stream-entry, those who are (iii) once-returners, (iv) work for the fruit of a once-returner, those who are (v) never-returners, (vi) work for the fruit of a never-returner, and those who are (vii) perfected beings, and those who (viii) work for the fruit of a perfected being.

3. There are eight ways of giving gifts: (i) disrespectfully, (ii) from fear, (iii) from gratitude, (iv) in the hope of getting something in return in the future, (v) to follow up the family tradition, (vi) for fame, (vii) to be reborn in heaven, or (viii) to adorn and prepare one's mind for the highest good.

4. The eight instances of sloth occur, to put it briefly, when a monk (i) has done a little but is too lazy to do more, (ii) has done something but is too lazy to do more, (iii) has done his work but is too tired to do more, (iv) is too lazy to work the next day, (v) is too tired to continue his journey the same day, (vi) is too tired to continue his journey the next day, (vii) is too ill to work hard, or (viii) has recovered from his illness but still is too lazy to do his work.

5. The eight instances of hard work: the opposite of the above.

6. Meritorious deeds result in good rebirth as (i) a wealthy person or as a god, be it a (ii) Mahārājika, (iii) a Trāyastriṃśa, (iv) a Yama, (v) a Tuṣita, (vi) a Nirmāṇarati, (vii) a Paranirmitavaśavarti, or (viii) a Brahmakāyika god.

7. The eight assemblies consists of (i) nobles, (ii) brahmins, (iii) householders, (iv) ascetics, (v) Caturmahārājakāyika gods, (vi) Trāyastriṃśa gods, (vii) Māras and (viii) Brahmās.

8. There are eight guiding principles in society, viz., (i) gain, (ii) loss, (iii) blame, (iv) praise, (v) fame, (vi) disgrace, (vii) frustration and (viii) satisfaction.

9. The eight liberations are described at length in the usual cliche, see e.g., *Dīghanikāya* III, p. 261.

10. The eight positions of mastery are also described at length in the standard cliche, see e.g., *Dīghanikāya* III, p. 260.

IX. Section of Nines

(T445b15-447a17; E199-203) There are two groups each of nine items:

1. The nine fetters, viz., (i) attraction, (ii) repugnance, (iii) seven kinds of conceit, (iv) ignorance, (v) dogmatism, (vi) clinging, (vii) wavering, (viii) envy and (ix) selfishness.
2. Of the nine abodes of beings (i)-(iv) and (vi)-(viii) are the same as the seven stations of consciousness, see VII (x), above. But there are also (v) material beings without any perception, and (ix) immaterial beings who have reached the realm of neither-identification-nor-nonidentification.

X. Section of Tens

(T447a18-453b19; E203-206) Finally there are two groups each of ten items:

1. Ten foundations of meditational totalization, viz., (i) earth, (ii) water, (iii) fire, (iv) air, (v) blue, (vi) yellow, (vii) red, (viii) white, (ix) endless space, and (x) endless consciousness.
2. Ten virtues in need of no further training, viz., a correct (i) view, (ii) intention, (iii) speech, (iv) action, (v) livelihood, (vi) effort, (vii) mindfulness, (viii) concentration, (ix) emancipation and (x) wisdom.

6

PRAJÑAPTIBHĀṢYA

According to Chinese tradition this is the sixth of the six *pādas* of the Sarvāstivāda school.[1] However, it is doubtful whether any of it remains in existence. There is a Tibetan version which comes to us in three parts. Louis de la Vallée Poussin has provided an "analysis and fragments", in French, of the first two section parts of this text,[2] and has summarized the third part.[3]

The work is ascribed to Maudgalyāyana by Yaśomitra and Bu-ston. Takakusu's description of the Tibetan text finds the *Lokaprajñapti* in 7 chapters, the *Kāraṇaprajñapti* in 7 chapters, and the *Karmaprajñapti* in 5 chapters.[4] Tradition ascribes the translation of all three parts of Prajñasena.

The content of these works can hardly be considered to belong in the field of philosophy. The first part, *Lokaprajñapti*, deals with cosmology of a highly mythical character. The second part *Kāraṇaprajñapti*, deals with the previous lives of the Buddha, the Buddha's mother, his previous existences, and such matters. The third part, *Karmaprajñapti*, deals with karma theory in a manner not requiring special attention here.

PAṬISAMBHIDĀMAGGA

Summary by James P. McDermott

The author of this text is unknown. A.K. Warder dates the earliest stages of the text to ca. 349 B.C. The body of the text was essentially completed by 200 B.C., with some additions possibly as late as 100 B.C.

The work has been edited by Arnold C. Taylor for the Pali Text Society (2 volumes, London 1905-07, reprinted in one volume in 1979), and by Bhikkhu J. Kashyap for the Nalanda Devanagari Pali Series (Bihar: Pali Publication Board, 1960). In addition, a version of the Pali text in Burmese characters was published as part of the Chaṭṭha-Saṅgāyana edition of the *Tripiṭaka* in 1956, and a version in Thai characters by the Mahamukuta Rajavidyalaya in 1926. "E" references are to the Kashyap edition.

The only English translation, here identified as 'T', is by Bhikkhu Nanamoli, *The Path of Discrimination*, edited by A. K. Warder, Pali Text Society Translation Series 43 (London, 1982). There exists a Japanese translation by S. Watanabe in *Nanden Daizokyo* 40-41 (Tokyo, 1935-41).

The analysis of *Paṭisambhidāmagga* often seems to supplement that of the *Vibhaṅga*. The most significant contribution of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* is in its analysis of the four discriminations (*Paṭisambhidā*) in I.I.416-433 and II.VI, which does not always match that of the *Vibhaṅga* either in order or in interpretation.

The description of the Buddha's miracle of the double appearance in I.I.592-595 would seem to be the first such description in Pali literature.[1]

I. GREAT DIVISION

(E3-6; T1-8) Treatise on Knowledge
Begins with matrices describing 73 kinds of knowledge. 67 of these are shared by disciples, while 6 are not.

Chapter I: Learning

1 (E6-7; T8-9) Summary statement of 16 cases in which auditory application leads to knowledge of what is heard.

Section I

2-3 (E7-8; T9) Propositions concerning factors to be known directly, namely: that all beings are maintained by nutriment; the conditioned and the unconditioned; the material, the immaterial, and the realm of sense desires; the 4 noble truths; 5 bases for liberation; 6 superior experiences; 7 virtuous qualities; 8 bases of mastery; 9 successive states; 10 causes of decay.

4 (E8; T9) Summary statement of all that is to be directly known, beginning with the eye, visible objects, eye consciousness, etc. This is elaborated on in

5 (E8-12; T9-12) where 201 factors are listed individually, including; 5 aggregates; 6 sense faculties; 6 sense objects; 6 sense consciousnesses; 6 sense contacts; 6 forms of contact-derived feeling; forms of identification related to the 6 senses; forms of volition related to the 6 sense objects; cravings for the 6 sense objects; initial thoughts applied to the 6 sense objects, and thoughts sustained on them; the 6 elements (e.g., earth, water, etc., including consciousness); 10 symbolic meditative devices; 32 body parts/ products; 12 bases; 18 elements; 22 faculties; 3 realms; 9 forms of being; 4 meditative states, 4 liberations; 4 meditative attainments; 12 links of dependent origination. [This fundamental list of 201 factors reappears frequently throughout the *Paṭisambhidāmagga.*]

6-17 (E12-14; T12-14) This basic list of 201 factors is expanded according to 6 different patterns.

18 (E14-15; T15-16) 15 aspects of existence are to be known directly, namely: arising, occurrence, sign, karmic accumulation, rebirth-linking, course (on rebirth), generation, rearising, birth, old age, disease, death, sorrow, lamentation, and despair. These are followed by their negations, namely nonarising, nonoccurrence, etc. These in turn are followed by one-to-one pairings of each aspect with its negation.

19 (E15-16; T16) Each aspect (i.e. arising, etc.) is identified with

frustration, their negations (i.e. nonarising, etc.) with liberation.

20 (E16-17; T16) The 15 aspects (arising, etc.) are related to fear, their negations to safety.

21 (E17-18; T16-17) The 15 aspects are material, their negations immaterial.

22 (E18-19; T17) The 15 aspects are conditionings, their negations liberation.

23 (E19; T17-18) A series of synonyms for embracing the noble path, e.g., perfection, unification, giving up, liberation, crossing over, seeing, etc.

24 (E19; T18) Synonyms for peace and insight.

25 (E20; T18) Further synonyms connected with entry on, continuance, and completion of noble path.

26-27 (E20; T18-19) Synonyms for the 5 faculties, 5 powers, 7 conditions of enlightenment, and eightfold path, both individually and collectively. In addition, meanings are given for applications of mindfulness, right endeavors, supernatural powers, truths, paths, and fruits.

28 (E21; T19) Synonyms for the 5 meditative states.

29 (E21; T19) A series of miscellaneous synonyms beginning with "higher faculty".

30 (E21; T20) Synonyms connected with cognizance.

31 (E21-22; T20) Synonyms connected with unity.

32 (E22; T21) This paragraph is concerned with aspects of the path and behavior governed by them. In addition there is a series of synonyms for burning up defilements and being stainless.

33 (E22-23; T21) Synonyms for the 4 roads to supernatural power, namely, concentration of (a) interest, (b) energy, (c) consciousness, and (d) deliberation.

34 (E23; T22) Synonyms for the 4 truths, namely, frustration, origin, cessation, and the path.

35 (E23; T22) Meanings connected with suchness, no self, truth, penetration, and the like.

36-40 (E24; T22) List the negations of the 7 hindrances, the 4 meditative states, 4 meditative attainments, 18 principal insights, 4 paths and their fruits all as to be directly known.

41 (E24-25; T23) All the faculties, powers, etc., listed at no. 26 are to be directly known through their meanings.

42 (E25; T23-24) Peace and insight are to be known through their meanings listed at 1.24.

43 (E25-26) Entry, continuance, and completion of the path are to be known through the meanings listed at 1.25.

44 (E26; T24) The nature of knowledge and understanding as applied to what is directly known is explained.

Section II

45-46 (E26; T24-25) 10 propositions concerning factors to be fully understood, namely, contact as producing clinging; psychical and physical things; 3 kinds of feeling; 4 kinds of nutriment; 5 aggregates; 6 faculties of consciousness; 7 supports of consciousness; 8 worldly conditions; 9 abodes of being; 10 bases.

47 (E26-27; T25) The summary statement (1.4) of all that is to be directly known is here listed as what is to be fully understood.

48-86 (E27-29; T25-26) The 201 factors, etc., of 1.5-43 are here listed as to be fully understood.

87 (E29; T26) The nature of knowledge and understanding as applied to what is fully understood is explained.

Secton III

88-89 (E29-30; T26-27) 10 propositions concerning unprofitable states to be abandoned, namely, the conceit that "I am"; ignorance and craving for existence; craving for sense desires, existence and nonexistence; 4 floods; 5 hindrances; 6 types of thirst; 7 latent dispositions; 8 elements of falseness; 9 ideas rooted in thirst; 10 falsenesses.

90 (E30; T27-28) Two kinds of abandoning: by cutting off and by tranquilization. Renunciation as escape from sense desire; immateriality as escape from materiality; cessation as escape from dependent origination. Abandoning as penetration of the 4 truths. 5 kinds of abandoning, namely, suppression, by negation, by destruction, by tranquilization, by escape.

91 (E31; T28) The summary statement of 1.4 of all that is to be directly known, is here listed as what is to be overcome.

92-129 (E31; T28) The 201 factors of 1.5-43 are listed as to be overcome.

130 (E31; T28) Knowledge and understanding as knowing what is to be overcome.

Section IV

131-132 (E31-32; T28-29) 10 propositions concerning states to be practiced, namely, mindfulness of the body; peace and insight; 3 kinds of concentration; 4 applications of mindfulness; 5 factors of perfect concentration; 6 matters for recollection; 7 enlightenment factors; the eightfold noble path; 9 factors in the struggle for purity; 10 exercises with symbolic meditative devices.

133 (E32; T29) Types of spiritual practice: worldly and of the

higher world. Practice of profitable ideas concerning the material sphere, the immaterial sphere, and the unincluded. Practice as penetration of the 4 truths.

134 (E33-35; T29-31) Spiritual practice as longing, acquisition, single taste, and cultivation.

135 (E35-38; T31-34) Practice in the sense (a) that the states produced do not turn on one another, (b) of single taste of faculties, (c) that the proper energy is operative, (d) of repetition.

136-173 (E38; T34) When each of the factors, etc. listed at 1.5-43 are seen, one practices.

174 (E38-39; T34-35) Spiritually practiced states have a single taste.

Section V

175-176 (E39; T35) 10 propositions concerning things to be realized, namely, steady liberation of awareness; understanding and emancipation; threefold understanding; 4 fruits of asceticism; 5 main portions of Buddhism; 6 higher faculties; 7 powers of the perfected being; 8 liberations; 9 successive cessations; 10 qualities of the adept.

177 (E39; T35-36) The summary statement of 1.4 of all that is to be directly known is here listed as what is to be realized.

178-215 (E40; T36) When each of the factors, etc. listed at 1.5-43 is seen, one comes to realization.

216 (E40; T36) States that are realized are attained.

Sections VI-IX

217-219 (E40-41; T36-38) The nature of knowledge of factors that partake of diminution, duration, advantageousness, and penetration for one who has obtained each of the 4 meditative states and spheres of boundless space, boundless consciousness, and nothingness.

Sections X-XII

220-222 (E41-42; T38) Knowledge of the 201 factors of 1.5 as impermanent, frustrating and not self.

Sections XIII-XVI

223 (E42; T38-39) The 4 noble truths.

224-236 (E42-44; T39-40) Detailed analysis of the first truth of frustration following *Majjhimanikāya* III.250.

237-238 (E44-45; T40-41) Detailed analysis of the second truth of the origin of frustration.

239-240 (E45; T41) Detailed analysis of the third truth of the end of frustration.

241-249 (E45-46; T41-42) Detailed analysis of the elements of the eightfold path.

250 (E46-47; T43) Knowledge of the 4 noble truths.

Chapter II: Virtue

251-257 (E47; T43) Analysis of virtue consisting in (a) limited, (b) unlimited, (c) perfected, (d) unmisapprehended, and (e) tranquilized purification.

258-259 (E47-49; T43-45) Distinction between virtue that has a limit and virtue that has no limit.

260-261 (E49; T45) Virtue is defined as will, as a concomitant of consciousness, as restraint, and as nontransgression.

262 (E49; T45) Habits may be good, bad or indeterminate.

263 (E49; T45) These originate respectively from good, bad and indeterminate cognizance.

264 (E49-51; T45-47) Virtue consists in restraint and nontransgression in the case of 10 types of bad behavior—killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, improper speech of various sorts, etc. Virtue as restraint and nontransgression through renunciation of the 7 hindrances, through the 4 meditative states, attainment of the 4 meditative attainments, contemplation of the 18 principal insights, and the 4 paths.

265 (E51-53; T47-48) Virtue as abandoning, abstention, will, restraint, and nonexcess leads to tranquility, joy, development, perfection, cessation, enlightenment, liberation. One trains in the higher cognizance that leads to these virtues by knowing them, reviewing them, being mindful of them, understanding them, abandoning what is to be abandoned, etc. This is repeated for each of the 10 types of bad behavior. Through renunciation of the 7 hindrances, through the 4 meditative states, through the 4 meditative attainments, through the 18 principal insights and the 4 paths one trains in virtue.

266 (E53; T48) Knowledge as understanding is restraint.

Chapter III: Concentration

267-268 (E53-54; T48) 55 kinds of concentration are grouped in groups of one kind, two kinds, three kinds, and so on up to 10 kinds.

269 (E55; T49-50) 25 meanings of concentration, beginning with embracing, equipment, fulfillment, unification, and so forth.

270 (E55; T50) Knowledge as understanding of concentration.

Chapter IV: Dependent Origination

271 (E55-56; T50-51) Notes causal relationship between ignorance and the arising of karmic conditionings in 9 aspects with reference to past, present, and future. This analysis is repeated with respect to the causal relationship between each of the elements in the formula of dependent origination and its succeeding element, beginning with that between karmic conditionings and the arising of consciousness.

272 (E56-57; T51) Analysis of the formula of dependent origination beginning "Ignorance is a cause, karmic conditionings causally arise", and so on through the chain for past, prêsent, and futures as at 1.271.

273 (E57; T51-52) Similarly with 'Ignorance is dependent, karmic conditionings dependently arisen', and so through the chain as at 1.271.

274 (E57; T52) Analysis as at 1.271, but of the form "Ignorance is a condition, karmic conditionings conditionally arisen".

275 (E57-58; T52) Ignorance, conditioning factors, craving, grasping, and existence in the past are conditions for rebirth-linking in the present. Consciousness, psychophysical complex, the bases for contact, contact, and feelings in the present have their conditions in past karma. This analysis is repeated for present cause and future result.

276 (E58; T53) Knowledge as the understanding of discerning conditions.

Chapter V: Comprehension

277-280 (E58-59; T53-54) 201 factors of 1.5, whether past, present, or future, whether internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, near or far are all impermanent, frustrating and not-self.

281 (E59-60; T54) Analysis of formula of dependent origination in reverse order in the form "With birth as condition, there is old age and death; without birth as condition, there is no old age and death, and so forth through the chain.

282 (E60; T54-55) Knowledge as understanding of past, present, and future factors.

Chapter VI: Rise and Fall

283-284 (E60; T55) The generation of the 201 factors of 1.5 is their rise. Their change is their fall.

285 (E60; T55) He who sees the rise of the 5 aggregates sees 25 characteristics. He who sees their fall sees 25 characteristics.

286 (E60; T55-56) He sees 5 characteristics each for the rise and for the fall of each of the aggregates individually.

287 (E60-61; T56) With the arising of ignorance, craving, karma, nutrition, and generation, he sees the rise of materiality. With their cessation, he sees its fall.

288-290 (E61-62; T56-57) With the arising of ignorance, craving, karma, contact, and generation, he sees the rise of feeling, perception, and conditioning factors. With their cessation, he sees their fall.

291 (E62-63; T57) With the arising of ignorance, craving, karma, the psychophysical complex, and generation, he sees the rise of consciousness. With their cessation he sees its fall.

292 (E63; T57) Thus a total of 50 characteristics for the rise and fall of the 5 aggregates.

293 (E63; T57-58) Understanding of change of factors as knowledge of rise and fall.

294 (E63; T58) Materiality has nutriment for its origin. Feeling, perception, and conditioning factors have contact for their origin; consciousness has the psychophysical complex for its origin.

Chapter VII: Dissolution

295-296 (E63; T58) Awareness arises with each of the 201 factors listed at 1.201 as its objects and then dissolves. This rise and dissolution is contemplated.

297 (E63-64; T59) Verses defining insight following reflection, insight into the characteristic of loss, and the insight of higher understanding.

298 (E65; T59) Knowledge of insight as understanding of the contemplation of the dissolution of awareness.

Chapter VIII: Appearance as Fear

299-305 (E65-67; T59-61) Understanding of appearance as fear is knowledge of danger. Knowledge of the way of peace is safety. Arising of the 15 essentials of being listed at 1.18 is dangerous. Their nonarising is bliss and peace. Knowledge and understanding involve realizing this.

Chapter IX: Equanimity Concerning Conditionings

306-312 (E67-68; T61-62) Understanding of desire for liberation, of reflection, and of composure as knowledge of the kinds of equanimity concerning conditionings.

313-317 (E68-69; T62-63) The guidance of awareness in equanimity about conditionings has two aspects in the case of the average individual, three in the case of the initiate, and three in the case of one without greed.

318 (E69; T63) For the average individual and the initiate delight in equanimity about conditionings is defiling.

319 (E69; T63) The average individual, the initiate, and one without greed all see equanimity about conditionings with insight as impermanent, frustrating, and not-self.

320 (E70; T63) Equanimity about conditionings is good for the average individual and the initiate, but indeterminate for one without greed.

321 (E70; T63-64) It is always clearly recognized by one without greed, but only sometimes by the other two.

322 (E70; T64) One without greed sees it with mature insight, the others with immature insight.

323 (E70; T64) The average individual sees it to enter the stream, the initiate to attain a higher goal, and one without greed to abide in bliss.

324 (E71; T64-65) One's response to peace about conditionings depends on the level of one's spiritual attainment.

325-328 (E71-72; T65-66) 8 kinds of peace about conditionings arises through insight, 10 kinds through insight. 15 of these are good; 3 are indeterminate.

329-330 (E73; T66-67) Verse and prose summary of the chapter.

Chapter X: Insight of the Convert

331-332 (E73-74; T67-68) Conversion involves overcoming what is to be overcome and turning away from it, and thus is spoken of as (literally) "change of lineage" (*gotrabhū*).

335-338 (E74-76; T68) 8 kinds of change of lineage arise through peace, 10 through insight, etc., as at 1.325-329.

339-340 (E76; T68-69) Verse and prose summary of the chapter.

Chapter XI: The Path

341-342 (E76-77; T69-70) At the moment of stream entry the elements of the eightfold path emerge from error, from defilements, from consequent aggregates, and externally from all signs.

343 (E77; T70) At the moment of entry on the path of once-returner they emerge from gross fetters, greed, defilements, consequent aggregates, and externally from all signs.

344-345 (E77-78; T70) Emergence of elements of the eightfold path at the moment of entry on the path of nonreturner and the path of the perfected being.

346-347 (E78; T70-71) Summary to the effect that one with insight is not shaken.

Chapter XIII: Fruition

348-353 (E78-80; T71-72) Liberation as spelled out in 1.341-345 is the fruition of the path.

354-358 (E80-81; T72-74) Three latent dispositions and two afflictions are cut off by stream entry; two gross dispositions and two gross afflictions by the path of once-returner; two secondary dispositions and two secondary afflictions by the path of nonreturner; and five dispositions and three afflictions by the path of the perfected being.

Chapter XIV: Reflection

359-360 (E81-83; T74-75) Details the sense in which the elements of the eightfold path, enlightenment of factors, powers, faculties, etc., are arrived at at the moment of stream-entry. Having emerged, these are reflected on.

361 (E83; T75) Analysis similar to that at 1.360 with reference to the moment of fruition of stream entry.

362-368 (E83-84; T75-76) The analysis of 1.360-361 is repeated with reference to the moments of entry on the paths of the once-returner, the nonreturner, and the perfected being, as well as the moments of their fruition.

Chapter XV: Analysis of the Internal

369-377 (E84-86; T76-77) Definition as internal of each of the six sense faculties according to how they are produced; as impermanent and dependently arisen, frustrating, and not self. Having defined them thus, one becomes dispassionate, gives up grasping, and abandons perception of permanence, satisfaction, and self.

Chapter XVI: Analysis of the External

378-386 (E86-88; T77) Objects of the six senses are defined as external according to the pattern of 1.369-377.

Chapter XVII: Behavior

387-388 (E88; T77-78) Behavior is either characterized by consciousness, ignorance, or insight.

389-390 (E88-89; T78-79) Adverting in order to see, hear, etc.; consciousness of objects by each of the senses; directing the mind and the results of this in response to sense perceptions are behavior characterized by consciousness. Such behavior is without greed, hate, delusion, pride, wrong views, agitation, uncertainty, and underlying tendencies. It is dissociated from karmically effective action.

391 (E89-90; T79-80) The act of impulsion of greed, hate, delusion, etc., as at 1.390 is behavior characterized by unknowing.

392 (E90-92; T80) Behavior characterized by unknowing involves greed, hatred, etc. It is associated with negative actions, and dissociated from positive actions.

393 (E92; T80-81) Behavior characterized by insight is acting for the purpose of contemplating impermanence, pain, not-self, dispassion ... change ... emptiness, etc. Entry on the 4 paths and their fruition are also behavior characterized by insight.

394 (E92-93; T81) Behavior characterized by insight is without greed, hate, etc., as at 1.390. It is associated with positive actions and dissociated from negative actions.

395 (E93; T81) Three types of behavior as at 1.387-388.

Chapter XVIII: Stages

396-397 (E93; T82) The stage of sense desires; the material, immaterial, and unincluded stages.

398 (E93; T82) The stage of sense desires ranges from Avīci hell to the deities with power over the productions of others.

399 (E93-94; T82) The material plane ranges from the Brahmā world to the highest deities.

400 (E94; T82) The immaterial plane ranges from deities of the realm of boundless space to those of the realm of neither identification not nonidentification.

401 (E94; T82) The unincluded plane consists of unincluded paths and their fruition; also the unformed principle.

402-403 (E94; T82-83) Knowledge of other fourfold categories, including foundations of mindfulness, right endeavors, roads to powers, meditative states, etc.

Chapter XIX: Diversity of Factors

404-410 (E94-97; T83-85) Sense-desire stage factors, material stage factors, immaterial factors, and unincluded factors are defined

as good and neutral. Sense-desire stage factors may be bad as well. Factors are rooted in joy when given attention as impermanent, frustrating, not-self. So for the 201 factors listed in 1.5. This leads to liberation and cessation of frustration.

411 (E97; T85) Diversity of principle leads to diversity in contact, which in turn leads to diversity in feeling... identification... thinking... interest... anguish... search... gain.

412 (E97-98; T85) Hence knowledge is understanding of diversity of factors.

Chapters XX-XXIV: Direct Insight, Full Understanding, etc.

413-415 (E97-98; T85-86) Directly known factors are known (Chapter XX). Fully understood factors are investigated (Chapter XXI). Abandoned factors are given up (Chapter XXII). Developed factors have a single taste (Chapter XXIII). Realized factors are attained (Chapter XXIV).

Chapters XXV-XXVIII: Four Discriminations

416 (E98; T86) Discrimination is of four types: (a) understanding of difference in sense is discrimination of meaning (Chapter XXV). (b) understanding of difference of factors (Chapter XXVI), (c) language (Chapter XXVII), and (d) perspicuity (Chapter XXVIII) are knowledge of the other discriminations respectively.

417 (E99; T86) 5 faculties are understood as separate factors. Understanding this distinction is knowledge of discrimination of factors.

418 (E99; T86-87) Meaning as resolve, determination, establishing, nondistraction, and seeing are understood as separate meanings. Understanding this distinction is knowledge of discrimination of meaning.

419 (E99; T87) Knowledge of language concerning these 5 factors and their meaning is distinguished. Understanding this distinction is knowledge of discrimination of language.

420 (E99; T87) Knowledge of these 5 factors, 5 meanings, and 10 kinds of language are to be distinguished from one another. Understanding this is knowledge of discrimination of language.

421 (E100; T87) Discrimination of factors with respect to 5 powers.

422 (E100; T87) Discrimination of meaning with respect to 5 types of unshakeability.

423 (E100; T87) Discrimination of language with respect to the factors of 1.421 and meanings of 1.422.

424 (E100-101; T87-88) Discrimination of perspicuity with respect to factors, meanings and language of 1.423.

425 (E101; T88) Discrimination of factors with respect to enlightenment factors.

426 (E101; T88) Discrimination of meaning as establishment, investigation, determination, intentness, peace, nondistraction, calculation.

427 (E101; T88) Discrimination of language with respect to factors and meanings of 1.425-426.

428 (E102; T88) Discrimination of perspicuity with respect to topics of 1.427.

429 (E102; T88) Discrimination of factors with respect to elements of the eightfold path.

430 (E102;T88) Discrimination of meaning as seeing, directing onto, embracing, originating, cleansing, determining, establishment, and nondistraction.

431 (E102-103; T88) Discrimination of language with respect to subjects of 1.429-430.

432 (E103; T88-89) Discrimination of perspicuity with respect to subjects of 1.431.

433 (E103; T89) Summary of discriminations.

Chapters XXIX-XXXI: States and Meditative Attainments

434 (E103; T89) The meaning of the states (Chapter XXIX), of attainments (Chapter XXX), and of states and attainments (Chapter XXXI).

435 (E103-104; T89) Definition of signless state, desireless state, and empty state.

436 (E104; T89-90) Definition of signless attainment, desireless attainment, and empty attainment.

437 (E104; T90) Definition of signless, desireless, and empty state and attainment.

438 (E104-106; T90) Whereas 1.435-437 define these in cases where the sign of conditioning is clearly seen, 1.438 repeats the definitions in cases where each of the 201 factors of 1.5 are clearly seen.

439-440 (E106; T90-91) 3 states, 3 attainments, 3 states and attainments. Knowledge as understanding this distinction.

Chapter XXXII: Concentration with Immediate Result

441-443 (E106-108; T91-93) Nondistraction is concentration. As a result of that concentration knowledge arises. As a result of this

intoxicants are exhausted. Understanding this is knowledge of concentration with immediate result.

Chapter XXXIII: States Without Conflict

444-445 (E109; T93-94) Contemplation of impermanence of the 201 factors of 1.5 is a predominance of seeing.

446 (E109; T94) Peaceful states as empty, signless, and desireless.

447 (E109; T94) Being intent on emptiness, the signless, and the desireless is excellent resolve.

448-449 (E109-110; T94) The 4 meditative states and attainment of the 4 bases are states without conflict.

450 (E110; T94-95) Knowledge of states without conflict.

Chapter XXXIV: Attainment of Cessation

451-452 (E110; T95) Control due to (a) possession of 2 powers, (b) tranquilizing the 3 conditionings, (c) 16 kinds of behavior with respect to knowledge and 9 with respect to concentration is knowledge of the attainment of cessation.

453-455 (E110-111; T95-96) The 2 powers are: the power of peace and the power of insight.

456 (E111-112; T96) The 3 conditionings tranquilized are: (a) verbal conditionings in the second meditative state, (b) bodily conditioning in the fourth meditative state, and (c) mental conditionings for one who has attained cessation of identification and feeling.

457 (E112; T96-97) The 16 kinds of behavior with respect to knowledge include contemplation of: impermanence, frustration, not-self, dispassion, fading away, cessation, relinquishment, turning away, the 4 paths and their fruitions.

458 (E112; T97) The 9 with respect to concentration are 4 meditative states, attainment of each of the 4 bases, and applied thought with purpose of attaining these 8.

459 (E112-113; T97-98) 5 kinds of mastery are defined, namely: mastery in adverting, in attaining, in steadfastness, in emerging, in reviewing. These are each related to each of the meditative states and attainment of each of the bases.

Chapter XXXV: Final Liberation

461-463 (E113-114; T98-99) Understanding of the end of that which goes on (i.e. the circle of existence = *pravṛtti*) in one who is fully aware is knowledge of final liberation.

Chapter XXXVI: Equivalent Headings

464-471 (E114-115; T99-100) Commentary on the terms in the statement that understanding of the cutting off, cessation, and nonreappearance of all factors is knowledge of the meaning of equivalent headings. 13 headings are enumerated with their equivalents.

Chapter XXXVII: The Higher Life

472-477 (E115-116; T100-101) Commentary on the terms in the statement that understanding separateness (i.e. that the defilements are all separate from liberation), difference and unity (i.e. that the hindrances are based on differences and the absorptive states and paths are based on unity), and the end of the 5 consuming fires is knowledge of the higher life.

Chapter XXXVIII: Application of Energy

478-481 (E116-117; T102-103) Understanding of the meaning of exertion in the self-motivated is knowledge of the application of energy. This is explained with reference to the prevention of unprofitable factors, the 7 hindrances, defilements, and with reference to the arising of the meditative states of absorption and the paths.

Chapter XXXIX: Demonstration of Meanings

482-486 (E117-118; T103-104) Commentary on terms in the statement that understanding the explanation of different factors is knowledge of the demonstration of meanings.

Chapter XL: Purity in Seeing

487-493 (E118-119; T104-105) Commentary on terms in the statement that understanding of the penetration of the 12 ways in which all factors are includable as one, and of their difference and unity, is knowledge of purity in seeing.

Chapter XLI: Patience

494-496 (E119; T105) The fact of having experienced understanding is knowledge of patience.

Chapter XLII: Penetration

497-499 (E119; T106) Understanding what one is affected by (namely 201 factors) is knowledge as penetration.

Chapter XLIII: Limited States

500-504 (E120; T106-107) Understanding the process of combination is knowledge of limited states. Such is knowledge that there exists what is experienced as conditioned by the elements of the eightfold path, their opposites, and the quieting of these 16. Similarly with respect to deliverance, zeal, applied thought, perception, the vigor needed to become a perfected being, and their opposites and quieting.

Chapters XLIV-XLIX: Six on the Standstill of the Cycle of Existence

505-507 (E120-121; T107-108) (XLIV) Understanding renunciation and the negations of the 7 hindrances being given predominance is knowledge of the standstill of the cycle of existence through perception.

508-510 (E121; T108) (XLV) When understanding diversity in the case of the hindrances, defilements, etc., and unity in their renunciation, in the paths, etc., cognizance turns away from the hindrances, etc., it is knowledge of the standstill of the cycle of existence through awareness.

511-513 (E121-122; T109) (XLVI) Understanding of establishing is knowledge of the standstill through awareness.

514-516 (E122; T109-110) (XLVII) Understanding emptiness is knowledge of the standstill through knowledge.

517-519 (E122-123; T110-112) (XLVIII) Understanding relinquishment is knowledge of the standstill through liberation.

520-523 (E123-124; T110-112) (XLIX) Understanding the meaning of suchness is knowledge of standstill through the 4 truths.

Chapter L: Supernormal Powers

524-528 (E124-125; T112-113) A monk develops the bases for success and cognizance of them. He is permeated with perception and enjoys supernatural powers. Specific powers are dealt with in Chapter LI-LIV.

Chapter LI: The Divine Ear

529-533 (E125-126; T113-114) Understanding the diversity and unity of the characteristics of sound is knowledge of the divine ear.

Chapter LII: Penetration of Minds

534-538 (E126-127; T114-115) A monk develops the bases for success and awareness of them. He directs this toward penetration of minds. He understands the nature of diverse types of awareness as they are. Understanding this unity and diversity of penetration in the case of the 6 faculties in this way is knowledge of penetration of minds.

Chapter LIII: Recollection of Past Lives

539-543 (E127-128; T115-116) Similar to 1.534-538 with recollection of past lives substituted for penetration of minds.

Chapter LIV: The Divine Eye

544-549 (E128-129; T116-117) Similar to 1.534-538 with the divine eye substituted for penetration of minds.

Chapter LV: Exhaustion of Intoxicants

550-563 (E129-131; T117-120) Understanding as mastery of the three higherworldly faculties—i.e. the assurance that I shall know what I did not yet know; the faculty of perfect knowledge; and the faculty of the knower—in 64 aspects is knowledge of the exhaustion of intoxicants.

Chapters LVI-LXIII: The Four Truths

564-566 (E132; T120) Synonyms for frustration, origin, cessation, and the path. Understanding the meaning of complete understanding, abandoning, realizing, and developing is respectively knowledge of frustration, origin, cessation, and the path.

567-569 (E132-133; T121) The understanding of one who possesses the path is knowledge of the 4 truths. Synonyms for understanding are listed here.

Chapters LXIV-LXVII: Pure Discrimination

571-572 (E133-134; T121-122) Discrimination of meaning, factors, language, and perspicuity is knowledge of meanings, factors, language, and perspicuity. Understanding of differences, definitions, noting, noticing, categories, evocation, etc., of meanings, etc., is knowledge of discrimination of meanings, etc.

[Chapter I-LXVII analyze the 63 kinds of knowledge shared with disciples, while Chapters LXVIII-LXXIII analyze those not so shared.]

Chapter LXVIII: Penetration of Faculties of Others

573-583 (E134-136; T123-124) A Buddha sees those with faith as having (a) little dust in their eyes, (b) keen faculties, (c) good parts; and as being easy to instruct, and as seeing fear in the world and what is censurable. He sees one without faith as the opposite. The term "world" here refers to the world of aggregates, of elements, bases, etc. Types of world are listed as 1 nutriment for all beings, 2 parts of the psychophysical complex, 3 kinds of feeling, 4 kinds of nutriment, 5 aggregates, 6 internal bases, 7 stations of consciousness, 8 worldly factors, 9 abodes, 10 bases, 12 bases, and 18 elements. The Buddha thus knows the 5 faculties of others in 50 aspects, this is his knowledge of penetration of faculties of others.

Chapter LXIX: Biases and Underlying Tendencies

584-591 (E136-138; T124-126) The Buddha knows the biases and underlying tendencies, behavior, resolutions, and capabilities of others. The terms "biases", "underlying tendencies", ... "capabilities" are explained.

Chapter LXX: Miracle of the Double Wonders

592-595 (E138-140; T126-127) The Buddha's miracle of the double wonders is not attainable by his disciples. In it a fire is produced from the various parts of his body, and a shower of water from the opposite parts. So too from each hair and pore. Amid 6 colors the Buddha appears doing one thing, and his created image another.

Chapter LXXI: The Great Compassion

596-597 (E140-145; T127-131) Upon enlightened ones who see the nature of worldly life in all its unsatisfactory aspects—which are here detailed—there descends great compassion for beings.

Chapters LXXII-LXXIII: Omniscience and Unobstructed Knowledge

598-606 (E145-147; T131-133) The Buddha's knowledge is omniscient and unobstructed. A detailed listing of all 73 kinds of knowledge known by the Buddha in his omniscience is listed in Chapters I-LXXIII.

607-612 (E147-148; T133-134) Because of this knowledge, he is "allseeing" in the sense of possessing the 14 kinds of knowledge of an enlightened one; namely, knowledge of the 4 truths, 4 discrimi-

nations, and the 6 kinds of knowledge unique to the Buddha as listed in Chapters LXVIII-LXXIII. There is nothing concerning these topics that he does not know.

II. TREATISE ON FALSE VIEWS

1 (E149; T140) Headings of the topics of the 6 main sections of the treatise.

Section I: Definition of False Views

2 (E149-153; T140) Misinterpretation, through misinterpreting the first 198 factors (i.e. excluding the higherworldly factors) listed in 1.5, is false view.

Section II: The Bases for False Views

3-4 (E153; T140-141) There are 8 kinds of base, cause, or condition which arouse false views, namely: the aggregates, ignorance, contact, identification, initial thought, careless attention, an evil friend, indoctrination by another.

Section III: Ways in Which One is Possessed (or Obsessed) by False Views

5 (E153-154; T141) One is possessed by false views in 18 ways. E.g., by having recourse to them, being caught as in a thicket, by the clash of opinions, by being fettered or impeded by them, etc.

Section IV: 16 Kinds of False Views

6 (E154; T141-142) These are: hedonistic views; views about self; wrong view; views about individuality, and eternity and annihilation based on it; views which assume finitude/infinitude; views concerning the past or future; views that fetter; views involving the conceits "I" or "mine"; theories of self and world; views of being and nonbeing.

Section V: Ways in Which False Views Function

7 (E154-155; T142-143) Summary.

8-47 (E155-159; T143-144) 35 aspects of misinterpretation through hedonistic view. Any misinterpretation of pleasure that arises dependent on the 5 aggregates, 6 internal bases, 6 external bases, 6 kinds of consciousness, 6 kinds of contact, 6 kinds of feeling is

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hedonistic view. These lead to rebirth in hell or as an animal.

48 (E159; T144) Some fetters are false; some are not.

49-130 (E159-170; T144-149) 20 aspects of misinterpretation through views about self. The ignorant and undisciplined see materiality as self, self as possessed of materiality, materiality in self, and self in materiality. Similarly for the other aggregates. Misinterpretation grounded in false assertion of these views is false view about self.

131-160 (E170-171; T149) 10 aspects of misinterpretation through wrong view. There are 10 grounds here, namely: nothing is given, offered, or sacrificed; there is no karmic result, no this world, no other world, no father or mother, no apparitional beings, no virtuous self-realized ascetics. Misinterpretation grounded in false assertion of these grounds is wrong view.

161-222 (E171; T149) 20 aspects of misinterpretation through views about individuality. Follows the pattern of 2.49-130.

223-284 (E172; T160) 15 aspects of misinterpretation through views of eternity based on individuality. The ignorant and undisciplined see self as possessed of materiality, materiality in self, self in materiality. Similarly for the other aggregates. Misinterpretation grounded in false assertion of these views is false view of eternity based on individuality.

285-321 (E172-173; T150) 5 aspects of misinterpretation through views of annihilation based on individuality. Each of the 5 aggregates is seen as self. Misinterpretation based on false assertion of these views is false view of eternity based on individuality.

322-462 (E173-179; T150-154) 50 aspects of misinterpretation through views which assume finitude/infinitude. Misinterpretation of finitude/infinitude in 10 instances of assuming: the world is eternal, not eternal, has an end, has no end, self and body are the same, self and body are separate; a Tathāgata exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, neither exists nor does not exist after death. There is misinterpretation through the view assuming finitude /infinitude in 5 aspects for each of these 10 instances.

463 (E179-180; T154) 18 aspects of misinterpretation through views about the past. These are 4 kinds of theory concerning eternity, 4 concerning eternity in part, 4 concerning finitude/infinitude, 4 indecisive, and 4 concerning spontaneous origination.

464 (E180; T155) 44 aspects of misinterpretation through views about the future. These are 16 kinds of theory concerning identification, 8 concerning nonidentification, 8 concerning neither identification nor nonidentification, 7 concerning annihilation, and 5 regarding the experience of liberation here and now.

465 (E180; T155) 18 aspects of misinterpretation through views

that fetter—as in 2.5.

466-518 (E180; T155) 18 aspects of misinterpretation through the conceit that the 6 sense faculties, 6 objects of sense, 6 types of sense consciousness are "I".

519-572 (E180-181; T155) 18 aspects of misinterpretation through the conceit "mine"—as at 2.466-518.

573-654 (E181-182; T155-156) 20 aspects of misinterpretation through views associated with theories of self—as at 2.49-130.

655-678 (E182-183; T156) 8 aspects of misinterpretation through views associated with theories of the world. That is, misinterpretation arising from the view that self and world are eternal, not eternal, both, neither. Similarly that they are finite, infinite, both, neither.

679 (E183; T156) Misinterpretation due to clinging to being.

680 (E183; T157) Misinterpretation due to overclinging to nonbeing.

681-700 (E183-185; T157-159) Classifies all aspects of all views in 2.8-678 according to whether they can be cross-classified as views of being or views of nonbeing.

Section VI: Abolishing the Ground of False Views

701 (E185-186; T159) How gods and humans cling to being or to nonbeing.

702-703 (E186; T159-160) Teachers of other schools, their disciples, and anyone else with false views are contrasted with Buddhas, their disciples, and others with right views.

704 (E186; T160) Those who assert "This is I, mine, or my self" have false views. Those who assert "This is not I, mine, or my self" have right views.

705 (E186-187; T160) Analysis of views listed in 1.704 as to number of kinds of each of these views and their connection with past and future.

706 (E187-188; T160-161) Those who find their goal in the Buddha have right view. Of those with right view, 3 kinds of stream-enterer, the once-returner, and the perfected being find their goal in this life. 5 kinds of nonreturner find their goal in the pure abodes.

III. TREATISE ON MEDITATION ON BREATHING

1 (E189; T164) When one develops supreme concentration by mindfulness of breathing, 212 kinds of knowledge arise in him. Summary of these as analyzed in 10 Sections which follow.

Section I: 8 Obstacles and 8 Aids to Concentration

2-3 (E189; T164-165) There are 8 obstacles to concentration: sensuous interest, malice, stolidity, excitedness, perplexity, ignorance, discontent, and all bad factors. There are 8 aids to concentration: renunciation, freedom from malice, perceptual identification, undistractedness, resolution, knowledge, delight, and all good factors.

4-5 (E190-191; T164-165) When awareness is well-oriented with respect to these 16 aspects, it establishes unity and is purified of hindrances.

Section II: 18 Afflictions

6-14 (E191-195; T165-168) In one purified of these hindrances who develops concentration by mindfulness of breathing, there are 18 afflictions obstructing concentration related variously to stages of inhalation and exhalation. These disquiet, perturb, and excite.

Section III: 13 Kinds of Cleansing

15-18 (E195; T168-169) 13 kinds of cleansing help avoid these minor obstructions. Thus the mind is not distracted and attains unity.

19-23 (E195-196; T169-171) Analysis of the beginning, middle, and end of the first meditative state.

24-38 (E196-197; T171) As at 3.19-23 with respect to the second, third and fourth meditative states.

39-168 (E197-198; T171) As at 3.19-23 with respect to the 4 immaterial attainments, 18 principal insights, and the 4 paths.

169-170 (E199-200; T171-172) Mental image, inhalation, and exhalation are not the object of a single awareness. One who knows these three performs spiritual practice and is not distracted. The simile of a man cutting wood with a saw is used to illustrate this point.

171 (E200; T172) Verse to the effect that one whose mindfulness of breathing is perfected is like the light of full a moon in illuminating the world.

172-182 (E200-203; T172-175) Commentary on terms in 3.171.

Section IV: Knowledge of 32 Kinds of Mindfulness of Breathing

183 (E200-204; T175-176) A monk seated in the lotus posture in the forest practices mindfulness of breathing in 32 ways.

184-193 (E204-205; T176-177) Commentary on terms in 3.183.

194-195 (E205-206; T177-178) Analysis of the way in which mindfulness of a long inhalation/long exhalation is developed.

196-198 (E206; T178) Equates this process with practice of contemplation of the body as the first foundation of mindfulness.

199-202 (E206-208; T178-180) When the mind is unified and undistracted as a result of mindfulness of inhalation and exhalation, he is aware of his feelings, identifications, and initial thoughts as they arise, are established, and pass away.

203-216 (E208-211; T180-182). When the mind is unified and undistracted as a result of mindfulness of inhalation and exhalation, he puts together the faculties, powers, etc., and understands their common significance.

217-218 (E211; T182) Analysis of the way in which mindfulness of short inhalation/short exhalation is developed.

219-238 (E211-212; T182-183) As at 3.196-216, but with reference to short breaths.

239-264 (E212-214; T183-185) Though the details differ, the analysis follows the general pattern of 3.194-216, but with respect to mindfulness of the whole body.

265-288 (E214-216; T185-187) Analysis of the way in which he trains himself tranquilizing the bodily conditionings while mindfully inhaling and exhaling. The pattern is generally as at 194-216 with some difference in detail.

289 (E216; T187) 3.194-288 thus analyze 8 kinds of knowledge of contemplation and 8 kinds of attendance on mindfulness. These constitute 4 subjects from the *sūtra*s on mindfulness of the body as body.

290-315 (E216-217; T187-188) Analysis of how he trains himself experiencing joy while mindfully inhaling and exhaling. Joy is explained. The analysis generally follows the pattern of 3.194-216 with some difference in order, except that the contemplative process here is equated with contemplation of feeling as the second foundation of mindfulness.

316-341 (E218; T189-190) As at 3.290-315 with satisfaction substituted for joy.

342-367 (E218-219; T190-191) Analysis of how he trains himself experiencing mental conditioning while mindfully breathing. The analysis follows the pattern of 3.290-315.

368-391 (E219-220; T192-193) How he trains tranquilizing mental conditioning, etc., following the pattern of 3.290-315.

392 (E220; T193) 3.290-391 thus analyze 8 kinds of knowledge of contemplation and 8 kinds of attention on mindfulness. These constitute 4 subjects from the *sūtra*s on mindfulness of feelings as feelings.

393-418 (E220-221; T193-194) How he trains experiencing states of awareness while mindfully breathing. The analysis is as at 3.290-315, except that the contemplative process here is equated with contemplation of states of awareness as the third foundation of mindfulness.

419-442 (E221-222; T194-195) How he trains rejoicing the mind while mindfully breathing. The analysis is as at 3.393-418.

443-466 (E222-223; T195-196) How he trains concentrating the mind while mindfully breathing. As at 3.393-418.

467-491 (E223-224; T196-197) How he trains liberating the mind while mindfully breathing. As at 3.393-418.

492 (E224; T197) 3.393-491 thus analyze 8 kinds of knowledge of contemplation and 8 kinds of attention to mindfulness. These constitute 4 subjects on mindfulness of states of awareness as states of awareness.

493-517 (E224-225; T197-198) He trains contemplating impermanence while mindfully breathing. Explanation of impermanence. Then the pattern of 3.290-315 is followed, except that the contemplative process here is equated with contemplation of factors as the fourth foundation of mindfulness.

518-596 (E225-227; T199-202) He trains contemplating nonattachment, cessation, and renunciation respectively while mindfully breathing. For each the analysis is generally as at 3.495-517 with some difference in detail.

597 (E227; T202) 3.493-596 thus analyze 8 kinds of knowledge of contemplation and 8 kinds of attention to mindfulness. These constitute 4 subjects on mindfulness of factors as factors.

Sections V-X: Kinds of Knowledge

598-599 (E229-230; T202) 24 kinds of knowledge through concentration.

600-601 (E230; T202-203) 72 kinds of knowledge through insight.

602-603 (E230; T203) 8 kinds of knowledge of aversion.

604-605 (E230-231; T203) 8 kinds of knowledge of what conforms with aversion.

606-607 (E231; T204) 8 kinds of knowledge as calming aversions.

608-612 (E231-232; T204-205) 21 kinds of knowledge of the satisfaction of liberation.

IV. TREATISE ON THE FACULTIES

1 (E233; T208) The Buddha addressed his monks to the effect that

2 (E233; T208) there are 5 faculties: faith faculty, energy faculty,

mindfulness faculty, concentration faculty, and understanding faculty.

3-5 (E233-236; T208-209) These 5 faculties are purified in 15 aspects, are being developed in 10 aspects, and have been fully developed in 10 aspects.

6. (E236; T209) At the moment of entry on the 4 paths (i.e. path of once-returner, etc.) the 5 faculties are being developed. At the moment of fruition of the 4 paths they have been fully developed.

7 (E237-238; T210) There is development of faculties in 7 kinds of initiate and in an average person who is virtuous. The faculties have been developed in a Buddhist disciple, a solitary self-enlightened one, and in a Buddha.

8 (E238; T210-211) Those who understand the 5 faculties, their rise and passing away, are true Brahmins and ascetics. Those who do not are not.

9-16 (E238-247; T211-218) There are 40 aspects to the origin of the faculties, 40 aspects to their passing away, 25 aspects of attraction to the 5 faculties, 25 aspects to their danger, and 80 aspects of liberation from the 5 faculties. These are all delineated.

17 (E248; T218) (a) Faith faculty is to be found among the 4 characteristic qualities of a stream-enterer. (b) Energy faculty is to be found among the 4 right endeavors. (c) Mindfulness faculty among the 4 foundations of mindfulness. (d) Concentration faculty among the 4 meditative states.

18 (E248; T218-219) 5 faculties are found through faith faculty in 20 aspects among 4 characteristic qualities of a stream-enterer, and 5 through energy faculty in 20 aspects among 4 right endeavors. The pattern continues similarly modifying (c) and (d) of 4.17.

19-23 (E248-250; T219-220) For each case in 4.18, the 20 aspects are listed.

24 (E250; T210-211) There are 20 aspects in which conduct with respect to 5 faculties is found through... etc., as in 4.18 for each case listed there.

25-29 (E250-254; T221-222) List the 20 aspects in which each conduct with respect to faculties as in 4.24 is found.

30-31 (E254-255; T223) 8 kinds of conduct are listed: adopting the 4 postures, conduct with respect to the internal and external bases, mindfulness of the 4 applications of mindfulness, concentration of the 4 meditative states, knowing the 4 truths, following the 4 paths, arriving at the fruits of asceticism, and for the enlightened, higher-worldly conduct.

32 (E255; T224) 8 more kinds of conduct are listed, namely: acting with faith, energy, mindfulness, equanimity, concentration, understanding, consciousness, and for one who has adopted the way, with

distinction.

33 (E255; T224) 8 more kinds of conduct, namely: those connected with the 8 elements of the eightfold path.

34-46 (E255-256; T224-225) Commentary on terms in 4.30.

47-103 (E256-263; T225-230) The 5 faculties are to be found in the sense of sovereignty, producing, original cleansing, being extraordinary, steadying, ending, basing upon. These are explained in detail.

104-107 (E264; T230-231) When an average person develops supreme concentration, he becomes skillful in attendance in 7 ways, an initiate in 8 ways, and one who has overcome the cankers in 10 ways. These are enumerated.

108-111 (E264-266; T231-232) When an average person develops insight, he becomes skillful in attendance in 9 ways and nonattendance in 9 ways; an initiate in 10 ways in attendance and 10 in nonattendance; one who has overcome the cankers 12 ways in attendance and 12 in nonattendance. These are enumerated.

112 (E266; T232-233) Through skillful attendance on various subjects he puts together the faculties. Cf. 3.203ff.

113-114 (E267; T233) Understanding in the sense of mastery of 3 faculties in 64 ways is knowledge of the destruction of the cankers.

115-124 (E267-268; T233) Repeat 1.552-562.

125 (E268; T233) Verse to the effect that the Buddha is called all-seeing because he has known and experienced all that is knowable.

126 (E268; T233) "All-seer" is glossed as at 1.608.

127-129 (E269; T233-234) The extent of this knowledge is explained.

130-131 (E269-270; T234-235) The relation between faith, exertion, concentration, and understanding.

132-140 (E270-272; T235) The Buddha's eye and knowledge are identified. 1.574-583 are then repeated.

V. TREATISE ON LIBERATION

1, 3-5 (E273-274; T236-237) There are 3 kinds of liberation: conditionless, desireless, and emptiness.

2 (E273; T237) Lists 68 kinds of liberation. These are explained as follows:

6-11 (E274-275; T237) 4 kinds of liberation as inward emergence, 4 kinds as external emergence, 4 kinds of emergence from both sides.

12-14 (E275-276; T238-239) 4 kinds of liberation in conformity with inward emergence, 4 kinds in conformity with external emergence, and 4 with emergence from both sides.

15-17 (E276; T239) 4 kinds of liberation as calming inward emergence, 4 as calming external emergence, and 4 as calming emergence from both sides.

18-24 (E276-280; T239-240) 7 kinds of liberation described in terms of perception of materiality, and resolution on liberation as the attainment of various bases and as the attainment of cessation of peception..

25-26 (E280; T241) Seasonable and unseasonable liberation.

27-28 (E280; T242) Temporary and permanent liberation.

29-30 (E280; T242) Unsteady and steady liberation.

31-32 (E281; T242) Mundane and supramundane liberation.

33-34 (E281; T282) Liberation connected with the intoxicants and liberation free from them.

35-37 (E281; T242) Fleshly liberation, nonfleshly liberation, and liberation more fleshly than nonfleshly.

38-40 (E281-282; T242-243) Controlled liberation, liberation free from all longings, and tranquilized controlled liberation.

41-42 (E282; T243) Harnessed and unharnessed liberation.

43-44 (E282; T243) Liberation based on unity and liberation based on distinctions.

45 (E282-283; T243-244) Liberation of perception.

46 (E283-284; T244-245) Liberation of knowledge.

47 (E284-286; T245-246) Liberation in the sense that "it can become cool".

48 (E286; T246) Liberation reached through meditative states.

49 (E286-287; T246) Liberation of awareness through non-attachment.

50-53 (E287-289; T246-249) Detailed enumeration of the variety of kinds of attachment from which knowledge of contemplation is liberated.

54 (E290; T250) 3 entrances to liberation lead to departure from the world.

55 (E290; T250) The appearance of the conditionings when given attention as impermanent, frustrating, and not-self.

56 (E290-291; T250) In these instances, his state of awareness is respectively possessed of great resolution, great tranquility, and great wisdom.

57 (E291; T250) In these cases one acquires respectively faith faculty, concentration faculty, and understanding faculty.

58-59 (E291-293; T250-252) For each of the cases in 5.57 is listed the dominant faculty operative, the number of consequent faculties, the variety of related conditions, the sense in which there is development, and by whom.

60-61 (E294-295; T252-253) When he gives attention to the

faculties as (a) impermanent, the faith faculty is outstanding, (b) frustrating, the concentration faculty, (c) not-self, the understanding faculty. In these cases respectively he is liberated by faith, a body-witness, has attained liberation through vision.

62 (E295; T253-254) One can be liberated by faith, a body-witness, attain liberation through vision according to object and function.

63 (E296-297; T254-256) Consequent faculties, related conditions, path acquired, and spiritual attainment are listed for cases where attention is given to the faculties as impermanent, frustrating, and not-self respectively.

64 (E297-299; T256-257) Those who have developed, are developing, will develop—a series of synonyms for each of these follows—in negation of the 7 hindrances, in the 4 meditative states, 18 principal insights, 4 paths, 4 foundations of mindfulness, 4 right endeavors, 4 bases for success, 5 faculties, 5 powers, 7 enlightenment factors, the eightfold path, 8 types of liberation, 4 discriminations, 3 kinds of understanding, 3 trainings, and realize the 4 truths are liberated by faith, a body-witness, attain liberation through vision.

65-66 (E299-300; T257-258) The truth of frustration is penetrated with the penetration of full understanding, the truth of origin with penetration of abandoning, the truth of cessation with the penetration of realization, and the truth of the path with the penetration of development. All factors are penetrated by direct knowledge, formations by full understanding, good states by abandoning, the 4 paths by development, and cessation by realization.

67-68 (E301; T258) Repeat 5.55-56.

69 (E301; T258-259) In the 3 cases of 5.56 one acquires respectively conditionless, desireless, and emptiness liberation.

70-73 (E302-304; T259-261) As at 5.58-61, but substituting liberation for faculty with corresponding changes in detail.

74 (E305; T261) At the 4 moments of fruition of the 4 paths, he is liberated, etc., as at 5.62.

75-77 (E305-306; T261-262) As at 5.64-66.

78 (E306; T262) When he gives attention as impermanent, frustrating, and not-self, he rightly knows and sees the sign or mental image, occurrence, and both sign and occurrence respectively. By impermanence the formations are seen as impermanent, etc., and doubt is overcome.

79 (E306; T262) Correct knowledge, right vision, and the conquest of doubt mean the same thing.

80 (E306-307; T263) Mental image, occurrence, and both mental image and occurrence respectively appear as fear when attention is given to the formations as impermanent, etc.

81 (E307; T263) Understanding of appearance as fear, knowledge of danger, and dispassion mean the same thing.

82 (E307; T263) Contemplation of not-self and of emptiness mean the same thing.

83 (E307; T263) When he gives attention to the conditionings as impermanent, etc., there arises knowledge after reflecting on mental image, etc.

84 (E307-308; T263) Desire for liberation, contemplation on reflection, and equanimity regarding the conditionings mean the same thing.

85 (E308; T263-264) Analysis of how states of awareness emerge and enter in when one gives attention to the conditionings as impermanent etc.

86 (E308; T264) Understanding of emergence and turning away from the external means the same as knowledge of change of lineage.

87 (E308; T264) When he gives attention as impermanent, etc., his liberation is respectively conditionless, desireless, and emptiness.

88 (E308-309; T264) Understanding of emergence and turning away from both sides means the same as knowledge of the path.

89-91 (E309-311; T264-266) 3 kinds of liberation are in different moments in 4 ways, in one moment in 7 ways.

92-103 (E311-315; T266-269) Commentary on the terms liberation; entrance to liberation; what conforms to liberation; turning away, development, and calming with respect to liberation.

VI. TREATISE ON COURSE ON EXISTENCE

1. (E316; T271) In the case of fortunate courses of existence rearising has its condition in 8 causes associated with knowledge. In the case of wealthy Kṣatriyas, wealthy Brahmins, wealthy householders, and deities of the sphere of sense desires rebirth has its conditions in 8 such causes; in the case of deities of the material sphere in 8 such causes; and in 8 such causes in the case of deities of the immaterial sphere.

2 (E316; T271-272) At the moment of impulsion of good action there are 3 good causes of the volition produced then. At the moment of attachment there are 2 bad causes of the volition produced then; at the moment of rebirth linking, 3 neutral causes.

3-5 (E316-317; T272) At the moment of rebirth linking 28 factors are conditions by way of simultaneous arising, conditions by way of mutuality, dependence conditions, and dissociation conditions.

6 (E317; T272) 6.2-6 relate to the 8 causes in the case of a fortunate course of existence.

7-11 (E317-318; T272-273) Repeat 6.2-6 but with reference to the case of wealthy Kṣatriyas, Brahmins, householders, and deities of the sense desire sphere.

12-16 (E318; T273) Repeat 6.2-6 with reference to the case of deities of the material stage.

17-20 (E319; T273) Similarly deal with the case of deities of the immaterial stage. Here but 14 factors are conditions, since there are no material conditions.

21 (E319-320; T273) In the case of a fortunate course of existence rebirth has its conditions in 6 causes dissociated from knowledge. In the case of the wealthy, etc., in 6 causes dissociated from knowledge.

22 (E320; T273-274) At the moment of impulsion of good action, there are 2 good causes of volition. At the moment of attachment, there are 2 bad causes; at the moment of rebirth linking, 2 neutral causes.

23-25 (E320; T274) At the moment of rebirth linking, 26 factors are conditions as at 6.3-5.

26-30 (E320; T274) In the case of a fortunate course of existence, rebirth has its conditions in 6 causes.

27-31 (E320-321; T274) Repeat as at 6.26-30 for the case of the wealthy, etc.

VII. TREATISE ON ACTION

1 (E322; T276) In past, present, and future there are actions with maturation and actions without maturation.

2 (E322-323; T276) As in 7.1 with reference to good actions and maturations.

3 (E323; T276) As in 7.1 with reference to bad actions and maturations.

4-11 (E323-324; T276) Similarly for blameworthy and blameless, dark and bright action; action which produces satisfaction and which produces frustration; action which results in satisfaction and that which results in frustration.

VIII. TREATISE ON PERVERSIONS

1 (E325-326; T277-278) There are 4 perverted views of identification, of consciousness, of view; namely, to regard the impermanent as permanent, the frustrating as satisfying, what is without self as having a self, and seeing what is foul as clean. There are 4 corresponding nonperversions— e.g., seeing the impermanent as impermanent, etc.

2 (E326; T278) Analysis of the perversions abandoned by one possessed of right views; namely, all 3 perversions with reference to seeing the impermanent as permanent and not-self as self; and perversion of view with reference to seeing the frustrating as satisfying and the ugly as beautiful.

IX. TREATISE ON THE PATHS

1 (E327-328; T279) The sense in which each element of the eightfold path is the path at the moment of stream-entry.

2-4 (E328-329; T279-280) As at 9.1, but at the moment of entering the path of once-returner, nonreturner, and perfected being respectively.

5 (E330-331; T280-281) Synonyms for the 8 elements of the eightfold path. The path as factors of enlightenment, powers, faculties, negation of hindrances, etc.

X. TREATISE ON THE FIRST CLASS DRINK

1 (E332; T282) Quotes *Saṃyutta* II.29.

2 (E332; T282) When the Buddha is present, the teaching, the receptacles, and the good life constitute a first class drink to be drunk.

3 (E332; T282) Explains the teaching as a first class drink in terms of synonyms for teaching, and a list of what is taught—namely 4 truths, applications of mindfulness, etc.

4 (E332; T282) It is monks, nuns, lay people, deities, humans, and other cognizant beings who are the receptacle.

5 (E332; T282) The good life is the eightfold path.

6-8 (E332-337; T282-285) Resolution, energy, establishment, nondistraction, seeing are a first class drink to be drunk. Lack of faith, sloth, negligence, agitation, ignorance are the dregs to be thrown out.

II. DIVISION ON CONGRUITY

I. Treatise on Yoking Together/Congruity

II.1.1 (E338-339; T287) Quotes *Aṅguttara* II.156.

II.1.2 (E340-341; T286-288) Commentary on unification of states of consciousness and nondistraction through renunciation. There are 4 kinds of spiritual practice. Explanation of the production of the elements of the eightfold path and abandonment of the fetters and their intoxicants.

II.1.3 (E342-343; T289) As in II.1.2 with reference to unification of freedom from malice.

II.1.4-71 (E343; T389) As in II.1.2 with reference to negations of the remaining hindrances, 4 meditative states, 4 meditative attainments, 10 symbolic meditative devices, 10 recollections, 10 kinds of impurity, 32 kinds of mindfulness of breathing.

II.1.72-273 (E343-344; T289-290) Development of peace preceded by insight in the sense of contemplation of the 201 factors listed in I.1.5 as impermanent, frustrating, not-self.

II.1.274 (E344; T290) Insight and peace are developed yoked together in congruity with one another in 16 ways; namely, in the sense of foundation, field, abandoning, renunciation, emerging, developing, peacefulness, sublimity, being liberated, being free of intoxicants, crossing over, being without signs, free of desire, empty, having a single taste, in the absence of excess.

II.1.275-288 (E344-348; T290-293) Explain how practice in each of the first 14 cases in I.1.274 occurs.

II.1.289-315 (E348-349; T294-295) How the mind is agitated, the path produced, fetters abandoned along with their tendencies while giving attention as impermanent, frustrating, and not-self; knowledge, happiness, tranquility, resolution, exertion, establishment, and equanimity arise.

II.1.316-5742 (E349; T295) As at II.1.289-315 while giving attention to each of the 201 factors of I.1.5 as impermanent, frustrating, and not-self.

II.1.5743 (E349-350; T295) Summary verse.

II. TREATISE ON THE TRUTHS

II.2.1 (E351; T297) Cites 4 truths quoting *Saṃyutta* V.430.

II.2.2 (E351; T297) Frustration in the sense of oppression, of being compounded, of torment, and of change.

II.2.3 (E351; T297) Origin in the sense of accumulation, source, bondage, and of impediment.

II.2.4 (E351-352; T297) Cessation in the sense of escape, seclusion, being uncompounded, and of deathlessness.

II.2.5 (E352; T297) Path in the sense of outlet, cause, seeing, and of sovereignty.

II.2.6-10 (E352-353; T297-298) The 4 truths have single penetration in 4 ways; namely, in the sense of suchness, in the sense of not-self, truth, and penetration.

II.2.11-16 (E353-355; T298-299) There is single penetration of the 4 truths in 9 ways; namely, in the 4 ways listed in II.2.6-10, in the sense of direct knowledge, full understanding, abandonment, development, and realization. These 9 ways are further applied to each of the 4 ways in II.2.6-10.

II.2.17 (E355; T299) As at II.2.11-16, but in 12 ways—in the sense of idea, principle, and being known are added.

II.2.18-29 (E355-356; T299-300) For each of the 12 cases in II.2.17 there is single penetration of the 4 truths in 16 ways.

II.2.30 (E356; T300) The truths have the characteristics of the compounded and the uncompounded.

II.2.31 (E356; T300) The rise, fall, and change of the compounded is known, but not of the uncompounded.

II.2.32 (E356; T300) As at II.2.31 for each of the 4 truths individually.

II.2.33-34 (E356-357; T301) With respect to the 4 truths, origin is bad, the path is good, cessation is neutral, and frustration may be good, bad or neutral.

II.2.35 (E357-358; T301-302) Quotes *Saṃyutta* III.26.

II.2.36 (E358-359; T302) Penetration by abandoning, by full understanding, by realization, and by practice respectively is knowledge respectively of the 4 truths.

II.2.37 (E359; T302) Truth in the sense of search, embracing, and penetration.

II.2.38-40 (E359-362; T302-304) Reverse analysis of the chain of dependent origination as explanation of the meaning of truth in the 3 aspects listed in II.2.37.

III. TREATISE ON THE FACTORS OF ENLIGHTENMENT

II.3.1 (E363; T306) Quoting *Saṃyutta* V.77 lists 7 factors of enlightenment, namely, the mindfulness, investigation of factors, energy, bliss, tranquility, concentration, and equanimity enlightenment factors.

II.3.2-13 (E363-366; T306-308) These are factors of enlightenment in the sense that they enlighten; in the sense of roots, of cause, condition, purification, blamelessness, renunciation, deliverance; in the sense of being free of cankers; in the sense of seclusion, and renunciation.

II.3.14 (E366; T308-309) They are enlightened in the sense of conduct with respect to roots, causes, etc., as at II.3.2-13.

II.3.15-19 (E366; T309) They are enlightened in the sense of embracing, equipment, perfection, ripening, and discrimination of each of the subjects listed in II.3.2-13.

II.3.20-22 (E366-367; T309-310) They are enlightened in the sense of causing to reach, developing mastery in, and achieving mastery in discrimination of all of the subjects of II.3.2-13.

II.3.23 (E367; T310) Thus they are factors of enlightenment.

II.3.24-43 (E367-373; T311-313) Lists numerous other senses

in which the factors of enlightenment are "enlightened". Included are repetitions of the patterns of I.I.26, 28-33, 35-36, and 41-43.

II.3.44 (E373-374; T313-314) Quotes *Saṃyutta* V.70.

II.3.45 (E375; T314) There is a factor of enlightenment as long as cessation is established, just as there is light as long as a lamp is burning.

II.3.46 (E375; T314) Defilements, etc., are limited; thus as long as there is cessation, there is a factor of enlightenment in the realization that it is boundless.

II.3.47 (E375; T314) Defilements are not the same. Cessation is a matter of sameness in the sense that it is at peace. As long as cessation is established, there is a factor of enlightenment in the realization that it is well-calmed.

II.3.48-50 (E375-376; T314-315) The mindfulness factor of enlightenment remains and falls away in 8 ways.

II.3.51-80 (E356-357; T315) Similarly for the other factors of enlightenment.

II.3.81-86 (E377-378; T315-316) 8 aspects of the rising and falling away of a factor of enlightenment in the realization that there is an equanimity factor of enlightenment.

IV. TREATISE ON LOVING KINDNESS

II.4.1 (E379; T317) Quotes *Aṅguttara* V.342 concerning deliverance by loving kindness leading to 11 benefits.

II.4.2 (E379; T317) There is deliverance by loving kindness with unlimited, limited, and directional pervasion.

II.4.3 (E379; T317) There is deliverance with unlimited pervasion in 5 ways, with limited pervasion in 7 ways, with directional pervasion in 10 ways.

II.4.4 (E380; T317-318) The 5 ways with unlimited pervasion are: (a) that all beings may be free from hatred and ill will, and live happily; (b) toward all who are so free and happy; (c) toward all breathing things; (d) toward all people; and (e) toward all their own personality.

II.4.5 (E380; T318) The 7 ways with limited pervasion are directed toward all women, all men, all noble ones, all who are not noble, all deities, all humans, and all creatures in states of distraction.

II.4.6 (E380-381; T318-319) The 10 ways with which directional pervasion are directed toward east, west, north, south, 4 intermediate directions, up and down. Each of the 5 cases in II.4.4 and 7 cases in II.4.5 is related to each of the 10 directions in this paragraph.

II.4.7 (E381; T319) Loving kindness treats kindly in 8 ways.

II.4.8 (E381-382; T319-320) Deliverance by loving kindness can be fortified by the 5 faculties.

II.4.9-10 (E382; T320) It is cultivated by means of the 5 faculties.

II.4.11 (E382-383; T320) When directing loving kindness toward all beings, one is unshaken.

II.4.12-13 (E383-384; T320) 5 powers are cultivation of deliverance by loving kindness.

II.4.14-16 (E384-385; T320-321) Deliverance by loving kindness is fortified by the 7 factors of enlightenment.

II.4.18-19 (E385; T321) 8 path factors are cultivation of deliverance by loving kindness.

II.4.20-1602 (E385-391; T321-322) Repeat the pattern of II.4.7-19 for each of the cases in II.4.4-6.

V. TREATIES ON NONATTACHMENT

II.5.1 (E392; T324) Nonattachment is the path; deliverance its fruit.

II.5.2-5 (E392-394; T324-325) There is nonattachment as liberation and as a reference to all factors which arise with liberation as their supporting object. At the moment of entry on each the 4 paths (stream-entry, etc.), the elements of the eightfold path become detached or fade away from their opposites (i.e. wrong view, etc.). The 7 path factors which arise with the elements of the eightfold path become detached or fade away.

II.5.6 (E394-395; T325-326) Outlines the sense in which nonattachment is identified with the elements of the eightfold path, the factors of enlightenment, the 5 powers, the faculties, the applications of mindfulness.

II.5.7-10 (E397; T326-328) There is deliverance as liberation and as a fruit in the sense that all factors which arise with liberation as their supporting object are delivered. At the moment of fruition of each of the 4 paths, the elements of the eightfold path are delivered from their opposites.

II.5.11 (E307; T328) Outlines the sense in which deliverance is identified with the elements of the eightfold path, etc. (as in II.5.6) as their fruit.

VI. TREATISE ON DISCRIMINATIONS

II.6.1 (E386-401; T329-331) Quotes *Vinaya* I.9 = *Saṃyutta* V.420. The treatise as a whole is a commentary on this passage with the discriminations as its central focus.

II.6.2 (E401; T331) The new (a) vision or insight, (b) knowledge, (c) understanding, (d) recognition, and (e) illumination that arose in the Buddha were recognition of the first truth of frustration.

II.6.3-4 (E401-402: T331-332) These 5 are factors which are the object and field in the discrimination of factors. Hence knowledge of factors is discrimination of factors. Similarly the meaning of seeing, knowing, understanding, recognition, and illumination are analyzed as object and field in the discrimination of meaning. Speaking to indicate these 5 factors and 5 meanings is analyzed as language which is the object and field in the discrimination of language. Knowledge of 5 factors, 5 meanings, and 10 sorts of language is analyzed as object and field in the discrimination of perspicuity.

II.6.5-11 (E402-403; T332) Repeat II.6.2-4 as what is to be fully understood and has been fully understood.

II.6.12-42 (E403-405; T332-333) Repeat II.6.2-11 for each of the remaining 3 truths and the 4 truths collectively.

II.6.43 (E405; T333-334) The contemplation of the body, feelings, states of awareness is identified with the vision, knowledge, understanding, recognition, and illumination that exists, is to be developed, and has been developed.

II.6.44-53 (E405-406; T334) The vision, knowledge, etc., that arose are identified with contemplation of the body as body. The analysis continues as in II.6.3-4. This contemplation of body as body is to be practiced and has been practiced. The analysis is as at II.6.5-11.

II.6.54-83 (E405-407; T334-335) Repeat the pattern of II.6.44-53 with respect to contemplation of feeling as feelings, states of awareness as states of awareness, and factors as factors.

II.6.85 (E407; T336) Quotes *Saṃyutta* V.258.

II.6.86-95 (E407; T335-336) Regarding the basis for the success endowed with both zeal for concentration and instigation. The pattern is as at II.6.44-53.

II.6.96-126 (E407-409; T336-337) Regarding the basis for success endowed with concentration due to energy, due to states of awareness, and due to investigation, etc., as at II.6.44-53.

II.6.127-142 (E409-411; T337-338) Arising and cessation were the vision, knowledge, etc., that arose in the Bodhisattvas Vipassi, Sikhi, Vessabhu, Kakusandha, Konāgamana, Kassapa and Gotama.

II.6.143 (E411; T338) Insofar as the meaning of higher faculty as higher faculty is known, seen, recognized, realized, and touched by understanding and no meaning is untouched by understanding, just so far vision, knowledge, understanding, recognition, and illumination arose.

II.6.144-172 (E411-413; T338-340) Similarly substituting complete understanding, abandoning, development, and realization for higher faculty. Similarly substituting aggregates, elements,

senses, what is conditioned, the unconditioned, frustration, and the 4 discriminations. Similarly substituting knowledge of penetration into the faculties of others, knowledge of their biases and contaminants, the miracle of double appearance, great compassion, omniscience, and unobstructed knowledge.

VII. TREATISE ON THE WHEEL OF *DHARMA*

II.7.1 (E414; T341) Quotes *Saṃyutta* V.420 as in II.VI.1.

II.7.2-3 (E414; T341) Repeat II.VI.2-3.

II.7.4 (E414-415; T341-342) The 5 factors as at II.VI.4 and their meanings have frustration and truth as their ground, support, and field. Established in the *dharma* and establishing it in others, the Buddha sets rolling the wheel of the *dharma*.

II.7.5 (E415-417; T342-343) The 5 faculties are factors which he sets rolling. So too are the 5 powers, 7 factors of enlightenment, elements of the eightfold path, the path, applications of mindfulness, right endeavors, bases for success, 4 truths, peace and insight, congruity, purification, liberation, knowledge, and zeal.

II.7.6-13 (E417; T343) Repeat II.6.5-10.

II.7.14-16 (E417; T343) Similar to II.6.12-14. Complete by repeating the end of II.VII.4.

II.7.17 (E417; T343) Repeats II.7.5.

II.7.18-25 (E417-418; T343-344) Repeat II.7.15-17 with the addition that the truth of the origin of frustration is to be abandoned.

II.7.26-37 (E418; T344) Repeat II.7.2-13 with respect to the truth of the cessation of frustration.

II.7.38-49 (E418-419; T344-345) Repeat II.7.2-13 with respect to the truth of the way which leads to the end of frustration.

II.7.50 (E419; T345) Quotes *Saṃyutta* V.178.

II.7.51-62 (E419; T345) Generally repeats II.6.44-52 with the addition of II.7.4-5.

II.7.63-90 (E419; T345) As at II.7.4 with the 5 factors having feelings, states of awareness, factors and application of mindfulness as their ground.

II.7.91 (E419-420; T346) Quotes *Saṃyutta* V.258.

II.7.92-103 (E420-421; T346) Repeat II.6.86-94 with the addition of II.7.4-5.

II.7.104-139 (E421-422; T346) As at II.7.4 with energy, states of awareness, inquiry as their ground and basis for success as their ground.

VIII. TREATISE ON THE SUPRAMUNDANE

II.8.1 (E423; T347) 4 applications of mindfulness, 4 right endeavors, 4 bases for success, 5 faculties, 5 powers, 7 factors of enlightenment, eightfold path, 4 paths and their fruits, and liberation are supramundane.

II.8.2 (E423-424; T347-348) Supramundane in the sense of crossing over, transcending, and escaping the world; not being smeared by the world; dissociated from it, purified of it. They are not attached to the world; they abandon it.

IX. TREATISE ON THE POWERS

II.9.1 (E425; T349) The 5 powers are the powers of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom.

II.9.2 (E425; T349) There are 68 powers, namely: the 5 powers listed in II.9.1 plus conscience, shame, reflection, development, blamelessness, assistance, patience, nominal designation, notification, sovereignty, steadiness, peace and insight, 10 powers each of the initiate and the adept, 10 powers of one who has overcome the intoxicants, 10 supernatural powers, and the 10 powers of a Buddha.

II.9.3-22 (E425-431; T349-352) Explain the first 18 of these kinds of power.

II.9.23 (E431; T352) Training in the elements of the eightfold path, plus training in knowledge and deliverance are powers of the initiate. Being trained in these 10 are the powers of an adept.

II.9.24-33 (E431-432; T352-353) The powers of one who has overcome the intoxicants are: (a) He correctly sees all formations as impermanent; (b) he sees sense desires as like a burning pit; (c) his states of awareness tend toward detachment; (d) he has developed the 4 applications of mindfulness, (e) the 4 right endeavors, (f) 4 bases for success, (g) 5 faculties, (h) 5 powers, (i) 7 factors of enlightenment, and (j) the eightfold path.

II.9.34 (E432; T353) The 10 supernatural powers are: the power of determination, of transformation, the power of mental creation, of penetrating knowledge, of penetrating concentration, the power of a noble one, the power born of the result of action, the power of the meritorious, power through sciences, and power in the sense of succeeding in what is appropriate to the occasion.

II.9.35-44 (E432-434; T353-354) The 10 powers of a Buddha are: (a) He knows the difference between the possible and the impossible; (b) he understands the result of past, present and future action; (c) he understands where all ways lead; (d) he understands the world, (e) the determination of beings, (f) the disposition of

faculties in others, (g) corruption, cleansing, meditative states, liberation, etc., (h) he remembers his past lives, (i) he sees beings passing from existence to existence in accordance with their karma; and (j) he abides in a state of liberation.

II.9.45 (E434-435; T354-355) Summary of the meaning of the 68 kinds of power.

X. TREATISE ON EMPTINESS

II.10.1 (E436; T356) Quotes *Saṃyutta* IV.54 on the nature of the world as empty.

II.10.2-26 (E436-445; T356-361) There is emptiness as emptiness, emptiness of conditionings, emptiness of change, supreme emptiness, emptiness of characteristics; emptiness through renunciation, by substitution of opposites, by cutting off, by tranquilization; internal and external emptiness, as well as emptiness in both ways; equivalent emptiness, dissimilar emptiness; emptiness in search, embracing, obtaining, penetration; emptiness in unity and difference, in choice, in steadiness, in fathoming.

II.10.27 (E445; T361) The ultimate meaning of emptiness is the termination that occurs on attaining the state of a perfected being.

III. DIVISION ON WISDOM

I. TREATISE ON GREAT WISDOM

III.1.1 (E446-447; T363) When developed, contemplation of impermanence perfects impulse-driven wisdom; contemplation of frustration perfects penetrative wisdom; contemplation of not-self perfects great wisdom; contemplation of equanimity perfects keen wisdom; contemplation of nonattachment perfects abundant wisdom; contemplation of cessation perfects profound wisdom; contemplation of renunciation perfects unequalled wisdom. These 7 kinds of wisdom perfect erudition. These 8 kinds of wisdom perfect wide wisdom. These 9 kinds of wisdom perfect laughter wisdom which is the discrimination of perspicuity. With the definition of meaning, factors, language, and perspicuity, the 4 discriminations are realized.

III.1.2-3 (E447-450; T363-366) When developed, contemplation of the 9 subjects (in III.1.1) in materiality, impermanence, etc., through the 201 factors of I.1.5 similarly perfect a variety of forms of wisdom as listed in III.1.1. Thus the 4 discriminations are realized as in III.1.1.

III.1.4 (E450-451; T366) Quotes *Saṃyutta* V.410 to the effect

that waiting on good men, hearing the *dharma*, attention to it, and practice in accord with it lead to realization of the fruit of stream-entry. Similarly with respect to the realization of the fruits of the remaining 3 stages of the path. They lead to awakening of wisdom of various types as in III.1.1.

III.1.5 (E451; T366-367) Obtaining wisdom means realizing, etc., knowledge of the 4 paths and their fruition, knowledge of the 4 discriminations, the 6 kinds of supernatural knowledge, the 73 kinds of knowledge listed in III.1.1, and 77 kinds of knowledge listed at *Saṃyuttanikāya* II.59.

III.1.6-11 (E451-455; T367-368) Explanation of awakening of abundance of, great, wide, abundant, and profound wisdom.

III.1.12 (E455-458; T368-371) Explanation of awakening of unequalled wisdom. Wisdom at each stage of the path exceeds that of previous stages. Compared to lower stages, a perfected being's wisdom is unequalled. Compared to a perfected being, the wisdom of a solitary self-enlightened Buddha is unequalled. Compared with this, the wisdom of a Buddha is unequalled. There is nothing a Buddha has not known and seen; nothing knowable he has not known and seen. His knowledge reaches all factors and all beings. [The approach of this paragraph is more discursive than much of the rest of the text.]

III.1.13 (E458; T371) The nature of extensive wisdom as overcoming negative qualities, defilements, misconduct, karmic conditioning and the like.

III.1.14 (E458-459; T371-372) The nature of abundant wisdom. Similes.

III.1.15 (E459-460; T372) The nature of quick wisdom as rapidly perfecting virtues, etc.

III.1.16 (E460; T372) The nature of speedy wisdom as speedily perfecting virtues, etc.

III.1.17 (E460-461; T372) Laughter wisdom is when one perfects the virtues, etc., joyfully, gladly, with much laughter.

III.1.18 (E461-462; T372-373) Driven by impulsion to realize that the 201 factors of I.I.5, whether past, present, or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near are impermanent, one develops impulse-driven wisdom. Having made clear, etc., that each of these 201 factors is impermanent, etc., it gives impulse to the cessation of these 201 factors.

III.1.19 (E462-463; T372-373) Keen wisdom severs defilement. It does not endure evil and bad attitudes, thought, or action.

III.1.20 (E463; T374) Penetrative wisdom reacts negatively toward conditionings, penetrates and explodes negative attitudes, thought, and action.

III.1.21 (E463; T374) There are 10 kinds of wisdom. One who has these has reached the discriminations.

III.1.22 (E463-464; T374) Some who have reached the discriminations have had practice in former lives; others have not.

III.1.23 (E464; T374) Of the two groups in III.1.22, some are well-taught; others are not.

III.1.24 (E464; T374) Of those who are well-taught, some teach much; others do not.

III.1.25 (E464; T374) Of those who do much teaching, some are dependent on a teacher; others are not.

III.1.26 (E464; T374-375) Of those who are so dependent, some abide in insight and maturation; others do not.

III.1.27 (E464; T375) Of those who so abide, some do much reflection; others do not.

III.1.28 (E464-465; T375) Of those who do much reflection, some have reached the discrimination of an adept; some the discrimination of an initiate.

III.1.29 (E465; T375) Of those who have reached the discrimination of an adept, some have reached the perfections of a disciple; others have not.

III.1.30 (E465; T375) Of those who have reached the discrimination of an adept, some have become solitary self-enlightened Buddhas, others have reached the perfection of a disciple. In each of the pairs in III.1.22-30, the wisdom of the self-enlightened Buddha is the highest in attainment of discrimination, etc., as in III.1.12.

II. TREATISE ON SUPERNATURAL POWER

III.2.1 (E467; T377) Matrices.

III.2.2-3 (E467; T377) There are 10 kinds of supernatural power. Supernatural power has 4 stages, 4 bases, 8 steps and 16 roots.

III.2.4 (E467; T377) The 10 supernatural powers are listed as at II.9.34.

III.2.5 (E467; T377) The 4 stages are the 4 meditative states.

III.2.6 (E468; T377) The 4 bases are: the basis that possesses (a) concentration due to zeal and volitional conditioning due to endeavor, (b) concentration due to energy and volitional conditioning..., (c) concentration due to states of awareness and volitional..., and (d) concentration due to inquiry and volitional...

III.2.7 (E468; T376-377) Obtaining concentration and unification of states of awareness supported by zeal, energy, awareness, and inquiry are the 8 steps.

III.2.8 (E468-469; T378) The 16 roots are undejected, unrelated, unattracted, unrepelled, independent, untrammelled, liberated,

unassociated, unified, and illuminated states of consciousness; awareness free from barriers, embraced by faith, by energy, by mindfulness, by concentration, and by understanding.

III.2.9 (E469; T378) The power of determination is defined in terms of a monk's ability to multiply himself or to become one; to disappear; to pass through walls, mountains, and the like; to dive into the earth as if it were water; to walk on water as if it were dry land; to float through the air; to touch the sun and the moon; and to have mastery of the body even into the Brahma world.

III.2.10-22 (E470-473; T379-381) Commentary on III.2.9.

III.2.23 (E473; T381) One possessed of the power of transformation preaches the *dharma* adopting a variety of physical appearances.

III.2.24 (E473; T381-382) One possessed of the power of mental creation mentally creates out of his own body another body.

III.2.25 (E474; T382) One possessed of the power of penetrating knowledge succeeds in abandoning false perception through proper concentration.

III.2.26 (E474-475; T382-383) One possessed of the power of penetrating concentration succeeds through attaining the meditative states and other higher states of awareness.

III.2.27 (E475-476; T383-384) One possessed of the power of a noble one abides perceiving the repulsive and unrepulsive in the repulsive or unrepulsive as he wills.

III.2.28 (E476; T384) The power born of the result of action is that in all deities, all birds, some humans, and some beings in states of deprivation.

III.2.29 (E476; T384) The power of the meritorious is when the Wheel Turning King (*cakravartin*) travels through the air with his army and retinue.

III.2.30 (E476; T384) The power of the lower sciences consists of magic spells which make possible flight through the air and the creation of various illusory appearances.

III.2.31 (E477; T384) The power of succeeding in what is appropriate to the occasion.

III. TREATISE ON HIGHER REALIZATION

III.3.1 (E478-479; T386-387) Higher realization is a result of awareness. One without knowledge does not produce realization of the truth. One without awareness does not realize the truth. If realization of the truth is produced by awareness and knowledge, it is not by means of knowledge and awareness in the sense desire sphere, the material sphere, the immaterial sphere, awareness that is heir to or possesses action, awareness in conformity with truth;

past, present, or future mundane awareness. Rather, the higher realization is produced by means of present mundane awareness at the moment of entry on the supramundane path and by means of knowledge.

III.3.2 (E479-480; T387-388) At the moment of entry on the supramundane path there is realization of the truth of seeing, directing onto, enhancing, originating, cleansing, exertion, establishing, nondistraction. These are identified with the elements of the eightfold path repectively. There is realization of the truth identified with the 7 factors of enlightenment, the 5 powers, 5 faculties. These are each explained. There is realization of the truth of the path, applications of mindfulness, right endeavors, bases for success, truths, peace and insight, etc. There is higher realization in the sense of liberation.

III.3.3-10 (E480; T388-389) As at III.3.2 with respect to the moments of stream entry, entry on the path of once-returner, entry on the path of nonreturner, and the path of the perfected being, as well as at the moment of fruition of each of these.

III.3.11 (E481-482; T389-390) When one abandons defilements, he does not abandon past defilements since these no longer exist. He does not abandon future defilements since these do not yet exist. He does not abandon present defilements, for that would mean that though fired by greed, he abandons greed, etc. It would mean that practice of the path has defilement. However, this does not imply there is no practice of the path or higher realization.

III.3.12 (E482; T390) Simile of a tree with undeveloped fruit which is cut down. The fruit remains ungenerated. So with higher realization, the cause of the defilements is destroyed and defilements no longer generated.

IV. TREATISE ON DISCERNMENT

III.4.1 (E483-484; T391) Quotes *Saṃyutta* V.45f to the effect that the eightfold path is developed by depending on virtue.

III.4.2 (E484; T391-392) In the case of each of the elements of the eightfold path there are 5 kinds of discernment, 5 kinds of nonattachment, 5 kinds of cessation, 5 kinds of relinquishing, and 12 supports.

III.4.3 (E484; T392) In the case of right view, the 5 kinds of discernment are discernment by suppression, by substitution of opposites, by cutting off, by tranquilizing, and discernment as escape. Three supports here are that he (a) is filled with zeal, (b) has faithful resolve and (c) steady awareness.

III.4.4 (E484-485; T392) The 5 kinds of nonattachment are by

suppression, etc., as at III.4.3.

III.4.5-6 (E485; T392-393) The 5 kinds of cessation and relinquishing are by suppression, etc., as at III.4.3.

III.4.7-34 (E485-487; T393) As at III.4.3-6 with reference to the cases of the remaining 7 elements of the eightfold path.

III.4.35-100 (E487-488; T393) Repeat III.4.1-34 substituting 7 enlightenment factors, 5 powers, and 5 faculties for the elements of the eightfold path.

V. TREATISE ON CONDUCT

III.5 (E489-490; T340) The treatise as a whole repeats I.4.31-33 verbatim.

VI. TREATISE ON MIRACLES

III.6.1 (E490; T395-396) Quotes *Aṅguttara* I.170 on 3 kinds of miracle, namely, supernatural power, the miracle of mind-reading, and the miracle of instruction.

III.6.2 (E490-492; T396) Renunciation has good results and is thus a supernatural power. It surprises and is thus a miracle. Those possessed of that renunciation have pure states of awareness and their thought is stilled. This is the miracle resulting from instruction. Such renunciation should be cultivated. Such renunciation is the miracle (resulting) from advice. Similarly beginning "the absence of ill will has good results, etc." with reference to the rest of the 7 hindrances and their negations, 4 meditative states, 4 immaterial attainments, 18 principal insights, and 4 paths. The path of the perfected being destroys defilements and is thus a miracle. Those on this path have pure states of awareness and their thought is stilled. This is a miracle resulting from instruction, etc.

III.6.3 (E492-494; T396) The supernatural power and the miracle together constitute the miracle of supernatural power.

VII. TREATISE ON EQUIVALENT HEADINGS

III.7 (E495-496; T397) The treatise as a whole repeats I.1.464-470.

VIII. TREATISE ON THE APPLICATION OF MINDFULNESS

III.8.1 (E497; T398) Quotes *Saṃyutta* V.73 listing the 4 applications of mindfulness.

III.8.2-4 (E497; T398) He contemplates the body as body. The

subject matter is like that at I.3.196-198.

III.8.5-40 (E498; T398-399) One contemplates the water body, fire body, air body, head-hair body, body-hair body, outer-skin body, inner-skin body, flesh body, blood body, sinew body, bone body, marrow body, etc., as at III.8.2-4.

III.8.41-49 (E498-499; T399) Similarly with respect to contemplation of feelings as feelings. Satisfying feelings, frustrating feelings, and feelings which are neither satisfying nor frustrating are considered.

III.8.50-115 (E499-500; T399-400) Similarly with respect to contemplation of states of awareness as states of awareness. 22 states of awareness are considered.

III.8.106-108 (E500; T400) Similarly with respect to contemplation of factors as factors.

IX. TREATISE ON INSIGHTS

III.9.1-5 (E501-503; T401) Quotes *Aṅguttara* III.441f regarding a monk realizing certainty regarding what is right and attaining the fruit of the paths when he sees conditionings as impermanent, frustrating, and not-self, and thus makes a choice in conformity with truth.

III.9.6 (E503; T401-402) He makes a choice in conformity with truth in 40 ways, and realizes certainty regarding what is right in 40 ways.

III.9.7-8 (E503-506; T402-404) That is, he sees 5 aggregates as impermanent, as frustrating, as a disease, a boil, a dart, a calamity, an affliction, as alien, disintegrating, as a plague, a disaster, fear, menace, as fickle, perishable, nonlasting, as offering no protection, no shelter, no refuge, as vain, void, not-self, a danger, changeable, as without a core, as the root of calamity, as murderous, as about to be annihilated, as subject to intoxicants, as compounded, as Māra's lure, as connected with birth, old age, illness, death, sorrow, lamentation, despair and defilement. For each of these negatives, he chooses the positive opposite.

III.9.9-10 (E506-507; T404) These 40 higher realizations are each analyzed according to whether they involve contemplation of impermanence, frustration, or not-self. These 40 with reference to each of the 5 aggregates amount to a total of 25 contemplations of not-self, 50 of impermanence, and 125 of frustration.

X. TREATISE ON MATRICES

III.10.1 (E508-511; T405) A list of terms: satisfied; it is liberated

and thus is liberation; higher virtue, higher states of consciousness, higher wisdom, tranquility, knowledge, seeing, purification, renunciation, escape, detachment, relinquishing, conduct, liberation through states of absorption, development, steadiness and life.

III.10.2-6 (E511; T405-408) A commentary on these terms. The text ends with a brief verse table of contents.

8

KATHĀVATTHU

by James P. McDermott

The *Kathāvatthu*, or *Points of Controversy*, consists of a series of debates over controverted points of doctrine. The text itself does not identify the disputants. The text is written from the perspective of Theravāda Buddhism. Where it seemed advisable as a matter of phrasing to identify the position of the text by name, I have adopted the convention of referring to it as Sakavādi, that is the author's own position.

In preparing the following summary, I have followed the edition by Bhikkhu J. Kashyap published by the Nalanda Devanagari Pali Series (Bihar: Pali Publication Board, Bihar Government, 1961), which is here identified as "E". "T" references are to the translation by Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Carolyn Rhys Davids, *Points of Controversy* (Pali Text Society, London 1915, reprinted by Luzac in 1960). In numbering the sections of the text I have followed the numbering of the P.T.S. translation. The numbers for Books and Controversies follow exactly those of the other standard available edition, that by Arnold C. Taylor in Pali Text Series nos. 34 and 36 (London: H. Frowde, 1894-97), and with rare exception match those of the Nalanda edition. There are two other editions to be mentioned, one by Mahesh Tiwari with Buddhaghoṣa's commentary from Patna in 1971, the other by N.A. Jayawickrame, Pali Text Series 169, London 1979, also with Buddhaghoṣa's commentary.[1]

The work is regularly ascribed to Moggaliputta Tissa, and it appears to have been prepared around 240 B.C. during Aśoka's period of reign, although André Bareau[2] dissents from this opinion. Bareau thinks that some verses of the work or its prototype may have been read at Pāṭaliputta during Aśoka's reign, and that *Kathāvatthu* and *Vijñānakāya* may stem from the same prototype.

Following the pattern of the printed versions themselves, I have taken the liberty of providing a more detailed picture of the argument involved in the earlier controversies than in those that follow.

BOOK I

I.1. Concerning the existence of a person (*pudgala*).

I.1.1. The eight refutations.

(1-5) The opponent states that the person is known as a real and ultimate fact, but is unwilling to admit that it is known in the same way as a real and ultimate fact is known. This is refuted as inconsistent.

(2-5) Using the same reasoning, the opponent argues that if this were true, it would also be inconsistent to maintain the person is not known as a real and ultimate fact while maintaining, as the Sakavādi would, that it is unknown in the same way as a real and ultimate fact is known. Since the Sakavādi does not admit this as inconsistent, the original refutation must be faulty.

(6-10) The opposite position is then argued beginning with the Sakavādi's assertion that the person is not known in the sense of real and ultimate fact. By repeating both steps of the above argument, it is thus shown that the opponent's rejoinder to the Sakavādi's original refutation in I.1.1.2-5 must be faulty.

(11-13) It is then shown that the person cannot be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, since the opponent is unwilling to admit that it (I.1.1.11) is known everywhere in that sense; (I.1.1.12) is always known in that sense; and (I.1.1.13) is known in everything in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

In each case the opponent attempts to demonstrate the refutation faulty, as in I.1.1.2-5.

(14-16) The opponent's rejoinder in I.1.1.11-13 is then rejected through the opposing argument, as at I.1.1.6-10.

I.1.2. Comparison of the hypothetical person with other realities.

(17) The opponent maintains that both the person and matter are known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, yet that they are not distinct from one another. The Sakavādi rejects such an opinion as inconsistent.

(18-21) The same argument is then repeated, substituting for matter the other aggregates,

(22-23) the twelve sense-bases,

(34-51) the eighteen elements,

(52-73) and the twenty-two faculties.

(74-129) The opponent's rejoinder and the Sakavādi's response repeat the pattern of argument from I.1.1. for each of the aggregates, bases, elements and faculties in turn.

(130-134) Since his opponent both maintains that each of the aggregates are known as real and ultimate facts and that they each are separate and distinct from one another, the Sakavādi argues by

analogy that to be consistent he must also maintain that the person is separate and distinct from the various aggregates, as he also considers it a real and ultimate fact. This the opponent does not do.

(135) The argument by analogy is repeated for each of the bases, elements and faculties in a similar manner.

(136) The rejoinder and response once again repeat the pattern of argument from I.1.1.

(138) Since the opponent does not consider the person distinct from these, logically he should consider it identical with them. This he does not do.

(139) The opponent is further shown to be illogical in that he is not willing to admit (a) a person as matter, (b) a person as apart from matter, or (c) matter as being in the person.

(140-145) The argument is repeated as in 139 for the remaining aggregates, the bases, elements and faculties. Again the pattern of rejoinder and response echo those in I.1.1.

(146) The opponent is questioned whether he considers the person (a) relative or absolute, (b) conditioned or unconditioned, (c) eternal or temporal, (d) to have external features or not. When he denies that any of these options can be truly predicated about the person, the Sakavādi calls the logic of this into question.

(148-152) The opponent clarifies his concept of the person by indicating that while it is known, and is a reality which exists, the converse is not true. Not all that is known, is real, or exists is the person.

(154-155) The opponent defines a person as one who has material qualities in the sphere of matter, and no material qualities in the immaterial sphere.

(156) He is refuted for admitting (a) the identity between physical frame and body, (b) the identity of person and self (*jīva*), and (c) the difference between the physical frame and the person, while at the same time denying the difference between body and self.

(158-170) The opponent maintains that the person passes from one world to another (i.e. transmigrates). However, he denies that the person who is reborn is (a) identical with, (b) different from, (c) both identical and different, (d) neither identical nor different from the being who passed on. This is refuted. The opponent is inconsistent, as he had earlier claimed that it was, indeed, the identical person which transmigrates from one course to another. The Sakavādi presses his point by getting his opponent to admit a god may be reborn as a human or a brahmin or as a noble. Further inconsistencies are noted to exist in his view of the relation between the transmigrating person and the five aggregates.

I.1.3 (171-179) The concept of the person is said to derive from

each of the aggregates in turn, yet not to have the characteristics of these aggregates. This is refuted as inconsistent.

(181-182) It is affirmed that a person with wrong views is derived from wrong views, but denied that when wrong views cease the person derived from them also ceases to exist. This is rejected as inconsistent. Similar claims and rejoinders are made for the other elements of the eightfold path.

(183-188) The opponent maintains the concept of a person may be derived from the aggregates, bases, elements and faculties in turn. However, this is rejected because of the absence of multiple persons corresponding to these sources in one individual's life-continuum.

(189-192) It is argued that the concept of the person is derived from material qualities just as a shadow is derived from a tree. The validity of this analogy is rejected since the shadow is impermanent like its source, whereas the same cannot be said about the person. Other analogies used to derive the concept of the person are rejected in the same way.

I.1.4 (193) It is maintained that there is a notion of a person for each moment of consciousness, yet denied that the person changes, dies and is reborn with each such moment. This is rejected as inconsistent.

I.1.5 (196-199) It is taken to indicate the reality of the person when the Buddha says he is able to see beings (here equated with person) being reborn according to their karma. The proponent of this view is caught in an inconsistency when he then refuses to admit that this implies that the person is a visible object cognizable by sight and possessing color.

I.1.6 (200) The opponent asks whether both the person who does an action and the person who causes him to do it are known to exist. Since the question involves the person rather than merely the action and its cause, the Sakavādi denies this. The opponent disagrees. The Sakavādi argues that logically this should imply that he who makes the doer should also exist, which the opponent cannot admit since it implies the existence of God. Thus he is caught in a contradiction.

(201) If by acting a person produces or causes a person who experiences the results, as the opponent at first maintains, each person would inevitably produce a successor, thus negating the possibility of final liberation—something untenable.

(202-203) Although the effects of good and bad karma are known to exist, this does not imply the existence of a person which experiences these effects.

(204-211) The argument of 202-203 is repeated using celestial satisfaction, human satisfaction, the misery of the realms of suffering, and the agony of hell as examples of effects of karma.

(212) The Sakavādi asks his opponent in turn (a) whether he who does an act is the same as he who experiences its effect, (b) whether they are two different persons, (c) whether they are at once the same and different persons, (d) whether they are neither the same nor different persons. At first the opponent answers each negatively, but on questioning reverses his opinion to avoid contradicting the *sūtras*. Then he is asked in succession whether (a) satisfaction and frustration are self-caused, (b) produced by another, (c) both self-caused and produced by another, (d) neither self-caused nor produced by another, but of spontaneous origin. Each of these possibilities he denies.

(213-216) Unlike his opponent, the Sakavādi will admit karma and its effect, but not that there is a person who performs the act and experiences its fruit.

I.1.7 (217-218) The opponent argues that the fact that there are those with supernatural powers demonstrates the existence of the person as a real and ultimate fact.

I.1.8 (219-220) The opponent argues that granting the reality of mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, nobles, brahmins, gods, etc., implies the existence of the person as a real and ultimate fact. The Sakavādi denies this as someone who is not a mother or the like can become one and vice versa, whereas the concept of the person implies permanence.

(221-223) A similar argument is made with respect to those on the various stages of the path (e.g., stream-enterers, once-returners).

(224) Since the stage of the path ends with the achievement of final liberation, the opponent's argument should imply the person is annihilated with the achievement of final *nirvāṇa*. This contradicts the *sūtras*.

(225) The controversy concerns what is implied when the opponent claims the person is real and ultimate. He holds the person is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. Since this implies a third alternative, it contradicts the *sūtra* where the Buddha lists the conditioned and the unconditioned as the only irreducible categories.

(226) The opponent holds the person is neither conditioned nor unconditioned, yet that the conditioned, the unconditioned and the person are not three different things. The aggregates and liberation are used as examples of the conditioned and the unconditioned respectively.

(227) The opponent admits the genesis, passing away and duration of the personal entity, but is caught in an untenable position since these are characteristics of the conditioned. On the other hand, he cannot admit these characteristics are not apparent in the person for, to be true to scripture, that would imply the person is uncondi-

tioned.

(228) The opponent affirms the person who has attained *nirvāṇa* exists therein. This wrongly implies eternality of the person. Yet one cannot say he does not exist therein for that implies annihilation. He similarly affirms the person depends on (coming into) existence. Since the state of coming into existence is impermanent, contrary to his intent this implies the person is impermanent and unconditioned.

(229-230) The opponent argues that the fact of self-awareness proves the existence of the person as real and ultimate fact. But if a person is known to be such because of such self-awareness, that must wrongly mean that the person who lacks such awareness does not exist.

(231) The opponent argues that denying there is such a thing as a person with self-awareness implies there can be no one with self-awareness. This the Sakavādi denies, thus leading his opponent to the conclusion that the person exists.

(232-233) The argument of 229-231 is repeated substituting one who carries out the applications of mindfulness for one who is self-aware.

(234) *Suttanipāta* 1119, which rejects the "world's opinion" as to self, is cited against belief in the person.

(236-243) Both parties to the controversy cite further passages from the *sūtras* in defense of their views, the opponent's citations using the term "person" in what the Sakavādi takes to be but a conventional sense, while the Sakavādi's proof-texts deny such concepts as the self, being and the like.

I.2. The debate in this section centers on whether a perfected being can fall away.

(1-8) The opponent asserts a perfected being can fall away from perfection. This is taken to imply any perfected being can fall away anywhere, at any time, not only from perfection, but also from the stages of never-returner, once-returner and stream-enterer. If this is so, those on the lower stages must also be able to fall away.

(9-13) This the opponent denies.

(14-20) It is replied that you cannot consistently deny that a perfected being who excels all others in cultivation of 37 matters pertaining to enlightenment (the eightfold path, applications of mindfulness, etc.) can fall away while at the same time denying that those who have cultivated these to a lesser degree can equally fall away.

(21-32) A similar argument is made substituting realization of the four noble truths for cultivation of matters pertaining to enlightenment.

(33-44) To be consistent it must either be maintained (a) that at whatever stage one is at, one must be capable of falling away or (b) that one cannot fall away regardless of one's stage of development.

(48) The opponent modifies his statement to maintain that only the perfected being who now and then reaches liberation can fall away, not the perfected being who has permanently achieved this state.

(49-54) In rejoinder it is maintained that this qualification does not affect the argument.

(55) The opponent is asked for examples of perfected beings who have fallen away, but can give none.

(56-59) Proof-texts are cited by both sides, A III.173 in support of the view that the perfected being can fall away; and *Suttanipāta* 714, *Aṅguttara* III.378, etc., against.

(60-61) It is claimed a perfected being is led to fall because of delight in business, talk, sleep and the like or because he is assailed by greed, hatred or delusion. But this would imply that he is bound by earthly desires or latent dispositions. However, since this in turn is denied, the original claim is seen to be refuted.

I.3. The claim that there is no observance of the religious life (*brahmacarya*) among the gods is debated.

(1-2) The opponent denies there is observance of the religious life among the gods, yet—inconsistently—also denies they are physically, mentally or morally defective.

(3) The Sakavādi maintains there is such observance, but denies that gods observe the monastic discipline and that Buddhas become enlightened among them. How then, he is asked, can they be said to observe the religious life?

(4-7) In rejoinder he notes that laymen do not follow the monastic discipline, yet may nonetheless lead a religious life.

(8-10) He further notes that the religious life is led in cities and countries other than where the Buddha became enlightened. Thus the absence of enlightened ones in the world of the gods does not make the opponent's case.

(11-14) The Sakavādi claims the religious life is observed by some gods, but not by all. The opponent considers this inconsistent. However, it is pointed out that even among men only some observe the religious life.

(15-18) Since the never-returner overcomes the upper five fetters and realizes final liberation in the pure heavenly abodes, observance of the religious life must be possible among the gods of those spheres.

(19) To claim otherwise is as much as to hold that the perfected being is capable of rebirth.

I.4. The controverted point concerns whether the defilements are

given up piecemeal.

(1-12) The opponent affirms that when those on the path attain higher vision, the defilments are put away piecemeal. But if this is so, it should be admitted that part of an individual can become a stream-enterer, or once-returner, etc., while the remainder still has not achieved such a stage.

(13-16) That part can be perfected being, while the remainder is not.

(17) The opponent cites *Dhammapada* 239 in his support.

(18) In rejoinder *Suttanipāta* 231 and *Vinaya* I.97 = *Saṃyutta* IV.47, etc. are cited.

I.5. The controversy concerns whether an ordinary person who achieves higher states renounces his desires while still a man of the world.

(1-6) The opponent maintains that the ordinary person who achieves the higher stages of the path does renounce sensuous desires and attachment as an ordinary person. The Sakavādi maintains this is the same as saying these desires are thoroughly arrested. The opponent disagrees.

(7-10) The opponent holds the ordinary person renounces these desires by means of a path belonging to the material realm. In rejoinder, it is noted that such a path does not lead to enlightenment and freedom from the fetters and intoxicants which lead to grasping and defilement; whereas the path leading to the stage of never-returner does lead to such results.

(11-13) The opponent says the ordinary person who has overcome his desires achieves the status of never-returner as soon as he has comprehended the truth. Why not say he becomes a perfected being? To say he achieves the status of non-returner must wrongly imply he achieves the lower stages beginning with that of stream-enterer at the same time.

(14-15) In defense the opponent cites *Aṅguttara* III.373, while *Aṅguttara* IV.104ff. is quoted in rejoinder.

I.6. The controverted point concerns whether everything exists.

(1) The opponent maintains everything exists. But this would imply that the nonexistent exists.

(2) It is argued that past, present and future exist. How can this be since the future has not yet happened and the past is something that has ceased?

(3-4) The argument is made concerning the existence of past material qualities and future material qualities, then repeated for each of the other aggregates.

(5-6) On questioning the opponent admits the phrases "present material aggregate" and "material present aggregate" to be equiva-

lent. A rejoinder is presented based on consistent parallel use of the adjectives "present" and "material". If the aggregate gives up its status as present when it ceases, it must also give up its materiality. If it cannot give up its materiality, it cannot give up its presence.

(7-8) If the material aggregate cannot lose its materiality, it must be permanent and not subject to change. But the opposite is true.

(9-10) To say past, present and future all exist implies analogies between them that are not valid.

(11-12) Since it is admitted that liberation exists, to say past, present and future exists implies analogies between them and liberation that are not valid.

(13-20) A similar argument is made concerning the existence of past, present and future aggregates.

(21) An argument similar to that in 5-6 of I.1.6 is made using the phrases "non-past exists" and "past nonexists".

(22) The opponent is caught in an inconsistency of logic in a rejoinder based on a word-play when he admits that the future becomes present, but what has not been (i.e. future) does not become present. A similar argument is made substituting present and past.

(23-26) If the opponent affirms all conditions of an act of perception exist when past, it also should be admitted that one perceives the past object with senses that are past. The same point is made concerning conditions of a future act of perception.

(27-28) If he denies one perceives past objects with past senses since they too exist, he must also deny one perceives present objects with present senses. Similarly with respect to future objects and acts of perception.

(29-34) Rejoinder based on the question of whether past and future awarenesses exist. If so, their existence must be analogous to the existence of the present processes of awareness.

(35) The opponent is asked whether the past defilements of a perfected being exist, and replies that they do. Is then the perfected being still attached as a result of his past but still existent attachment? Logically it would seem so, but it cannot be. The argument is repeated for nine other past defilements.

(36-38) The argument is again repeated with respect to the past fetters, defilements and desires of the non-returner, once-returner and stream-enterer.

(39-42) Insofar as the past defilements or fetters exist, the average man must be said to be subject to them at present. This wrongly implies that the perfected being, never-returner, etc., should also be subject to his past but nonetheless existent fetters, etc.

(43-46) If it is impossible for a perfected being, etc., to be subject to defilements that exist for him as past, this should imply the same

for the ordinary person.

(47-49) Do past bodies, their parts and elements exist? If so, they must still be capable of acting and being acted upon.

(50-53) Do past, present and future aggregates exist? If so, there must be fifteen aggregates rather than the five listed by the Buddha. Similarly an excessive number of organs and objects of sense, elements and faculties are implied.

(54) Similar logic implies three wheel-turning kings must exist simultaneously. This cannot be. The same holds for multiple Buddhas existing simultaneously.

(55-58) Having affirmed the past exists, the opponent is asked whether the existent is then past. He responds it may be past and not past. But since the existent is past, substituting terms considered equivalent, this implies the past may be past and not past, a logical fallacy. Similar logic is used with respect to the existence of the future and of *nirvāṇa.*

(59) *Majjhima* III.16ff. = *Saṃyutta* III.47 is quoted in defense of the view that past and future exist.

(60-62) *Saṃyutta* III.71 and IV.52 and *Aṅguttara* I.197 are cited in opposition.

(63) *Saṃyutta* II.101 is then cited in support.

(64) The immediately following passage is taken in opposition.

I.7. Debate over whether one's past consists of aggregates, bases, elements or all three.

(1-2) The opponent argues that to admit that one's past and future consist of aggregates, bases or the like implies the past and future exist. The Sakavādi admits such is their character, but not that they exist.

(3-4) The opponent argues that to admit the present exists and consists of aggregates, etc., implies that the past and future which are similarly constituted also exist.

(5-6) Again if a past or future consisting of aggregates, etc., which does not exist is admitted, it must also be concluded that the present no longer exists.

(7-18) The same argument is repeated substituting numerous specifics.

(19-20) The Sakavādi cites *Saṃyutta* III.71, his opponent *Saṃyutta* III.47 in support of their respective views.

I.8. Controversy over the claim that some of the past and future exists and some does not.

(1-4) The opponent admits that past things, the effects of which have not yet matured, exist. If their effects have matured, past things do not exist. But since the opponent admits that even the former may have ceased, he is refuted as inconsistent.

(5) The opponent argues that since the immature effects of past things will mature, these things may be said to exist. This means that such past things may be said to be present. This logic could lead to the conclusion that present things that will perish are non-existent.

(6-10) The argument is similar to that of 1-5, but is based on the claim that inevitably determined future things exist, while those not inevitably determined do not.

I.9. Controversy over whether the factors are all applications of mindfulness.

(1-9) The debate arises from an ambiguity in the use of the term "application of mindfulness" which can have both a subjective and objective sense. The opponent confuses the two senses of the term, and thus maintains that all factors are applications of mindfulness. In rejoinder it is shown that this confusion results in logical inconsistency.

I.10. The debated point is the claim that things exist one way and not another.

(1-7) The opponent asserts that things exist exclusively as past, present or future at one time. They thus exist one way and not the other. This implies that each of these temporal modes both exists and does not exist, which the opponent has already denied.

(8-12) A similar line of reasoning is followed with respect to the existence of the aggregates.

BOOK II

II.1. A debate concerning seminal emission on the part of perfected beings.

(1-2) The opponent maintains a perfected being can have impure seminal emissions, but denies there is any passion remaining in the perfected being. This is taken to negate the original proposition.

(3) The opponent holds this impurity is imparted by the Māra-gods, yet admits they themselves have no such impurity. Lacking such themselves, how could they impart it to others?

(4) Such impurity is not imparted from the bodies of these gods, from the perfected beings themselves, nor from others—the only possibilities.

(5-6) It is not imparted through the pores of the body. The opponent holds it is imparted to the perfected being in order to cause doubt as to his achievement. If the perfected being is free from doubt, this argument fails. If not, he must be capable of doubt as to the principles of faith as well, which is absurd.

(7-8) The impurity cannot be due to eating or drinking.

(9-13) The Sakavādi argues that if perfected being(s) were capable of impure seminal emissions, it would imply sexual interest and activity on their part. But this cannot be for, as the opponent admits, the perfected being has cut off all desires at their roots, cultivated the factors of enlightenment and realized the final goal.

(14-20) The opponent now limits his claim that perfected beings can have impure seminal emissions. He now holds this is so only for perfected beings who are skillful in their *dharma* but not for those skillful in (an)other *dharma*(s).

(21) The Sakavādi cites *Vinaya* I.295 in rejoinder.

(22) The opponent argues that since the requisites for monastic life (e.g., robes, alms) can be imparted to a perfected being, the same should also be true of the impurity of seminal emission.

(23) In response it is noted that the argument is flawed since not everything can be imparted to a perfected being.

II.2. A controversy over the knowledge possessed by a perfected being.

(1-4) The opponent holds a perfected being may be lacking in knowledge. The Sakavādi takes this as equivalent to a claim that a perfected being may be ignorant. This the opponent denies, although an ordinary man may be both lacking in knowledge and ignorant. The ignorance of an ordinary man may lead him to evil deeds, but the lack of knowledge on the part of a perfected being cannot do the same, maintains the opponent.

(5-10) The opponent holds that although the perfected being may lack knowledge, it is not knowledge of spiritual import (e.g., *dharma*, ethics, causes) that is lacking, although such knowledge may be lacking in the case of the ordinary individual.

(11-16) The opponent's claim that a perfected being may be lacking is limited to the perfected being who is good in his own *dharma*, and does not apply to the perfected being good at (an)other *dharma*(s).

(17-21) In opposition to the view that a perfected being may be lacking in knowledge, *Saṃyutta* II.29, V.434 and IV.17, *Suttanipāta* 231, and *Vinaya* I.97 = *Saṃyutta* IV.47, etc., are cited.

(22) The opponent holds a perfected being can lack knowledge of ordinary things like names or directions.

(23) But since it cannot be said he lacks knowledge of the path, the Sakavādi argues he cannot be said to lack knowledge.

II.3. Controversy over whether a perfected being can have doubts.

(1-19) Repeats the argument of II.2 substituting "doubt" for "lack of knowledge" and "perplexity" for "ignorance".

(20) In rejecting the view that a perfected being can experience doubt, *Vinaya* I.18, *Udāna* 7, and *Dīghanikāya* II.275 are quoted.

II.4. Controversy over whether a perfected being can be excelled by others

(1-19) The argument is similar to that in II.2 and II.3, the opponent holding the affirmative.

(20) In opposition *Suttanipāta* 1064 is quoted.

II.5. The controversy concerns whether a person who is in the first
meditational state utters the word "frustration" on attaining the stage of the stream-enterer.

(1) The opponent affirms this. But since such an utterance is not universal in such cases, his view is rejected.

(2-3) It is further argued that this position cannot be maintained as there is no corresponding bodily expression.

(4-5) Since he says "frustration" having understood frustration, why should he not equally utter names of the other three noble truths which he has also come to understand? That he does so is denied by the opponent.

(6-7) The opponent holds the object of one's insight to be the truth of frustration, and the object of his hearing to be the sound "frustration". For this to be so and the sound articulate would imply a combination of two simultaneous perceptions or moments of awareness—an impossibility.

(8-11) Although affirming the thesis, the opponent denies that one who has meditated on the devices or who practices meditation for mundane reasons can utter an articulate sound. The Sakavādi does not consider these claims reasonable.

(12-13) It is unclear why the possibility is claimed only for one who has attained the first meditational state and not for those in higher meditational states.

(14) The opponent cites the Buddha to the effect that sustained mental application leads to speech. Such application is characteristic of the first meditational state.

(15) This seems to contradict 8-11, as concentration on the devices involves sustained application of mind.

(16) But speech is also caused by identification. But since identification is also present in the higher meditational states, this contradicts 12-13.

(17-19) *Saṃyutta* IV.217 is cited against the opponent's proposition.

(20-22) The opponent cites *Aṅguttara* V.133 in his favor, but this is shown not to apply. He then cites *Aṅguttara* I.227 and *Saṃyutta* I.157.

II.6. Controversy over whether repeating "frustration" plays a role in inducing insight. The opponent claims it does, and thus is part

of the path. This is rejected on the grounds that it wrongly implies that anyone saying the word is following the path.

II.7. Controversy concerning the duration of an awareness.

(1) The opponent holds a single awareness can last a day or longer. This is rejected as implying its constituent moments of arising and cessation can each last half a day or longer.

(2-3) *Aṅguttara* I.10 and *Saṃyutta* II.95 are cited to suggest how quickly awarenesses arise and pass away.

(4) Since the content of an awareness does not endure for a day, the state itself should not be said to do so.

(5) Since apprehension of sounds, smells, sights, etc., involves separate awarenesses, the opponent's view is refuted.

(6) Since movement leads to separate awarenesses, the controverted point is again refuted.

(7-10) The opponent's inconsistency in admitting a single awareness lasts the entire aeons-long lifetime of gods of the sphere of unbounded space, but does not last an entire lifetime for other beings is noted.

II.8. Controversy over whether all conditioned things are no more than an ash-heap.

(1-2) Basing his claim on the Buddha's fire sermon (*Vinaya* I.134) and the doctrine that all conditioned things involve frustration, the opponent holds that without exception they are no better than an ash-heap. In opposition various types of satisfaction are noted.

(3-8) *Saṃyutta* IV.126 and *Aṅguttara* I.286 are cited in support of the affirmative, *Majjhima* I.85 and 92, *Saṃyutta* IV.126, and *Udāna* II.1 in opposition.

II.9. A debate over whether penetration of the path is made in ordered segments.

(1-4) The opponent holds that penetration is achieved gradually, but not that the stages of stream-enterer, once-returner, etc., are each gradually developed.

(5-9) He holds the defilements are given up piecemeal, but not that one can become a partial stream-enterer, etc. The Sakavādi by contrast considers the views that the defilements can be given up piecemeal and that one can become a partial stream-enterer, etc., equivalent.

(10-13) The opponent considers one who is coming to see a stage of the path as practicing it. When he has seen it, he is considered experienced in its fruit. While the opponent admits this of the stages of the path, he will not admit it of the realization of the four truths. The Sakavādi considers this inconsistent.

(14-15) The Sakavādi admits that once the first truth is realized,

the others are also realized. Nonetheless, he rejects the charge that this is equivalent to holding the first truth amounts to the four truths collectively.

(16) He holds the opponent's original proposition wrongly implies multiple fruits corresponding in number to the portions into which the process of spiritual advancement is divided.

(17-18) The opponent supports his thesis by citing *Vinaya* III.303 and *Dhammapada* 239.

(19-20) *Saṃyutta* V.436, *Suttanipāta* 231 and *Vinaya* I.97 = *Saṃyutta* IV.47, etc., are quoted in rejoinder.

II.10. Was the Buddha's worldly speech supramundane?

(1) The opponent holds the affirmative. The rejoinder denies the Buddha's ordinary speech was supramundane on the grounds that it was heard by the mundane ears of ordinary people.

(2) The opponent is asked whether the Buddha's terminology was supramundane—the implication being that he used mundane terminology to speak of spiritual matters.

(3) Since the supramundane is not apprehended by the physical senses, no one could have heard the Buddha's everyday speech if the opponent's thesis were true.

(4-7) His listeners were affected by his everyday speech in ways incompatible with the supramundane nature claimed for it.

(8) The Sakavādi holds that whether the Buddha spoke of worldly or supramundane matters he used the same worldly speech.

(9-11) The opponent now affirms the Buddha's speech is mundane or supramundane depending on its content.

II.11. (1-5) The opponent affirms two kinds of liberation. The rejoinder is that this wrongly implies the duality of the four noble truths and that there are two different liberations. The two kinds of cessation affirmed are the cessation of composite things upon and without calculation. The Sakavādi holds cessation to be one, not two.

BOOK III

III.1. Whether all the powers of the Buddha are also possessed by his leading disciples.

(1-2) The opponent holds the powers of the Buddha are also possessed by his disciples. This should wrongly imply that they are all-knowing as he is.

(3-11) The Sakavādi holds only some of the Buddha's powers are held in common with his disciples. The knowledge of the Buddha concerning causal matters and the like is without limit, that of the disciples limited.

(12-16) That all can share knowledge of the extinction of the

intoxicants is taken to confirm the opponent's proposition. But in rejoinder it is noted that not all share knowledge of the development of the faculties.

III.2. That of the ten powers of knowledge, all are to be considered noble.

(1) The opponent affirms the power to discern causes is noble.

(2-3) This is rejected on the grounds that emptiness (i.e. the *suññatā* of *nibbāna*), the signless and what cannot be desired are not the object of this power.

(4-7) Since the opponent denies that liberation, etc., are objects of the power of a Buddha, it is argued that that power cannot be noble.

(8-12) Repeats the argument with regard to the Buddha's power to see the death and rebirth of beings.

(13) The Sakavādi admits as noble only the power of knowledge of the extinction of the intoxicants.

(14-16) The point of 13 is expressed in negative terms and the argument of 13-14 repeated substituting "knowledge of the three signs as object is noble".

III.3. Concerning liberation.

(1-3) The opponent affirms liberation occurs for mental states associated with attachment. In rejoinder this is taken to mean it is the attached awareness which is emancipated. The opponent's point is, rather, that there is no need for emancipation in the case of the pure awareness.

(4-10) The same point is repeated substituting "hatred" and "delusion" for "attachment".

III.4. Of becoming liberated.

(1-8) The opponent holds becoming liberated is a process. The rejoinder considers this tantamount to a claim that liberation occurs step by step.

III.5. Of the person at the eighth or lowest stage of the path.

(1) The opponent's view is that doubt and wrong views are put behind by an individual on entering the eighth and lowest stage of the path. This is not a claim that from the moment he has entered this stage he is a stream-enterer.

(2-6) The rejoinder holds the proposition implies such an individual has put away the latent bias of doubt and wrong views. This cannot be since such a person has yet to engage in the actual practice of the path he is entering.

(7-11) Though denying the initial proposition, the Sakavādi holds the view that outbursts of doubt and wrong views will no longer occur for one who has entered the eighth stage of the path. The opponent holds the latter claim tantamount to the former.

III.6. Of the faculties of the individual at the eighth or lowest stage of the path.

(1-13) The opponent holds the faculties to be absent in the individual as he enters the path. The rejoinder holds that this is to deny such an individual the faith necessary for him to have entered the path. *Saṃyutta* V.202 is further cited in opposition to the thesis. In contrast, the point of the opponent's proposition is that these faculties are not yet fully developed as one first enters the path.

III.7. Of the higher or divine vision.

(1-4) The opponent holds that fleshly vision becomes the higher or divine vision when it is the medium of a spiritual idea. The rejoinder takes this as equating this fleshly with divine vision, and denying a third type of vision which the Sakavādi calls the vision or eye of wisdom. The Sakavādi cites I.61.

III.8. Of the higher or divine ear.

(1-3) The argument corresponds to III.7.

III.9. Concerning knowledge of destiny (as determined) by karma.

(1-4) The opponent holds that divine vision amounts to knowledge of the passing of beings from one mode of existence to another in accordance with their karma. The point is that inherent in the vision of beings being reborn in accordance with their karma is the explanation of their destiny. In rejoinder this is taken either to imply that such vision involves judgment of such beings, or that what is in fact a single act of consciousness is sequential.

III.10. Concerning moral restraint.

(1-8) The opponent holds there is restraint among certain gods. In rejoinder this is taken to imply its absence among some gods, since for them to refrain from a vice implies they are otherwise capable of such a vice. The opponent responds that if they lack moral restraint, this must mean they are evildoers.

III.11. Concerning (the sphere of) identification.

(1-7) The opponent holds there is identification among beings in the sphere where there is no identification at precisely the moment of death from that sphere or rebirth into it. This is not a claim that such beings identify things during their life in this sphere as the rejoinder suggests.

III.12. Concerning (the sphere of) neither identification nor its reverse.

(1-12) The opponent holds it wrong to say there is identification among beings in the sphere of neither identification nor its reverse. In refutation it is argued that the opponent would not be willing to consider this realm to be comprised only of the material aggregate and to lack the four mental aggregates. In refutation it is further asked

how it can be consistently maintained that there is identification in the realm where there is no identification but not in the realm where there is neither identification nor its opposite.

BOOK IV

IV.1. Concerning whether a layman can be a perfected being.

(1-6) The opponent holds that a layman can become a perfected being. His point is that one living in secular circumstances can attain perfection. The rejoinder assumes that the term "layman" applies not just to the external circumstances of the lay life, but more especially to the fetters binding a layman. Surely one so bound cannot attain perfection.

IV.2. Concerning whether one can become a perfected being at the moment of rebirth.

(1-2) The opponent so affirms, but not that one can become a stream-enterer, once-returner or non-returner at that moment.

(3-4) On questioning he is unable to provide examples.

(5-6) The rejoinder holds that since rebirth occurs as a result of desire the proposition cannot be valid.

IV.3. Concerning the absence of intoxicants (in the case of the perfected being).

(1) The opponent holds that everything about the perfected being or belonging to him is free from the intoxicants. In rejoinder it is noted that only the paths, the fruits of liberation and the factors of enlightenment are free of intoxicants.

(2-8) The perfected being's body and possessions are not.

(9) In response the opponent argues that since the perfected being is free from the intoxicants, so must be everything connected with him.

V.4. Concerning endowment.

(1-24) The opponent holds that past spiritual achievements are retained permanently, that is that they are carried on as one rises to higher spiritual states. The rejoinder is that they are transcended, as nothing is permanent.

IV.5. Concerning endowment with equanimity.

(1-4) The opponent holds the perfected being is endowed with sixfold equanimity. The rejoinder understands this to imply he experiences six states of equanimity simultaneously, which is not the opponent's point.

IV.6. That one becomes (the) Buddha through enlightenment.

(1-10) The debate hinges on an ambiguity in Pāli, the opponent taking the position that one becomes enlightened through enlightenment, the rejoinder assuming this to be a claim that one becomes

the Buddha through enlightenment.

IV.7. That one gifted with the characteristic marks is destined for enlightenment.

(1-6) The opponent holds that one possessed of the 32 characteristic marks is a *bodhisatta*. This is based on an interpretation of *Dīgha* III.145 where it is stated that "two careers are open" to the individual thus endowed. The rejoinder points out that this interpretation wrongly identifies the universal king as a *bodhisatta*, and seems to imply that one possessed of some of the characteristic marks is a partial *bodhisatta*.

IV.8. On entering fixedness on the path.

(1-6) The opponent holds that the *bodhisatta* actually entered the path of fixedness (i.e. the path of the stream-winner, etc.) when the Buddha Kāśyapa assured him of his future enlightenment. The rejoinder sees the Buddha Kāśyapa's fixedness merely as a prophecy concerning the future.

(7-8) He cites *Vinaya* I.91 = *Majjhima* I.171 = *Therīgāthā* 129.15 and *Saṃyutta* V.422 in the rejoinder.

IV.9. Further debate on endowments.

(1-24) The opponent holds that a person striving to attain perfection permanently holds the three fruitions as acquired qualities. The argument largely repeats that of IV.7.

IV.10. That putting off all the fetters is tantamount to perfection.

(1-5) The opponent holds that perfection is the putting off of all fetters. His point is merely that all fetters have been put off by the perfected being. The rejoinder, however, takes him to mean that they are put off simultaneously with the achievement of perfection, which is to be denied.

BOOK V

V.1. Concerning liberation.

(1-4) The opponent holds knowledge of liberation to have the quality of liberation. The rejoinder considers this statement too general as only knowledge of deliverance as the fruit of tranquilization has this quality.

V.2. Concerning the insight of the adept, i.e. one beyond learning.

(1-4) The opponent holds a disciple (or learner) has knowledge of an adept. The point is that a disciple is supposed to recognize what makes one an adept. The rejoinder, however, takes the proposition to imply the disciple has the same insight as the adept, which of course is to be denied.

V.3. Concerning perverted awareness in meditation.

(1-8) The opponent holds that awareness is perverted in the case

of one who has attained a meditative state through use of a symbolic device. His point is that he sees one thing (the actual device) and becomes conscious of another (an idea). The rejoinder holds this is not really a perversion of awareness. For there to be such would require that permanence be seen where there is none.

V.4. Concerning fixedness.

(1-7) The opponent holds that in one not yet possessed of fixedness on the path, there is knowledge requisite for going on to fixedness. The rejoinder takes this as a claim that only the ordinary individual not yet engaged on the path is capable of developing knowledge necessary to assure achievement of the goal. The point of the thesis, rather, is that even in one not yet fixed in his pursuit of the path the possibility of developing the knowledge necessary for success may nonetheless exist.

V.5. Concerning discrimination.

(1-3) The opponent asserts that in the case of the spiritual adept all knowledge is discrimination. The debate turns on an ambiguity of terminology. While the opponent intends the term *ñāṇa* to mean "(transcendental) knowledge", the rejoinder takes the thesis as a more general claim concerning all awareness. In this latter interpretation the thesis would imply that even conventional knowledge is transcendental.

V.6. Concerning conventional knowledge.

(1-3) The opponent holds the object of conventional knowledge to be truth. The rejoinder, wishing to distinguish between (conventional) truth and (ultimate) truth, rejects the thesis for failing to avoid the implication—which the opponent rejects—that the (ultimate) truth is the sole object of conventional knowledge.

V.7. Concerning knowledge of the awareness of others.

(1-4) The opponent holds that knowledge of the consciousness of another—one of the six higher powers—has no object beyond (that) awareness. His point is that the only object of such insight is the state of consciousness of the other, that is, what is in his mind. The thesis is rejected as a claim that what is known is the psychological complex we know as awareness.

V.8. Concerning knowledge of the future.

(1-4) The opponent holds that knowledge of the future is possible. This is a claim that certain future events can be seen, not as the rejoinder understands it, that every element in the chain of future events can be known.

V.9. Concerning present knowledge.

(1-2) The opponent holds possible knowledge of the present as a whole. The rejoinder considers this impossible for it would involve an endless regression in which present knowledge of the present

becomes the object of present knowledge in the present and so forth.

V.10. Concerning knowledge of fruition.

(1-5) The opponent holds a disciple can have knowledge of the attainment of spiritual fruition by another. The point is that he can teach that a particular person has attained such spiritual fruits. The rejoinder rejects the thesis as a claim the disciple actually understands that person's knowledge.

BOOK VI

VI.1. Concerning whether fixedness is unconditioned.

(1-6) The opponent holds fixedness on the path to be unconditioned. The intent is to maintain that once one is fixed on the path so as to assure its fruition, the nature of this fixedness is such that it cannot cease. The objection is that to use the term "unconditioned" to refer to fixedness in this way wrongly makes fixedness equivalent to liberation.

VI.2. Concerning dependent origination.

(1-7) The opponent holds the causal links in the chain of dependent origination to be unconditioned, citing S II.25 in his support. The rejoinder is as in VI.1.

VI.3. Concerning the four noble truths.

(1-6) The opponent, citing *Saṃyutta* V.430, holds the four noble truths to be unconditioned. The rejoinder is as in VI.1.

VI.4. Concerning the immaterial.

(1-4) Citing *Aṅguttara* II.184, the opponent holds the sphere of infinite space to be unconditioned. The rejoinder is as in VI.1.

VI.5. Concerning the attainment of cessation.

(1-5) The opponent holds the attainment of cessation to be unconditioned. In part the rejoinder follows VI.1. The objection further holds the fact one can enter and emerge from the state of cessation precludes its being considered unconditioned.

VI.6. Concerning space.

(1-5) The opponent holds space to be unconditioned. The rejoinder begins as in VI.1. Evidence against the thesis includes the fact that one can make space where there has been none, that movement through space is possible, and that space can be enclosed.

VI.7. Concerning whether space is visible.

(1-3) The opponent holds space is visible, as the interval between two objects can be "seen". The rejoinder is based on the view that visibility implies an object which is visible.

VI.8-10. Concerning the four elements, the five sense faculties, and bodily action.

(1-9) The opponent holds each of these to be visible. The argument

parallels that of VI.7.

BOOK VII

VII.1. Concerning the grouped.

(1-8) The opponent holds that factors cannot be grouped together by means of ideas. The point is that the factors are brought together in the physical sense. In rejecting this thesis, the rejoinder uses the terms "group" in the sense of "classify".

VII.2. Concerning whether factors are connected with one another.

(1-2) The opponent holds that factors are not connected with one another, by which he means that they do not literally pervade one another. The rejoinder holds they are connected with one another, by which he means that they can be associated with one another.

VII.3. Concerning properties of awareness.

(1-5) The opponent holds that properties of awareness do not exist as things. The position of the rejoinder is that the term *cetasika* refers to mental properties or states of mind, which may properly be said to exist.

VII.4. Concerning giving of a gift.

(1-7) The opponent holds that terms *dāna* refers not to the material gift but to the will to surrender it. That is, he considers giving a mental state. In contrast, the rejoinder recognizes the use of the term in both a mental and a material sense.

VII.5. Concerning whether merit increases with enjoyment.

(1-7) The opponent holds that merit increases with enjoyment, that is that the merit accruing from a gift increases with its use. The rejoinder rejects this view for it could imply that one continues to gain merit for an act of which one is no longer conscious, or for an act performed with unwholesome thoughts. In rejecting the thesis, *Aṅguttara* II.50 is cited, while *Saṃyutta* I.33 is quoted in its defense.

VII.6. Concerning what is given here.

(1-4) The opponent holds that what is given here (i.e. in this life) sustains elsewhere (i.e. in the afterworld of the hungry ghosts). This is rejected as implying the actual gifts are enjoyed in the afterlife, or that what is experienced by one individual is caused by another. The opponent's point is, rather, that when an individual does an act in one life, he may experience its fruits in a future rebirth. *Khuddakapāṭha* 6 and *Aṅguttara* III.43 are cited in support of the thesis.

VII.7. Concerning the earth and the maturation of karma.

(1-7) The opponent holds that the earth is a result of action. The point is that some obtain dominion or ownership over land as a result of their action. In rejecting the thesis, the point of the rejoinder is to maintain the maturations of actions take the form of subjective experiences. Further, the earth is experienced in common with

others, while the same could not be said of the results of an individual's karma.

VII.8. Whether decay and death are the result of karma.

(1-6) The opponent holds old age and death to be maturations of karma. The argument is largely as in VII.7, the point of the rejoinder again being that the term "maturation" refers only to the subjective experiences resulting from action.

VII.9. Concerning whether the factors of the noble or spiritual adept have maturations.

(1-6) The opponent holds that the factors of the noble have no positive results, for they do not lead to further rebirth. The opposing view stresses in rejoinder that the career of the noble person produces great rewards, namely the fruits of the path, as its maturation.

VII.10. Whether a maturation is a factor resulting in factors.

(1-5) The opponent holds that a maturation is a factor resulting in further factors, that is that a maturation in turn is the cause of further maturation. The rejoinder considers this view to lead to an endless cycle of maturation entailing maturation which in turn would rule out the possibility of ending existence and attaining liberation.

BOOK VIII

VIII.1. Concerning courses of existence.

(1-5) The opponent holds that there are six courses of existence or possible realms of rebirth, the sixth being birth in the realm of demons. The Sakavādi recognizes only five courses of existence: godly, human, animal, ghost and hellish.

VIII.2. Whether there is an intermediate state of existence.

(1-13) The opponent posits an intermediate state of existence during the interim between the death of an individual and his rebirth in the succeeding life. This is to allow for time for the requisite conditions for conception to arise. The rejoinder notes that the Buddha allowed for the existence of only three states of becoming—the realm of desire, the realm of matter, and the immaterial realm—thus excluding the possibility of an intermediate state. Moreover, the existence of cases of immediate retribution is taken as evidence against the intermediate state.

VIII.3. Concerning the constituents of sensuality.

(1-5) The opponent holds the term *kāmadhātu* ("sensuous world") refers only to the five constituents of sensuality. The rejoinder notes that the sensuous world also involves mind and external organs of sense. Further the term refers to a realm of beings to which action leads.

VIII.4. Concerning sense-desire.

(1-3) The opponent holds the term *kāma* refers only to the five constituents of sensuality. The Sakavādi, to the contrary, holds these are not to be termed *kāma*, but that the term *kāma* refers rather to the subjective experience of desire.

VIII.5. Concerning the realm of matter.

(1-2) The opponent holds the term *rūpadhātu* (realm of matter) to refer to material qualities only. He is criticized for limiting the meaning of the term too far, for the term should refer to every aspect of the material realm.

VIII.6. Concerning the immaterial realm.

(1-2) The opponent holds the term *arūpadhātu* (immaterial sphere) to refer to the immaterial sphere as a realm of existence only. The objection to this is that this overly limits the meaning so as not to include such mental aspects of this sphere as feeling.

VIII.7. Concerning the sense bases in the material sphere.

(1-14) The opponent asserts that beings in the material sphere have all six senses. This is rejected as implying the existence of objects to stimulate these senses in this sphere.

VIII.8. Concerning matter in the immaterial sphere.

(1-5) The opponent holds that there is matter even in the immaterial sphere. Although the reference is to a subtle, refined matter, this is rejected as a logical contradiction.

VIII.9. Concerning whether matter is action.

(1-39) The opponent holds that matter is karma, that the matter involved in physical and vocal action is of ethical import. Two points are involved: (a) bodily and vocal action are material, and (b) matter may be said to be good or bad. The rejoinder is to stress that karma is defined as will. The physical involvement of body and voice only follows upon the act of having willed. *Aṅguttara* III.415, *Aṅguttara* II.157ff. = *Saṃyutta* II.39ff., *Majjhima* III.209, etc., are cited in support of the rejoinder.

VIII.10. Concerning vitality.

(1-11) The opponent holds that there is nothing material in vitality, that vitality is a wholly psychological phenomenon. The rejoinder holds that this implies the impossibility of life in organic phenomena, for these are material.

VIII.11. Concerning karma as cause.

(1-3) The opponent holds that a perfected being can fall away from perfection as a result of karma, specifically as a result of making malicious accusations against a perfected being in a previous life. The orthodox position considers this idea absurd.

BOOK IX

IX.1. On seeing what is commendable.

(1-4) The opponent holds the fetters are put off only by one who discerns liberation as commendable. The rejoinder notes that the fetters are also put off by those who discern the unsatisfactoriness and impermanence of the conditioned world.

IX.2. Concerning the deathless as a supporting object.

(1-7) The opponent holds that the deathless state as an object of thought is a fetter. The objection is that the deathless state is in fact accompanied not by the fetters, but by their opposites.

IX.3. Whether matter is considered a "co-supporting object".

(1-4) The opponent holds that matter should be considered a co-condition for the working of the mind. The objection holds this wrongly would imply that matter has mental features.

IX.4. Whether intoxicants are without supporting objects.

(1-10) The opponent maintains that intoxicants lack a corresponding mental object. For example, a latent bias to evil may exist even in one thinking moral thoughts. If this were so, it would mean that all manifestations of sensual desire would be without mental objects. Moreover, the relationship of the intoxicants to the mental aggregates further suggests the invalidity of the opponent's thesis, for the mental aggregates are not without mental objects.

IX.5. Whether knowledge is objectless.

(1-5) The opponent maintains that the knowledge belonging to the perfected being may lack a mental object. When his senses are occupied with a visual object, for example, his knowledge is objectless. The rejoinder largely follows that of IX.4.

IX.6-7. Of past and future mental objects.

(1-5) The opponent holds that awareness of past or future ideas lacks a mental object. The rejoinder finds this view self-contradictory.

IX.8. On what is affected by initial thought.

(1-4) The opponent holds that all awareness is affected by initial thought. The point is that any awareness can be an object of initial thought. In the rejoinder it is argued that some awarenesses arise independent of prior thought, and thus that the thesis is to be rejected.

IX.9. Of sound as the diffusion of initial thought.

(1-2) The opponent holds that sound is the diffusion of initial thought. His point is that thought produces speech. If sound were merely the diffusion of thought, argues the rejoinder, each mental process would produce its own characteristic sound.

IX.10. That speech does not conform to awareness.

(1-5) The opponent maintains that speech does not conform to awareness, that is that one can speak without thinking or talk about something other than is on one's mind. This is rejected as wrongly

implying there is no connection possible between speech and awareness.

IX.11. That action does not conform to awareness.

(1-5) The debate is as in IX.10.

IX.12. Concerning past, future and present.

(1-7) The opponent argues that past and future experiences can be possessed in the present by one who can induce the meditative states. This contradicts the orthodox understanding of the past as come to an end and the future as not yet come into being.

BOOK X

X.1. Concerning cessation.

(1-4) The opponent maintains that before one congeries of five aggregates ceases, five karmically functional aggregates arise. This is rejected as implying the existence of ten aggregates simultaneously rather than the five posited by the Buddha.

X.2. Whether the path is material.

(1-8) The opponent holds that the (eight-)limbed path is a path with physical form, that is that right speech, right action and right livelihood are material and, hence, that the body of one practicing the path is included in the path. The rejoinder denies that the three aspects of the path mentioned are material, hence rejecting the thesis.

X.3. Concerning the path and fivefold consciousness.

(1-4) The opponent holds that one can be practicing the path while enjoying the five types of sense-consciousness. This cannot be, goes the rejoinder, because sense-consciousness is worldly.

X.4. Whether the fivefold consciousness is good or bad.

(1-4) The opponent holds that the five kinds of sense-consciousness are morally good or bad. The argument follows that of X.3.

X.5. Concerning co-ideation.

(1-4) The opponent holds that the fivefold sense-consciousness is co-ideational. The argument is as in X.3.

X.6. Concerning double morality.

(1-7) The opponent holds that an individual engaged in pursuit of the path is practicing at once a worldly and an other-worldly morality. The rejoinder is based on the understanding that this would wrongly imply the simultaneous existence of two sets of mental processes.

X.7. Whether morality is not a property of awareness.

(1-11) The opponent holds that morality is not a property of awareness. The point is to affirm that the virtue of an act continues to exist after it has passed from mind. The rejoinder argues that to hold this thesis wrongly implies morality is either material, liberation

a sense organ, or a sense object. The argument parallels that of VII.4.

X.8. That morality is not connected with awareness.

(1-8) The argument is as in X.7.

X.9. Concerning attitude as cause.

(1-4) The opponent holds that virtuous attitude is the cause of virtue. The argument is as at VII.5.

X.10 Whether what makes itself manifest is moral.

(1-2) The opponent holds that acts of manifestation are moral, that is that they have a moral quality. The rejoinder argues that manifestation is physical and morality is not, thus contradicting the opponent's thesis.

X.11. Whether nonmanifestation is immoral..

(1-4) The opponent holds that acts which do not intimate a moral thought behind themselves are immoral. The rejoinder notes that immoral acts themselves are manifest.

BOOK XI

XI.1. Three points about intoxicants.

(1-20) The opponent holds that intoxicants are morally neutral, without root conditions, and independent of awareness. The rejoinder notes that the intoxicants cannot be identified with any of the morally neutral ultimates. Further it cannot be shown that these intoxicants are different from the corresponding fetters which are immoral. The argument continues as in IX.4.

XI.2. Of knowledge.

(1-3) The opponent holds that an individual who has overcome spiritual ignorance cannot be said to have knowledge at the same time as he has mundane thoughts. The rejoinder is based on the understanding that to overcome ignorance means to have knowledge.

XI.3. Whether knowledge is conjoined with mundane consciousness.

(1-5) The opponent holds that knowledge is not conjoined with mundane consciousness. If this were true, goes the rejoinder, knowledge would be identifiable with liberation, matter, sense-organs, sense objects, or the like.

XI.4. Of the utterance "This is frustrating".

(1-7) The opponent holds that knowledge of the nature of frustration arises at the same time in the individual who at the moment of entering the path utters the phrase: "This is frustrating." He is found inconsistent in not admitting the development of knowledge in one who utters the other truths under such circumstances.

XI.5. Of the force of supernatural power.

(1-7) The opponent holds that one possessed of supernatural

power can live an entire *kalpa*. The rejoinder argues that such power can only avert an untimely death, not prolong one's life-span unnaturally.

XI.6. Concerning concentration.

(1-4) The opponent holds that continuity in the flow of awareness constitutes concentration. The rejoinder considers concentration to be confined to a momentary unit of awareness.

XI.7. Concerning the establishing of causes and effects.

(1-2) The opponent holds that the establishment of causes and effects is predetermined. The objection is that this would result in an endless chain of causes rendering the attainment of liberation impossible.

XI.8. Concerning impermanence.

(1-5) The opponent holds that impermanence is predetermined. The objection is again that this would result in an endless regression.

BOOK XII

XII.1. Whether restraint is karma (i.e. morally effective action).

(1-3) The opponent holds that both mental self-restraint and the lack thereof are karmically efficacious. The objection is that the opponent's refusal to apply the thesis to the other senses is inconsistent. The rejoinder stresses that karma is will.

XII.2. Concerning action.

(1-3) The opponent holds that all action has maturation. In support he cites *Aṅguttara* V.292ff. The objection is that the thesis is unqualified, implying that both inoperative and neutral volitions produce karmic effects.

XII.3. Whether sound is a karmic maturation.

(1-3) The opponent holds that sound is a result of karma. The thesis is based on scriptural passages indicating that the quality of a person's voice is a karmic reward. The objection is that the term "maturation" refers to psychological states only.

XII.4. Concerning the sense-organs.

(1-4) The opponent holds that the sense-organs are the result of karma. The argument is as at XII.3.

XII.5. Concerning (rebirth) seven times at the most.

(1-6) The opponent holds that an individual who is said to be liable to seven more rebirths at the most becomes subjectively assured of final liberation only at the culmination of the seven. The objection is that such a person may achieve the goal in less than the maximum.

XII.6. Of the individual passing from one noble family to another (from "clan-to-clan").

(1) The previous argument is continued with reference to the

clan-to-clan individual that is one of the three kinds of stream-enterer.

Of the single-seeder.

(2) Further continuation as in XII.5. (The Nalanda edition numbers this separately as XII.7.)

XII.7. Of deprivation of life.

(1-5) The opponent holds that an individual possessed of accomplishment in views can deprive a creature intentionally of life. The objection is that the thesis implies such an individual is capable of matricide, patricide, arhaticide, etc.

XII.8. Concerning woeful destiny.

(1-5) The opponent holds that for an individual accomplished in views the possibility of woeful destiny is eliminated although he may experience desire for objects or creatures in such courses of existence. The Sakavādi to the contrary holds that one at the stage of accomplishment in views is still subject to sense desires of a sort which may lead to rebirth in a woeful course.

XII.9. Concerning the individual who has reached the seventh rebirth. The argument is as at XII.8.

BOOK XIII

XIII.1. Of staying there for an aeon (*kalpa*).

(1-3) The opponent holds that an individual doomed to aeon-long retribution must endure it for an entire aeon. The Sakavādi holds such retribution to last only for the duration of the current aeon.

XIII.2. Of the acquisition of goodness.

(1-2) The opponent holds that an individual doomed for an aeon cannot acquire good awareness. The rejoinder is based on the view that such an individual is capable of mundane goodness.

XIII.3. Concerning what is immediately applied.

(1-3) The opponent holds that an individual who has instigated a crime resulting in immediate retribution cannot enter the path to enlightenment. The Sakavādi, however, holds that if the instigator reforms before the commission of the act it may be possible for him to enter the true path.

XIII.4. Concerning the way of assurance.

(1-2) The opponent holds that he who is fixed enters the way of assurance. The objection is that one can be equally fixed in assurance of immediate retribution.

XIII.5. Concerning one who is hemmed in.

(1-3) The opponent holds that only one who is hemmed in by an obstacle can overcome it. The objection is that the thesis implies the simultaneous presence and absence of defilements such as hatred

and the like.

XIII.6. Of one who is face to face.

The opponent holds that a fetter is cast off by one who is face to face with it. The argument is as at XIII.5.

XIII.7. Whether having attained a meditative state one enjoys it.

(1-3) The opponent holds that one who has attained a meditative state enjoys it. The objection is that this implies that the meditative state is an end in itself, rather than merely a means to the goal.

XIII.8. Of attachment to the disagreeable.

(1-3) The opponent holds that one can experience attachment for what is disagreeable, basing this view on an interpretation of *Majjhima* I.266. The objection finds the thesis self-contradictory.

XIII.9. That craving for factors is morally neutral.

(1-5) The opponent holds that craving for objects of the mind is morally indeterminate. The objection is that there is no basis for distinguishing between this and other craving which is immoral.

XIII.10. That craving for *dharmas* is not a cause of frustration.

(1-5) The argument is as at XIII.9.

BOOK XIV

XIV.1. Concerning the relinking of the good and bad.

(1-7) The opponent holds that the root of good awareness can link directly to the root of bad awareness, and conversely. For example, good and bad thoughts can occur consecutively. The objection is that this implies good awareness can follow upon bad and conversely without an intervening change of mind.

XIV.2. Of the origin of the sense-organs.

(1-3) The opponent holds that the six sense-organs originate at the moment of conception. The Sakavādi maintains, to the contrary, that only the mind and the organ of touch originate at the moment of conception, the others developing over time.

XIV.3. Concerning proximity condition.

(1-5) The opponent holds that one sensation follows another in immediate proximity. The rejoinder is similar to XIV.1.

XIV.4. Of noble matter.

(1-3) The opponent holds that the noble forms of speech and action, as material qualities, are derived from the primary material elements. Objection is that such speech and action are moral, rather than amoral as are the primary material elements.

XIV.5. Of contaminant as other.

(1-8) The opponent holds that a being afflicted by a contaminant is different from actually being possessed by the contaminant; that is, that the bias is different from the actual manifestation. The

objection is that this wrongly implies that an actual but unmanifest contaminant is also different in kind from the open manifestation of that contaminant.

XIV.6. Whether outbursts are unconscious.

(1) The opponent holds that passionate outbursts are not associated with awareness. The objection holds that this wrongly classes them as nonmental.

XIV.7. Concerning what is included.

(1-5) The opponent holds that desires for the material and the immaterial realms crop up and are included in those realms. The argument is based on an analogy to the sensual realm. The Sakavādi, however, holds that such desires are limited to the sensual realm.

XIV.8. Concerning what is neutral.

(1-5) The opponent holds that speculation is neutral. By this he means that speculation concerning matters upon which the Buddha did not pass judgment is morally neutral. The thesis is rejected as a claim that speculation is morally neutral.

XIV.9. Concerning the unincluded.

(1-2) The opponent holds that speculation is to be found in the unincluded. The objection is that the term "unincluded" is limited to the experiences appropriate to the path and to liberation.

BOOK XV

XV.1. Of causal conditionhood.

(1-8) The opponent holds that only one kind of causal relation can exist between two phenomena. Thus, a phenomenon related to another as moral cause or as its object cannot be related to it through contiguity or immediate succession. The rejoinder gives counter-examples of multiple relationships of other sorts.

XV.2. Of reciprocal relation.

(1-4) The opponent holds that a reciprocal causal relationship does not exist between ignorance and action. The objection is that since action and ignorance can coexist, the relationship between them is reciprocal.

XV.3. Concerning duration.

(1-6) The opponent holds that duration is predetermined, which the Sakavādi denies.

XV.4. Concerning moments, instants and seconds.

The opponent holds that moments, instants and seconds are predetermined. The Sakavādi denies it.

XV.5. Concerning the intoxicants.

The opponent holds that four intoxicants are free from intoxicants. The objection is that the intoxicants *per se* are not included in the

category of nonintoxicants.

XV.6. Concerning decay and death.

The opponent holds that the decay and death of higher- worldly factors is itself higher-worldly. The objection is that there are but nine higher-worldly factors (i.e. four paths, four fruits and liberation), and higher-worldly *per se* is not one of them.

XV.7-8. Concerning the experience of identification.

The opponent holds that to attain cessation of the experience of identification is higher-worldly. The reply is that it is mundane. The argument is as at XV.5 and 6.

XV.9. A third argument concerning the experience of identification.

(1-5) The opponent holds that having entered the state of the cessation of the experience of identification one may die. The objection is that the mental symptoms of death and its accompanying states are absent in such a state, and that the causes of violent death cannot affect the body of an individual therein.

XV.10. Concerning attaining rebirth in the sphere of unconscious being.

(1-4) The opponent holds that attainment of the cessation of the experience of identification leads to rebirth in the sphere of unconscious being. The objection is that one can experience the cessation of identification without attaining the moral conditions necessary for rebirth in the sphere of unconscious being.

XV.11. Of action and its accumulation.

(1-6) The opponent holds that karma is one thing and its accumulation another. The objection is that karma and its accumulation are conjoined, as are feeling, identification, mindfulness, etc., and their respective accumulation. Where there is karma, its accumulation begins; where it stops, its accumulation ceases.

BOOK XVI

XVI.1. Concerning influencing awareness.

(1-4) The opponent holds that one who has power and authority can influence the awareness of another. The objection is that this implies the possibility of external control of one's attitudes, emotions, will or the like. The rejoinder cites *Dhammapada* 164.

XVI.2. Concerning operating another's awareness.

The opponent holds that one can operate the mind of another. The argument is as at XVI.1.

XVI.3. Concerning giving another satisfaction.

(1-3) The opponent holds that an individual can give satisfaction to another. He cites *Majjhima* I.447. The objection is that one

doesn't give away happiness in the same sense as a gift is given.

XVI.4. Concerning excelling attention.

(1-5) The opponent holds that we can attend to all things at once. The reference is to such generalizations as: "All things are impermanent". The objection is that we attend to things in any given moment as exclusively past, present or future, and not all at once. Moreover, we aren't attentive to the process of attention at the moment of that attention.

XVI.5. Concerning matter as cause.

(1-4) The opponent holds that material qualities can be causes, that is that the four primary material qualities condition secondary qualities. The objection takes the term "cause" (*hetu*) in its special sense as a reference to one of the causes of moral or immoral conduct.

XVI.6. Concerning matter and concomitant cause.

(1-4) The opponent holds that material qualities are accompanied by a cause. The argument is as at XVI.5.

XVI.7. Concerning matter as good or bad.

(1-7) The opponent holds that matter is morally good or bad. His point is that the physical motions involved in action are moral or immoral. The objection is that unlike the moral conditions, matter does not have a mental aspect.

XVI.8. Concerning matter as maturation.

(1-3) The opponent holds that matter is a maturation of action. The rejoinder insists on maintaining the subjective or psychological nature of the results of action.

XVI.9. Concerning matter in the material and the immaterial realms.

(1-3) The opponent holds that there is matter of the realm of matter and matter of the immaterial realm, that is matter which is due to actions done in these two spheres. The objection sees the thesis as a claim that there is matter in these two realms.

XVI.10. Concerning what is included in the material and immaterial elements.

(1-7) The opponent holds that attachment to matter in the sensuous realm is included among the elements of this realm. The argument is similar to XVI.9.

BOOK XVII

XVII.1. Concerning a perfected being accumulating merit.

(1-4) The opponent holds that a perfected being can accumulate merit, that is that he can perform merit accumulating acts. The objection is that this thesis wrongly implies a perfected being can build up further karma.

XVII.2. Whether a perfected being can suffer an untimely death.

(1-5) The opponent holds that since a perfected being must experience the results of all his past karma before death, he cannot die an untimely death. The rejoinder notes the possibility that a perfected being can be murdered, and considers that this would be an untimely death.

XVII.3. That all this is from karma.

(1-4) On the basis of *Suttanipāta* 654 the opponent holds that all this is due to karma. The objection is that this implies karma itself is a karmic result and hence that one can commit crimes as a result of previous karma.

XVII.4. On being bound up with the faculties.

(1-4) The opponent holds that frustration is bound up with the faculties. The objection is that this implies that only what is bound up with sentience is impermanent, and thus that some frustration is not bound up with the other faculties.

XVII.5. On the omission of the noble path.

(1-4) The opponent holds that with the exception of the noble path all remaining conditionings are frustrating. The noble path is excepted as leading to the cessation of frustration. The objection is that the thesis leads to the conclusion that the origin of frustration (i.e., the second noble truth) is also frustration (i.e., the first noble truth), thus reducing the noble truths to three in number.

XVII.6. That it ought not be said the monastic order accepts gifts.

(1-5) The opponent holds that it ought not be said that the monastic order accepts gifts. The thesis is based on the assumption that the term *saṅgha* refers to the paths and their function.

XVII.7. That it ought not be said the monastic order sanctifies gifts.

(1-4) The argument is as at XVII.6.

XVII.8. That it ought not be said that the monastic order enjoys (lit. "eats", *bhuñjati*).

(1-4) The argument is as at XVII.6.

XVII.9. That it ought not be said that what is given to the monastic order has great fruit.

(1-4) The argument is similar to XVII.6.

XVII.10. That it ought not be said that what is given to the Buddha has great fruit.

(1-3) The opponent holds that what is given to the Buddha is not really helpful, as he is beyond earthly enjoyment. The objection is that since he is the supreme field of merit, gifts to the Buddha do bear great fruit.

XVII.11. Concerning the sanctification of a gift.

(1-4) The opponent holds a gift is sanctified by the donor but not by the recipient. The objection is that since there is greater merit

in giving a gift to a more worthy field of merit, the recipient must also be a factor in the sanctification of the gift.

BOOK XVIII

XVIII.1. Concerning the world of men.

(1-4) The opponent holds it ought not be said that the Buddha lived in the world of men. The thesis is based on the *sūtra* that says the Buddha was not defiled by the world (*Saṃyutta* III.140).

XVIII.2. Concerning exposition of the *dharma*.

The opponent holds it ought not be said that the Buddha himself taught the *dharma*, but that it was taught by his magical creation.

XVIII.3. Concerning compassion.

(1-5) The opponent holds that the Buddha felt no compassion, since he had conquered his attachment. The objection is that the thesis implies the Buddha was ruthless.

XVIII.4. Concerning odors.

(1-2) The opponent holds that the fragrance of even the Buddha's excrement surpassed that of all other things. The rejoinder holds that had this been true, some would have used the Buddha's excrement for perfume.

XVIII.5. Concerning the one path.

(1-5) The opponent holds that the four fruits of the religious life are realized by pursuit of a single path. The objection considers the paths of stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner and perfected being separate and distinct.

XVIII.6. Concerning passing over from one state of meditation to another.

(1-8) The opponent holds that the passage from one state of meditation to another is immediate. The objection is that the thesis seems to deny that any additional mental process is necessary to lead to the second state of meditation from the first.

XVIII.7. Concerning the interval between meditative states.

(1-9) The opponent holds that concentration accompanied by sustained thought without initial thought constitutes an intermediate stage between the first and second meditative states. The objection considers it inconsistent to posit any intermediate state of awareness between only the first two states of absorption. Further, as but one of three types of concentration spoken of by the Buddha, concentration accompanied by sustained thought without initial thought should not be singled out from the others as the thesis does.

XVIII.8. Concerning whether one hears sound.

(1-3) The opponent holds that one who has attained meditation continues to hear sound, because the Buddha said that sound is a

thorn for the first meditative state. The objection is that the opponent is inconsistent in not allowing the other senses to operate in the first meditative state, and in failing to deal analogously with the "thorns" of the other meditative states.

XVIII.9. Concerning whether one sees matter with the eye.

(1-5) The opponent holds that one sees matter with the eye. The objection is that one sees with visual consciousness, rather than with the material eye.

BOOK XIX

XIX.1. On leaving behind the defilements.

(1-4) The opponent holds that one can leave behind past, present and future defilements. The objection is that the thesis implies that we can dismiss both what has already ceased and what has not yet come to be.

XIX.2. Concerning voidness.

(1-5) The opponent holds that voidness is included in the aggregate of conditionings. For the fourth aggregate to involve the void, goes the objection, would be to deny its impermanence. Moreover, it would lead to the inclusion of the voidness of the other aggregates under the fourth aggregate.

XIX.3. Concerning the fruit of monkhood.

(1-5) The opponent holds that the fruit of monkhood is unconditioned. The argument is similar to VI.1.

XIX.4. Concerning attainment.

(1-7) The opponent holds that attainment is unconditioned. The argument is similar to VI.1.

XIX.5. Concerning suchness.

(1-4) The opponent holds that the suchness of all factors is unconditioned. The argument is similar to VI.1, XIX.6.

XIX.6. Concerning the morally good.

The opponent holds that the sphere or element of liberation is good (i.e. faultless). The objection is that unlike liberation morally good states have mental objects and produce karmic results.

XIX.7. Concerning final fixedness.

(1-8) The opponent holds that the ordinary person can possess final fixedness. The objection notes that an ordinary person can commit heinous crimes, harbor doubts or adopt annihilationist views, none of which is possible for one possessed of final fixedness.

XIX.8. Concerning the faculties.

(1-7) The opponent holds that the five spiritual faculties are not worldly. The objection is that there can be faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom (i.e. the five spiritual faculties) with

reference to worldly matters. Further the thesis is inconsistent in not treating the sixth mental sense analogously.

BOOK XX

XX.1. Concerning what is unintentional.

(1-9) The opponent holds that the five gravest transgressions (matricide, patricide, etc.) involve immediate retribution even when committed unintentionally. This thesis aims at stressing the seriousness of such acts even if unintentional. The rejoinder notes the lack of scriptural warrant and the inconsistency in denying that unintentionality is a mitigating circumstance only in the case of these five offences.

XX.2. Concerning knowledge.

(1-3) The opponent holds that there can be no knowledge in the case of an ordinary person. The debate results from the opponent's failure to distinguish between "knowledge" in the sense of "worldly knowledge" and in the sense of "spiritual insight". The thesis denies knowledge in the latter sense to the ordinary individual. The objection allows knowledge in the former sense to such a person.

XX.3. Concerning guardians in hell.

(1-5) The opponent holds that there are no guardians to inflict punishment in hell. The objection is that since there is punishment in hell, a class of punishers is necessary.

XX.4. Concerning animals.

(1-3) The opponent holds that beings can be born in the heavens as animals. The case of Eravana, the elephant, is cited as proof. The objection is that the thesis wrongly confuses the animal and heavenly realms.

XX.5. Concerning the path.

(1-6) The opponent holds that the noble path is fivefold only. Right speech, action and livelihood are not counted as limbs of the path because they are not states of awareness, as are the other limbs, and on the basis of a proof-text which suggests that one who is already pure in action, speech and livelihood can go on to pursue the path. Objection is based on numerous scriptural references to the path as eightfold.

XX.6. Concerning insight knowledge.

(1-2) The opponent holds that higher-worldly knowledge has a twelvefold base. *Vinaya* I.96ff. is cited as evidence. The objection is that this wrongly implies that each of the paths and fruits is also twelvefold.

BOOK XXI

XXI.1. Concerning the teaching.

(1-3) The opponent holds that the teaching has been made new, that is, reformed. The objection is that this implies it was possible to improve upon the Buddha's message.

XXI.2. Concerning one who is not separated.

(1-3) The opponent holds that an ordinary person is not separated from factors of the three worlds. The point is that since he cannot tell which world his actions will lead to, he cannot be held incapable of actions leading to any of the three worlds. The objection is that the thesis implies an ordinary person can experience factors in all three worlds simultaneously.

XXI.3. Concerning fetters.

(1-3) The opponent holds that there is attainment of perfected being without eliminating a certain fetter, namely ignorance. His point is that the perfected being lacks the complete knowledge of the Buddha. The objection is based on a different listing of fetters not including lack of total knowledge.

XXI.4. Concerning supernatural power.

(1-5) The opponent holds that either a Buddha or his disciple has the power to do what he wills. The case of Pilindavaccha is cited as evidence. The rejoinder points to numerous wishes which such powers could not fulfill, a wish for perpetual moonlight to give but one example.

XXI.5. Concerning Buddha.

The opponent holds that there are differences among Buddhas. The Sakavādi objects that in essential matters such as enlightenment there is no differenee. The only differences are in such accidental characteristics as age and physical appearance.

XXI.6. Concerning all directions.

(1-2) The opponent holds that the Buddhas abide in all directions. The objection is that Sākyamuni, the historical Buddha, does not persist in all directions, nor can a separate Buddha be identified for each direction.

XXI.7. Concerning factors.

(1-4) The opponent holds that all *dharmas* are fixed in their fundamental nature. The rejoinder takes the thesis as a claim that all factors are to be classed among those things resulting in assured fixed retribution.

XXI.8. Concerning karma.

(1-4) The opponent holds that all karma is fixed, that is that one type of karma cannot be converted into another. The objection is as in XXI.7.

BOOK XXII

XXII.1. Concerning final liberation.

The opponent holds that final liberation can be obtained without eliminating a certain fetter. The dialogue is as at XVI.3.

XXII.2. Concerning good awareness.

(1-3) The opponent holds that there is good awareness in a perfected being when he attains final release. The objection is that good awareness inevitably involves karmic consequences.

XXII.3. Concerning unchangeableness.

(1-4) The opponent holds that a perfected being is in a state of unchangeableness when he attains final release. The objection is that the perfected being's final awareness is an ordinary though karmically inoperative consciousness.

XXII.4. Concerning realization of the *dharma*.

(1-3) The opponent holds that an embryo is capable of realizing the *dharma*. The objection is that a perfected being is incapable of hearing and paying attention to the doctrine.

XXII.5. Three similar arguments. (The Nalanda edition numbers these separately.)

The argument of XXII.4 is repeated with reference to: (a) attainment of perfection by an embryo, (b) realization of the truth by a dreamer and (c) attainment of perfection by a dreamer.

XXII.6. Concerning the karmically neutral.

(1-2) The opponent holds that all states of dream-awareness are karmically neutral. The objection is that in his dreams an individual can commit serious offences.

XXII.7. Concerning repetition as condition.

The opponent holds there is no condition by way of repetition. The rejoinder cites *Aṅguttara* IV.247 and *Saṃyutta* V.54.

XXII.8. Concerning what is momentary.

The opponent holds that all *dharmas* persist for but a single moment of awareness. The point is to stress their mutability and impermanence. The rejoinder notes the existence of such concrete things as mountains and trees that persist for longer than a single unit of awareness.

BOOK XXIII

XXIII.1. Concerning single intention.

The opponent holds that sexual intercourse can be entered into with single intention. The objection is that the thesis does not discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate circumstances.

XXIII.2. Concerning apparent perfected beings.

The opponent holds that nonhuman beings with the appearance

of perfected beings may engage in sexual intercourse. The objection is that the thesis appears to limit their possible offences to this one from among many.

XXIII.3. Concerning one who governs himself according to his own inclination. (The Nalanda edition numbers this as XXIII.3-6.)

The opponent holds that a *bodhisattva* of his own free will can (a) enter a hellish state, (b) enter a womb, (c) perform difficult tasks, (d) perform acts of penance. In each case the Sakavādi denies what the opponent says.

XXIII.4. Concerning what is fitting.

The opponent holds that there can be the appearance of attachment, hate, delusion or the defilements without these actually existing. The Sakavādi denies this.

XXIII.5 Concerning what is not predetermined.

The opponent holds that the aggregates, elements, faculties—all save frustration—are not predetermined. The objection is that all these are impermanent and, as such, characterized by frustration.

9

MAHĀNIDDESA

Summary by Grace G. Burford

The *Mahāniddesa* is an Abhidharma-style commentary on the *Aṭṭhakavagga* of the *Suttanipāta*. Its structure is determined by that of the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, which it follows closely by *sutta* and verse. (The *Aṭṭhakavagga* consists of verses 766-975 of the *Suttanipāta* and is divided into sixteen *suttas*.) Along with the *Cūḷaniddesa*, which comments on portions of the *Pārāyanavagga* of the *Suttanipāta*, the *Mahāniddesa* constitutes the eleventh text of the Pali canon's *Khuddakanikāya*. The *Niddesa* is the only explicitly commentarial text included in the Pali canon. Reflecting this unusual status, although most of the canonical texts are regarded as the Buddha's words (*buddhavacana*), the *Niddesa* is attributed by the Theravāda tradition to the Buddha's leading disciple, Sāriputta. As a commentary the *Niddesa* is quite old, while as a canonical text it is relatively late. Thus it provides a valuable glimpse into a crucial time within the historical development of Theravāda Buddhist thought—a time when Abhidharma types of analysis were being developed and were taking hold within the Buddhist traditions.

Scholars have paid very little attention to the *Mahāniddesa* itself. Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike have used it primarily as a reference work for interpreting the *Aṭṭhakavagga*. Buddhaghoṣa utilized it in writing his *Suttanipāta* commentary, the *Paramatthajotikā* II. Modern scholars tend to consult it on difficult *Aṭṭhakavagga* passages and point out its divergence from the original text's intent on passages that are easier to interpret. The *Mahāniddesa*'s peculiar style encourages this rather piecemeal use; it is considerably more difficult to read on its own than other Theravāda commentaries. The bulk of it is hardly prose at all, consisting as it does of lists of synonyms (glosses, Pali: *niddesa*, Sanskrit: *nirdeśa*) for particular words in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* verses. Although its repetitious application of these strings of synonyms gives the impression that the *Mahāniddesa* offers a simplistic and rather tedious commentary on an exciting, beautifully

poetic work, a closer examination reveals that this admittedly dry text achieves a wide range of creative complexity within its standardized glossing form. Due to its peculiar style and commentarial structure, I shall offer a general description of this voluminous text, rather than a summary that follows the order of the text itself.

References throughout are to the Pali Text Society edition: *Mahāniddesa*, edited by L. de la Vallee Poussin and E.J. Thomas, 2 parts (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press for the Pali Text Society, 1916-17; reprint edited in one volume, London: Pali Text Society, 1978). The text has not been translated.

The *Mahāniddesa*'s comments on the occurrences of the terms "*suddhi*" ("purity") and "*santi*" ("peace") in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* exemplify the range of commentarial innovation exhibited by this text within the limits of the glossing format. At one exteme, the *Mahāniddesa* has *subbi-* for *suddhi-* at 910, which is a scribal rather than a doctrinal divergence. On the same level, by glossing the phrase "*passāmi suddhaṃ*" ("I see the purified") with: "*passāmi suddhaṃ, dakkhāmi suddhaṃ, olokemi suddhaṃ, nijjhāyāmi suddhaṃ, upaparikkhāmi suddhaṃ*" the gloss on 788 reveals nothing new about the term *suddha*.

At the simplest level of actual commentary, the *Mahāniddesa* begins to supplement the *Aṭṭhakavagga*'s terms with vocabulary of its own by offering strings of synonyms that begin with a word from the *Aṭṭhakavagga* but often conclude with terms far removed from that original word. The *Mahāniddesa* usually has more than one of these stock definitions for any one term, and its application of one or the other in particular instances can further indicate its underlying interpretation of the passages in question. The *Mahāniddesa* employs two strings of synonyms for "*suddhi*": (1) "*suddhi, visuddhi, parisuddhi, vodāta, pariyodāta*" and (2) "*suddhi, visuddhi, parisuddhi, mutti, vimutti, parimutti*". In seven instances the glosses of "*suddhi*" consist entirely of one or the other of these two formulas.

At the next level of increasing commentarial innovation, many glosses utilize one of the stock synonym strings as the basis for a slightly more complex explanation. Often the text builds on the basic formula by compounding the synonyms with other terms. For example, the gloss on 891 defines *suddhi* as: "*suddhimagga, visuddhimagga, parisuddhimagga, vodātamagga, pariyodātamagga*". In this way the text extends the connotation of "purity" (*suddhi*) in this particular context to include the path to purity.

At an even higher level of innovative complexity, the *Mahāniddesa* begins many glosses with a standard formula and then introduces an explanatory passage that, unlike the synonym strings, consists entirely of material external to the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, having no particular

term connecting it directly with that original text. Further, the *Mahāniddesa* utilizes these passages themselves as stock expositions, to be plugged into explanations as they are needed. For example, the gloss on 824 begins by defining "*suddhi*" with the "*suddhi... parimutti*" list and then it explains the phrase "*Idh'eva suddhi iti*" ("Just this is purity") with a passage that the *Mahāniddesa* will use repeatedly in other contexts. This passage enumerates ten statements that deluded persons proclaim as the only truth, including opinions concerning the nature of the world (as eternal, ephemeral, finite, infinite), of the soul/life-principle (as identical to the body or other than the body), and of the ultimate fate of the Buddha (after death the Buddha is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not). These are, of course, the famous metaphysical issues. Other Pali texts depict the Buddha as refusing to explain.

In another example of this relatively complex level of commentarial creativity, the comment on the second line of 824 develops the meaning of *suddhi* in a slightly different way. The line in question states that nonideal persons do not say *visuddhi* is in other *dharmas*. The *Mahāniddesa* paraphrases it as follows:

> Having set aside [i.e. excepting] their own teacher, *dharma*-preaching, group, view, way, path, they disparage [etc.] all other dogmas (thus): "that teacher is not omniscient, *dharma* is not well-taught, group is not well-practised, view is not good, way is not well-attained, path is not leading-out; there is neither *suddhi* nor *visuddhi* . . . nor *parimutti*) from (i.e. because of) that; low, inferior (etc.) (persons) are not purified (*sujjhanti*, ... *parimuccanti*) from that", thus they say, preach [etc.].

This gloss includes the second stock definition of *suddhi*, but it also offers a more innovative illustration of the term in the 'That teacher is not omniscient . . . path is not leading-out' statement. Since this gloss utilizes more than a simple string of synonyms and since, in turn, the commentary applies this more creative passage repeatedly in a variety of settings, this comment provides another example of an innovative explanation used by the *Mahāniddesa* in a set manner.

Another type of complex glossing explanation that incorporates a stereotypical string of synonyms is illustrated by the gloss of "*santi*" (peace) compounded with "*pada*" in 915 as:

> *Santi* is, in one aspect, peace, the state of peace (*santipada*), that deathless *nibbāna* which is quieting of all conditionings, eradication of all limitations (*upādhi*), destruction of thirst, dispassion, cessation, *nibbāna*.

As the phrase "in one aspect" implies, there is more to this definition. A quotation from another (Pali Buddhist) text follows. Here, and in all similar instances, the *Mahāniddesa* introduces the quotation with the phrase "Thus it was spoken by the Bhagavant" (*vuttaṃ h' etaṃ bhagavatā*). (The editors of the Pali Text Society edition have located the sources of most of these passages and they provide cross-references in the notes.) The quotation concludes with a string of synonyms for "*santi*" which relates loosely to the "first aspect" of this gloss, namely "the state of (*-pada*) peace (*santi-*), shelter (*tāna-*), protection (*leṇa-*), refuge (*saraṇa-*), the fearless (*abhaya-*), the eternal (*accuta-*), the deathless (*amata-*), *nibbāna-*". We find this string of synonyms in the *Mahāniddessa*'s gloss of "*santi*" in 845, as well.

The gloss on 784, which verse contains the first instance of the term "*santi*" in the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, exemplifies the *Mahāniddesa*'s highest level of innovation. This line presents a challenge to the word-by-word commentator because while overall the *Aṭṭhakavagga* treats *santi* as an undeniably ideal condition, this line implies that in some cases it can be less than ideal:

> Of whom there are designed, defined,
> preferred, unclean *dharmas*,
> What good result he sees in himself,
> he is dependent on that *santi*-with-unsteady-basis.

The *Mahāniddesa* reconciles this somewhat derogatory use of the term "*santi*" with *Aṭṭhakavagga*'s usual unmitigated praise for *santi* by delineating three *santis*: (1) "*accantasanti*, that deathless liberation which is the quietening of all conditionings, eradication of all limitations, destruction of thirst, nonattachment, cessation, *nibbāna*" (as in the "first aspect" of the verse 915 gloss of *santi* mentioned above); (2) *tadaṅgasanti*, the calming of a series of negative factors at the eight successive levels of concentration-meditative attainment; and (3) *sammutisanti*, the sixty-two false views (*diṭṭhigata*)" (the text does not enumerate these). Here the *Mahāniddesa*, by attributing secondary and tertiary meaning to one word, explains the *Aṭṭhakavagga* verse on two levels. On the level of the individual term "*santi*", this gloss reflects a complexity inherent in the original text's vocabulary. But it goes beyond the obvious implication in this particular line that sometimes calm is not dependable. In connecting the idea of an unsteady calm with elaborate descriptions of three types of calm (from the most to the least valuable), the commentary elucidates the meaning of the entire verse.

It seems clear that the gist of the *Mahāniddesa*'s comment is that the *dharmas* referred to in the first two lines of this verse are the sixty-two false views and a calm based on self-perceived accomplishment in these is a calm with unsteady basis. Thus in this instance the commentary introduces elaborate schemes that are foreign to the original text, but the interpretation seems closer to the original significance of the verse than a stereotypical string of synonyms for the isolated word "*santi*" would be.

The *Mahāniddesa* has various ways of applying and building on the basic formulas it uses. It will often apply one stereotypical string of synonyms and/or one stock passage in defining more than one word. For instance, we find the "*tāna, leṇa, saraṇa, accuta, amata, nibbāna*" formula that the *Mahāniddesa* used to explain "*santi*" in 915 and 845 as the gloss of *khema* in 896. The gloss at 809 combines that formula with the "deathless *nibbāna*, ... cessation, *nibbāna*" passage to define *khema*, as well.

In the case of some words, the *Mahāniddesa* reiterates a stock definition verbatim every time it explains the term. Yet such definitions can be quite complex. The *Mahāniddesa* treats the term "*muni*" this way. Since this stock gloss exemplifies the stylistic and doctrinal complexity of the *Mahāniddesa*'s commentarial analysis at its best, it will be useful to present a summary of it here. This exposition begins with a formulaic definition of sagacity (*mona*) as that awareness (*ñāna*) which is:

> wisdom, knowledge, investigation, investigation into *dharma*, discernment, discrimination, erudition, proficiency, skill, criticism, thought, examination, understanding, intelligence, leading to (insight), insight, comprehension, goad? (Pali *patodo*), wisdom, wisdom-faculty, wisdom-power, art of wisdom, palace of wisdom, light of wisdom, splendor of wisdom, lustre of wisdom, jewel of wisdom, nondelusion, investigation into *dharma*, right-view.

The gloss explains that one endowed with this awareness, attained to silence, is a sage (*muni*). Next the commentary delineates aspects or types of sagacity (*moneyya*): of body, speech and mind. Bodily sagacity consists of:

> abandoning of both the three kinds of body misbehavior and the three kinds of body right-behavior; knowledge, comprehension of body; the path having comprehension; abandoning of desire and passion for the body; cessation of body-conditionings and attainment of the fourth concentration-meditative state (*jhāna*).

Sagacity of speech is basically the same formula, substituting "speech" for "body" and second concentration-meditative state for the fourth. The definition of mental sagacity follows the same pattern, using "mind" instead of "body" or "speech" with reference to the misbehavior and right-behavior, "thought" with the remaining phrases, and ending with "attainment of cessation of identification and feeling".

Next the gloss quotes *Itivuttaka* III, II, VI and VII, which adds that the sage is without intoxicants and is called "one having abandoned all" and "one cleansed of evil". Reverting to its own material, the commentary lists and defines six types of sage, all of whom are endowed with these three factors of sageliness:

> householder sages (householders having visible signs of having known the teaching), non-householder sages (ones gone forth having visible signs of having known the teaching), trainee sages (the seven trainees), non-trainee sages (*arahant*), individual sages (*paccekabuddhas*), and sages' sages (*tathāgatas*, *arahants*, *sammāsambuddhas*).

Then the gloss cites, first, *Dhammapada* 268-69 to the effect that it is not silence (*mona*) that makes one a sage, but rather wise taking up of right (*varam*) and avoiding of evils (*pāpāni*) in the world, and second, *Suttanipāta* 527 which attributes becoming a sage to knowledge of what is and is not, of what is inner and outer in the world, and to having passed beyond the snare of attachment.

Thus this one stock definition, reiterated by the *Mahāniddesa* every time "*muni*" occurs in *Aṭṭhakavagga*, includes a string of synonyms for the sagacity a sage has attained; a description of three aspects of sagacity; three quotations from other Pali texts to illustrate the meaning of the term; and its own list of six types of sages. It draws on a plethora of terms and categories entirely foreign to the *Aṭṭhakavagga*: the faculties; powers; three kinds of right behavior (and three of wrong) specifically with reference to body, speech, and mind; the idea of path; conditionings; the four concentration-meditative states and the four higher concentration-meditative states; intoxicants; distinctions among householders and nonhouseholders and the seven trainees and perfected beings; those enlightened for themselves (*paccekabuddhas*) and those rightly enlightened (*sammāsambuddhas*); perfected beings; and *tathāgatas*. Finally, it couples a later *Suttanipāta* description of knowledge that has a definite metaphysical ring to it (knowledge of what is and is not, is inner and outer in the world)—far beyond the scope of the *Aṭṭhakavagga*'s

epistemological vocabulary—with that original text's typical, simple depiction of the ideal as having passed beyond attachment.

In its explanations of the *Aṭṭhakavagga*'s words and phrases, the *Mahāniddesa* reveals the ways in which the Theravāda tradition had developed between the time of the early texts and the time when the canon was nearing completion. In contrast with the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, the *Mahāniddesa* utilizes vocabulary with reference to the goal, ideal persons, and ethical prescriptions that appears to have been introduced, developed, and standardized in the period between the two texts, such as (deathless) liberation, cessation, nonattachment, noble, stream-enterer . . . perfected being (the four paths and four fruits), *dharma*, those enlightened for themselves, enlightened disciples, those rightly enlightened, *tathāgatas*, ignorance, thirst, wrong views, moral precepts and vows, defilements, conditionings, limitations, and the five constituents of desire. In addition, the commentary reveals a much more developed metaphysical-cosmological scheme, as it couches its interpretations in terms of birth, lineage, rebirth, birth, old age and death, self-nature, elements, faculties, and occasionally aggregates. As for the practice, the *Aṭṭhakavagga*'s relatively simple prescriptions to do good, avoid evil, and refrain from criticizing and arguing with others, are fully elaborated by the *Mahāniddesa*. The commentary speaks of a clearly delineated path (*patha, mārga*), from an impure, nonideal state (*saṃsāra*) characterized by frustration and death, through various meditative states and accomplishments (the concentration-meditative states, cessation of identification and feeling, mindfulness, and insight), to that deathless liberation which is the quietening of all conditionings, eradication of all limitations, destruction of thirst, nonattachment, cessation, liberation. This latter formula epitomizes the doctrinal transformation of the Theravāda during the canonical period, as we find no part of it in the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, and yet it is all standard Theravāda doctrine, clearly well developed and familiar by the time of the writing of the *Mahāniddesa*.

The *Mahāniddesa* offers a developed conceptual scheme that reflects the teachings of the Theravāda Buddhism of its own time, rather than the teachings of the *Aṭṭhakavagga* itself. The explanations that purport to render a vague idea more accurate, or a loose description precise, tend to alter the original teaching somewhat. In some respects, the *Mahāniddesa* is quite consistent with the *Aṭṭhakavagga*—for example, it retains the treatment of the ideal goal as entirely anthropocentric. But in other cases disagreements either between the original text and the accepted developed teachings of the *Mahāniddesa*'s time or between particular verses in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* itself, force the commentary to alter the original teaching quite radically.

Both of these types of modifications of the connotation of *Aṭṭhakavagga* verses provide fascinating material to the historian of religion. By examining particular instances of this common commentarial phenomenon, one can trace the development of religious tradition. The *Mahāniddesa* reveals the doctrinal history of the Theravāda as it expands earlier, simpler ideas into complex metaphysical hierarchies of epistemology, ontology, and soteriology. It also must resolve certain ambiguities and outright conflicts in the original text, precisely because the *Aṭṭhakavagga* is identified as the very words of the Buddha.

The glossing method of textual exposition ideally presents one consistent definition for each occurrence of a word or phrase in a text, regardless of the term's various conceptual contexts within that text. At the same time, a gloss, no matter how stereotypical, remains a kind of commentary; it purports to explain a text and cannot do so accurately if it ignores shifts in the basic meaning of particular words or phrases. Thus the *Mahāniddesa* also introduces complex conceptual hierarchies as a means of resolving problematic differences within the *Aṭṭhakavagga* itself. For instance, in its innovative definition of "*santi*" as three types of peace (see above re: *santi* at 784), the *Mahāniddesa* explains why the *Aṭṭhakavagga* sometimes regards *santi* as a positive trait or accomplishment and at other times it clearly denounces it. It gives similar treatment to instances within the *Aṭṭhakavagga*'s criticisms of selfishly defending one's own opinion or view, wherein words for knowledge and teaching are used in an unusual derogatory sense.

The overall impact of the *Mahāniddesa* is to bring the *Aṭṭhakavagga* into line with late canonical Theravāda Buddhism. It interprets that early text in a manner consistent with the highly elaborate *abhidharma* categories and hierarchies of its own era. Remarkably, it does this within the confines of a rather limited commentarial format: the gloss. While it is by no means the only example of early Theravāda Buddhist *abhidharma*, its focus on one particular early Buddhist text renders it a valuable tool in tracing the doctrinal development of early Buddhism. This value is increased by the fact that—as a canonical text itself—there is a major post-canonical commentary on it, the *Saddhammapajjotikā*. Combined with Buddhaghoṣa's commentary on the *Suttanipāta*, the *Saddhammapajjotikā* provides a third valuable layer of literary source mateial for tracing this doctrinal history.

10

CŪḶANIDDESA

Summary by Grace G. Burford

The *Cūḷaniddesa* is most easily characterized as the canonical commentary on the *Pārāyanavagga*, the fifth *vagga* of the *Suttanipāta*. Yet the structure of the *Cūḷaniddesa* is somewhat more complex than that of its companion the *Mahāniddesa*, reflecting more obviously the composite nature of the *Suttanipāta*. The core of the *Pārāyanavagga* consists of sixteen sets of questions posed by sixteen sages, and the Buddha's replies to them. These appear as *suttas* nos. 2-17 in the text, with *suttas* no. 1 and no. 18 serving as an introduction and conclusion which provide a frame story for the questions and answers. The *Cūḷaniddesa* begins with the first *sutta*, but it simply reiterates these verses without comment. It then gives a full commentary on the remaining *suttas*, including the final one. But it doesn't stop there. Rather, it concludes with a commentary on the third *sutta* of the first *vagga* of the *Suttanipāta*, the traditionally admired *Khaggavisāṇa* (Rhinoceros-horn) *sutta*.

The *Cūḷaniddesa*, like the *Mahāniddesa*, consists of formulaic definitions and explanations (glosses, Pali: *niddesa*; Skt. *nirdeśa*) of words and phrases in the original text. The version of the *Cūḷaniddesa* that has been reasonably accessible to scholars in the West for some time directly reflects the rather piecemeal nature of this type of commentary. This Pali Text Society edition (W. Stede, editor, London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1918) is not the usual straightforward edition based on manuscripts. Stede has modified the arrangement of the *Cūḷaniddesa*, presenting its individual glosses in dictionary form.

In doing so, Stede has provided the potential student of the *Suttanipāta* and the *Cūḷaniddesa* with an edition that facilitates a terminological analysis of these texts. Yet certain aspects of his explanation for modifying the arrangement of this text tend to undermine our confidence that he has presented the text *merely* rearranged, and such confidence must be inviolable if we are to utilize

his analysis and not be forced to repeat it ourselves from the manuscripts.

His statements that throw this procedure into question are of two sorts. First, he justifies his reworking of the text by saying that:

> In reality the exposition is not an organic structure, but only an aggregate of disconnected pieces or atoms—each of them representing a stereotype phrase which serves for the word or words not only in this special setting, but in any setting. (p. ix)

We have seen that this is not strictly true with reference to the *Mahāniddesa*, as the variations among the glosses for individual terms reveal a great deal about the particular instances of them *in situ*. Although Stede's arrangement of them does not necessarily preclude recognition of such variations in the *Cūḷaniddesa*, it is certainly not legitimate to use this rearranged version of the *Cūḷaniddesa*—as Stede suggests—as "a sort of passage-index" to the *Mahāniddesa*. For if there is no variation among the *Cūḷaniddesa* glosses, they cannot accurately reflect the *Mahāniddesa* glosses; and if there is such variation, knowledge of the specific locations of the terms being variously explained in either the *Aṭṭhakavagga* or the *Pārāyanavagga* would be crucial to interpreting them.

Stede also makes the general observation that all commentarial explanations are stereotypical and, consequently, he aims

> to one day reduce the whole of our explanatory matter (and I daresay a good deal of our text-matter as well) to its simplest form, its nucleus, and trace it back to its common source. (p. x)

Putting his specific observation about the *Cūḷaniddesa* together with this claim concerning the commentaries in general, Stede concludes that the *Cūḷanidessa* fits nicely into his scheme for analyzing the Pali Buddhist literature, as the real value of its glosses

> lies by no means in their "speciality", i.e. being an explanation of the passage to which they are appended, but rather in their "generality", as being part of a greater commentary-whole, bricks in a larger building, to the reconstruction of which the new arrangement will help contribute. (p. x)

The second sort of statement that could lead one to doubt the precise faithfulness of this edition to the original text is epitomized by Stede's asseration:

> Thus its setting into the modern form is, I believe, in no way an impairment of its character; it only exchanges its Eastern garb for a Western one, and gains in its value as analysis ("exposition") by a further improvement of it. (p. x)

Any serious textual scholar should beware of previous attempts, no matter how scholarly, to "improve" a text, especially when that improvement is presented as an analytical substitute for a basic edition of the text.

If we can rely on Stede's analysis—and there is no obvious reason to suspect it, aside from the ideological comments in his methodological introduction—he has indeed done us a great service. As he claims, Stede's rearrangement of the text facilitates the identification of the abbreviated "*pe*" passages so common in Pali texts. In such passages, a long or complex formulaic explanation is referred to by the first word or phrase in it, followed by the "etc." device. Often the full version of the passage can only be found at far remove from the "*pe*" passage at hand. This rearrangement also aids the study of Buddhist philosophical terminology. This latter benefit is quite welcome, as this text represents an early stage in the development of Buddhist Abhidharma terminology. Still, it would be better if we had a true edition of the text for the sake of comparing particular passages. Without such an edition, some uncertainty must remain as to whether Stede has overlooked minor glossing variations in the hope of reconstructing his commentarial building with uniformly made bricks. Perhaps the Pali Text Society has not yet reprinted this edition, although it did reprint the *Mahāniddesa* edition in 1978, because it recognizes the need for an edition of this text in a more conventional format.

Despite Stede's efforts to improve on the *Cūḷaniddesa*, it seems to have been largely ignored by scholars of Pali texts in general. This is reflected in (and no doubt abetted by) the fact that this edition is fairly difficult to obtain, at least in the West. The Pali Text Society no longer sells it. In my experience, the only accessible copy in the U.S. is the rather decrepit one (thus not to be photocopied) held by the Library of Congress.

Until a critical edition in a more traditional form is published, we must set aside our potential doubts about Stede's reworking of the text and use it to consider the philosophical content of the *Cūḷaniddesa*. Stede's edition facilitates this process greatly, whether one wishes to examine the definitions of the terms in particular verses, or the collected explanations of specific terms. This is because he first presents the *Cūḷaniddesa* in its original order, but without any of the actual glosses. For each verse he gives, rather, a list of the

terms the *Cūḷaniddesa* explains and a number referring the reader to the location of their explanations in the Explanatory Matter or "dictionary" that constitutes the second portion of the edition.

The *Cūḷaniddesa*, like the *Mahāniddesa*, uses a variety of explanatory formulas in a variety of ways. On the basis of the somewhat piecemeal 'reading' of these formulas one can get from Stede's edition, his observation that the philosophical content of the *Cūḷaniddesa* does not differ from that of the *Mahāniddesa* in any significant way seems justified. The *Cūḷaniddesa* reveals the same kind of developed Theravāda soteriological, ontological, and epistemological conceptual schemes that the *Mahāniddesa* presents. It, too, utilizes many of the terms and formulas of the later tradition in explicating the earlier text.

A comparison of the relationship between these two *Niddesas* and the texts they comment upon does lead to an interesting conclusion, but not one concerning the commentaries themselves. It seems clear that, while there is no great divergence between the two *Niddesas*, the philosophical and doctrinal differences between the *Cūḷaniddesa* and the *Pārāyanavagga* are not nearly as radical as those between the *Mahāniddesa* and the *Aṭṭhakavagga*. This indicates that the *Pārāyanavagga* is somewhat closer to the later tradition, especially in terms of its soteriology and metaphysics, than is the *Aṭṭhakavagga*. Thus the *Cūḷaniddesa* in some instances does not need to alter the original teaching a great deal in order to explain particular ideas or descriptions.

The *Pārāyanavagga* is undoubtedly much closer to the point in the evolution of the tradition represented by the *Aṭṭhakavagga* than to the later, fully developed tradition of the *Niddesas*. It never uses the basic *abhidharmic* terms or classifications that are so standardized by the time of the *Niddesas*: nobles, stream-enterer . . . perfected being, the three types of enlightened ones, wrong views, precepts and vows, defilements, conditionings, constituents of desire, rebirth, self-nature, elements, faculties, *saṃsāra*. But its use of certain terms that the *Niddesas* and other later Theravāda texts utilize frequently—such as "*dharma*", "enlightened one", "*tathāgata*", "ignorance", "thirst", "*upādhi*", "birth and old age", "path", and "frustration"—indicate that it is at least slightly closer to the later text's Abhidharmic view of reality than is the *Aṭṭhakavagga*.

ŚĀRIPUTRĀBHIDHARMAŚĀSTRA

Summary by Shingyo Yoshimoto

The extant text of this work is in Chinese translation: *She-li-fu-a-p'i-t'an-lun* by Dharmayasas and Dharmagupta (Taisho No. 1584, vol. 28, pp. 525-719). A Japanese translation of the Chinese is available by Baiyu Watanabe, Kokuyaku-issai-kyo, Bidonbu vol. 19 and 22 (Daizo-shuppan).

This text is one of the oldest Abhidharma texts in India. It presents a complete outline of Abhidharma thought in the early period of Buddhism before it had split into several sects. Little is known of the history of the Abhidharma thought in this period.

This text has some common contents and thought with *Vibhaṅga* and *Prakaraṇapāda*. Perhaps the root of this text may be the text of the Vibhajyavādins before it split into Theravāda, Kāśyapīya, Mahīśāsaka, and so on. But the dominant view about the school of this extant text is that it may have belonged to the Dharmaguptaka.[1] The *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* is a work in four sections called *Sapraśnaka* (with questions), *Apraśnaka* (without question); *Saṃyuktasaṃgraha* (conjoined and inclusion), and *Nidāna* (source).

SECTION ONE: WITH QUESTIONS
Chapter One: Senses

I. Classification of Spheres and Definitions of Them (525c1-526c20)

1. The inner six senses

(a) The eye-senses

The eye-organ, the eye component; various pure forms belonging to the self, seeing the visible objects, coming of the light. The same rule correspondingly applies to the following:

(b) The ear-senses

(c) The nose-senses

(d) The tongue-senses

(e) The body-senses
(f) The mind-senses

The mental faculty, the aggregate of consciousnesses, and various consciousnesses.

(1) The definition of six groups of consciousness.
(2) The definition of seven elements of consciousness.
(3) The definition of other modes of consciousness (e.g., the consciousness, past, future, present, and so on)

2. The outer six senses
(a) The visible senses.

The visible and reacting objects which are perceived by the eye-consciousness. The same rule correspondingly applies to the following:

(b) The sound-senses
(c) The odor-senses
(d) The taste-senses
(e) The tangible senses
(f) The factor senses.

The factor senses: the aggregate of feeling, identification, and of conditioning factors, invisible objects, nonreacting objects, and nonconditioned factors.

II. Several Classifications of Twelve Senses in the Abhidharmic Manner (526c21-534b3)

The senses as mentioned above are further classified into two types, three types and four types in the so-called Abhidharmic manner.

In this text, 36 kinds of senses are classified: the material or immaterial senses, visible or invisible, resisting or unresisting, noble or ignoble, pure or impure, and so on. Five kinds of senses in three types: good, bad, or neutral, etc. Two kinds of senses in four types: past, present, future, or atemporal.

In these classifications, the first, among the 12 material and immaterial, is as follows:

How many senses are material and how many are immaterial? Ten are material, one is immaterial, and one is both material and immaterial. Which are ten material senses? They are the eye-sense, ear-sense, nose-sense, tongue-sense, body-sense, matter, sound smell, taste and tangibles.

Which one is immaterial? It is the mind-sense. Which one is both material and immaterial? It is the factor sense. Which is a material or immaterial sense?...

Chapter Two: Elements

I. Classification of (Eighteen) Elements and Definitions of Them (534b9-535a18)

1. The visual element
2. The auditory element
3. The olfactory element
4. The gustatory element
5. The body element
6. The material element
7. The sound element
8. The smell element
9. The taste element
10. The tangible element
11. The visual consciousness element
12. The auditory consciousness element
13. The olfactory consciousness element
14. The gustatory consciousness element
15. The bodily consciousness element
16. The mental element

The mind which arose, arises, will arise, and is uncertain to arise by knowing, thinking of, and remembering of the phenomena is explained.

17. The mental consciousness element

The consciousness similar to and closed to its objects, and the mind similar to other objects, arose, arises, will arise, and is uncertain to arise.

18. The factor element

The definition of it is the same with the factor sense.

II. Several Classifications of Eighteen Elements in the Abhidharmic Manner (535a19-542c28)

The several concepts of elements as mentioned above are further classified in two types, three types and four types in the Abhidharmic manner.

Chapter Three: Aggregates

I. Classification of Aggregates and Definitions of Them (543a5-545c10)

1. The Material Aggregate

(a) The form factors, ten spheres with materiality (the eye-spheres, ear, nose, tongue, body, visible, sound, odor, taste, tangible) and the form included in the factor sense (karma, bodily and

word, unmanifest without moral precepts, etc.).

(b) The four great elements, e.g., earth, water, fire and air, and the derivative matter from the four great elements. The manner of the definition is the same as that of the material factors.

(c) Three aspects of materiality

(1) Visible and reacting objects

(2) Invisible and reacting objects

(3) Neither visible nor reacting objects

(d) The variety of materiality: past, future, present, inner, outer, and etc.

2. The Aggregate of Feelings

This is grouped under several classifications as follows:

(a) One kind of feeling: the feeling accompanying mental factors.

(b) Two kinds of feeling: bodily and mental.

(c) Three kinds of feeling: satisfying, frustrating and neither.

(d) Four kinds of feeling: the feeling (1) belonging to the realm of desire, (2) belonging to the realm of form, and (3) belonging to both of them, (4) not belonging to both of them.

(e) Five kinds of feeling: the feelings (1) with the faculty to feel satisfaction, (2) with the faculty of frustration, (3) with the faculty of joy, (4) with the faculty of depression, and (5) with the faculty of equanimity. These are interpreted in detail.

(f) Six kinds of feeling: the feelings (1) caused by mutual contact with eye, (2) ear . . ., and (6) mind.

(g) Seven kinds of feeling: the feelings connected with (1) the visible element, (2) the audible element, (3) the olfactory element . . ., and (7) mental consciousness.

(h) Eighteen kinds of mental action and other feelings of mind: six mental actions to feel joy, six to feel grief, six to feel hedonic neutrality: and the feelings of mind except for those eighteen kinds of mental actions.

(i) 36 holy words and other feelings of mind: six joys based on greed, six joys based on the departure from the world, six griefs based on greed, six griefs based on the departure from the world, six hedonic neutralities based on the departure from the world, and the sensations of mind except for the 36 holy words.

(j) 108 kinds of feeling, and other feelings of mind: the 36 holy words, past, future and present, and the feeling of mind except for these.

(k) The variety of feelings: feelings, past, future, present, inner, outer, etc.

3. The Aggregate of (Conceptual) Identification

This is also grouped under several classifications which correspond to the groupings of feelings.

4. The Aggregate of Conditions

The factors except for feeling-aggregates, identification-aggregates and consciousness-aggregates, e.g., thinking, touch, attention, initial thought, sustained thought, liberation, absence of greed, lack of hatred, understanding, etc.

5. The Aggregate of Consciousness

(a) The senses of mind, or the faculty of mind.

(b) Awareness, mind, consciousness, six groups of consciousnesses, seven elements of consciousness.

(c) The variety of consciousness: past, future, present, etc.

II. Several Classifications of Five Aggregates in the Abhidharmic Manner (545c11-552c8)

The several concepts of aggregates as mentioned above are further classified in two types, three types, and a quartet in the Abhidharmic manner.

Chapter Four: The Four Noble Truths

I. Classification of the Four Noble Truths and Definitions of Them (552c1-554c3)

1. The Noble Truth of Frustration

The frustration of birth, old age, dying, meeting with the hated, parting from the loved, failure in one's aims and the frustrations caused by all the five aggregates except for the desire mentioned below.

2. The Noble Truth of the Origin of Frustration

This desire involves joy and sensual pleasure. It is divided into two kinds of desires, three, four, five, and six kinds of desires, and 36 kinds of behaviors of desires.

3. The Noble Truth of the Cessation of Frustration

(a) This is the entire dispassionateness, cessation, abandoning, forsaking, liberation, without a refuge, leaving, unborn of satisfaction.

(b) The calculated cessation

(1) The cessation of a factor as awareness is exhausted.

(2) The cessation of a factor as the practise of the path of noble truth.

(3) Four fruits of monkhood: stream-entry, once-returning, nonreturning, perfected being.

(4) The Noble Truth of the Way to the Cessation of Frustration. Eight noble paths (1) right view, (2) right conceptualizing, (3) right speech, (4) right action, (5) right livelihood, (6) right exercise, (7) right mindfulness, and (8) right concentration.

These noble truths are the truth attained by noble ones and the doctrine showed by the Buddha.

II. Several Classifications of the Four Noble Truths in the Abhidharmic Manner (554c4-560a3)

The several concepts of these noble truths as mentioned above are further classified in two types, three types, and four types in the Abhidharmic manner.

Chapter Five: Faculties

I. Classification of the Twenty-two Faculties and Definitions of Them (560a8-561a12)

The 22 kinds of faculties in human beings are as follows: (1) sight-faculty, (2) auditory-faculty, (3) olfactory-faculty, (4) taste-faculty, (5) touch-faculty, (6) faculty of femininity, (7) faculty of masculinity, (8) faculty of life-force, (9) satisfaction-faculty, (10) frustration-faculty, (11) contentedness-faculty, (12) depression-faculty, (13) equanimity-faculty, (14) mental-faculty, (15) faith-faculty, (16) energy-faculty, (17) mindfulness-faculty, (18) concentration-faculty, (19) wisdom-faculty, (20) the faculty of resolving to come to know something unknown (*anājñātām ājñasyāmīndriya*), (21) the faculty attained by thorough knowledge (*ājñendriya*), and (22) the faculty possessed of perfect knowledge (*ājñātāvīndriya*).

II. Several Classifications of Twenty-two Faculties in the Abhidharmic Manner (561a9-568a20)

The several concepts of faculties as mentioned above are further classifed into two types, three types, and four types in the so-called Abhidharmic manner.

In these classifications, it is worthy of note that five bodily faculties (e.g., sight-faculty ... touch-faculty) are free from the intoxicants. This theory is the same as that of the Vibhajyavādins.

Chapter Six: Seven Conditions of Enlightenment

I. Classification of Enlightenment-conditions and Definitions of Them (568a21-c7)

The seven kinds of enlightenment-conditions are as follows: (1) mindfulness, (2) investigation of *dharma*, (3) energy, (4) tranquility, (5) joy, (6) concentration and (7) equanimity.

II. Several Classifications of Seven Enlightenment-factors in the

Abhidharmic Manner (568c8-569a28)

The several concepts of enlightenment-factors as mentioned above are further classified in two types, three types, and four types in the Abhidharmic manner.

Chapter Seven: Three Bad Roots

I. Classification of the Bad Roots and Definition of Them (569a29-569b28)

1. The bad root of greed: covetousness.
2. The bad root of hatred: anger.
3. The bad root of delusion: ignorance.

II. Several Classifications of Three Kinds of the Bad Roots in the Abhidharmic Manner (570b29-571a14)

The bad roots mentioned above are further classified into two types, three types, and four types in the so-called Abhidharmic manner.

Chapter Eight: The Three Good-Roots

I. Classification of the Good Roots and Definitions of Them (571a15-572c15)

1. The good root of absence of greed: noncovetousness, the adaptability of mind without desire.
2. The good root of lack of hatred: nonwrath, the adaptability of mind without anger.
3. The good root of understanding: freedom from ignorance, the adaptability of mind without stupidity.

II. Several Classifications of Three Kinds of the Good Roots in the Abhidharmic Manner (571b20-572c15)

The good roots mentioned above are further classified into two types, three types, and four types in the so-called Abhidharmic manner.

Chapter Nine: The Primary Elements

I. Classification of the Primary Elements and Definitions of Them (572c16-573a18)

The primary elements are classified into four kinds:

1. Earth
   (a) The inner earth: the intenal organs and the solid matters in one's body.

(b) The outer earth: the solids out of one's body.
2. Water
   (a) The inner water: the liquid in one's body.
   (b) The outer water: the liquid out of one's body.
3. Fire
   (a) The inner fire: the heat in one's body.
   (b) The outer fire: the heat out of one's body.
4. Air
   (a) The inner air: the air or wind in one's body.
   (b) The outer air: the air or wind out of one's body.

II. Several Classifications of Four Primary Elements in the Abhidharmic Manner (573a19-573c8)

The several concepts of the primary elements as mentioned above are further classified into two types, three types, and four types in the Abhidharmic manner.

Chapter Ten: Devout Layman

The Definitions of the Devout Layman (573c9-574c24)
1. The devout layman is Śākyamuni Buddha.
2. The devout layman is perfumed by the factors of fading away, cessation, and liberation.
3. The restriction of the devout layman.
4. The devout layman has five virtues. They are as follows:
   (a) not to kill
   (b) not to steal
   (c) not to commit adultery
   (d) not to speak falsely
   (e) not to drink wine.

II. Several Classifications of the Five Virtues in the Abhidharmic Manner (574c25-575b2)

All the virtues as mentioned above are classified in everyone type in several Abhidharmic classifications: e.g., the whole are with form, invisible, penetrable, nonexcellent, impure, and so on.[2]

SECTION TWO: WITHOUT QUESTIONS[3]

1. Elements (575b7-579b23)
2. Karma (579b25-584c9)
3. Person (584c15-589c2)
4. Awareness (589c8-606a12)
5. The chain of dependent origination (606a18-612b20)

6. The four applications of mindfulness (612b26-616c7)
7. The four right abandonments (616c9-617a20)
8. The four supernatural powers (617a22-619c18)
9. The four trances (619c24-624c24)
10. The path (625a5-646a1)
11. Bad factors (646a7-661a9)

SECTION THREE: CONJOINED AND INCLUDED

A. Conjoined

1. Explanation and clarification of which objects are included in which objects (661a15-666a5)

2. To which aggregates, elements and faculties do each of these objects belong? (666a6-671b2)

B. Included

1. Explanation and clarification of which are the holy objects (671c5-673c21)

2. In which categories do these objects belong? (674a5-679a18)

SECTION FOUR: SOURCE

1. The ten conditions (679b5-687b17)
2. The causes (687b19-689a18)
3. Name and form (689a20-690a29)
4. Ten fetters (690b2-694b10)
5. Bodily, vocal and mental conduct (694b12-694c11)
6. Contact (694c13-697b16)
7. Awareness (697b18-700a11)
8. Ten bad paths of action (700a13-700c7)
9. Ten good paths of action (700c9-701a29)
10. Concentration (701b6-719a21)

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YAMAKA

Summary by Karen C. Lang

This work is called 'The Pairs' (*yamaka*) because it contains paired questions on the distribution of terms in a proposition. The second question of the pair is the converse of the first, reversing the order of the terms. Often a second pair of questions, adding the negative *na* to the terms, follows the first pair. The answers to these questions indicate whether the term covers all the members of the class it denotes, some of them, or none. The work has ten chapters, each named after the topic under examination.

The work was edited for the Pali Text Society by Mrs. Rhys Davids (*Journal of the Pali Text Society*, 1910-12, 51-107 2 volumes; Pali Text Society, London 1911-13). More recently there have been published editions by Jagdish Kasyap (Bihar, 1961) and by Mahesh Tiwari (Patna 1972). Parts 6-10 exist in Burmese characters edited by Hsaya Lingayama (Mandalay 1905). There is no translation into a Western language, though it has been translated into Japanese by Shoko Watanabe in *Nanden*, volumes 48-49.

The following summary's 'E' references are to the Kashyap 1961 edition.

Chapter One: Pairs on the Roots
Section One: Distribution of Designations

I.1 (E1-9) Questions on four types of factors—good, bad, neutral and verbal—and their respective roots and nine synonyms: cause, foundation, source, origination, nutriment, support, condition and origin. Three pairs of questions ask whether a specific type of factors have one and the same root and whether these factors that have one and the same root have one another as roots. The second question of each pair is the converse of the first and asks whether a specific type of root is identical with the same type of factor, etc.

(E9-22) Answers, indicating the distribution of the terms, e.g.,

three factors (greed, hatred, delusion) are bad roots; all bad roots are bad factors.

Chapter Two: Pairs on the Aggregates
Section One: Distribution of Designations

II.1 (E23-30) Questions on matter, sensation, identification, conditioning and consciousness. Eight pairs of questions ask about the relation between the terms "matter", etc. and "aggregate of matter", etc., between the general term "aggregate" and the specific term "aggregate of sensation", etc., and between the terms "matter", etc. and "aggregate". The format used in this chapter reoccurs in subsequent chapters with the appropriate substitution of terms:

1. a. Is all matter the matter-aggregate?
   b. Is the matter-aggregate matter?
2. a. (= 1.a)
   b. Are all aggregates the sensation aggregates?
3. a. Is matter an aggregate?
   b. Are all aggregates material?
4. a. (= 3.a)
   b. (= 2.b)

Each of these paired questions is followed by a parallel pair which negates the terms, e.g., Is all that is not matter not the matter-aggregate?

(E30-48) Answers. To 1.a. Expressions such as "pleasing matter" are covered by the term "form" but not by the term "form-aggregate". To 1.b. The matter-aggregate is covered by both terms. To 2.a. (= 1.a) To 2.b. The sensation-aggregate is covered by the terms "aggregate" and "sensation-aggregate". The other aggregates are covered by the term "aggregate" but not by the term "sensation-aggregate". To 3.a. Yes. To 3.b. The matter-aggregate is covered by the term "aggregate" and by the term "matter". The other aggregates are covered by the term "aggregate" but not by the term "form-aggregate". To 4.a. (= to 3.a) To 4.b. (= to 2.b)

Section Two: Application

II.2.1 (E48-67) Questions and answers on the arising of pairs of aggregates—form and sensation, sensation and identification—at the same time (present, past or future) or at different times (one arising in the present, the other in the past, one in the present and the other in the future, and one in the past and the other in the future). These questions are asked in regard to persons, places and both. This same format is used in subsequent chapters:

1.a. Does the sensation-aggregate arise for whom the material aggregate arises? The material aggregate arises for those born as nonidentifying beings but not the sensation-aggregate.

1.b. Does the material aggregate arise for whom the sensation aggregates arises? The sensation aggregate arises for those born immaterial but not the material aggregate.

2.a. Does the sensation aggregate arise where the material aggregate arises?

2.b. Does the material aggregate arise where the sensation aggregate arises?

3.a. Does the sensation aggregate arise for whom and where the material aggregate arises?

3.b. Does the material aggregate arise for whom and where the sensation aggregate arises?

(The answers to 2.a, b and 3.a, b are identical to 1.a, b) The same questions are then asked in the negative: 1.a. Does the sensation aggregate not arise for whom the material aggregate does not arise? The material aggregate does not arise for those born in the immaterial realm but the sensation aggregate does arise. Neither aggregate arises for those who pass away from that realm. 1.b. Does the sensation aggregate not arise for whom the material aggregate does not arise? The sensation aggregate does not arise for those born as nonidentifying beings but the material aggregate does. Neither aggregate arises for those who pass away from that state. These same questions are then asked in the past tense, future tense and in the combinations of present-past, present-future and past-future.

II.2.2 (E67-84) Questions and answers on the cessation of these pairs of aggregates, e.g., Has the sensation aggregate ceased for whom the material aggregate has ceased (and conversely)? Yes.

II.2.3 (E85-100) Questions and answers on the arising of one aggregate and the cessation of the other, e.g., Will the sensation aggregate cease for whom the material aggregate has arisen? The material aggregate has arisen for those who have attained final liberation and the sensation aggregate will no longer cease; for all others the material aggregate has arisen and the sensation aggregate will cease. Has the material aggregate arisen for whom the sensation aggregate will cease? Yes.

Section Three: Comprehension

II.3 (E101-104) Questions and answers on the comprehension of the paired aggregates matter and sensation in the present, etc., e.g.,

Does someone who fully understands the material aggregate fully understand the sensation aggregate (and conversely)? Yes.

Chapter Three: Pairs on the Sense-bases
Section One: Distribution of Designations

III.1 (E105-122) Questions and answers (E112-122) on the six sense-organs and objects—visual organ and visible matter, auditory organ and sound, the olfactory organ and smell, the gustatory organ and taste, the organ of touch and tangibles, the mental organ and factor—and the respective twelve bases. These questions and answers follow the same format as II.1, e.g., Is visual organ the visual organ base? Expressions like "divine eye" are covered by the term "visual organ" but not by the term "visual organ base".

Section Two: Application

III.2.1 (E122-200) Questions and answers on the arising of paired bases, following the format of II.2.1, e.g., Does the visual organ base arise where the mental organ base arises? Yes.

III.2.2 (E200-292) Questions and answers on the cessation of paired aggregates.

III.2.3 (E258-292) Questions and answers on the arising of one base and the cessation of the other.

Section Three: Comprehension

III.3 (E292-295) Questions and answers on the comprehension of the visual organ base paired with the auditory organ base.

Chapter Four: Pairs on the Elements
Section One: Distribution of Designations

IV.1 (E296-300) Questions and answers (E300-308) on the relation between the six sense-organs and the six sense consciousnesses with the respective six elements, e.g., Is the visual consciousness the visual consciousness element (and conversely)? Yes.

Section Two: Application

IV.2 (E308-310) Questions and answers on the arising of paired elements. Excepts for the substitution of the term "element" for "base", this section is identical to III.2.1.

Chapter Five: Pairs on the Truths
Section One: Distribution of Designation

V.1 (E311-314) Questions on the relation between the terms "frustration", "origin", "cessation", and "path" and the respective terms for the four noble truths, between the general term "truth" and the specific terms for the four noble truths, and between the terms "truth" and "frustration", etc.

(E315-322) Answers. The term "frustration" refers to the truth of frustration but apart from references to physical and mental frustration the term "truth of frustration" does not refer only to frustration (here defined as painful sensation). The terms "origin", "cessation" and "path" do not refer only to the truth of origin, the truth of cessation and the truth of the path but these three truths do refer only to craving's origin, its cessation and the eightfold path. Specific truths, e.g., the truth of origin, are covered both by the terms "truth" and "truth of origin". The terms "frustration", etc., do refer to "truth".

Section Two: Application

V.2.1 (E323-355) Questions and answers on the arising of the truths of frustration, origin and path (cessation = liberation) which neither arises nor ceases. The truth of frustration arises at the moment awareness unconnected with craving arises in those who undergo rebirth, but the truth of origin does not arise then. At the moment craving arises, both truths arise. Similarly, the truth of frustration, and not the truth of the path, arises when awareness is not connected with the path; when awareness is so connected, both truths arise. In the immaterial realms only the truth of the path arises; among the nonidentifying beings, only the truth of frustration; among beings in the lower realms, only the truths of frustration and origin; but among beings with four or five aggregates all three truths arise.

V.2.2 (E355-381) Questions and answers on the cessation of pairs of these three truths.

V.2.3 (E382-397) Questions and answers on the arising of one of these three truths and the cessation of the other.

Section Three: Comprehension

V.3 (E397-400) Questions and answers on the full understanding of pairs of these three truths.

Chapter Six: Pairs on the Conditionings
Section One: Distribution of Designations

VI.1 (Vol. II, E3-5) Questions on the relation between the terms "body", "speech", and "awareness" and the respective conditionings, between the general term "conditioning" and these three specific conditionings, and between one specific conditioning and another. (E5-10) Answers. The terms "body", "speech" and "awareness" do not refer to the respective conditionings, nor do the terms for these conditionings refer to body, speech or mind. Specific conditionings, e.g., speech conditioning, are covered both by the term "conditioning" and "speech conditioning". No one specific conditioning refers to another.

Section Two: Application

VI.2.1 (E10-39) Questions and answers on the arising of the conditionings. Bodily conditionings arise when discursive thought (*vitarka, vicāra*) is absent, for those engaged in breathing in and out, and speech conditionings do not; both arise for beings in the sensuous realm when discursive thought is present and for those in the first meditative trance. When discursive thought is present and breathing in and out is absent, then vocal and mental conditionings arise, but not bodily conditionings. No vocal conditionings arise without the presence of discursive thought, but mental conditionings arise. For beings in the sensuous realm all three conditionings arise in the first meditative trance, bodily and mental conditionings arise in the second and third trances, but only mental conditionings arise in the fourth meditative trance. For beings in the material and immaterial realms vocal and mental conditionings arise in the first meditative trance, and only mental conditionings arise in the second through fourth meditative trances.

VI.2.2 (E39-64) Questions and answers on the cessation of these three conditionings.

VI.2.3 (E64-79) Questions and answers on the arising of one of these three conditionings and the cessation of another.

Section Three: Comprehension

VI.3. (E79) Questions and answers on the comprehension of paired conditionings.

Chapter Seven: Pairs on the Contaminants
Section One: Place of Origin

VII.1 (E81) Questions and answers on where the seven contaminants, i.e. (1) sensual desire, (2) repugnance, (3) pride, (4) wrong view, (5) perplexity, (6) desire for existence and (7) ignorance, occur. The contaminant of sensual desire occurs in regard to satisfying and neutral sensations of the sensual world. The contaminant of repugnance occurs in regard to frustrating sensations of the sensuous world. The contaminant of pride occurs in regard to satisfying and neutral sensations in all three realms. The contaminant of desire for existence occurs in the material and immaterial realms. The contaminants of wrong views, perplexity and ignorance occur in regard to factors which possess individuality.

Section Two: Major Section

VII.2.1 (E82-144) Questions and answers on the occurrence of combinations of these seven contaminants in regard to the categories of person, place and both. All the contaminants occur in an ordinary person; all but wrong views and perplexity occur in the stream-enterer and the once-returner: pride, desire for existence, and ignorance occur for the nonreturner.

VII.2.2 (E144-203) Questions and answers on the possession and nonpossession of these contaminants.

VII.2.3 (E203-260) Questions and answers on the abandonment of combinations of these contaminants. Answers on the abandonment of pride, perplexity, desire for existence, and ignorance, when paired with sensual desire or hatred, indicate that only the pride, etc., connected with the sensual realm is abandoned.

VII.2.4 (E260-320) Questions and answers on the comprehension of combinations of these contaminants.

VII.2.5 (E320-379) Questions and answers on the abandoned contaminants in various combinations. Only the perfected being has abandoned all seven contaminants.

VII.2.6 (E379-380) Questions and answers on the arising of the paired contaminants: sensual desire, hatred and pride.

VII.2.7 (E380-386) Questions and answers (E386-393) on the number of contaminants that arise after someone has died and been reborn. The answers are the same regardless of which realm a person has passed away from and has been reborn into: the ordinary person has seven contaminants, the stream-enterer and the once-returner have five, and the nonreturner has three.

Chapter Eight: Pairs on Awareness

This Chapter has a single section, with five subsections.

VIII.1 (E395-399) Questions on the arising and ceasing of awareness in regard to persons. The questions concern stages in the arising of awareness, i.e. awareness that is in the process of arising, is arising, has arisen, arose, or will arise, and pair one stage with another or with one of a similar series of stages in the cessation of awareness.

VIII.2 (E399-403) Questions on arising and ceasing of awareness in regard to *dharma.*

VIII.3 (E403-408) Questions on the arising and ceasing of awareness in regard to both persons and *dharma.*

VIII.4 (E408) Questions on the arising of awareness according to the categories of the (*Satipaṭṭhāna*) *Suttanta,* i.e. consciousness with and without greed, anger and delusion, collected and distracted, distinguished and undistinguished, inferior and superior, concentrated and unconcentrated, released and unreleased.

VIII.5 (E409) Questions on the arising of awareness according to the categories of the Abhidhamma, i.e. awareness that is good, bad, neutral, etc.

(E409-419) Answers to the questions, e.g., Will awareness cease and not arise for whom awareness arises and does not cease (in the present moment)? Awareness will cease and not arise only for those persons in the moment of the last awareness (prior to attaining final liberation); for others awareness arises and does not cease (in the present moment) and will arise and cease (in a later moment).

Chapter Nine: Pairs on Factors
Section One: Distribution of Designations

IX.1 (Vol. III, E3-6) Questions and answers on the terms "good" "bad" and "neutral" and whether they refer to the respective classes of factors; whether the general term "factor" refers to any specific type of factor and whether the terms "good", "bad" and "neutral" refer to factors.

(E6-13) Answers. The terms "good", etc., refer to the respective types of factors. Any specific type of factor is covered both by the general term "factor" and the term for its specific type. The terms "good", "bad", etc., do refer to factors.

Section Two: Application

IX.2.1 (E13-45) Questions and answers on the arising of pairs of factors, i.e. good and bad, good and neutral, and bad and neutral in regard to persons, places and both in the present, etc. Good and

bad factors never arise together; among beings with five aggregates good or bad factors may arise together with neutral factors but in the immaterial realms neutral factors never arise together with good or bad factors. Among nonidentifying beings and those who have attained the cessation trance only neutral factors arise.

IX.2.2 (E45-75) Questions and answers on the cessation of pairs of these factors.

IX.2.3 (E75-105) Questions and answers on the arising of one type of factor and the cessation of another.

Section Three: Spiritual Practice

IX.3 (E105-106) Questions and answers on the practice and abandonment of these factors. E.g., does not someone who practices good factors abandon bad factors? Yes.

Chapter Ten: Pairs on the Faculties

Section One: Distribution on Designations

X.1 (E107-129) Questions on the relations between the terms for the six sense-organs, the terms 'female', 'male', 'life', 'satisfaction', 'frustration', 'contentedness', 'depression', 'equanimity', 'faith', 'energy', 'mindfulness', 'concentration', 'insight', 'the thought: I will know the unknown', 'knowledge', 'perfected knowledge', and the twenty-two respective faculties, between the general term "faculty" and specific faculties, and between the terms "visual organ" etc. and "faculty".

(E129-179) Answers. The answers on questions concerning the sense-organs are the same as III.1, with the substitution of the "faculty" for "base". The terms "female", "male" and "equanimity" do not refer to the respective faculties (and conversely); the remaining terms are identical with the respective faculties. Any specific faculty, e.g., visual organ faculty, is covered both by the term "faculty" and the term "visual organ faculty" etc.

Section Two: Application

X.2 (E179-492) Questions and answers (for the sense faculties the same as III.2.1) on the arising of pairs of all faculties except the last three in the present, etc. The feminine and masculine faculties occur only in the sensuous realm. The equanimity faculty does not occur among nonidentifying beings. The faculties of faith, mindfulness, energy and concentration arise in the awareness of those being reborn when connected with a good cause; the arising of the faculty of insight requires a connection with knowledge as well.

Section Three: Comprehension

X.3 (E493-531) Questions and answers on the comprehension of the pairs' visual and auditory organ faculties, the abandoning of the depression faculty, and the cultivation of the last three faculties.

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PAṬṬHĀNA

Summary by K.H. Potter

The vastness of this work is belied by the comparatively brief summary that follows. McGovern remarks: "Pāli theories concerning cosmic dynamics are to be found in that vast literary jungle known as the Paṭṭhāna." Of unknown authorship, this work probably grew over the years but may be dated in its earliest form to about the same age as *Yamaka*. Cousins considers it "cannot be later than the second century B.C.", although Bareau dates it in the 1st century A.D. Yamada considers it "the last of the Pāli Abhidharma texts".

Editions of portions of the work began to appear as early as 1904, when the *Paccayavibhaṅgavara* and *Kuśalaṭīkā* sections appeared in Burmese characters (ed. by Hsaya Sudhamma, Mandalay 1904). Mrs. Rhys Davids edited the *Duka* section for the Pali Text Society in 1906, and the *Ṭīkā* section in 1923 with Buddhaghoṣa's commentary. Complete editions exist: one in Sinhalese characters by Nanavimala Thera, four volumes, Colombo 1954-55; Jagdish Kashyap from Nalanda in 1961, in six volumes. A translation of an initial portion was made by U Narada in London 1969 for the Pali Text Society under the title "Conditional Relations". References in the following summary are to the Kashyap 1961 edition ("E") and the Narada translation ("T").

The *Paṭṭhāna* discusses in terms of conditions (*pratyaya*) the relations among the items identified in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and the other six Theravāda Abhidharma treatises. It is extremely long, and the summary here will be very laconic. See the tabular presentation by Narada in T for detailed explanation of the contents of this work.

INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS OF TRIPLETS
ENUMERATION OF THE POSITIVE CONDITIONS

(E1-11, T1-12) Twenty-four types of conditions are listed and explained.

1. Moral or root condition is related to the *dharmas* associated with roots and matter produced thereby.

2. Supporting object condition by which sense-bases are related to their corresponding elements and the *dharmas* associated with them. Any *dharma* may be the content of awareness.

3. Dominant condition relating desire, energy, awareness and investigation to the *dharmas* associated with them and the matter produced thereby.

4. Immediately precedent condition by which preceding *dharmas* are related to their immediately succeeding ones.

5. Directly antecedent condition by which preceding *dharmas* are related to their immediate successors. The exposition of this and item 4 preceding it are precisely the same.

6. Conascence condition relating those pairs of things which are born together.

7. Mutuality condition between things which regularly go together.

8. Dependence condition between things which depend on one another.

9. Strong dependence condition between things which necessarily depend on one another.

10. Prenascent condition relating each kind of sense-basis with the corresponding kinds of element and its associated *dharmas*.

11. Postnascent condition relating postnascent awareness and concomitant (*cittacaitāsika*) *dharmas* to the prenascent body.

12. Repetition condition relating the moral quality (good, bad, neutral) of preceding *dharmas* to the same quality in succeeding *dharmas*.

13. Act condition, relating good and bad karma to the matter constituting the matured aggregates, and relating will to the *dharmas* and associated matter produced thereby.

14. Maturation condition relating the four nonmaterial matured aggregates to each other.

15. Nutriment condition relating food to the body constituted by it, and relating the nonmaterial nutriments to their associated *dharmas* and matter.

16. Faculty condition relating each sense basis to its corresponding element and associated *dharmas*.

17. Meditation condition relating the factors of meditation to their associated *dharmas* and matter resulting.

18. Path condition relating the factors of the path to their associated *dharmas* and resulting matter.

19. Association condition relating the four nonmaterial aggregates to each other.

20. Dissociation condition relating material *dharmas* to immaterial

ones and vice versa.

21. Presence condition relating *dharmas* with other dharmas which are present, i.e. in contact, with them when they arise.

22. Absence condition, relating *dharmas* which have just parted from each other to each other.

23. Disappearance condition relating *dharmas* which have completely disappeared from relation with others to those others.

24. Nondisappearance condition relating *dharmas* which have not completely disappeared from relation with others to those others.

QUESTIONS

(E11-119; T13-21) The first triplet of *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* concerns good, bad and neutral *dharmas*. For each of the three alone and for each possible combination (making seven possible ways of occurrence) the question arises for each of the 24 conditions just listed, whether the *dharmas* in question are determined by or dependent on that kind of condition. A total of 49 *X* 24, or 1176 such questions are indicated.

I. GOOD, ETC., TRIPLET
A. DEPENDENCE SECTION
1. Positive Method
(a) Analysis (*vibhaṅga*)

(E120-129; T22-35) Answers to those of the foregoing questions which related to positive conditioning are provided, showing which *dharmas* depend on which of the 24 conditions.

(I-A.1) Enumeration (*saṃkhyā*)

(E129-132; T35-38) The number of answers relating to the combinations and conditions of the several sorts is provided. E.g., there are nine answers concerning root conditions, three concerning supporting object conditions, etc., and there are three answers concerning root and object conditions together, nine concerning root and dominant conditions together, etc. Conditions are first discussed singly, then in pairs, then by threes, twelves and twenty-twos.

(I-A.2) Negative Conditions
Questions about Good, Bad or Neutral

(E132-144; T38-54) Those *dharmas* which arise dependent on good, bad or neutral states though not being conditioned in each of the 24 ways are now answered, and the answers enumerated.

(I.A.3) Positive-Negative

(E144-155; T54-64) Taking a positive condition (e.g., root) and a negative condition (e.g., not-object) the number of answers provided is enumerated. The method is by twos (as above), by threes (e.g., root + object is positive, nondominant is negative), by fours (e.g., root, object and dominance are positive, nonprenascent is negative), by elevens, twelves and twenty-threes.

(I-A.4) Negative-Positive

(E155-163; T65-73) Taking a negative condition and a positive condition the number of answers is enumerated by twos, threes, sevens, tens, fourteens and twenty-ones.

I-B. Conascence Section
1. Positive Conditions

(E164-165; T73-75) Answers to those of the questions (cf. Introduction) which relate to conascent conditioning are provided, showing which *dharmas* depend on which of the 24 conditions. Then the number of answers relating to the combinations of conditions of the several sorts is provided, as before.

2-4. Negative Conditions, Positive-Negative
and Negative-Positive

(E165-166; T75-76) As in I-A.2-4, except that now it is the relations of conascence that are studied.

I-C. Conditioned Section
1-4. Positive, Negative, Positive-Negative
and Negative-Positive Conditions

(E167-1100; T77-115) Answers to those of the questions of Introduction which relate to which are the good, bad and neutral *dharmas* on which other good, bad and neutral *dharmas* depend. The organization of this section parallels the preceding sections I-A and I-B.

I-D. Supported Section
1-4. Positive, Negative, Positive-Negative
and Negative-Positive

(E1100-1104; T115-120) As the three preceding sections, except that the new attention is on those good, bad and neutral *dharmas*

which are supported by good, bad and neutral *dharmas*.

I-E. Conjoined Section

(E1104-1120; T120-138) Discussion as in the preceding four sections and in same order. Discussion concerns which good, bad and neutral *dharmas* are conjoined with which other good, bad and neutral *dharmas*.

I-F. Associated Section

(E1121-1122; T138-141) As in the preceding five sections. Discussion concerns which good, bad and neutral *dharmas* are associated with which other good, bad and neutral *dharmas*.

I-G. Wisdom Section

(E1123-1270; T141-317) The order of subsections of this is the same as in the six preceding sections. The section answers the same set of questions as the preceding six do, but with the emphasis now on which states condition others rather than the ones that are conditioned. For example, in discussing what sorts of *dharmas* good *dharmas* condition, three relations are studied: (1) with other good *dharmas*, (2) with neutral *dharmas*; (3) with *dharmas* which are both good and neutral. On the other hand, in discussing what sorts of *dharmas* condition, since only neutral *dharmas* are conditioned by them, there is only one relation discussed.

II. FEELING TRIPLET

(E1. 271-308; T318-361) Discussion now turns to the second triplet of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. The order of seven sections, and the order of subsections, is preserved. The questions are as before (they are not repeated); the sections provide the answers as before.

III. MATURATION TRIPLET

(E1. 308-360; T362-428) Discussion as before of third triplet.

IV. GRASPED AT TRIPLET

(E1. 361-414; T429-502) Discussion of fourth triplet.

V. DEFILEMENT TRIPLET

(E1. 414-436; T502-526) Discussion of fifth triplet.

VI. INITIAL THOUGHT TRIPLET

(E2. 3-118)

VII. JOY TRIPLET

(E2. 119-146)

VIII. VISION TRIPLET

(E2. 147-190)

IX. ELIMINATION BY SEEING TRIPLET

(E2. 191-251)

X. ACCUMULATION TRIPLET

(E2. 252-287)

XI. TRAINING TRIPLET

(E2. 288-316)

XII. LIMITED TRIPLET

(E2. 317-357)

XIII. LIMITED OBJECT TRIPLET

(E2. 358-375)

XIV. INFERIOR TRIPLET

(E2. 376)

XV. REGULATED FALSITY TRIPLET

(E2. 377-401)

XVI. PATH AS OBJECT TRIPLET

(E2. 402-422)

XVII. ARISEN TRIPLET

(E2. 423-430)

XVIII. PAST TRIPLET

(E2. 431-437)

XIX. PAST OBJECT TRIPLET

(E2. 438-453)

XX. INTERNAL TRIPLET

(E2. 455-474)

XXI. INTERNAL OBJECT TRIPLET

(E2. 475-485)

XXII. VISIBLE/RESPONSIVE TRIPLET

(E2. 486-417)

ANALYSIS OF PAIRS

1. Positive Conditions

(E3-4) Now each of the 100 pairs of *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* are examined in a similar fashion.

ANALYSIS OF PAIRS/TRIPLETS

1. Positive Conditions

(E4) Now each of the 100 pairs is taken as reference with each of the 22 triplets as variants, e.g., the first section studies good-root *dharmas*, not-good-root *dharmas* and root-good-not-root-good *dharmas*. There are 100 such sections.

ANALYSIS OF TRIPLET/PAIRS

1. Positive Conditions

(E4) Each of the 22 triplets is taken as reference with each of the 100 pairs as variants. So, the first section deals with good-root *dharmas*, bad-root *dharmas* and neutral-root *dharmas*. There are 22 such sections.

ANALYSIS OF TRIPLET/TRIPLETS

1. Positive Conditions

(E5) Now each triplet is varied with the rest of the triplets.

ANALYSIS OF PAIR/PAIRS

1. Positive Conditions

(E5) And each pair with the rest of the pairs.

TRIPLET, PAIR, PAIR/TRIPLET, TRIPLET/TRIPLET, PAIR/PAIR

2-4. Negative, Positive-Negative and Negative-Positive Conditions

(E6 entire) And finally, each of the foregoing lists is taken in

reference to negative conditioning (e.g., *dharmas* that are not good-root conditioning *dharmas* that are not good), positive-negative conditioning (e.g., good *dharmas* that root condition *dharmas* that are not good) and negative-positive conditions (e.g., *dharmas* that are not good root conditioning good *dharmas*).

14

DHĀTUKĀYA

Summary by Robert E. Buswell, Jr.

The *Dhātukāya* is traditionally placed as the fifth of the six *pādaśāstras* of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma canon.[1] Chinese sources ascribe authorship to Vasumitra, although which of the five Vasumitras known to the Chinese tradition this might have been is never clarified.[2] Sanskrit and Tibetan sources declare Pūrṇa to be the author.[3] Baiyu Watanabe, the Japanese scholar who has most carefully studied the text, has noted this discrepancy and finds the ascription to Vasumitra the more credible of the two. Nevertheless, he finally concludes that the text is most probably a composite product of a number of Abhidharmikas, which was then ascribed out of reverence to an earlier, well-known figure.[4]

Considerable controversy reigns among modern scholars concerning the *Dhātukāya*'s chronological position among the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma materials. Kogen Mizuno has divided the seven canonical texts into three groups, early, middle and late. He places in the first group the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, *Dharmaskandha* and *Prajñaptiśāstra*; the *Vijñānakāya* and *Dhātukāya* in the second; and the *Prakaraṇapāda* and *Jñānaprasthāna* in the last group.[5] Hajime Sakurabe advocates instead two major divisions, with the second group divided into three subdivisions: first, the *Saṅgītiparyāya* and *Dharmaskandha*; and second, (a) the *Vijñānakāya*, *Dhātukāya* and *Prajñapti*; (b) *Prakaraṇa*; (c) *Jñānaprasthāna*.[6] Ryogon Fukuhara, the scholar who has made the most exhaustive study of the Sarvāstivāda canonical materials, finally returns to a three-fold division in his description of the appearance of the six *pādaśāstras*: *Saṅgītiparyāya* and *Dharmaskandha* appear in his earliest group, *Prajñapti* and *Vijñānakāya* in his middle group, and *Dhātukāya* and *Prakaraṇa* in his late group.[7] Both in structurre and content, we would expect the text to appear in later strata of material than the obviously primitive *Saṅgītiparyāya* and *Dharmaskandha*, which are both reminiscent of the *āgamas* in

their approach, though a more precise determination will be virtually impossible to make.

K'uei-chi's postface to Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation[8] notes that the *Dhātukāya* was originally composed in 6,000 *ślokas*, which was later abridged into two different versions of 900 and 500 *ślokas*. Hsüan-tsang's text in 830 *ślokas* apparently represented still another recension.[9] The extant recension is divided into two major sections. The opening **Mūlavastuvarga* lists headings of 91 awareness and awareness-concomitant (*cittacaitta*) *dharmas* in 14 groups, followed by a standard Abhidharmika definition of each term; these provide the working matter for the detailed analyses that comprise the majority of the text. The subsequent **Vibhajyavarga* is a longer analytical section divided into 16 subsections. The first three subsections detail the intricate interrelationships between three major groups of mental phenomena—(1) the 5 feeling-faculties, (2) consciousnesses and (3) shamelessness and disregard—and each individual awareness-concomitant listed in the headings. The concluding thirteen subsections give an abbreviated analysis of the interrelationships between each individual awareness-concomitant on the schedule. *Dharmas* are listed in dyads as associated with and dissociated from individual *dharmas*, the inclusion or noninclusion of which is then analyzed in light of the 18 elements, 12 sense-bases and 5 aggregates. The concluding lines of the Chinese recension note that the full-length text was subdivided into 88 sections, which would have allowed for a separate subdivision to cover each of the concomitants listed in the headings, except for the final set of cravings, which would already have been covered in full in the preceding analyses.[10]

The attempts of the *Dhātukāya* to make some sense of the burgeoning lists of awarenesses, as well as the expository style adopted in this attempt, were to be of considerable importance in later Abhidharma treatises. While *Dhātukāya*'s listings from the 5 defilements onward were known in earlier strata of Āgama and Abhidharma literature, its novel groupings of the 10 *dharmas* that arise with every awareness, 10 *dharmas* that arise with every defilements, and 10 *dharmas* that arise with every affliction were the forerunner of later standardized lists of awarenesses as found in the *Prakaraṇa* and *Abhidharmakośa*. This particular grouping of 91 awarenesses into 14 categories is, however, unique to this text. The expository style of the *Dhātukāya*, in which opening headings with Abhidharmika definitions is followed by an analysis in contrasting pairs, also influenced the approach of the later *Prakaraṇa*, a synthetic Abhidharma work that tried to draw together all the doctrines of the earlier canonical materials. This similarity in structure is the major

piece of evidence supporting the traditional ascription of both these texts to Vasumitra's authorship. Hsüan-tsang's *Ta T'ang Hsi-yü chi* records that Vasumitra was presumed to have written the *Prakaraṇa* near Puṣkaravatī in the Gandhāra district,[11] probably about 100 years after Aśoka's time. This notice would virtually guarantee that this text was written after the Sarvāstivāda school had already moved into its Northwest Indian headquarters. We would then have fairly firm grounds for assuming that the *Dhātukāya* was composed in similar circumstances.[12]

The *Dhātukāya* is most reminiscent in style and approach to two Pali Abhidharma works: the *Paṭṭhāna* and the *Dhātukathā*. Like the *Dhātukāya*, the *Paṭṭhāna* also opens with introductory headings on the 24 conditions with their definitions, which is followed by sections that explicate their interrelationships; a separate section is allotted for explication in contrasting pairs. The strongest resemblances both in title and general approach are, however, between the Pali *Dhātukathā* and the *Dhātukāya*, although the content of the two texts shows virtually no parallelism. The *Dhātukathā* also opens with headings and, like our text, analyzes *dharma*s in relation to the elements, sense-bases and aggregates, although the 14 approaches followed and the 125 *dharma*s included in the investigation are radically different. It would seem possible, however, that both texts have independently evolved from a more primitive form of analysis in which *dharma*s were treated in terms of the elements, bases and aggregates. If this is indeed the case, we have here the philosophically interesting instance of two entirely distinct and independently developed approaches to a parallel descriptive problem. A comparative investigation could yield important information on the difference between Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda analytical approaches.[13]

References are to page and column of the Chinese translation (Taisho 1540). The Chinese title of Hsüan-tsang's translation is *(A-pi-ta-mo) Chieh-Shen Tsu-Lun*. The date of the translation is identified as July 14, 663.

SUMMARY
PART ONE: HEADINGS (* MŪLAVASTUVARGA)
(1.614b10-c10)

10 factors that arise with every awareness:

1. feeling
2. identification
3. volition
4. contact
5. attention

6. interest
7. resolve
8. mindfulness
9. concentration
10. intellection

10 factors that arise with every defilement:

1. lack of confidence
2. sloth
3. lack of mindfulness
4. distraction
5. ignorance
6. lack of comprehension
7. careless attention
8. false resolve
9. excitedness
10. heedlessness

10 factors that arise with every affliction:

1. anger
2. vengefulness
3. hypocrisy
4. spite
5. envy
6. selfishness
7. deceit
8. guile
9. arrogance
10. cruelty

5 defilements:

1. sensual desires
2. desire for material things
3. desire for immaterial things
4. repugnance (or hatred?)
5. perplexity

5 wrong views:

1. belief in a self
2. extreme views
3. false views
4. adherence to views
5. adherence to moral precepts and vows

5 contacts:

1. contact arising from sensory impingement
2. expressible contact
3. mental contact associated with understanding
4. mental contact associated with ignorance

5. mental contact associated neither with knowledge nor ignorance

5 faculties (properly, the 5 feeling-faculties):
1. faculty of satisfaction
2. faculty of frustration
3. faculty of contentedness
4. faculty of depression
5. faculty of equanimity

5 factors:
1. initial thought
2. sustained thought
3. consciousness
4. shamelessness
5. disregard

6 consciousnesses:
1. visual consciousness
2. auditory consciousness
3. olfactory consciousness
4. gustatory consciousness
5. tactile consciousness
6. mental consciousness

6 contacts:
1. eye-contact
2. ear-contact
3. nose-contact
4. tongue-contact
5. body-contact
6. mind-contact

6 feelings:
1. feeling born of eye-contact
2. feeling born of ear-contact
3. feeling born of nose-contact
4. feeling born of tongue-contact
5. feeling born of body-contact
6. feeling born of mind-contact

6 identifyings:
1. identifying born of eye-contact
2. identifying born of ear-contact
3. identifying born of nose-contact
4. identifying born of tongue-contact
5. identifying born of body-contact
6. identifying born of mind-contact

6 volitions:
1. volition born of eye-contact

2. volition born of ear-contact
3. volition born of nose-contact
4. volition born of tongue-contact
5. volition born of body-contact
6. volition born of mind-contact

6 cravings:

1. craving born of eye-contact
2. craving born of ear-contact
3. craving born of nose-contact
4. craving born of tongue-contact
5. craving born of body contact
6. craving born of mind-contact.[14]

The *Dhātukāya* continues with standard Abhidharmika definitions of each of the factors appearing in the headings: the factors arising with every awareness (614c10-26), the factors that arise with every defilement (614c26-615a13), the factors that arise with every affliction (615a13-23), defilements (615a23-b2), wrong views (615b2-11), contacts (615b14), feeling faculties (615b14-22), factors (615b22-c4), consciousnesses (615c4-9), contacts (615c10-15), feelings (615c15-26), identifyings (615c26-616a.8), volitions (616a8-20), and cravings (616a20-28). These definitions are principally intended: (1) to clarify the efficiency of each factor in present, past and future; (2) to delineate the primary characteristic of each factor; (3) to outline the conditions which lead to the arising of an individual factor. As can be gleaned from the above outline, there is a total of three lists of ten factors, five lists of five factors, and six lists of six factors, for a total of ninety-one individual awarenesses and concomitants. Throughout the remainder of the text, the interactions between these individual factors will be explored sequentially in considerable detail. Familiarity with the headings, consequently, is essential for untangling the complicated interrelationships that will be explored in the following sixteen sections.

PART TWO: DISTINCTIONS (*VIBHAJYAVARGA)

The remainder of the *Dhātukāya* is concerned with detailing explicitly the interrelationships between the factors listed in the headings. There are sixteen separate sections in two major divisions. The first division is in three sections: section one treats the 5 feeling faculties, section two discusses the 6 consciousnesses, and section three analyzes the two factors of shamelessness and disregard. These sections treat groups of awarenesses in terms of their relationships with each individual member listed in the headings. The second division is in thirteen sections, which discuss each of the factors in

the headings in terms of their relation to the eighteen elements, twelve sense-bases and five aggregates. The full-length recension of the *Dhātukāya*, no longer extant, divided this second division into eighty-five separate sections, which would have allowed for individual treatment of each factor in the headings excluding the six cravings. The latter six factors did not require their own section, as their association/dissociation in regards to the elements, senses and aggregates would already have been covered in the preceding sections.

(Since the type of analysis undertaken in this text is so repetitive, I intend to give a periphrastic translation only of the first section in each of the two major divisions. This should suffice to characterize the primary approaches of the *Dhātukāya*.)

Section One: The Five Feeling Faculties
(First division, First section; 616b5-c6)

The 5 feeling faculties are the faculties of satisfaction, frustration, contentedness, depression and equanimity. How many of the factors arising with every awareness and the 5 feeling faculties are associated and how many are dissociated ?... How many of (the awareness-concomitants) up to and including craving born of mind-contact (the last of the cravings) and the 5 feeling faculties are associated and how many are dissociated?

As far as the lack of association between the factors arising with every feeling and the 5 feeling faculties is concerned: all are dissociated. The factors arising with every identification and the 5 feeling faculties are all associated. As far as those (factors arising with every awareness) which are not dissociated is concerned, in the same way that identifying (is associated), volition, contact, attention, interest, resolve, mindfulness, concentration and intellection are likewise (in association with all the 5 feeling faculties).

The lack of confidence (factor arising with every defilement) and the 5 feeling faculties: the five faculties are both associated and dissociated. Just as for lack of confidence, the remaining factors arising with every defilement are also the same.

(Of the factors arising with every affliction) anger, vengefulness, spite, envy and violence are associated with two faculties—depression and equanimity—and dissociated from five faculties. Hypocrisy, deceit and craftiness are associated with three faculties—excepting satisfaction and frustration—and are dissociated from five faculties. Arrogance is associated with four faculties—excepting frustration—and dissociated from five faculties. Selfishness is asso-

ciated with two faculties—contentedness and equanimity—and dissociated from five faculties.

(Of the five defilements) sensuous desire and attachment to material things are associated with three faculties—excepting frustration and depression—and dissociated from five faculties. Desire for immaterial things is associated with one faculty—equanimity—and dissociated from five faculties. Repugnance is associated with three faculties—excepting satisfaction and depression—and dissociated from five faculties. Perplexity is associated with four faculties—excepting frustration—and dissociated from five faculties.

Among the 5 wrong views, false view is associated with four faculties—excepting frustration—and dissociated from five faculties. The remaining four wrong views are associated with three faculties—excepting frustration and depression—and dissociated from five faculties.

(Among the 5 contacts) contact arising from sensory impingement is associated with three faculties—excepting contentedness and depression—and dissociated from four faculties—excepting frustration. Expressible contact is associated with four faculties—excepting frustration—and dissociated from three faculties—excepting contentedness and depression. Mental contact associated with understanding is associated with three faculties—excepting frustration and depression—and dissociated from five faculties. Mental contact associated with ignorance and mental contact associated neither with understanding nor ignorance are associated with five faculties and dissociated from five faculties.

As far as the lack of association between the satisfaction faculty (and the 5 faculties of feeling) is concerned: all are dissociated. Just as for the satisfaction faculty, the frustration faculty, contentedness faculty, depression faculty and equanimity faculty are also the same.

(Of the five factors) initial thought and sustained thought are associated with five faculties, and dissociated from three faculties—excepting frustration and depression. Consciousness is associated with five faculties; it is (awareness) from which no other (awareness-concomitants) are dissociated. Shamelessness and disregard are associated with five faculties and dissociated from five faculties.

(Of the 6 consciousnesses) visual consciousness is associated with three faculties—excepting contentedness and depression—and dissociated from five faculties. Just as for visual consciousness auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile consciousnesses are also the same. Mental consciousness is associated with four faculties—excepting contentedness and depression. Just as for the 6 conscious-

nesses, the 6 contacts, the 6 identifications and the 6 volitions are also the same.

As far as the lack of association between the feeling born of eye-contact (the first of 6 feelings) and the 5 feeling faculties is concerned: they are all in dissociation. Just as for the feeling born of eye-contact, the remaining feelings are also the same.

(Of the 6 cravings) the craving born of eye-contact is associated with two faculties—contentedness and equanimity—and dissociated from five faculties. Just as for the craving born of eye-contact, the craving born of ear, nose, tongue and body contact is also the same. The craving born of mind-contact is associated with three faculties—excepting frustration and depression—and dissociated from five faculties.

An identical approach is followed in the concluding two sections of this first division: section two on the 6 consciousnesses (616c.8-617a.4) and section three on the two factors shamelessness and disregard (617a.5-b.7).

In the second division, there are thirteen sections in which each factor is analyzed in dyads in terms of its association/dissociation with the elements, senses and aggregates. As with the previous division, I will outline in detail only the first of these sections.

Section Four: The Factors Arising with Every Feeling
(Second division, First section: 617b.12-619a.15): 79 dyads
A. Factors Arising with Every Awareness (9 dyads)

1. Association and Dissociation with Feelings and Identifyings

How many of the eighteen elements, twelve senses and five aggregates are included in what is associated with feeling? Eight elements (six consciousness elements, the mental element and the factor element), two senses (the mental sense and factor sense), three aggregates (identification, conditioning, consciousness). What is remaining? Feeling itself, matter, unconditioned factors and conditionings dissociated from awareness associated with eleven elements (five physical senses, five physical objects and the factor element); eleven senses (idem.); and three aggregates [matter, feeling (since feeling itself was excluded) and conditioning (because the conditionings dissociated from awareness were excluded)]. How many of the eighteen elements, twelve senses and five aggregates are included in the dissociated identifications? Identification itself, matter, unconditioned factors and conditionings dissociated from awareness associated with elements (idem.), eleven senses (idem.) and three aggregates (matter, identification and conditioning).

The *Dhātukāya* then transposes this dyad to what is associated

with identifying and/or dissociated from feeling, with the values for each similarly transposed. Associated with identifying are eight elements and two senses (idem. with what is associated with feeling above), and three aggregates (feeling, conditioning, consciousness). The remaining factors are identification itself, matter, unconditioned factors and conditionings dissociated from awareness associated with eleven elements and eleven senses (idem. with what is associated with feeling above), and three aggregates (matter, feeling and conditioning). Associated with what is dissociated from feeling are eleven elements and eleven senses (idem.), and three aggregates (matter, feeling, conditioning).

Rather than giving a complete analysis for the nine remaining dyads between feeling and the other factors arising with every awareness the author simply notes that the analysis should proceed in the same fashion for the other members of that category.

B. Factors Arising with Every Defilement et al. (16 dyads)

1. Associated with Feeling/Dissociated from Lack of Confidence and Associated with Lack of Confidence/Dissociated from Feeling

The values for what is associated with feeling and what is dissociated from feeling here, and in all the following dyads, will be identical with those given in the first dyad of the previous section. Associated with what is dissociated from lack of confidence are all eighteen elements, twelve senses and five aggregates; associated with what is associated with lack of confidence are eight elements and two senses (idem. with what is associated with feeling above), and four aggregates (feeling, identification, conditioning and consciousness), with all eighteen elements, twelve senses and five aggregates remaining. Once again, the author of the *Dhātukāya* simply notes that the same analysis is to be applied for the remaining dyads between factors arising with every feeling and the other factors arising with every defilement, with sensuous desire and repugnance (among the five defilements), mental contact associated with ignorance and mental contact associated neither with understanding nor ignorance (of the five contacts), and shamelessness and disregard (of the five factors), for a total of sixteen separate dyads investigated in this section.

C. Factors Arising with Every Affliction et al. (24 dyads)

1. Associated with Feeling/Dissociated from Anger and Associated with Anger/Dissociated from Feeling

All of the values arrived at are identical with the analysis in the

section on the factors arising with every defilement. The analysis follows in parallel manner for the nine remaining factors arising with every affliction attachment to immaterial things and perplexity (among the five defilements), the five wrong views, mental contact associated with understanding (among the five contacts), and the six cravings, for a total of twenty-four dyads in this section.

D. Sensuous Attachment (1 dyad)

1. Associated with Feeling/Dissociated from Sensuous Attachment and Associated with Sensuous Attachment/ Dissociated from Feeling

What is dissociated from sensuous attachment is associated with all eighteen elements, twelve senses and five aggregates; what is associated with sensuous attachment is associated with six elements (of visual, auditory, bodily, mental consciousness along with the mental element and the factor element), two bases (the mental and factor sense) and four aggregates (excluding matter). There is no comparable analysis for any other mental factor.

E. Repugnance Contact (1 dyad)

1. Associated with Feeling/Dissociated from Repugnance Contact and Associated with Repugnance-Contact/Dissociated from Feeling

What is dissociated from repugnance-contact is associated with thirteen elements (six senses, six sense objects and the mental-consciousness element), twelve senses and five aggregates. What is associated with repugnance contact is associated with seven elements (five nonmental sense consciousnesses, the mental element and the factor element), two bases (mind sense and factor sense) and four aggregates (excluding matter); remaining are thirteen elements, twelve bases and five aggregates as just listed. There is no comparable analysis for any other mental factor.

F. Expressible Contact (1 dyad)

1. Associated with Feeling/Dissociated from Expressible Contact and Associated with Expressible Contact/Dissociated from Feeling

What is dissociated from expressible contact includes seventeen elements (excluding the mental-consciousness element), twelve senses and five aggregates. What is associated with expressible contact includes three elements (mind element, factor element and

mental-consciousness element), two senses (mental sense and factor sense) and four aggregates (excluding matter). There is no comparable analysis.

G. Initial and Sustained Thought (2 dyads)

1. Associated with Feeling/Dissociated from Initial Thought and Associated with Initial Thought/Dissociated from Feeling

What is dissociated from initial thought includes thirteen elements (six senses, six sense objects and the mental consciousness element), twelve and five aggregates. Associated with initial thought includes eight elements (six consciousness elements, the mental element and the factor element), two senses and four aggregates (excluding matter). The analysis is identical for sustained thought.

H. Consciousness (1 dyad)

1. Associated with Feeling/Dissociated from Consciousness and Associated with Consciousness/Dissociated from Feeling.

What is dissociated from consciousness includes eighteen elements, twelve senses and three aggregates (matter, conditioning and consciousness). What is associated with consciousness includes one element (factor element), one sense (factor sense) and three aggregates (feeling, identification and conditioning); remaining are eighteen elements, twelve senses and three aggregates (matter, conditioning and consciousness). There is no comparable analysis.

I. 6 Consciousnesses (6 dyads)

1. Associated with Feeling/Dissociated from Visual Consciousness and Associated with Visual Consciousness/Dissociated from Feeling

What is dissociated from visual consciousness includes all eighteen elements, twelve senses and five aggregates. What is associated with visual consciousness includes one element (factor element), one sense (factor sense) and three aggregates (feeling, identification and conditioning). The same analysis applies for the other five consciousnesses, for a total of six dyads.

J. Six Contacts et al. (18 dyads)

1. Associated with Feeling/Dissociated from Eye Contact and Associated with Eye Contact/Dissociated from Feeling

What is dissociated from eye contact includes seventeen elements

(excluding the visual consciousness element), twelve senses and five aggregates. What is associated with eye contact includes three elements (visual consciousness element, mind-element and factor element), two senses (mind sense and factor sense) and four aggregates (excluding matter). This same analysis applies for the other five contacts, the six identifyings and the six volitions, for a total of eighteen dyads in this section.

For the entire section, we find a total of seventy-nine dyads covered, abbreviated into ten different groups. It should be noted that, in the text itself, no indication is given as to which of the elements, senses and aggregates are implied; a correct understanding of the text would have required either a written commentary on the text or oral instruction from a teacher trained in the traditional interpretation to fill out the bare list of numbers.

For the remaining sections of this second division, I will be content simply to note the awareness-concomitants covered in the section, along with the factors subsumed under that heading in this abbreviated version of the full-length text.

Section Five: Factors Arising with Every Identifying (619a17-620c20)

Section Six: Factors Arising with Every Volition (620c21-621c17)

Section Seven: Factors Arising with Every Contact (621c23-622a19)

Section Eight: Factors Arising with Every Attending (622a20-b18)

Section Nine: Factors Arising with All Interest (622b19-c17)

Section Ten: Factors Arising with Every Resolve (622c18-623a16)

Section Eleven: Factors Arising with All Mindfulness (623a17-b14)

Section Twelve: Factors Arising with Every Concentration (623c15-c14)

Section Thirteen: Factors Arising with Every Intellection (623c15-624a3)

Section Fourteen: Factors Arising with All Lack of Confidence (624a4-29)

Section Fifteen: (624b1-c25)

It is in this section that we find our first major abridgement. The *Dhātukāya* notes laconically that the factors arising with sloth, which logically would have been the subject of this section, is analyzed as in section fourteen and is deleted. Henceforth, the author will only analyze those factors which have some modicum of novelty. Consequently, we find the following sections from the full-length recension passed over: sections 15-23 on the factors arising with every defilement, sections 24-33 on the factors arising with every affliction, sections 34-38 on the 5 defilements, sections 39-43 on the 5 wrong views, sections 44-48 on the 5 contacts, sections 49-53 on the 5 faculties and sections 54-58 on the 5 factors. The author finally takes up in our section fifteen what was actually section 59 in the complete text, on visual consciousness. Concluding that analysis, he notes that the following mental factors are to be analyzed in a similar fashion, and deletes them: sections 60-64 on the remaining consciousnesses and sections 65-70 on the 6 contacts.

Section Sixteen: (624c26-625c2)

The author here takes up the first of the 6 feelings, the feeling born of eye-contact, which would have been section 71 in the full-length text. Completing that analysis, he notes that the following awarenesses are to be analyzed in a similar fashion, and deletes them: sections 72-76 on the remaining feelings, sections 77-82 on the 6 identifyings, sections 83-88 on the 6 volitions. Hence, as the author informs us in the opening verse of the *Vibhajyavarga* (616b.1-4)[15], the complete text of the *Dhātukāya* was in eighty-eight sections, which have sensibly been reduced in this recension to a mere sixteen.

15

DHĀTUKATHĀ

Summary by Karl H. Potter

As in the case of the other Abhidharma treatises of the Theravāda tradition, scholarly opinions vary regarding the date of the *Dhātukathā*. H. Saddhatissa[1] thinks it was recited at the 3rd Council during Aśoka's reign. Hajime Nakamura[2] finds it contemporaneous with *Kathāvatthu* but coming after the *Puggalapaññatti*, *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and *Vibhaṅga*. André Bareau[3] believes it must be in the 1st century B.C., contemporaneous with the third part of the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* and the corresponding section of the *Prakaraṇapāda*. Its authorship is likewise unknown.

The work has been edited a number of times: with Buddhaghoṣa's commentary by Edmund Rowland Jayatileka Gunaratne for the Pali Text Society in London, 1892, this edition being our "E"; with the *Puggalapaññatti* by D.S. Mahathera and V. Sarman in 1960; by M. Tiwari in 1968. An English translation, our "T", was prepared by Narada and Thein Nyun under the title *Discourse on Elements*, Pali Text Society Translation Series 34, London 1962. There are summaries in the Tiwari edition cited above, and by J. Kashyap in the Introduction to the 1960 edition as well as in his *Abhidhamma Philosophy*.

As with the other Theravāda works, a list of headings is first provided, which proposes fourteen modes of analysis for some 105 topics, as well as an analysis of the common principles and characteristics of the modes proposed, and concludes with a recapitulation of the 122 triplets and pairs expounded in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. The chapters of the work then proceed in accordance with the organization into fourteen chapters. The 105 topics listed here are as follows: 5 aggregates, 12 senses, 18 elements, 4 truths, 22 faculties, 28 aspects of the chain of dependent origination, 4 applications of mindfulness, 4 right efforts, 4 supernatural powers, 4 meditative stages, 4 things unlimited (in scope), 5 faculties, 5 powers, 7 factors

of enlightenment, the eightfold path, contact, feeling, identification, volition, awareness, determination, attention.

As Frauwallner points out,[4] Louis de la Vallée Poussin refers to the kinship between the *Dhātukāya* and the *Dhātukathā*. "Both works show the same construction. In both a *mātṛkā* stands at the head, the topics of which are then discussed from the standpoints of connection and comprehension..." But there are also clear differences. "The *mātṛkā* that forms the basis for the explanations is different in each text. At the discussion of "connection" the *Dhātukāya* asks about the *dharmas* of the *mātṛkā* "With which other *dharmas* of the *mātṛkā* are these connected?" The *Dhātukathā* asks only about the connections with the *dhātus*, *āyatanas* and *skandhas* ... The more complicated questions of the *Dhātukathā* are omitted (in the *Dhātukāya*)... Thus the determination of the connection between the two works is uncertain."

Frauwallner points out that Chapter Four of the *Prakaraṇapāda* includes a portion of the *Dhātukāya*. He concludes, after some discussion of details, that the *Prakaraṇa* version agrees with the *Dhātukathā* rather than the *Dhātukāya*, but thinks this does not mitigate against the general kinship of all three works.

All of this relates mainly to the first sections of the two works. When we examine the second sections it is evident, Frauwallner thinks, that the *Dhātukāya* has been extensively reworked, while the *Dhātukathā*, it is probable, has remained essentially as it was originally.

Frauwallner concludes from his discussion that the two works from the Pali and Sarvāstivādin literature go back to a common source. He rejects the idea that they are two versions of the same text. The texts work with different matrices and show other important divergences.

Chapter I: Inclusion and Exclusion
Section One: Aggregates

(E1-4; T1-3) Matter is included in a group with 1 aggregate (matter itself), 11 senses (of vision, audition, olfaction, gustation and touch, the 5 contents corresponding to those, and the factor sense), and 11 elements (the same list). Feeling is included in a group with 1 aggregate (feeling itself), 1 sense (the factor sense), and 1 element (the factor element).

Identification is included in a group with 1 aggregate (itself), 1 sense (the factor sense), and 1 element (the factor element).

Conditioning is included in a group with 1 aggregate, 1 sense, 1 element, as the two previous.

Consciousness is included in a group with 1 aggregate (itself), 1 sense (the mental sense), and 7 elements (those of visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual consciousness, the mental element and the mind-consciousness element).

By elimination, the factors which each aggregate excludes are identified.

Next, four pairs (matter plus each of the other aggregates) are studied in the same manner—so that the pair matter/feeling is included in 2 aggregates, 11 senses and 11 elements, etc.

Then three triplets (matter, feeling, and each of the remaining three aggregates in combination with those two) are studied likewise.

Then two sets of four (the first three aggregates plus each of the remaining two).

Then all five aggregates.

Section Two: Senses

(E5-6; T3-5) A similar study is made of each of the senses, taken singly, in pairs (visual combined with each of the other 11 bases), and by all 12.

Section Three: Elements

(E6-8; T5-6) And the elements are studied in the same manner, singly, in pairs (visual combined with each of the other 17 elements), and by all 18.

Section Four: Truths

(E8-10; T7-8) The truth of frustration is included in a group with 5 aggregates, 12 senses, 18 elements. The truth of the origin of frustration is included in a group with 1 aggregate, 1 sense and 1 element. So is the fourth truth, of the eightfold path. The third truth, of the cessation of frustration, is included in a group with no aggregate (since liberation falls within no aggregate), 1 sense and 1 element. The same information is conveyed by analysis into pairs, triplets and quadruples.

Section Five: Faculties

(E10-13; T8-10) The same treatment is provided for the 22 faculties. Each of them is included in a group with 1 aggregate, 1 sense and 1 element, except for the life faculty, which is included in a group with 2 aggregates, and the mental faculty, which is included

in a group with 7 elements. Again, analysis by pairs, triplets, etc., up to 22's.

Section Six: The Remaining Factors

(E13-16; T10-12) The remaining factors in the list of headings are now studied in the same manner. The 28 aspects of dependent origination are generated by the 12 standard items beginning with ignorance and ending with old age and death, but increased by the distinctions among a number of types of states of being, viz., karmic states of being, rebirth states of being, sensuous states of being, material states of being, immaterial states of being, identifying states of being, nonidentifying states of being, states of being neither identifying nor nonidentifying, single-aggregate states of being, quadruple-aggregate states of being and quintuple-aggregate states of being, as well as several added items which accompany the last three members of the chain, viz., sorrow, lamentation, frustration, depression and irritation.

Then the remaining items in the 105 topics (see list of headings) are treated likewise. Tables and charts on pp. 26-35 of T indicate the numbers of aggregates, senses and elements included in each item; the text does not indicate which specific aggregates, senses and elements are encompassed by these numbers.

Section Seven: Triples

(E16-22; T12-16) Now the 22 triples of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* are studied in like manner, i.e. showing how many aggregates, senses and elements each triplet comprehends.

Section Eight: Pairs

(E22-33; T17-26) And the 100 pairs of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* likewise.

Chapter II: Included and Excluded

(E34-35; T54-55) Here the 37 items that, with a comparison group, are included under the same aggregate but not under the same sense or element are identified. Also the 7 items which are included with a comparison group under the same aggregate and the same sense but not under the same element. The discussion proceeds by eight questions and answers, each of which concern those items for which the answers are the same. Thus, for example, the visual sense is included in a group with the remaining items which belong with the material aggregate, but those remaining factors are excluded from

the other four aggregates, from the senses of vision and mind, and from the visual group of the elements plus the seven elements of consciousness. The same is true of 9 other senses and 10 elements. These items are the subject of the first question. The remaining questions concern (2) the group of the 7 elements of consciousness, (3) the group of the 7 faculties, (4) the group of 2 states of being, viz., nonidentifying states of being and single-aggregate states of being, (5) the group consisting of two items, viz., lamentation and the factors which are both visible and reactive, (6) the factors that are invisible and reactive, (7) the visible factors, and (8) the reactive factors, and the derived factors.

A concluding list of all the items discussed in this chapter is appended.

Chapter III: Excluded and Included

(E36-38; T61-63) This chapter discusses some 90 items that are not in a group with a single aggregate but are included in a group with a single sense and a single element. These 90 items are those that do not involve matter or consciousness, since material factors fall under various senses and elements, while consciousness falls under various elements. The 90 items are: 3 aggregates (feeling, identification and conditioning), 3 noble truths (excluding the first), 16 faculties (exclusive of those corresponding with the sense-organs), 14 out of the 28 items in the list of dependent origination, applications of mindfulness, right efforts, things unlimited, 5 faculties, 5 powers, 7 factors of enlightenment, eightfold path, contact, feeling, identification, volition, determination, attention, and then a number of pairs.

Chapter IV: Included and Included

(E39-40; T67-68) Here 69 items are discussed. Each of them is included in a group with the same aggregate, sense and element. The 69 items are: the second and fourth noble truths, 15 faculties, 11 of the dependent origination items, applications of mindfulness, right efforts, unlimited things, 5 faculties, 5 powers, 7 factors of enlightenment, eightfold path, contact, volition, determination, attention, and 30 of the pairs.

Chapter V: Excluded and Excluded

(E41-50; T71-79) Here are discussed 257 items which cannot be included in a group with others having the same aggregate, the same basis and the same element. The 99 factors which can be treated

in this way are those which do not involve both the material and consciousness aggregates. The remaining 158 items which make up the 257 are pairs and triples.

Chapter VI: Association and Dissociation

(E51-62; T83-95) Now 250 items are studied in terms of how many aggregates, senses and elements each is associated with and dissociated from. (An item is said to be "associated" with another when the two arise and cease together, have the same content (if any) and the same basis. When the above is not the case they are "dissociated".) Matter is always dissociated from the four other aggregates, and liberation is always dissociated from these aggregates as well by virtue of the Buddha's say-so. An aggregate excluding matter may be partially dissociated from the other three if they do not satisfy the conditions of association (above). Dissociation is of four varieties: (a) dissociation through meditative state, (b) dissociation through class (e.g., good vs. bad factors, etc.), (c) dissociation in time, and (d) dissociation through stream of consciousness (in one's own stream an item is dissociated from any item in another's stream). This information is supplied in T.

The method of exposition is by question and answer, and is divided into sections relating to (1) aggregates, (2) senses, (3) elements, (4) truths, etc., (5) triples, and (6) pairs.

Chapter VII: Associated and Dissociated

(E63-65; T105-106) Thirty-seven items are considered here. For each, an associated group and a dissociated group of items are identified. The 37 items involve 24 factors and 13 triplets or pairs. The 24 factors in question are those which are either consciousness or mental, viz., the aggregates of feeling, identification, conditioning and consciousness; the mental sense; the consciousness element (having six kinds); the mental consciousness element; the mental faculty; the equanimity faculty; three parts of the dependent origination formula, namely consciousness, contact and feeling; contact; feeling; identification; will; awareness; attention; determination.

Chapter VIII: Dissociated and Associated

(E66; T110) Items dissociated (in the four ways mentioned above) from 97 factors and 227 more triplets and pairs are studied. The question is, with how many aggregates, senses and elements are such dissociated items associated? The answer is, with none. Chapter XIV takes up the same group of items.

Chapter IX: Associated and Associated

(E67-72; T113-118) One hundred twenty items (56 factors, the rest triples and pairs), which are parts of the four aggregates other than matter, are considered here. The group of items that is associated with each item in turn is related to the number of aggregates, senses and elements associated with that group.

Chapter X: Dissociated and Dissociated

(E73-82; T119-127) The 250 items discussed in Chapter VI are the items discussed here too. A group of items dissociated from each is identified and the question then asked, which elements, senses and elements is this group dissociated from.

Chapter XI: Associated and Dissociated from the Included

(E83-85; T129-131) The groups identified under the same aggregate, sense and element in Chapter IV are now treated under association and dissociation as in Chapter VI.

Chapter XII: Included and Excluded Relating to the Associated

(E86-92; T133-137) The items identified as groups by the method of Chapter IX are studied as to whether they are included in or excluded from the aggregates, senses and elements.

Chapter XIII: Associated and Dissociated Relating to the Excluded

(E93-97; T139-142) The groups of items identified in Chapter V are now treated by the method of Chapter VI.

Chapter XIV: Included and Excluded Relating to the Dissociated

(E98-113; T144-155) The items identified by the method of Chapter VIII are now considered as to whether they are included in or excluded from the aggregates, senses and elements.

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VIJÑĀNAKĀYA

The date of this Sarvāstivāda text has been variously estimated between 200 B.C. to 75 A.D. Several scholars find it closely related to the *Jñānaprasthāna*, and it would seem to be datable close to the time of that work, with which it shares some features.

The work is only available in a translation made by Hsüan-tsang in 649, according to tradition. Hsüan-tsang says that it was composed in Visoka near Śrāvastī. It is only partly translated. The first and second of its six chapters are available in French translation by Louis de la Vallée Poussin as "La Controverse du Temps et du Pudgala dans le Vijñānakāya", from *Études asiatiques oubliées a l'occasion du 25e anniversaire de l'École-francaise de l'Estreme Orient*, Volume One (Paris 1925), pp. 343-76. This translation is referred to below as "TP". Fumimaro Watanabe provides as English rendering of a portion of the second chapter in *Philosophy and Its Development in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma* (Delhi 1983), signified here by "TW" page references. In some cases Watanabe is quoted verbatim with technical terms made consistent with the present volume's translations, in other cases translations provided by him are summarized by the editor (Potter).

Chapter I: Maudgalyāyana

(TP346-348; TW175-176) The monk Maudgalyāyana is represented as asserting that the past and future do not exist, but that the present and unconditioned do exist. A series of criticisms of this are presented, each following much the same pattern. First, in most cases, the Buddha's words are cited and Maudgalyāyana is asked if he agrees. He says he does. Now, the argument continues, is the Buddha speaking of things past, present or future? If the answer is that he is speaking of past or future things, then to also hold, as Maudgalyāyana says he does, that the past or future do not exist

is self-contradictory. If he accepts past and future but denies present existence certain implications (differing case by case) are generated which are either inconsistent among themselves or contradict something evidently true or clearly maintained by the Buddha. This pattern of reasoning is applied in a series of sections as follows.

Section 1

1. Attachment, the root of evil, is bad. But is this attachment past, present or future? It must be admitted that past and future attachment exist. If they are denied, attachment must be always present, never past or future. But then what is the temporal locus of that to which one becomes attached? Finally, suppose Maudgalyāyana denies the existence of all three, past, present and future. This will undermine the very point of Buddhist teaching: there can be no bondage and no liberation. Similar argument can be addressed against the denial of hatred and delusion.

2. Illustrations are provided of the distinction between elements taught by the Buddha to be good or bad respectively.

Section 2

The general line of argument is adduced to show that the following topics of the Buddha's teaching require admission of past and future: the four floods, *yogas*, grasping, the knots and obstructions.

Section 3

1. The Buddha talks of fetters having been gained or lost, born or destroyed. The general pattern of argument is applied to show that unless past, present and future exist the Buddha's words must be rejected, and this is unacceptable.

2. When one has gained the first obstruction, of interest in sensual pleasure, he realizes it. This implies temporal passage. Likewise for the other obstructions.

3. Awakeners to liberation must come to exist, so they were past, are now present, and will be in future.

4. Things desired must come not to be desired. This establishes the necessity of admitting temporal distinctions.

5. If only present and not past or future bodily and mental sensations exist, then one must feel at the same time both bodily and mental sensations, which is impossible.

6. Again, unless temporal discriminations made sense mental

consciousness (i.e. awareness of an awareness) would be impossible. But the Buddha accepted it.

7. Counting and counted must be different, the latter preceding the former.

9. The eighteen ponderings require temporal passage.

Section 4

1. The Buddha speaks of the discernment of something discerned, of consciousness as distinct from its content.

2. Speech requires a distinction between something about which we speak and the speaking of it. They cannot be simultaneous.

3. The Buddha distinguishes different results for different levels of excellence of the senses. This would be inexplicable if all the senses operated together at one time.

4. The waning of desire, required for meditative ascertainment, must occupy a time after one has desired. Otherwise no cessation can occur.

5. Unless shame is followed by respect meditative ascertainment is not possible.

6. The distinctions of stages of perfected being require temporal passage.

7. Do the nonidentifying gods eat food? If they do so at present, they are not nonidentifying. If not at all, the Buddha was wrong when he said that all beings require food.

8. Cognition requires a thing's existence before awareness of it. Otherwise no knowledge is possible, and liberation is unattainable.

9. It takes time to abandon the impure influences.

Chapter II: Person
Section 1: Transmigration into Five Courses

(TP358-361; TW177-180) The believer in persons (*pudgalavādin*) believes that the person exists in the highest, ultimate sense. The believer in emptiness (i.e. the one who denies persons) (*śūnyatāvādin*) argues that if the Buddha was correct in teaching that there are five future courses—viz., purgatory, animal, the dead, gods and humans—and that they are different, then it cannot be the same person who dies in one and is reborn in another. So either the Pudgalavādin must deny this teaching of the Buddha or he must give up his thesis.

Suppose the Pudgalavādin says the following: It is wrong to say that a person living and dying in purgatory is the same as a person reborn as an animal, but it is also wrong to say that these persons

are different. The Śūnyatāvādin answers that in that case the Pudgalavādin should admit that it is impossible for him to assert either that the person persists or that (s)he doesn't.

The same argument is now reviewed with respect to the relation between an (alleged) person in purgatory and one in the human course. If the Pudgalavādin asserts that it is the same person who is reborn as a man, he should be willing to admit that purgatory is the same as the human course. But there are functions—the five faculties, five powers and seven conditions of enlightenment—which operate in humans and not in beings in purgatory, and so these courses must be different. So the Śūnyatāvādin concludes that the persons in these two courses must be different, contrary to the Pudgalavādin's assertion.

Now suppose the Pudgalavādin changes his assertion. He now asserts that the person in purgatory *is* different from the one reborn as a human being. The Śūnyatāvādin points out that this too is unreasonable, since if the person is destroyed in purgatory, (s)he cannot be reborn as a human, nor can anyone be reborn as a human: rebirth requires persistence.

These lines of argument are rehearsed as pertaining to the identity or difference of a person as between each of the five courses.

Section 2: Eight Kinds of Person *re* Stages on the Path

(TP361-363; TW184-187) Pudgalavādin: There is a person in the highest, ultimate sense.

Śūnyatāvādin: But the Buddha teaches that there are eight different kinds of persons, viz., one who is getting the result of stream-entering, another who has entered the stream, another who is becoming a once-returner, another who has become a once-returner, another who is becoming a nonreturner, another who has become a nonreturner, another who is becoming a perfected being and another who is a perfected being. Do you accept that these are different persons?

Pudgalavādin: Yes.

Śūnyatāvādin: And does the first kind of person, the one becoming a stream-enterer, become a stream-enterer?

Pudgalavādin: Yes.

Śūnyatāvādin: Then you are involved in inconsistency, since you hold that the same ultimately real person is both the same as and different from himself. You cannot hold either that the person who is entering the stream and who has entered are the same, since then the one who is seeking the fruit will have already received it, and you cannot hold that the persons are different, since then the one

person will cease to exist when the other one comes into existence, which contradicts your original thesis that the person exists in the ultimate sense.

Pudgalavādin: Then it must be that it is impossible to say that the person who is the one entering the stream and the one who has entered it are the same or that they are different.

Śūnyatāvādin: Then you must admit that it is impossible to say that the ultimately real person is the same as himself.

The last part follows the pattern of the previous part of Section 2, except that now the question relates to the identity or difference between the one who is becoming a non-returner and the one who has become a non-returner.

Section 3: The Person in Three Groups

(TP363-364; TW187) This 'deals with the person in three groups, namely: (1) group of wrongness (*mithyātvaniyatarāśi*), (2) group of rightness (*samyaktvaniyatarāśi*) and (3) group of the undetermined (*aniyatarāśi*). This section is explained in the same way as Sections 1 and 2.'[1]

Section 4: Three Types of Person *re* Training

(TP364; TW187-189) The Pudgalavādin asserts the reality of the person as before.

Śūnyatāvādin: The Buddha teaches that there are three types of persons: (1) a seeker, (2) one who is not (is no longer) a seeker, (3) one who is neither a seeker nor no longer a seeker. Was he correct?

Pudgalavādin: Yes.

Śūnyatāvādin: And isn't it the case that the seeker learns and so is no longer a seeker, but again becomes a seeker (at the next stage)?

Pudgalavādin: Yes.

Śūnyatāvādin: But does one who is neither a seeker nor an achiever become one who is neither, or vice versa?

Pudgalavādin: No.

Śūnyatāvādin: Then what you say is inconsistent. If there is a real, ultimately existent person then either you should deny that the same person is first a seeker, then an achiever, etc., or you should admit that the one who is neither is the same as the one who is either achiever or seeker.

Section 5: Persons and Karma

(TP364-366; TW189-193) Pudgalavādin: There exists such a

thing as a self, a being, a living being, a man, a person. This person performs actions which conduce either to satisfying, frustrating or neutral feelings depending on the feature of the acts.

Śūnyatāvādin: Are satisfaction and frustration made by that person or by something else? If they are self-made, then your view contradicts the Buddha's teaching to Timbaruka, to whom he denied that they were self-made. If they are made by another, this contradicts the other part of the Buddha's teaching to Timbaruka when he denied they were made by another.

Furthermore, is the person who performs actions the same as the one that experiences the satisfying, frustrating or neutral result? If so, then you are convicted of eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*) by the Buddha's own teaching when he said "he who performs actions and feels their results falls into the extreme of eternalism".

Section 6: Where Does the Person Exist?

(TP366; TW193-194) Pudgalavādin: Because the person exists among the factors that are seen, heard, sensed and cognized, the mind inquires into what it can obtain and seek.

Śūnyatāvādin: But the Buddha taught the monk Arittha: "Whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, obtained or sought and inquired into must be regarded as 'not mine, not me, not my self'." So what you say violates the Buddha's teachings.

Section 7: Loving Kindness

(TP366-368; TW194-197) Śūnyatāvādin: There is no such thing as an existent, ultimately real person.

Pudgalavādin: Then what supporting object is there that is supposed to display loving kindness?

Śūnyatāvādin: Factors exist, and their nature is designated according to their identification. Thus, the aggregates are the basis of that which displays kindness.

Pudgalavādin: But it is unreasonable to suppose that, if kindness is a function of the aggregates, the Buddha would have taught "in order to make beings happy as he entered into meditation charged with kindness".

Śūnyatāvādin: However, did not the Buddha teach that there are six kinds of consciousness, namely, visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, bodily and mental consciousness?

Pudgalavādin: Yes.

Śūnyatāvādin: With which one of these is kindness connected? If you say, e.g., the first, visual consciousness, then the appropriate supporting basis there is matter, or if it is the second, auditory

consciousness, then the appropriate basis is sound. And so on through the rest, each of which have their appropriate supporting bases none of which account for kindness. So there ought to be a seventh consciousness beyond the six, a consciousness whose basis accounts for kindness. But the Buddha did not recognize any such additional consciousness, and yet he himself exhibited kindness in teaching the wheel of *dharma* confidently in the assembly, having gained enlightenment. If he was enlightened and did not teach a seventh consciousness, should we conclude he was ignorant about it?

Pudgalavādin: No, he must have known the truth.

Śūnyatāvādin: Also, the Buddha told Ānanda that he always explains the 37 headings (4 applications of mindfulness, 4 right exertions, 4 supernatural powers, 5 faculties, 5 powers, 7 awakeners to liberation, 8 parts of the noble path). Yet you say he didn't explain this seventh consciousness. Do you blame him for not teaching completely what he knew?

Pudgalavādin: I do not blame him. Nevertheless, he did know of such a consciousness though he didn't explain it. He himself said (in *Śiṃśapāvanasūtra*) that he hasn't taught everything he understood.

Śūnyatāvādin: But he goes on in the same passage to remark that the things he does not teach are just those things not conducive to good, truth, the religious life or higher faculties, enlightenment or liberation. Therefore if a person existed and the Buddha did not teach about it, and he taught truly, it follows that the notion of person is not conducive to good, truth, the religious life, higher faculties, enlightenment or liberation, and should be rejected. So the person does not exist.

Section 7: Loving Kindness Continued

(TP369; TW197) In this section "the relation between the occurrence of kindness in the four applications of mindfulness and the seven awakeners to liberation and the person is discussed in the same way as above".[2]

Section 8: Is the Person Conditioned or Not Conditioned?

(TP369; TW197) Śūnyatāvādin: If conditioned, then (s)he is subject to birth, impermanence, duration and change. If unconditioned, (s)he is not born, not impermanent, not durable, not changing. You want to claim a third kind of thing, neither conditioned nor unconditioned, as your person. But the Buddha taught that there are only these two classes and no other. Therefore your view is wrong.

Section 9: The Six Consciousnesses and the Person

(TP370-373; TW198-207) It is carefully shown that none of the six kinds of consciousness are the person, nor does the contact that gives rise to each of those kind require the postulation of a person. Likewise, feelings, identifications, and thinking do not require such a postulation. The visual organ, its objects, visual consciousness and visual contact are none of them the person, and it is easily seen how each of the five aggregates arises from these four and their parallels in the other five cognitive realms. Each of the six consciousnesses have their own respective kinds of objects (color and shape for vision, sound for audition, etc.) and cannot cognize each others' objects, though they can identify their own kind of object. So there is no place nor need for a person. The person claimed by the Pudgalavādin does not have a nature such that it could function as any of the consciousnesses or any of the 12 senses for that matter. So, since we never are aware of such a person, it does not exist ultimately.

Chapter III: Conditions as Cause

This chapter "deals with the relations of many types of awareness which might be called mental (active) phenomena (as can be seen in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* in which 89 awarenesses are distinguished). Also this chapter treats of four kinds of condition, namely: (1) cause, (2) directly antecedent, (3) supporting object, and (4) dominant factor, whilst the *Paṭṭhāna* operates with 24 kinds of conditions and the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* explains 33 cause including 10 conditions and the pervasive."[3]

Chapter IV: Condition as Supporting object

"This fourth chapter deals with the problem of cognition and explains the six kinds of consciousness which are in the past, present and future, and which are good, bad, and neither-good-nor-bad, the interrelation of them, etc."[4]

Chapter V: Conjuncts

"The fifth chapter is devoted to epistemological explanations of the 6 consciousnesses, 12 sense-bases, 18 elements, etc."[5]

Chapter VI: Coming Together

"The sixth chapter deals with the mental functions of a person under training and explains the mental phenomena of the perfected being."[6]

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PRAKARAṆAPĀDA

Summary by Christian Lindtner
and
Karl H. Potter

Traditionally this work, one of the six *pādas* of the Sarvāstivāda canon, was composed by Vasumitra in a *stūpa* at Puṣkaravatī.[1] There are two Chinese translations. One was prepared by Hsüan-tsang and is preserved as T.1542, the other by Guṇabhadra and Bodhiyaśas as T.1541. Hajime Nakamura, citing Japanese authorities, believes it was the last of the Sarvāstivāda *pādaśāstras* and that it was emended in about 160-320 A.D. after the compilation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. He remarks that it represents a transition point between the treatises of the middle period of Sarvāstivāda literature and the later commentarial materials.

The first chapter of this work is known as the *Pañcavastuka*. It has survived in Sanskrit fragments and in three ancient Chinese translations: (1) as the first chapter of the *Prakaraṇa* (T. 1541 and T. 1542), and in independent versions by (2) Shih-kao (T. 1557) and (3) Fa-ch'eng (T. 1556). Moreover there is an incomplete Chinese version of an Indian commentary *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā* (T. 1555) ascribed to a certain Dharmatrāta. A single Sanskrit fragment of this has survived. This commentary was probably composed later than the *Mahāvibhāṣā* to which it shows affinity in several cases.

When comparing the *Pañcavastuka*—the original title of which may well, as it appears, have been *Pañcadharmaka*—with other early affiliated Abhidharma works the following picture emerges: Its style instantly reminds one of texts such as *Daśottarasūtra* and *Saṅgītisūtra*, characterized as they are by simple enumerations and brief definitions of the *dharmas* of Buddhism. In its attempt to deal with all the *dharmas* in a systematic way under five basic principles the *Pañcavastuka* is taking over a classification that has its origin in the *Dharmaskandha*, one of the earliest, if not the earliest of the seven

Abhidharma works of the Saravāstivāda school. The historical significance of the *Pañcavastuka*, then, consists in the systematic and rational way in which Vasumitra presents all *dharmas* under five headings. This way of dealing with the basic Buddhist concepts in terms of five actual entities (*vastu*) rather than in terms of five aggregates was to have a great impact upon many later Abhidharma authors without, though, ever completely superseding the traditional canonical five-aggregate classification.

References preceded by 'S' are to the Sanskrit restoration from Chinese by N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Visva-Bharati Annals 10 (Santiniketan 1966).

Chapter One: Pañcavastuka
Summary by Christian Lindtner

There are five kinds of factors: (i) matter, (ii) awareness, (iii) awareness-concomitants, (iv) conditionings dissociated from awareness and (v) the unconditioned. A complete preliminary enumeration of all these factors is given.

I. Matter (S1-3)

Matter comprises (i) the four great elements, i.e. earth (solid), water (fluid), fire (heat) and wind (movement), (ii) eleven material derivatives (*upādāyarūpa*), i.e. eye, ear, nose, tongue, body (all are subtle matter); visible matter (color and shape), sound, smell, taste and a part of the tangible derived matter (viz., softness, hardness, weight, lightness, coldness, hunger and thirst), and (iii) the unmanifest (*avijñapti*).

II. Awareness (S1-3)

"Awareness" (*citta*) is a synonym for "mind" (*manas*) and "consciousness" (*vijñāna*). It is awareness of an object (*prativijñapti*) that occurs dependent on the six sense-faculties and their respective objects, i.e. visible matter, sound, etc.

III. Awareness-Concomitants (S1-11)

The awareness-concomitants are those factors that are associated with awareness. They are enumerated and briefly defined as follows:

1. Feeling. They may be satisfying, frustrating or neither.
2. Identification. May be small, big or immeasurable.
3. Thinking. An activity created by awareness; may be good, bad

or neutral.

4. Contact. May be satisfying, frustrating or neutral.
5. Attention.
6. Interest.
7. Resolve.
8. Faith.
9. Energy.
10. Memory.
11. Concentration.
12. Wisdom. Determination of factors.
13. Initial thought.
14. Sustained thought.
15. Heedlessness.
16. Heedfulness.
17. Three good roots, viz., (i) nongreed, (ii) nonhatred and (iii) nondelusion.
18. Four neutral roots, viz., (i) desire, (ii) views, (iii) pride and (iv) ignorance.
19. Nine fetters, viz., (i) affection, (ii) hostility, (iii) conceit, of which there are seven kinds, (iv) ignorance, (v) views, of which there are three kinds, (vi) overestimation, (vii) doubt, (viii) jealousy and (ix) stinginess.
20. Three bondages, viz., (i) greed, (ii) hatred and (iii) delusion.
21. Seven kinds of contaminants, viz., (i) sensual passion (comprises 5 kinds), (ii) enmity (5 kinds), (iii) thirst for existence (10 kinds), (iv) pride (15 kinds), (v) ignorance (15 kinds), (vi) wrong view (36 kinds) and (vii) doubt (12 kinds).
22. Afflictions. Refers to the same as the contaminants.
23. Eight envelopers, viz., (i) langor, (ii) torpor, (iii) excitation, (iv) malice, (v) jealousy, (vi) stinginess, (vii) shamelessness and (viii) disregard.
24. Ten awarenesses.
25. Vision. Refers to the eight kinds of patience.
26. Higher realization. A cognitive vision.

The author concludes by saying that other similar phenomena can also be regarded as awareness-concomitants.

IV. Conditionings Dissociated From Awareness (S2; 11-12)

Moreover, some factors are dissociated from awareness:

1. Acquisition-force
2. Trance free from conceptual identification,
3. The cessation trance
4. Those not involving identification

5. Life-force
6. Homogeneity-force
7. Obtainment of a locus
8. Obtainment of entities
9. Obtainment of a sense-base
10. Birth
11. Aging
12. Duration
13. Noneternality
14. Collection of words, and finally
15. Collection of phrases.

V. The Unconditioned (S2, 12)

There are three unconditioned things, viz.:
1. Space
2. Uncalculated cessation and
3. Calculated cessation.

Chapter Two: Ten Kinds of Awareness[2]

(T.1541, p. 628c28-631b23; T.1542, p. 694b3-696b13) These are the same ten that are discussed in Chapter 1, Section Two, and also in the seventh chapter of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa.* The discussion follows the style of the *Vijñānakāya.* It is asked which supporting object each awareness has and why it has that object; to what extent is each awareness contained in others and why this is the case; which awarenesses are impure and which pure, and which have pure or impure objects, and which are conditioned, which unconditioned, and which have conditioned or unconditioned objects.

Chapter Three: The Twelve Sense-Bases

(T.5141, p. 631c5-634a9; T.1542, p. 696b14-698b26) Again the discussion follows a property-matrix that exhibits far-reaching similarities with the matrix found in the various forms of the *Pañca-skandha.*

Chapter Four: Seven Categories

(T.1541, p. 634a10-636c28; T.1542, p. 698b27-702a6) This section repeats the first part of the *Dhātukāya*, enumerating groups of factors and explaining them in the same fashion. Indeed so close

is the resemblance that the differences are miniscule. The only difference is a list of ten good generally permeating factors, viz., (1) faith, (2) energy, (3) shame, (4) scruple, (5) absence of greed, (6) lack of hatred, (7) tranquility, (8) equanimity, (9) heedfulness, and (10) kindness. This list is added to the list of 12 sense-bases, 5 aggregates, 10 generally permeating factors, 10 defiling permeating factors, and 10 limited defiling permeating factors found in the *Dhātukāya*.

Chapter Five: Ninety-Eight Contaminants

(T.1541, p. 637a5-644a23; T.1542, p. 702a7-711b5) Thirty-six of these are confined to the realm of desire, 31 to the material realm, the remaining 31 to the immaterial realm.

Chapter Six: What can be Known or Inferred

(T.1541, p. 644b5-662c26; T.1542, p. 711b6-733a16) The treatment here resembles that found in the third and fourth chapter of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, except that where the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* contents itself with groups of pairs drawn from the *Saṇgītisūtra*, this treatment begins from small groups of threes and develops in no particular oder into groups of larger number. Frauwallner notes that here and in the following two chapters similarities can be found with the matrix in use in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

Chapter Seven: 1,000 Questions

(T.1541, p. 663a5-688c10; T.1542, p. 733a17-765c25) Here it is the *Dharmaskandha*'s *mātṛkā* that is used as basis. There are a few slight changes for comparisons between the *mātṛkās* of the two texts.

Chapter Eight: Resumė of the Work

(T.1541, p. 688c11-692a23; T.1542, p. 766a4-770a19) This chapter provides nothing new, merely summarizing what has gone before.

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PEṬAKOPADESA

Summary by George D. Bond

This work is closely related to the *Nettippakaraṇa*, and both works appear to have been composed around 150 B.C., although the dating is a matter of some debate. Several writers (Mrs. Rhys Davids, B.C. Law, Hajime Nakamura[1]) feel that the *Nettippakaraṇa* precedes the *Paṭṭhāna*. Mrs. Rhys Davids wrote a whole article (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1925, 111-13), in which she argues that the author of the *Netti* didn't know the *Paṭṭhāna*. However, this fact might alternatively be explained as Nakamura reports Kogen Mizuno to explain it: "K. Midzuno (sic) conjectures that this work (the *Netti*) was originally not of Pali Buddhism, but that it was later adapted by it." We may hazard that the work was in existence in some form by the 2nd century B.C.—beyond that evidence is not available at this point.

This text, as well as the *Nettippakaraṇa*, is traditionally attributed to Mahākaccāyana. It has been edited by Aravinda Basu in the Pali Text Society in 1948 ("E" references below), and was translated as *The Piṭaka-Disclosures* by Bhikkhu Nanamoli, also for the Pali Text Society, in 1964 (= "T").

Chapter One

(I) (E1-22; T1-26) Explanation of the Noble Truths

There are two conditions for the arising of right view for a hearer: another's utterance of truth in proper order, and one's own reasoned attention. This connection between hearing the truth explained properly and experiencing the truth leads to the need for a method of interpreting passages.

In order to explain the consecutive order or logic of the *dharma*, as seen in the passages, one must understand the following aspects:

(I.1) Sixteen Categories

Teaching

Investigation
Logical Ground
Footing
Characteristic mark
Fourfold Arrangement
Conversion
Analysis
Turning Back
Synonyms
Mere Designations
Descending
Clearing Up
Support
Requisites
Coordination.

(I.2) Five Guidelines
Conversion of Pleasure
Trefoil
Play of Lions
Plotting of Directions
The Hook.

(I.3) Eighteen Root Terms
Ignorance
Desire
Greed
Hatred
Delusion
Identification of Cleanliness
Identification of Satisfaction
Identification of Eternality
Identification of Self
Peace
Insight
Nongreed
Nonhate
Nondelusion
Identification of Foulness
Identification of Frustrations
Identification of Noneternality
Identification of No-Self.

These root terms can be correlated with the four truths. The first nine represent unprofitable root terms and are equivalent to the origin of frustration. The second nine are profitable and equivalent to the path. In order to understand the noble truths, one must coordinate

the meaning and phrasing terms in the passage.

(I.4) (E5-6; T6-8) Characteristic Marks of the Truths

Frustration is analyzed into fifteen subcategories: birth, aging, sickness, death, sorrow, lamentation, frustration, grief, despair, association with the unpleasant, separation from the beloved, not attaining, the five aggregates, aging and death, and desease and reappearance. The other three truths are origin, cessation and the path. (Short definitions are given for each of these aspects of the truths.)

(I.5) (E6-22; T8-26) Passages Exemplifying These Truths

(Here short passages are cited illustrating the kinds of teachings represented by all the truths listed above. These passages demonstrate how the logic of the *dharma* should be understood.) Wherever the truths are expressed, having identified them through their characteristic features (parallel ideas), one can use unbounded phrasing to express the true meaning of a teaching. (That is, when one reads/hears passages, one can interpret them properly by extrapolating from them to the four truths by means of characteristics and root terms.)

Chapter Two

(II) (E23-59; T26-76) Foundation of the Dispensation

(This chapter comprises three subject classifications for passages. Those represent three alternative and overlapping classification systems to identify the meaning of the passages.)

(II.1) (E23-43; T26-57) First Classification of Types of Passages

The first classification divides passages into four main types with additional types given because of combinations of these four. There are passages

(II.1.1) dealing with defilement

(II.1.2) dealing with living (in *saṃsāra*)

(II.1.3) dealing with penetration

(II.1.4) dealing with adept

(II.1.5) dealing with defilement and living

(II.1.6) dealing with defilement and penetration

(II.1.7) dealing with defilement, penetration and the adept

(II.1.8) dealing with living and penetration.

(A short passage exemplifying each of these types is given. Following these examples, explanations of each type are given.)

(1) Defilement is of three kinds: defilement by desire, defilement by view, defilement by wrong conduct.

(2) Passages dealing with living (in *saṃsāra*) concern virtue and good conduct here and now and in future existence.

(3) Passages dealing with penetration explain that those who overcome the hindrances abandon embodiment-view and attain the goal. There are two types of persons who attain the noble *dhamma*: faith-followers and *dharma*-followers. These two types of persons give rise to other classifications of persons on the Path. The faith-follower is (A) guidable, and the *dharma*-follower is (B) one who learns from a condensed teaching.

The one who learns from a condensed teaching (type B) takes two forms: (B1) with keen faculties, (B2) with dull faculties.

Likewise the guidable type (A) takes two forms: (A1) with keen faculties and (A2) with dull faculties.

Type B2 and A1 can also be grouped together to form a third major type, (C) the type of person that learns from what is expanded. Thus, there are three major types of persons, types A2, B1 and C.

These three types of persons when following of the path attain different levels of stream entry when reaching the plane of vision. The three types attain the following levels:

Type B—who learns by condensed teaching—becomes a single-seeder, the first kind of stream enterer,

Type C—who learns from an expanded teaching—becomes a clan to clan, the second kind of stream enterer,

Type A—the guidable—becomes a seven times at most, the third kind of stream enterer.

(4) Passages dealing with the adept concern the way of the noble persons.

These three types of persons (A, B and C) on reaching the fruit of nonreturn attain various levels of non-returnerhood.

Type B1—who learns by a condensed teaching—becomes either (i) one who attains release early or (ii) one who attains release after reducing the time of rebirths.

Type C—who learns from what is expanded—becomes either (iii) one who attains release without conditioning factors or (iv) one who attains release with conditioning factors.

Type A—who is guidable—becomes (v) one who goes up stream to the *akaniṣṭha* gods.

Or alternatively these three types of persons can be equated with the five types of nonreturners as follows:

B1 = (i)

B2 = (ii)

C1 = (iii) [N.B. The previous discussion did not actually divide those who learn from what is expanded into the two groups of keen-facultied and dull-facultied, but this distinction is used here.]

C2 = (iv)

A = (v)

Thus there are nine kinds of learners: these five nonreturners, the once-returner and three stream enterers. There are also nine kinds of perfect beings. The three basic types of persons on attaining perfection become the following kinds of perfected beings:

B1—condensed with keen faculties—becomes two kinds
- (a) Both ways liberated
- (b) Liberated by wisdom

B2—condensed with dull faculties—becomes two kinds
- (c) Waiting an aeon
- (d) Penetrator

C1—expanded with keen faculties—becomes two kinds
- (e) Able by choice
- (f) Able by guarding

C2—expanded with dull faculties—becomes two kinds
- (g) No-liberation-attainer if he seeks it, liberation-attainer if he does not seek it
- (h) No-liberation-attainer if he guards it, liberation-attainer if he does not guard it

A—the guidable—becomes either one liable to fall away or one certain in action or even-headed.

(E32-39; T39-49) Ten Powers of a Buddha

In perfected beings the ten fold power of a Buddha occurs. The ten-fold power is as follows:

(1) Knowledge of the possible and the impossible
(2) Knowledge of the path leading to the welfare of all
(3) Knowledge of difference of belief
(4) Knowledge of different elements
(5) Knowledge of ripening of action
(6) Knowledge of defilement and cleansing in all the undertakings of action
(7) Knowledge of variety in the faculties, powers and energies of other persons
(8) Knowledge of his own previous lives
(9) Divine eye
(10) Knowledge of exhaustion of intoxicants.

Established in these ten powers, the Buddha teaches with five kinds of teaching: corruption, living in *saṃsāra*, seeing, spiritual practice, and the adept.

(Rather than continuing to explain the other possible combinations of these four (now five) passage themes, the author ends the exemplification here.)

These passages are taught to or for three kinds of persons, the ordinary person, the learner and the adept. The five basic kinds of passages (given above) can be reduced to the four basic kinds. The

four kinds fall into three kinds: relating to the ordinary person, the learner and the adept. When abbreviated, these come to two types of passages: that dealing with penetration and that dealing with former connection.

(II.2) (E43-48; T57-63) Second Classification of Types of Passages

Passages can also be categorized according to these types:

(II.2.1) Injunction
(II.2.2) Fruition
(II.2.3) Means
(II.2.4) Injunction and fruition
(II.2.5) Fruition and means
(II.2.6) Injunction, fruition and means
(II.2.7) Gratification
(II.2.8) Disadvantage
(II.2.9) Escape
(II.2.10) Gratification and disadvantage
(II.2.11) Gratification and escape
(II.2.12) Disadvantage and escape
(II.2.13) Gratification, disadvantage and escape.

(II.3) (E48-59; T63-76) Third Classification of Passages

(Short passages given to illustrate the following types of passages. No analysis beyond the passages in given.)

(II.3.1) Associated with the mundane plane
(II.3.2) Associated with supramundane plane
(II.3.3) Associated with mundane and supramundane
(II.3.4) Passages on karma
(II.3.5) Passages on ripening of karma
(II.3.6) Passages on karma and ripening
(II.3.7) Passages that are demonstrated
(II.3.8) Passages that are undemonstrated
(II.3.9) Passages demonstrated and undemonstrated
(II.3.10) Passages on knowledge
(II.3.11) Passages on the knowable
(II.3.12) Passages on knowledge and the knowable
(II.3.13) Passages on seeing
(II.3.14) Passages on spiritual practice
(II.3.15) Passages on seeing and spiritual practice
(II.3.16) Passages on ideas inseparable from ripening
(II.3.17) Passages on ideas not inseparable from ripening
(II.3.18) Passages on both of the preceding (16 and 17)
(II.3.19) Passages on our own word
(II.3.20) Passages on another's word
(II.3.21) Passages on both of the preceding (19 and 20)

(II.3.22) Passages on abodes of beings
(II.3.23) Passages expressing the *dharma*
(II.3.24) Passages on both of the preceding (22 and 23)
(II.3.25) Passages on eulogy
(II.3.26) Passages on the permitted
(II.3.27) Passages on the rejected
(II.3.28) Passages on both of the preceding (26 and 27).

Chapter Three

(III) (E60-73; T77-94) Terms of Expression in Passages
This chapter presents another scheme for classifying passages. Passages can be divided into three groups: (1) dealing with three profitable and three unprofitable roots, (2) dealing with three kinds of action, (3) dealing with the five sense-faculties.
(III.1) (E60-69; T77-89) The Six Roots
Passages on delusion, anger, attachment, nongreed, nonanger and nondelusion. (For each of these types of passages, a short example is given.)
Each of these kinds of passages should be analyzed for three elements essential to the Buddha's teaching style: outcome, cause and fruition. (The chapter analyzed the passages' illustrations with these three ideas to show how they identify the meaning of a passage.)
(III.2) (E69-70; T89-90) Three Kinds of Action
Passages also fall into the following three types depending upon the action they demonstrate: passages on bodily action, *sūtras* on speech action and on mental action.
(III.3) (E70-73; T90-94) Five Faculties
Passages express the five faculties: faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom.

Chapter Four

(IV) (E74-80; T95-104) Investigation of Passages
Investigation and construing of passages involve these four kinds of activity:
(IV.1) Investigation and construing of passages as profitable and unprofitable. A passage must be scrutinized as to profitable ideas in proper order. Unprofitable ideas should be coordinated with profitable ideas that counteract them and bring them to abandonment. But note that not all profitable ideas counteract all unprofitable ideas. For example, friendship does not counteract lust. If a passage is not construable in accord with the known meaning of the passages, then

it cannot be accepted. This is what is prescribed in the four great authorities.

(IV.2) Investigation and Construing of Passages by Conditions

The causes and conditions for ideas—profitable and unprofitable—must also be investigated. Three kinds of conditions, slight, medium and extraordinary. In addition to the condition, the outcome of a passage must also be investigated.

(IV.3) Investigation and Construing of Agreement to the Blessed One's Word

Passages not uttered by the Buddha and seen among the passages must be investigated. Does such a passage agree or disagree with the Buddha's sayings? A passage that agrees can be accepted; one that disagrees cannot.

(IV.4) Confusion of Passages

There are five basic types of passages: namely those dealing with corruption, living in *saṃsāra*, the plane of vision, the plane of developing and the adept. Confusion of the passages occurs whenever passages are classified under the wrong headings and whenever passages are applied to the wrong types of persons. Also when the meaning and phrasing are confused.

Chapter Five

(V) (E81-111; T105-154) Classification of Categories

(V.1) Teaching Category

(This category seems to represent the same aspects of interpretation that were mentioned in Chapter One.)

What is taught? Profit or lack of profit? Truths or one part of truths? The interpreter should examine a passage to find explanations of the four truths separately or together as was mentioned in I.5 above. These truths occur in shared or unshared passages in the form of the eighteen terms mentioned above as characteristics (I.4). Frustration can be taught in brief by seven terms: (1) association with what one hates, (2) dissociation from what one loves, (3) bodily frustration, (4) mental frustration, (5) frustration itself, (6) frustration in determinations and (7) frustration in change.

The truths are thus taught in various forms and must be recognized. They are taught in seven and ten terms, and in the fiftyfold foundation of the dispensation, in the eighteenfold terms of expression in *sūtras*, in the tenfold testings of the passage, in the sixteenfold classification of categories and in the twenty-onefold investigation inquiry.

(V.2) (E82-88; T107-116) Category of Investigation

Passages should be investigated or analyzed in four ways: according to term questions, what is asked, what comes before and what after,

and a verse paraphrase.

When investigating the terms one examines how many key terms are used in a passage.

Investigating questions means how many questions the terms imply. Are the questions used of the kind (a) to be answered in one way, (b) to be answered after analysis, (c) to be answered by asking a further question, (d) to be left unanswered?

Investigating what is asked in a passage means noting what the Buddha was asked and how he answered in order to see the logic of his *dharma*.

Investigating what goes before and what after means analyzing the structure of a passage. Does the Buddha answer first what was asked first? What order are the terms in? Once the logical structure is seen, the root terms such as quiet and insight should be found implicit in the passage.

Investigating the paraphrasing verse means comparing the verse with the prose explanations.

(V.3) (E88-89; T116-118) Category of Logical Ground

This category is partially demonstrated in the first two categories. The example given for this category indicates how to construe the passage "Beings are defiled by a cause by a condition . . . and purified by a cause and a condition." Construing in this case involves identifying the causes and conditions for the three aspects of the path: virtue, concentration and understanding. (These causes and conditions are implicit at best in the passage. From the explanation it is not clear whether looking for causes and conditions is essential to this category, or whether—and this is more probable—the example shows how the interpreter uses the passage's mention of causes and conditions as a way of construing the passage in terms of the central *dharma* concepts, virtue, concentration and wisdom.)

This category can also be seen in the four great authorities (above IV.1).

(V.4) (E89-90; T118-120) Category of Footings

Footings are the proximate causes for other ideas. This category explains how the logic of the *dharma* can be used to construe passages in terms of the cardinal ideas. All the examples given here indicate the footings of cardinal unprofitable ideas, e.g., the five faculties are a footing for lust for form. Perception of pleasure is the footing for lust for sensual desires.

(V.5) (E90-91; T120-121) Category of Characteristic Marks

When one idea is expressed, all ideas of like characteristic are therein expreseed. For example, when a passage speaks of mindfulness of the body, it implicitly speaks of the other three foundations

of mindfulness because they share the same characteristic. This category provides another method for establishing word-connections that lead from a particular passage to the four truths and the meaning of the *dharma*.

(V.6) (E91-93; T121-125) Fourfold Arrangement Category

Under this category the interpreter deals with (a) grammar, (b) intention, (c) the source of a teaching and (d) the consecutive-sequence or structure.

Intention and structure or context represent the key ideas in this category. The interpreter must deal with these two aspects of a passage by means of the four headings given here.

(V.7) (E93-95; T25-128) Conversion Category

This category shows how "footings" and "characteristics" can be used first to identify unprofitable root terms or other basic ideas of defilement and then to convert the unprofitable root terms or other basic ideas of defilement and then to convert the unprofitable roots to the profitable ones. The four foundations of mindfulness oppose the four perversions.

The mention of heedlessness in a passage can be seen through footings to imply desire and views. These two concepts represent the four intoxicants. Having definite negative characteristics, these four intoxicants are equivalent to the four graspings: grasping after sensual desire, being, views and self-theory. These equated quadruple views are converted or counteracted by the four foundations of mindfulness which can be further equated with the four noble truths.

This is how conversion should be used in interpretation.

(V.8) (E95; T129) Analysis Category

Whatever is "declarable after analysis", that is the analysis category. The term used here was given above (V.2) as one of the four kinds of questions.

The text gives a very cryptic definition of this category.

(V.9) (E95-96; T129) Turning Back Category

Whereas the previous category was said to include any kind of analysis, this category is said to include any demonstration of opposites. Obviously this is a central idea in the method of interpretation being presented in this text, but the explanation of this category does not clarify the method much further.

(V.10) (E96; T129-130) Synonyms Category

To understand the passage one must see that a single idea can be expressed by many synonyms. For example, the Buddha praised Śāriputra by saying he had great wisdom, joyous wisdom and impulsive wisdom. These are synonyms for wisdom.

Since the Buddha teaches people in their own language—i.e.

according to their own abilities (?)—one must look for synonyms to translate or interpret the language he uses in a given teaching.

(V.11) (E96-98; T130-132) Designations Category

The Buddha teaches by means of various kinds of designation with the designation of the four truths being the basic kind. Other kinds are designation in terms of abandoning and in terms of rejection.

The category says that there are two important kinds of designation: in terms of dependence on another and in terms of dependence on self. These two kinds of dependence are explained as having to do with the relations between ideas rather than the relations of persons. Thus in the case of the four truths, the four faculties are other-dependent on wisdom, but wisdom is self-dependent. Self-dependence represents the end of the chain of footing relations.

(V.12) (E98-101; T132-137) Descending Category

Passages can and must be understood by reading them in the light of (or placing them beside) six ideas: aggregates, elements, senses, faculties, truths and dependent origination. There is no passage of any kind that cannot be compared with, made to agree with one of these ideas. For the whole of the teaching concerns these ideas. (This is perhaps the clearest explanation of the method of interpretation set forth by both the *Peṭakopadesa* and the *Nettippakaraṇa.*)

The example is cited of the aggregate of feeling. Feeling represents the footing for lust, hate and delusion. There are three kinds of feeling: satisfying, frustrating, neither satisfying nor frustrating. These forms of feeling can be compared with and linked with the truth of frustration. Thus one is able to see how a teaching exhibits the truths.

As to elements. The eighteen elements of form constitute the material aggregate, and correlate with the truth of frustration.

There are twelve senses, ten of which have form and also correlate with matter and frustration. The mind sense represents the consciousness category and the factor sense represents the meeting of different factors.

Dependent origination can be seen in passages having three elements, having four elements and having two elements. It can be seen in passages that deal with cause, fruit and outcome. The factors of dependent origination can be divided into three groups to correlate with these three terms. Ignorance, conditionings, desire and grasping are represented by cause. Consciousness, name and form, the sixfold base, contact, feeling are represented by fruit, and being, birth, aging and death are the outcome.

In passages having the four elements of cause, condition, ripening and outcome, the factors of dependent origination can be divided into four corollary groups. Likewise in passages having the two elements of frustration and origin.

(V.13) (E101-102; T138) Clearing-Up Category

In a passage, several verses may express the spirit or ground of the teaching. Therefore one must understand the logic of the passage —the structure of it—to understand which verses must be taken together.

(V.14) (E102-104; T139-142) Support Category

Under this category, ideas are examined according to their unity and their diversity. Unity and diversity are also agent and function. Understanding a basic idea such as form is a unity, and understanding the various kinds of forms, such as the elements of earth, air, fire, water, are a diversity. Again, craving is a unity and craving for sensual desire, craving for being and craving for views are the diverse expressions of this idea.

(V.15) (E104-110; T142-151) Requisites Category

This category looks for the cause and condition of ideas. The cause is the individual essence while the condition is the other essence. The cause is unshared; the condition is shared.

Cause and condition are twofold: immediate and remote. For example, ignorance is the remote condition for name and form, while consciousness is the immediate condition. The linkage between such remote and immediate conditions is central to the logic and functioning of the factor.

Ignorance is a condition for the aggregates for four reasons (four further kinds of conditions):

(a) conditionality because of being born at the same time, which applies when desiring aggregates arise along with ignorance and destroy wisdom;

(b) conditionality because of direct antecedence, which applies when ignorance arises immediately before a state of mind that lacks knowledge;

(c) conditionality because of overflowing, which means that ignorance floods the aggregates as water does a lotus;

(d) conditionality because of being a support, said because the aggregates reach their growth based on ignorance.

The cause of ignorance is prior ignorance and the condition of ignorance is unreasoned attention. The field of ignorance proceeds from these because of noninterruption, fruition, rebirth and renewal of being, noneradication obsession and nonpenetration.

(V.16) (E109-111; T151-154) Coordination Category

This brief category states that the interpreter must look for what has been condensed and for synonyms as well as for coordination. The examples focus on coordination, showing that the ideas in the type of passages dealing with defilement must be coordinated only with the type dealing with defilement. The same sense of coordinating

like ideas with like ideas also applies to passages on living in *saṃsāra* and on penetration.

Chapter Six

(VI) (E112-140; T154-209) Collection of the Meaning of the Passage

This chapter represents a further attempt to clarify the context within which passages have meaning. It offers a tripartite division of the main teachings and the path. In other words, it analyzes the structure of the *dharma*.

(VI.1) (E112-114; T155-156) Part One

The dispensation of the Buddha has three headings: aggregates, elements and senses.

(VI.1.1) (E112; T155) Five Aggregates

The five aggregates in their various manifestations are all diagnosed as impermanent, void, frustrating and without self.

(VI.1.2) (E113; T155-156) Eighteen elements also have these four characteristics.

(VI.1.3) (E113-114; T156-157) Twelve bases also have these four. But these with regard to comprehension divide into two groups: comprehension as knowledge and comprehension as abandonment. Comprehension as knowledge means knowing according to the above four characteristics. But comprehension by abandoning means abandoning desire and craving.

(VI.2) (E114-136; T157-183) Part Two

The schedule for this part lists the contents as follows: truths, higher realization of the truths, determination of defilement, abandoning, planes and fruits of the monk's life, and the elements of liberation.

Higher realization of truth is a heading for the thirtyseven allies of enlightenment: the four foundations of mindfulness down to the noble eightfold path. Also the seven limbs of enlightenment, mindfulness down to equanimity.

The eightfold path has three groupings, namely, virtue, concentration and wisdom. A meditator established in virtue does not grasp unprofitable hate, he removes the underlying tendency to hate, he extracts the arrow of hate, he recognizes frustrating feeling and overcomes the element of sensual desire. One established in concentration does not grasp unprofitable greed and knowing the satisfying feelings overcomes the form element. And one established in wisdom does not grasp delusion and overcomes the immaterial element.

Finally, higher realization of the truths requires a knowledge of dependent origination which is cited and explained.

Defilement can be seen in the nine bad root terms. Two root defilements: ignorance and desire for being. Three bad roots: greed, hate and delusion. Four perversions: perversion of identification, of awareness, of view, which equate with the four wrong identifications.

Abandoning comes about through the nine good root terms: quiet and insight, nongreed, nonhate, nondelusion, and the four right identifications. The five faculties are part of abandoning. The footing for faith is the four factors of stream entering. The footing for energy is the four sight endeavors. The footing for mindfulness is the four applications of mindfulness. The footing for concentration is the four meditative states. The footing for wisdom is the four truths.

The four wheels for abandoning are: (1) living in befitting places, (2) waiting on noble ones, (3) right disposition in self guidance, (4) having formerly made merit.

There are four noble planes and four fruits of the life of a monk. The plane of vision and the fruit of stream entry. The plane of attenuation and the fruit of once returning. The plane of freedom from attachment and the fruit of nonreturn. The plane of one who has done and the perfected being.

(VI.3) (E136-153; T183-204) Part Three

Part Three describes the nine consecutive meditative attainments: four meditative states, four immaterial attainments and the attainment of cessation.

The first meditative state is dissociated from five factors and associated with five factors. It is dissociated from the five hindrances which "hinder" the development of good factors. Interest in sensual interests hinders one from seeing foulness. Ill will hinders one from developing friendliness. Stolidity hinders one from tranquility. Sleepiness hinders one from instigation of energy. Excitedness hinders one from calmness, regret hinders one from nonremorse, and perplexity hinders from wisdom.

The first meditative state is associated with the five factors of initial thought, sustained thought, joy, satisfaction and one-pointedness of mind. The other meditative states are associated with some of the same factors and with some other more purified factors.

Seven types of persons have the five hindrances to their entry into the meditative states. The persons are those of attached conduct, hating conduct, deluded contact, attached and hating conduct, attached and deluded, hating and deluded, and attachment, hate and delusion quieting conduct.

After this (E141 ff.) the author analyzes the four meditative states via a word commentary. Explanations of the five factors associated with the meditative states are given.

Analyżed in detail, the meditative states are described in the following ways: according to their factors; according to their plane —the plane of the first state is that of discernment, the plane of the second is that of satisfaction, the plane of the third is that which has abandoned satisfaction and excitement due to satisfaction, the plane of the fourth is unaccompanied by satisfaction or frustration and accompanied by endeavor. They are also described according to accumulations, according to their reasons for coming about, according to their cause, according to their spiritual practice, according to the reasons for falling away from them, and according to gratification, skill and power.

Chapter Seven

(VII) (E153-241; T210-327) Combined Treatment of the Categories

Organizationally, this chapter applies the sixteen categories from Chapter Five to the eight types of *sūtras* given in Chapter Two, Part One. It does this by taking the eight pairs of *sūtra* quotations cited in Chapter Two as illustrating the eight types of *sūtras* and offers a demonstration exegesis of each one using the sixteen interpretive categories. Thus the chapter is divided according to the eight types of *sūtras*:

(1) on defilement
(2) on living
(3) on penetration
(4) on the adept
(5) on defilement and living
(6) on defilement and penetration
(7) on defilement, penetration and adept
(8) on living and penetration.

Although, on the basis of this structure, the basic intent of this chapter would seem to be to explain further the sixteen categories, this intent actually seems to play only a secondary or formal role in the actual chapter. For each of the *sūtra* passages, the chapter runs through the sixteen categories showing how they apply to that passage. However, the bulk of the material in this lengthy chapter consists not of these demonstrations of the categories, which are cited quite briefly and perfunctorily, but rather consists of commentaries on the meanings of these *sūtra* passages. After citing a *sūtra* passage and before going through the sixteen categories, the author provides a (usually) lengthy *sūtra* gloss or meaning commentary. Because this concept of the gloss is not part of the sixteen categories, it represents something of an intrusion here, upsetting the structure

and intent of the chapter. The gloss becomes the major element and the chapter becomes essentially a commentary on the eight pairs of *sūtra* passages from Chapter Two.

The glosses are not totally different from the sixteen categories, however, for they also interpret the meaning by pointing out the connections between the passage and ideas in the *dharma* as a whole. The glosses, however, seem more concerned to clarify the meaning and intent of the ideas in the *sūtra* passages, whereas the applications of the sixteen categories indicate more specifically the links between the *sūtra* passages and the essential ideas of the *dharma*.

Because this chapter is based on the eight types of *sūtras* discussed in Chapter Two, and, by means of glosses and the categories, it interprets them in terms of the already explained central factor categories and concepts, most of the material in this chapter has been seen earlier in the work. Thus, rather than rehearsing all the explanations of all the *sūtra* passages, we shall only mention here some of the most important new concepts introduced in these commentaries.

The categories are cited very briefly in most cases. For example,

(E187; T254) On one *sūtra* the text asks "What is the teaching category (in regard to this passage)?". And it answers, "In this *sūtra* the four noble truths are taught".

(E170-172; T232-234) The commentarial gloss on the second *sūtra* of the type dealing with living in *saṃsāra* explains four concepts in the passage: faith, virtue, generosity and wisdom. Among several alternate explanations of faith it finds this analogy: faith is like a man who can see the water in the bottom of a well, but cannot reach it. This faith is mundane.

(E177; T240) In commenting on the first *sūtra* passage of the type dealing with penetration, the author explains that the word "above" in the passage refers to the future and that the word "below" refers to the past. These two views represent the nihilist and the eternalist views respectively. The first fifteen of the terms of the embodiment-view belong to the eternalist view, and the other five terms of embodiment belong to nihilism. The commentary shows how these two types of persons arrive at penetration.

(E179; T242) The explanations in this chapter consist almost entirely of distinctions, categories and analyses already made in the previous chapters. As in the explanation of the category of construing applied to the penetration type of *sūtra* the text explains again the types of persons discussed in Chapter Two (above II.1.3 and 4).

(E182-183; T246-248) In the commentary on the second *sūtra* of the penetration type, the *Peṭakopadesa* says that the meaning is twofold: word meaning (*vacanārtha*) and person's meaning (*puru-*

ṣārtha). These two kinds of meaning are said to be present in all *sūtras* in the case of each term. The word meaning or aim is the aim of the *dharma*; the person's meaning is the aim he seeks to achieve. The person's aim is the actual realizing of whatever aim the person wants; the word's aim is the Buddha's aim in teaching.

(E190ff.; T258ff.) An example of the kind of commentary that these glosses contain is seen in the explanation of the *sūtra* on the adept. The *sūtra* speaks of "one whose awareness is steady as a rock". The gloss explains this simile by showing that one whose mind is free from attachment and hate is steady. Then it goes on to show how the entire path is developed building upon this steadiness.

(E218; T294) In commenting on the *sūtra* on defilement and penetration, the *Peṭakopadesa* explores the three kinds of action: mental action, bodily action and vocal action.

(E232; T321) In order to explain the *sūtra* on living and penetration, the author repeats the distinction between the two basic kinds of persons seen in Chapter Two: the faith-follower and the *dharma*-follower. Although, here the faith-follower is divided into the two kinds, blunt and keen facultied, and the *dharma*-follower type is likewise subdivided. A fifth type of person mentioned here is the totally deluded person, who finds enlightenment suddenly.

Chapter Eight

(VIII) (E242-260; T328-349) Arising of the guidelines.

This chapter explains the three meaning and the two phrasing guidelines. These guidelines analyze *sūtras* according to the root terms and show how *sūtras* thus analyzed apply to and guide specific types of persons.

(VIII.1) (E242-249; T328-336) Play of Lions Guideline

(VIII.1.1) Four Types of Persons

All creatures can be divided into four types in the following way: First there are creatures of desire-conduct and of view-conduct. These two types are equivalent to the nihilist and eternalist (cf. Ch. VII, p. 177). When view-conduct persons become followers of the Buddha, they become *dharma*-followers whereas desire-conduct persons become faith-followers (cf. II.1.3).

Beings of view-conduct divide into two kinds, those with dull faculties and those with sharp faculties. Beings of desire-conduct also divide into these two. View-temperament beings with sharp faculties follow (1) the satisfying way with quick higher faculties. View-temperament beings with dull faculties follow (2) the satisfying way with sluggish higher faculties. Desire-conduct beings with sharp

faculties follow (3) the frustrating way with quick higher faculties. Desire-conduct beings with dull faculties follow (4) the frustrating way with sluggish higher faculties. These are the four types of persons and the four paths.

(VIII.1.2) (E244-249; T330-336) The Play of the Lions

Corresponding to these four types and four ways the *dharma* can be classified under a fourfold scheme.

On the bad side:

(1) Four nutriments
(2) Four perversions
(3) Four graspings
(4) Four bonds
(5) Four knots
(6) Four intoxicants
(7) Four floods
(8) Four darts
(9) Four conditions of consciousness
(10) Four evil practices.

The first two of each of these tetrads can be abandoned by beings of desire-conduct; the second two of each tetrad by beings of view-conduct.

All of these negative states can be interrelated. The first nutriment is equivalent to the first perversion, etc.

The plotting of directions guideline correlates all the members of these tetrads. All of the first members constitute the first direction, all of the second members, the second direction, etc. This "plotting" can be done because their meaning is one and only their phrasing is different. These tetrads are all corollaries to the four root terms, the four misperceptions or perversions.

On the good side there is a parallel grouping of ideas:

(1) Four modes of progress
(2) Four meditative states
(3) Four foundations of mindfulness
(4) Four abodes
(5) Four right endeavors
(6) Four strange and wonderful things
(7) Four supports
(8) Four developments of concentration
(9) Four satisfying factors
(10) Four measureless factors.

These good tetrads also can be correlated with each other and grouped under the four directions. The play of the lions consists in the ability of enlightened ones to use the good tetrads to counteract the bad ones.

The four good directions lead respectively to the four noble persons.

(VIII.2) (E249-253; T326-341) Trefoil Guideline

(VIII.2.1) (E249-250; T326-327) Three Types of Persons

Those persons who find the way by (1) the satisfying path with quick higher faculties represent the type of person (A) who learns via a condensed teaching. Persons on (2) the satisfying way with sluggish higher faculties and (3) the frustrating way with quick higher faculties represent the type of person (B) who learns by teachings that are expanded. And persons on (4) the frustrating way with sluggish higher faculties represent the type of person (C) that is guidable (cf. II.1.3, above).

Type A pursues concentration, then insight, Type B pursues both together, and type C pursues insight before concentration.

Type A is trained in higher wisdom, type B in higher virtue, and type C in higher concentration.

(VIII.2.2) (E250-253; T327-341) Threefold Concepts and Directions

The defilement or bad side:

(1) Three bad roots
(2) Three kinds of contact
(3) Three feelings
(4) Three ponderings
(5) Three defilements
(6) Three kinds of initial thought
(7) Three fevers
(8) Three characteristics of the conditioned
(9) Three kinds of frustration.

All the elements of these triads are linked in a causal fashion. The first bad root, greed, arises from the first kind of object (this entire category is missing in the enumeration but should be satisfying, frustrating and neutral objects) and upon the first kind of contact, causes the first kind of feeling (satisfying feeling), etc. The second bad root, hatred, arises from the second kind of object (bad), etc. The third bad root, delusion, arises from the third object (neutral), etc.

The good side:

(1) Three good roots
(2) Three wisdoms
(3) Three concentrations
(4) Three trainings
(5) Three signs
(6) Three kinds of initial thought
(7) Three faculties

(8) Three ponderings
(9) Three longings
(10) Three categories.

These factors also can all be linked causally beginning with the three good roots, nongreed, nonhate and nondelusion.

These three good roots and their related concepts represent for the three types of persons the three gateways to liberation: that which cannot be desired, the void and the signless.

(VIII.3) (E253-255; T341-344) Conversion of Pleasure

(VIII.3.1) (E253-254; T341-342) Two Types of Persons

Two types of persons can be seen by equating types (1) and (2) (VIII.1.1, above) with the view-conduct type, and types (3) and (4) with the desire-conduct type.

(VIII.3.2) (E254-255; T342-344) Twofold Factors and Directions

The bad side is characterized by these pairs of factors

(1) Ignorance and thirst
(2) Shamelessness and disregard
(3) Unmindfulness and noncomprehension
(4) Obstructions and fetters
(5) Cleaving and insistence
(6) I-making and my-making
(7) Lack of confidence and sulkiness
(8) Sloth and careless attention
(9) Perplexity and covetousness
(10) Not hearing the *dharma* and nonattainment.

All of these bad factors can be coordinated under the two directions. In relation to the four noble truths, they correspond to the first two truths, frustration and origin. The good side:

(1) Peace and insight
(2) Understanding and good conduct
(3) Mindfulness and comprehension
(4) Shame and modesty
(5) Abandoning I-making and my-making
(6) Right effort and reasoned attention
(7) Right mindfulness and right concentration
(8) Wisdom and dispassion
(9) Attainment and hearing the *dharma*.
(10) Contentedness and practice in accord with the *dharma*

These good ideas also can be plotted according to their directions.

(VIII.4) (E255-260; T344-349) Summary of the Guidelines

The lions' play guideline uses eight root-terms, four good, four bad. The trefoil guideline uses six root-terms. The conversion of pleasure uses four. All eighteen root-terms can be made to agree with the group of eight in lions' play, or the group of six in trefoil,

or the group of four in conversion of pleasure. The coordination of these root-terms is done by the plotting of directions guideline in conjunction with the hook guideline which brings the good and bad together.

The lions' play guideline leads to the four noble truths. The trefoil leads to the three gateways to liberation, and the conversion of pleasure leads to the liberation of the mind by the fading of attachment and to the wisdom liberation by the fading of ignorance.

The *Peṭakopadesa* of Mahākaccāyana Thera, dweller in the Rose-Apple wood, is completed.

19

NETTIPPAKARAṆA

Summary by George D. Bond

This work is of the same genre as the *Peṭakopadesa.* It is traditionally attributed to Mahākaccāyana, but appears to have been written around the 1st-2nd century B.C., possibly by someone else named Kaccāyana. Mrs. Rhys Davids believed that the work precedes the *Paṭṭhāna*, on the basis that it seems to be acquainted with *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and *Vibhaṅga* but not with *Paṭṭhāna.*[1] More recent scholarship has preferred a later date.[2]

The earliest edition, and the only one in South Asian characters, is by Edmund Hardy for the Pali Text Society (London 1902). Editions also exist in Sinhalese (Perera, Sri Lanka 1923) and in Burmese characters (Rangoon 1909, 1917, 1956). The translation ('T') is by Bhikkhu Nanamoli as *The Guide* (Pali Text Translation Series: London 1962).[3]

The *Nettippakaraṇa* represents an early Theravāda Buddhist hermeneutical or exegetical treatise. Regarded as quasi-canonical by some Theravādins and canonical by other Theravādins, especially in Burma, the *Netti* comes down to us as the tradition's earliest attempt to solve the problem of how to interpret and expound the *dharma* correctly. The text seems to have been written to provide commentators and expositors of the *Tripiṭaka* with a distinctively Buddhist solution to a distinctively Buddhist hermeneutical problem.

For the *Netti*, the hermeneutical problem arises because of two characteristics of the Buddha's *dharma.* First, the Buddha understood and taught a *dharma* that was "unbounded" or "immeasurable" (*aparimāṇa*) and, thus, beyond the wisdom of ordinary human beings. Second, the Buddha's *dharma* was perfectly conceived and imparted to guide people, who differed in their intelligence and development, to wisdom and liberation. These two characteristics account for, on the one hand, the *dharma*'s profundity and inner consistency of meaning, and on the other hand, the outer variety and diversity of expression in the *dharma* teachings.

In short, the necessity for correctly interpreting teachings that participate in the unique meaning and intention of the *dharma* constitutes the problem of interpretation of the *Netti*. The solution to this problem rests upon the understanding that all of the "immeasurable" teachings convey the central meaning of the *dharma*. Since the *dharma* was perfectly devised and set forth by the Buddha to guide all beings to the truth, an interpreter must be able to recognize its structure and intention in order to convey its truth. The *Netti*'s method of interpretation, based upon the inherent structure and intention of the *dharma*, is intended to present a mirror image of the *dharma* itself. That is, just as in his teachings the Buddha employed definite techniques and a consistent logic in order to adapt the *dharma* for various purposes and various kinds of people, so the *Netti* presents techniques of interpretation presupposing this logic in order to examine the *dharma*-teachings to identify their essential meaning. This solution to the problem of interpretation presupposes that the only way to understand the unique *dharma* is to interpret it in terms of itself: in accord with its own logic in terms of its own fundamental ideas. In this way, the Buddha, in effect, becomes the interpreter of his own teachings.

The elements of "meaning" (*artha*) and "phrasing" (*vyañjana*) in the *dharma* determine the structure of the *Netti*'s method with special categories employed to treat each element. The term "*artha*", usually translated as "meaning", seems to denote, in the context of the *Netti*'s method, the purpose or goal of the Buddha's teaching, liberation or the path to liberation. With regard to the element of meaning, the method of interpretation brings out the underlying intention of all teachings to point to the goal of liberation and demonstrates the interrelationships among the various levels of teaching and the essence of the *dharma*. The interpretation of the phrasing element calls for ways of recognizing the unity of meaning behind the variety of phrasing. The two main categories employed in the method of interpretation to accomplish these tasks are the guideline (*naya*) and the category (*hāra*) (see II.2 and II.3 below).

PART ONE

(I) (E1; T3-4) Comprehensive Section

The text begins with five verses that summarize the *Netti*'s method of interpretation. We might take this section as a preface, except that the text develops by commenting on and building on what is set out here. Each of the succeeding sections has what we might call a commentarial relationship to the sections that precede it and especially to this initial section. This careful arrangement is typical

of the tight structure and order present throughout the *Netti*.

This section says that wise men can know the master's teachings characterized by phrasing terms and meaning terms. Mahākātyāyana provided sixteen categories to examine the phrasing, three guidelines to examine the meaning (plus two additional guidelines that apply to phrasing), and eighteen root terms.

PART TWO

(II) (E1-193; T5-249) Explanation of Details

(The title of this section is a heading that comprises the next three subsections and their divisions.)

(II.1) (E1-3; T5-7) Indication

Whereas the first section simply mentioned the elements of the *Netti*'s exegetical method, this section lists them, specifically answering the questions of the first section: What are the categories? What are the guidelines? What are the root terms?

(II.1.1) The sixteen categories are not explained here, but are enumerated as teaching, investigation, construing, footing, distinctive characteristic, fourfold arrangement, conversion, analysis, turning back, synonyms, designations, descending, clearing-up, support, requisites and coordination.

(II.1.2) The five guidelines are listed as conversion of pleasure, trefoil, lion's play, plotting of directions and the hook.

(II.1.3) The eighteen root terms are divided into two groups, the good and the bad. The bad root terms are thirst, ignorance, greed, anger, delusion, identification of what is clean, identification of what is satisfying, identification of what is eternal and identification of (things as having) self (as nature).

The good root terms are peace, insight, nongreed, nonanger, nondelusion, identification of what is foul, identification of what is frustrating, identification of what is noneternal, and identification of (things as) not (having) self (as nature).

(Although the text has not yet explained how these elements are to be utilized, it becomes clear that the root terms represent an outline of the central ideas of the *dharma* in Theravāda's view.)

(II.2) (E3-5; T8-12) Gloss

This section comments on the elements listed in the Indication Section (II.1). It offers short, verse descriptions of the categories, the guidelines and their workings. These descriptions are still quite cryptic but they build upon the previous section and establish the agenda for the following one.

(II.3) (E5-193; T13-249) Further Description Section

Following the three increasingly detailed verse outlines (Sections

I, II.1 and II.2), the *Netti* returns again to these descriptions to begin the full explanation of its exegetical methods. The remaining four major divisions of the text represent subsections to this one.

(II.3.1) (E5-85; T13-118) Analysis of the Categories (That Interpret the Phrasing)

This section explains the categories and in each case begins by commenting on the gloss given in the prior section (II.2).

(II.3.1.1) (E5-10; T13-20) Category of Teaching

As the first of the *Netti*'s interpretive categories the Category of Teaching provides a general overview of the problem and method of interpretation. It begins with a quotation from the Buddha that it takes as a summary of the nature and purpose of the *dharma*. The quotation is:

> O Monks, I shall teach a *dharma* that is good in its beginning, good in the middle, and good in the end, with its own meaning and phrasing. I shall make known a religious life (*brahmacarya*) entirely perfect and pure.[4]

The *Netti* adds to the start of this quotation six terms, relishing, disadvantage, escape, fruit, means and injunction. By commenting on this passage and these six terms, this category explains the structure of the *dharma* and the keys to understanding it properly.

The six terms are shown to represent the various ways that the Buddha explained the human predicament and its solution. Using these terms the *Netti* demonstrates the various kinds of the teachings found in the *dharma*, and shows that the variety of teachings can be categorized under these six heads. Further, the *Netti* explains that the six categories of teachings have the purpose of adjusting the *dharma* to various types of individuals. The text classifies individuals by a set of three types and a set of four types. The three are those persons who learn by what is condensed, who learn by what is expanded, and who are merely guidable. The four types include persons of thirst-conduct and of view-conduct multiplied by dull and intelligent variations. For example, the Buddha is said to have taught only escape to persons who learn from what is condensed, to have taught both disadvantage and escape to persons who learn from what is expanded, but to have taught relishing, disadvantage and escape to the guidable.

Significantly, this category shows that these six kinds of teaching can be reduced to or equated with four noble truths. In this way the *Netti* begins to show how the interpreter must move from the diversity of the *dharma* teachings to the consistent meaning present

throughout the *dharma*. This technique is basic to the *Netti*'s method of interpretation.

Finally, this category also clarifies the notions of the meaning and phrasing of the *dharma*. It indicates six ways that the phrasing of a teaching can be expressed and six ways that the meaning can be expressed; then it correlates these phrasing and meaning terms. The phrasing and meaning terms are shown to structure the *dharma* into the threefold goodness mentioned in the initial passage. This threefold goodness also corresponds to the three types of persons mentioned above.

The point of this category is to indicate the intricacy of the *dharma* and to lay the foundation for the *Netti*'s method of interpretation that was designed to deal with the elements of the *dharma* outlined here.

(II.3.1.2) (E10-21; T20-36) Category of Investigation

This category also represents an introduction to the method of interpretation proper. It outlines four kinds of investigations that the interpreter should make of any teaching. The four are:

(a) Term, question, answer, consecutive sequence

(b) Relishing, disadvantage, escape, fruit, means and injunction (the six terms from Category 1)

(c) Any paraphrasing verses

(d) All that is in the ninefold *sūtra*.

As the inclusion of the terms under (b) above indicates, the kind of investigation envisaged here is more than merely an identification of the structure of the teaching. This category intends to teach the interpreter to examine a teaching to discern how its elements express the essence of the *dharma* and accomplish the *dharma*'s purpose of pointing the way to liberation.

(II.3.1.3) (E21-27; T36-44) Category of Construing

This category—like the first two, but unlike most of those that follow—is also comprehensive in that it describes the entire method of interpretation. Here the interpreter is taught the basic criteria for the correct interpretation and application of *dharma* teachings. The criteria for acceptable interpretation is taken from the *Mahāpadesa-sutta* of the *Sutta Piṭaka*.[5] A correctly interpreted or construed passage must conform to the basic themes of the *dharma*; the thread (*sūtra*), the discipline (*vinaya*) and the essential nature (*dharmatā*). The *Netti* equates "thread" with the four truths, "discipline" with the disciplining of attachment, anger and delusion, and "essential nature" with dependent origination.

The point of this category is to explain further the *Netti*'s view of interpretation as a process of reducing any teaching to its "prime

factors'' in the *dharma*. *The Netti* sets up an outline of these ''prime factors'' that constitute the essence of the *dharma*. The doctrines named here as criteria for construing are central to that outline, as are the six terms from the first category, the eighteen root terms mentioned in Section II.1.3, and other concepts mentioned or implied further on. Correct construing involves finding these factors implicit in any teaching under consideration.

Another task outlined in this category concerns understanding how the Buddha applied various teachings to various kinds of persons. For example, the *Netti* says the Buddha taught foulness rather than friendliness to a person of attached conduct. His teachings always fit the person's needs. The *Netti* seems to imply that the value of properly construing teachings such as this is that it enables the interpreter (1) to understand the teachings correctly and (2) to apply the *dharma* teachings to the right kinds of people.

(II.3.1.4) (E27-29; T45-50) Category of Footings

This category, like the succeeding twelve categories, specifies a particular technique for carrying out the interpretive task delineated in the first three categories, namely the task of construing any teaching in terms of the essence of the *dharma*. The technique explained in this category represents a way of discerning word-connections between any teaching and the central concepts. Footings represent the proximate causes for other ideas or concepts. Thus, to find what concepts are implied in a particular teaching, the interpreter must determine what the footings of the teaching are and for what other concepts this teaching is the footing. For example, the five strands of sensual desire are said to be the footing for attachment to sensual desire; the five material faculties are the footing for attachment to material things. By recognizing the relationships called ''footings'', the interpreter can establish the necessary connections between any passage and the essential ideas of the *dharma*.

(II.3.1.5) (E30-32; T50-54) Category of Characteristics

Another exegetical technique for establishing word connections, this category is closely related to the previous one. Both techniques represent methods frequently used by the Pali commentaries. This category provides for correlating a single idea with all other ideas that share a common characteristic or classification. For example, if one faculty is mentioned, all other faculties can be inferred also. This kind of association is shown to be valid because of the interconnections between the progressive stages of spiritual practice leading toward *nirvāṇa*.

(II.3.1.6) (E32-40; T55-64) Fourfold Arrangement Category

The interpreter must explain four aspects of a teaching: the language, the intention, the foundation, and the consecutive se-

quence. Each of these four are here explained and exemplified.

(II.3.1.7) (E40-48; T64-73) Conversion Category

The exegetical technique of this category is basic to the *Netti*'s entire method. "Conversion" means identifying the root terms in a passage via footings and converting the bad ones to good ones. In the exemplification, we clearly see how the *Netti*'s method of interpretation works. Interpretation for the *Netti* is a process of reading between or behind the lines to find the basic *dharma* teachings.

(II.3.1.8) (E48-51; T73-77) Analysis Category

Teachings must be analyzed according to factors, footing, levels of individuals for whom intended or mentioned and characteristics shared in common by various individuals. Closely related to other categories, the task of this category is to indicate further ways of examining and explaining teachings. The exemplification of the category draws an interesting distinction between the path teachings for householders and those for persons who have gone forth.

(II.3.1.9) (E51-52; T77-78) Turning Back Category

This category warns the interpreter to be aware of the opposites of the terms in a teaching in order to understand what is implied.

(II.3.1.10) (E53-56; T79-84) Synonyms Category

A basic form of word-connections, synonyms are to be employed by this interpreter to elicit the essential factors in a passage. The summary verse states, "He is a knower of *sūtras* who knows how many synonyms there are for one idea in the *sūtra.*"

(II.3.1.11) (E56-63; T84-92) Designations Category

That various teachings make known or describe various aspects of the path but can all be seen as expressions of the four truths is the message of this category.

(II.3.1.12) (E63-70; T93-100) Descending Category

Recalling the third category where a primary criterion for proper interpretation was said to be "descending into" or "placing beside" the *sūtra*, this category clarifies further how teachings should be correlated with and understood in terms of the key concepts of the *dharma*. Here five doctrines are specified as part of the *Netti*'s outline of the *dharma*: dependent origination, faculties, aggregates, elements and senses.

The *Netti* explains how the interpreter should establish connections between the phrasing of a text and one of these five central factors.

(II.3.1.13) (E70-72; T100-103) Clearing-Up Category

The "clearing-up" here refers to the spirit or ground of a teaching, especially in the form of a question. Under this category, interpretation requires understanding the structure of a text in order to see

why the Buddha gave a teaching or asked a question and how he cleared it up.

(II.3.1.14) (E72-78; T103-109) Terms of Expression Category

This category shows the interpreter how to analyze passages according to unity and diversity. Factors can be expressed by one basic term or by diverse forms of that factor, e.g., frustration or forms of frustration. In either case, the *Netti* shows, the meaning is the same. Again the *Netti* manifests its basic assumption that the essential unity of the factor can be found behind the diversity of the phrasing.

(II.3.1.15) (E78-80; T109-114) Requisites Category

A doctrinally based method for correlating teachings with essential factors, this category points to two kinds of relations between terms, cause and condition. These are two "requisites" for the interpreter to identify.

(II.3.1.16) (E81-84; T114-118) Coordination Category

With all the basic exegetical techniques explained, the *Netti* concludes this section with a category that again demonstrates its general method of interpretation. Here the interpreter is shown how to coordinate four items: footings, synonyms, spiritual practice and abandoning. The explanation of this category provides good examples of how the *Netti* intends for interpretation to proceed by correlating related ideas and eliciting the entire path from any passage.

(II.3.2) (E85-109; T119-147) Sixteen Categories in Combined Treatment

In this section, the *Netti* demonstrates how the exegetical method works by applying all sixteen categories to one passage from *Udāna* 38. The demonstration, however, does not seem to work the way it was planned because the exegesis is completed under the first two categories with the remaining fourteen then simply being mentioned in brief.

(II.3.2.1) (E85-86; T119-121) Teaching Category

Here we see exactly what the *Netti* means by the proper interpretation of a teaching. The exegesis first shows that the terms in the *Udāna* passage imply the category of the perversions. A discussion of these perversions leads to consideration of desire and ignorance. These concepts are then shown to imply the first two of the truths, frustration and origin, and the opposites of these are finally seen to be cessation and the path. Beginning with a single passage, the interpreter explains it by recounting the essential ideas of the *dharma* ending with the four truths.

(II.3.2.2) (E87-103; T121-139) Investigation Category

The demonstration exegesis continues here with an account of

factors involved in peace and insight, the noble path. The eight path factors, factors of concentration, and three gateways to liberation (concentration, wisdom, morality) are listed here. These are brought in as explications of the fourth noble truth, the path.

Then, the *Netti* offers a detailed exposition of the ten powers of the Buddha. These stand as justification for the teachings and they support the *Netti*'s understanding of the uniqueness of the *dharma* and its being perfectly suited to beings.

The ten powers of the Buddha are:

(a) Knowledge of the possible and impossible
(b) Knowledge of the path leading to the welfare of all
(c) Knowledge of the many and different elements in the world
(d) Knowledge of diversity of resolve of beings
(e) Knowledge of differences in fruition of past, future and present actions in their causal occasion and in their conditions
(f) Knowledge of the defilements, cleansing and arising of all the meditative states, liberations, concentrations and attainments
(g) Knowledge of diversity in the states of faculties of other persons or other beings
(h) Knowledge of previous lives
(i) Divine eye
(j) Knowledge of destruction of the intoxicants.

(II.3.2.3-16) (E103-109; T139-197) The rest of this section applies the methods of the remaining categories to the same *Udāna* passage. These are all done in very brief fashion—even cryptically—and do not add either to the sample exegesis or the explanation of these categories in the previous section.

(II.3.3) (E109-127; T148-172) Arising of the Guidelines

Since the previous two chapters have explained the categories for interpreting the phrasing, this chapter explains the methods for interpreting the meaning of a teaching. "Meaning" refers to the implications of a teaching for pointing to the goal of the tradition, *nirvāṇa*. Because the phrasing and meaning of teachings are necessarily interrelated, the previous chapters, it will be seen, have already dealt with meaning, especially in the exegetical demonstrations. The specific methods for dealing with meaning are the three guidelines explained here. These are seen to function in conjunction with two phrasing guidelines that recall and control the phrasing categories. The eighteen root terms mentioned in II.1 above represent the key interpretive elements for the meaning guidelines. Having established correlations between the phrasing of a passage and the root terms, the interpreter can then lead to the goal via further implications of the root terms.

(II.3.3.1) (E109-113; T148-152) First Meaning Guideline: Con-

version of Pleasure and First Phrasing Guideline: Plotting of Directions

The pair of bad root terms, thirst and ignorance can be counteracted or guided out by the pair of good root terms: calmness and insight. Two types of persons correspond to the two bad root terms, the person of desire-conduct and of view-conduct. With regard to these two types of persons, calmness and insight represent the counteracting teachings. The dynamics of these pairs of good and bad root terms are equivalent to the four truths. These two types of persons can be subdivided into four types on the basis of the ways that they attain liberation. The view-conduct type find liberation "on the satisfying way with sluggish or quick higher faculties", and persons of desire-conduct divide into those who find liberation "on the frustrating way with either sluggish or quick intuition". This is the way that noble ones describe a fourfold path.

The summary verse at the end of this section reminds that the Conversion of Pleasure guideline specifically has to do with the counterbalancing of the two pairs of root terms, while Plotting of Directions generally refers to "plotting out" good and bad factors. (So, in this explanation the two are combined.)

(II.3.3.2) (E113-124; T153-167) Second Meaning Guideline: Lion's Play in Combination with Plotting of Directions

The summary verse for the lion's play guideline states that it counterbalances four bad root terms, the four perversions, with four good root terms, the faculties. All defilements are said to be demonstrable by means of the perversions and all true doctrines by way of the faculties. In combination with the plotting of directions guideline, this guideline accomplishes an elaborate correlating of fourfold doctrines.

Ten grounds of defilement are given, with each ground comprising a set of four terms: four nutriments, four perversions, four graspings, four yokes, four knots, four intoxicants, four floods, four darts, four conditions of consciousness and four evil practices. These ten sets of four are shown to parallel each other and to lead into each other. The ten grounds constitute the defilement of the two types of persons, the one of desire-conduct and the one of view-conduct, with the first two of each set of four applying to the desire-conduct type and the last two applying to the view-conduct type.

The sets of four can also be divided up and equated with the four directions, with all of the first items belonging to the first directions, etc. These four directions apply to four types of persons as their defilement: the person of attached conduct, the person of hating conduct, the person of dull view-conduct and the person of intelligent view-conduct.

The ten grounds of defilement are also divided according to which elements are comprehended through the three gateways to liberation: the gateway of what cannot be desired, the void gateway and the signless gateway.

The good side is shown to parallel these aspects of the bad side. Ten profitable ways counteract the ten grounds of defilement. They are the four modes of progress, four advances of mindfulness, four meditations, four abodes, four right endeavors, four strange and wonderful things, four supports, four practices of concentration, four factors dealing with satisfaction and four measureless states.

These ten sets of four can all be paralleled in the same way as the bad terms. They constitute the good directions and are applied to the four types of persons as their corrective. The factors of these ten are also equivalent to the three gateways in a positive sense.

Finally, all the ten grounds of defilement are shown directly to be the opposites of the ten sets of good terms. The equating and counteracting of all these concepts are the play of the lions: the Buddhas, *pratyekabuddhas* and disciples.

(II.3.3.3) (E124-127; T167-172) Third Meaning Guideline: Trefoil and Second Phrasing Guideline: Hook

The trefoil guideline equates and counterbalances triads of root terms. On the unprofitable side there are greed, hatred and delusion; and on the profitable side, their opposites. These triads apply to three types of persons: those who learn from what is condensed, those who learn from what is expanded and those who are guidable.

The three bad root terms generate a list of twelve triads of bad factors that apply to these three types of persons. And the three good root terms generate twelve sets of threes that represent the cleansing of these persons.

The hook guideline functions in conjunction with the plotting of directions guideline to parallel the good and bad terms. (It is said to be exemplified here, but it has no separate explanation.)

(II.3.4) (E127-193; T173-249) Setting Out of Dispensation

Whereas the previous sections set forth a method for construing all teachings in terms of the essence of the *dharma*, this chapter provides an outline of the main themes of the *dharma*. The two parts of this chapter offer two classifications of types of passages with examples of each type. This chapter concerns interpretation because it attempts to delineate the context within which all passages must be understood. It points to the overall meaning and intention of the *dharma*.

The introduction to this chapter asks, "Where are the eighteen root terms to be seen?" The answer is "In the setting out of the dispensation". But despite this mention of the root terms, which

would seem to be consistent with the *Netti*'s original plan, this chapter does not explicitly deal with the root terms. On the *Netti*'s view, however, they are surely here implicitly.

(II.3.4.1) (E127-161; T173-213) First Classification of Types of Passages

Sixteen types of passages express the *dharma*:

1. Passages dealing with defilement
2. Passages dealing with living (in *saṃsāra*)
3. Passages dealing with penetration
4. Passages dealing with the adept
5. Passages dealing with defilement and living
6. Passages dealing with defilement and penetration
7. Passages dealing with defilement and the adept
8. Passages dealing with defilement, penetration and the adept
9. Passages dealing with defilement, living and penetration
10. Passages dealing with living and penetration
11. Passages dealing with defilement by desire
12. Passages dealing with defilement by view
13. Passages dealing with defilement by wrong conduct
14. Passages dealing with cleansing from desire
15. Passages dealing with cleansing from view
16. Passages dealing with cleansing from wrong conduct.

(Since these sixteen types of passages actually amount to combinations and variations of the first four types, this section devotes most of its attention to providing examples of passages of these four types.)

(1) What is the type of passage dealing with defilement?

The passages given as examples of this type have as their subject the predicament of human existence. For example, *Dhammapada* verse one is cited here: "If someone speaks or acts with a defiled mind, then frustration follows him as the wheel follows the ox's hoof." Other *sūtra* passages refer to the frustration in this life and in future lives brought about by wrong desires and actions. A typical passage says, "by greed he turns from the *dharma*, by greed he does not go to heaven".

(2) What is the type of passage dealing with living in *saṃsāra*?

These passages delineate the kind of life one should lead to begin to avoid the defilements described above. Nanamoli translated *vāsanā* as "morality" which is basically correct, but it is a particular kind of morality: the morality for those living in the world, primarily householders.

This classification and the following one were mentioned under category eight (II.3.1.8) and represent the two basic aspects of the path. A passage dealing with proclivities concerns "giving, morality, heaven, merit, the disadvantage of sensual desire and the advantage

of renunciation". Giving to the Buddhas and perfected beings is the most frequently discussed topic here. Numerous passages tell how successful people and perfected beings attained their position as a result of a simple act of giving in a previous life.

Passages on living deal with the first of "two principal endeavors" (E159) mentioned by the Buddha: giving robes, alms, lodging and the requisite of medicine to those who have gone forth from home to homelessness.

(3) What is the type of passage dealing with penetration?

A passage on penetration is said to concern the four truths. This kind of passage has as its subject the second of the "two principal endeavors": going forth from home to homelessness and cutting off all desires and attachments. The passages here describe the advantages of practicing meditation, the negative states to be abandoned and the positive states to be developed.

(4) What is the type of passage dealing with the adept?

Passages dealing with the adept describe the perfection attained by perfected beings.

(5-16) The remaining types of passages that represent combinations of the first four are illustrated briefly with a few examples. These examples serve to clarify the four basic themes.

(II.3.4.2) (E161-193; T213-249) Second Classification of *Sūtra* Types

The eighteen root terms also can be seen in the following ten threefold categories of passages:

1. Worldly (passages), higher-worldly passages and both
2. (Passages) focused on beings, focused on factors and both
3. (Passages) on knowledge and knowable and both
4. (Passages) on vision, on spiritual practice and both
5. (Passages) on our own words, another's words and both
6. (Passages) on the answerable, the unanswerable and both
7. (Passages) on action, maturation and both
8. (Passages) on the good, the bad and both
9. (Passages) on the permitted, the rejected and both
10. (Passages) on eulogy.

The first category, worldly and higher-worldly, is the basic one in the classification. After giving a few verses illustrating each of these themes, the *Netti* summarizes both sections by showing how the two classifications of passages are interrelated.

The type of worldly passage encompasses the types from the first section that deal with defilement and living in *saṃsāra*. The type of higher-worldly *sūtra* encompasses passages on penetration and the adept. These six comprehensive concepts express the meaning and intention of the *dharma*. The logic of the *dharma* can be

understood further by observing that the passages on living in *saṃsāra* are intended to counteract passages on defilement. This begins logic of the path wherein passages on seeing counteract passages on living, passages on practice are for renouncing vision, and passages on the adept are for renouncing practice.

This section ends with lists of types of persons belonging to worlds (nineteen types) and types of adepts (nine types). Other correlations between the second set of types of passages are also made.

The *Netti* ends by citing Mahākaccāyana as the one who spoke this text at the first council.

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JÑĀNAPRASTHĀNA

Summary by Edwin Gerow
and
Karl H. Potter

This text is only available (except for fragments) in Chinese. It is available now in two Chinese translations. One (T. 1543), generally called the *Aṣṭagrantha* and attributed to Paramārtha, was made in 383 A.D. by Saṅghadeva and someone else (a Chinese named Chu Fo-nien, Pali Dhammapiya, according to Takakusu).[1] The other (T.1544), generally called *Jñānaprasthāna*, was made by the famous Hsüan-tsang in 657-60 according to tradition. Hsüan-tsang seems to have used a Sanskrit text, perhaps in a Kashmiri dialect, while the one attributed to Paramārtha appears to have been composed in a dialect 'akin to Pali'.[2]

The author of the work is identified by Hsüan-tsang as Kātyāyanīputra, who composed it in the monastery of Tamasāvana in Chinapati in North India where there were 300 Sarvāstivāda students.[3] Poussin dates this event in the 4th century A.N.[4]

The work has been partly rendered into Sanskrit from Hsüan-tsang's version by Shanti Bhiksu Shastri in Visva-Bharati Annals 1, 1955. A fragment is edited and translated into French by Paul Demiéville as "Un fragment Sanskrit de l'Abhidharma des Sarvāstivādin", Journal Asiatique 249, 1961, 461-76. There are translations of sections of it by Louis de la Vallée Poussin in "Documents d'Abhidharma", Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d' Extreme-Orient (Paris) 1930 and Melanges Chinois et Boudhique 1, 1932. Besides the summary by Takakusu just referred to, other summaries are provided by S.C. Banerjee, *Sarvāstivāda Literature*, op. cit., pp. 54-59 and by Kogen Mizuno in *Encyclopedia of Buddhism* (ed. G.P. Malalasekera et.al.) 1.1, 1961, 64-80. Leon Hurvitz has studied portions of the text in "Path to salvation in the *Jñānaprasthāna*", *Studies in Indo-Asian Art and Culture* 5, 1977, 77-102.

This is the basic text of the Sarvāstivāda school, the movement in Abhidharma Buddhism that is set forth in its fullest in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, summarized below, which is itself a commentary on the *Jñānaprasthāna*.

"E" references are to the translation from Chinese to Sanskrit by Shanti Bhiksu Shastri of Santiniketan 1955. There is no translation.

BOOK ONE: MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS

Chapter One: Higher Worldly Factors[5]

Part One: Higher Worldly Factors

1.(E2) Higher factors are awarenesses and mental states that are directly antecedent conditions conducing to enlightenment. Others say they are the five faculties that are directly antecedent conditions to that destiny.

2.(E2) They are called "higher factors" because they are the awarenesses and mental states that are preeminent among worldly factors. These awarenesses and mental states directly destroy the status of ordinary person, lead to nobleness, and destroy falsity, thus leading to enlightenment.

3.(E3) The higher factors are associated with the material realm, not the sensual or immaterial realms. It is not possible through any path in the sensual realm to overcome the obstacles by destroying the obstructions; rather, the obstacles constitute that realm. But it is possible by a path in the material realm to overcome these obstacles. Thus the higher factors are not associated with the sensual realm.

If the higher factors were associated with the immaterial realm, the first full understanding that conduces to the enlightenment would involve recognizing frustration as frustration in the immaterial realm; afterward would come the parallel recognitions in the sensual and material realms. Thus the first discrimination of the reality of the immaterial realm would come when the noble path had already arisen, and later on would come the discrimination of the reality of the sensual and material realms. But this is of course not the order in which these discriminations occur. So the higher factors are not associated with the immaterial realm.

4.(E4) These higher factors may occur with both initial and sustained thought, without either, or with neither in their respectively appropriate meditative states.

5.(E4) The higher worldly factors may occur associated with satisfaction in the third meditative state, with contentedness in the first or second meditative states, and with equanimity in the fourth meditative state.

6.(E4-5) A higher worldly factor is a single awareness, not many awarenesses. When it arises there is no arising of another ordinary awareness. If there were, the higher factor would have been destroyed, would be equivalent to an ordinary one, or would be still to come. If it were destroyed one could not practice realization, since one cannot practice through a destroyed path. If it were equivalent the possibility would be the same. If it were still to come then the higher worldly factors could not have been practiced previously, since this would be such a factor.

Part Two: Summit

1.(E6) What is the summit of faith? It is the arising of faith which provides a small instrument of knowledge of the factors of enlightenment.

2.(E6) Falling from the summit occurred when a man who had heard the correct *dharma*, has had faith in the Buddha and the factors of enlightenment, belonging to a well-placed order, and practicing good conduct, and so understanding the first two of the noble truths, at another time fails in these regards and his cessation is thus destroyed.

Part Three: Heat

1.(E7) Heat is the assumption of a little faith in training for correct *dharma*.

Part Four: The (Incorrect) View that the Body is Real

1.(E7) There are twenty such views. Of them, five are wrong views about the self, viz., taking the self as body, feeling, identification, conditioning and consciousness. The remaining fifteen views are views relating to there being a self.

Part Five: What is Included in and Excluded from Wrong Views

1.(E7) The wrong view that what is noneternal is eternal is comprised within extreme views and eternalism; it is overcome by the vision of frustration.

2.(E8) The wrong view that what is eternal is noneternal is comprised among false views, and is overcome by the vision of cessation.

3.(E8) The wrong view that what is frustrating is satisfying is comprised within adherence to particular (wrong) views of a grasper

practicing lower factors, and is overcome by the vision of frustration.

4.(E8) The wrong view that what is satisfying is frustrating, which is included among false views, is destroyed by the vision of cessation.

5.(E8) The wrong view that what is not pure is pure, fostered by adherence to lower factors, is destroyed by the vision of frustration.

6.(E9) The wrong view that what is pure is impure is a false view and has two kinds. One is that cessation is impure and is destroyed by the vision of cessation. The other is that the path is impure and is destroyed by the vision of the path.

7. (E9) The wrong view that what is not self is self is comprised within the belief that the body is real, and is destroyed by the vision of frustration.

8.(E9) The wrong view that what is not a cause is a cause is comprised within adherence to moral precepts and vows, and is destroyed by the vision of frustration.

9.(E9) The wrong view that what is a cause is not a cause, comprised among false views, is destroyed by the vision of cessation.

10.(E9) The wrong view that what exists does not exist is comprised within false views and has four varieties: (1) that there is no frustration; (2) that there is no origin of frustration; (3) that there is no cessation of frustration; (4) that there is no path. Each is overcome by the vision of what it denies.

11.(E9) The view that what does not exist exists is actually not a wrong view but just a mistaken awareness.

Chapter Two: Awareness
Part One: Single Awareness

(E10) Can one awareness cognize all factors at once? No. When one is aware that all factors are not self, one is not aware of this awareness' nature, of what is associated with it and coordinated with it.

Part Two: Consciousness is Single

(E10) The same formula is repeated for consciousness.

Part Three: The Supporting Object of Two (Mental) Awarenesses

1.(E11) Two awarenesses cannot reciprocally cause each other, because in no person can two awarenesses arise at once.

2.(E11) Two awarenesses can, however, have a mutual supporting object. Also, two awarenesses can be mutually cognizant of each other, so each has two supporting objects.

Why can't two awarenesses arise in the same person at once? Because there is no directly antecedent condition through which consecutive awarenesses of a being function in a series of awarenesses, and so there is no person.

Part Four: Memory

(E11-12) Memory arises by force of the repetition of factors.

Part Five: Faith

(E12-13) In dependence on what can faith be based if there is no going to the (world of) the fathers, etc.? On the factors involved in the fathers' courses.

Part Six: The Number of Sense Faculties

(E13) Is color seen by one or by two visual organs? By two, because when one eye is closed a nonvivid consciousness arises, but when both eyes are open the consciousness is vivid.

Objection: When one eye is closed consciousness still arises, just as at the time both eyes are open, so it cannot be said that seeing color arises from two visual organs.

Answer: But the consciousness arising when one eye is open is not vivid, as also when an eye is averted, defective or destroyed. Likewise, the hearing of a sound is from two auditory organs, a smelling from two olfactory organs, etc.

Part Seven: The Past

(E13-15) Is everything past no longer present? There are four alternatives: (1) Something past and not present, e.g., any living thing; (2) something not present which is not past—e.g., something by a higher faculty or by a knowledge of *mantras* or by some medicine is covered over, hidden and thus not cognized; (3) something past which is also not present—all conditionings arise, are born, return, are born again, and so become past, ceased; (4) something neither past nor non-present. The same alternatives are repeated.

Again, with respect to the avoiding of the fetters the following alternatives exist: (1) there are past fetters that do not cease, (2) ceased fetters that are not past, (3) past fetters which have ceased, (4) there are no past fetters and none have ceased.

Is everything past hidden? Again four altenatives: (1) nothing past is hidden; (2) what is hidden is not past; (3) what is past is also

hidden; (4) nothing is past and nothing hidden.

Part Eight: Perplexity

(E15) If perplexity arises concerning frustration one might say "this is frustrating but that is not frustrating". Is this one or more than one awareness? Answer: It is many awarenesses. The awareness "this is frustrating" is one awareness, the awareness "this is not frustrating" is a second awareness. Perplexity is born thus in the paths' origin and cessation.

Is there a single awareness involving both perplexity and non-perplexity? No. Why? With respect to the truth of frustration "this is frustrating" is an awareness involving perplexity. There is (another) awareness "this is frustrating" not involving perplexity. Likewise there is one awareness "this is not frustrating" which is not perplexing, and another which is perplexing.

Part Nine: Of Names, Words and Phonemes

(E15) A collection of names consists of particular utterances, identifyings, things established for grasping.

(E16) A word is a single arrangement filling an unfulfilled purpose.

(E16) A phoneme is an assemblage of syllables.

Part Ten: The Fatigue of the Buddha

(E16-16) Once the Lord said: "Indeed, one who addresses pupils is a useless person". What was the point of that? Answer: He was tired.

Part Eleven: Six (Moral) Causes

1. Enumeration of Six Causes

(E17) These six causes are those associated through the causal causes.

2. Connected Cause

(E17) Feeling is a connected cause of those factors that are connected with feeling, and vice versa. Likewise identification, contact, attentive interest, resolve, memory, concentration and intellection are connected causes of those factors that are connected with intellection.

3. Simultaneous Cause

(E17) Awareness is a simultaneous cause of awareness-concomitants and vice versa. Awareness is a simultaneous cause with the

dissociated factors that follow awareness and vice versa.

4. Homogeneous Cause

(E18) A good root from a previous birth is a homogeneous cause of a good root of its homogeneous element born afterwards and of the factors associated with that.

5. Pervasive Cause

(E18) Dispositional tendencies which are pervasive and to be abandoned by seeing frustrations born earlier are the pervasive causes of those dispositions produced later of the same kind of element. They are to be avoided by spiritual practice and seeing the path to cessation.

6. Maturation Cause

(E18) All awarenesses and their concomitant factors give rise to maturations and are thus conditionings dissociated from awareness. These—awareness and concomitant factors—are the maturation causes of these maturations.

7. Efficient Cause

(E19) The visual organ and matter cause visual consciousness. Those two are thus the efficient causes of visual consciousness, just as are the auditory organ and sound, the olfactory organ and smell, etc.

Part Twelve: Being Dormantly Defiled in Relation to Awareness and Its Destruction

(E19-20) Every awareness which has a latent disposition is called "dormantly defiled". Does the trace adhere closely to awareness or not? Some traces do so, and they are not destroyed through association with that awareness; such an awareness is one with a supporting object. Some traces do not, and are destroyed through association with that awareness.

Objection: A trace adheres closely to awareness. This trace is dormantly defiled.

Answer: There are two kinds of such awareness. One kind, defiled by one but not by another, is awareness that is not destroyed. The other, defiled by the one and the other, is an awareness, when knowledge of frustration has arisen but knowledge of its origin has not yet arisen, whose supporting object is the destruction of the visions of frustration and of origin.

Every awareness accompanied by defilement is called "dormantly defiled". Either it is to be destroyed by awareness or it isn't. The kind that is destroyed is the one whose supporting object is the defilement itself. The kind that is not destroyed is that associated with awareness of the defilement.

Objection: If so, any trace whose supporting object is impure is destroyed by the vision of the cessation path, so that what was clung to is destroyed. So the destruction of the supporting object is the destruction of the trace.

Answer: Not so. It is the trace whose supporting object is pure which is destroyed through the vision of the cessation path, so that what was clung to is destroyed. And from the destruction of the pure influences comes the destruction of the impure ones.

Objection: A trace is destroyed when awareness occurs. An awareness is called dormantly defiled since it occurs with traces.

Answer: The awareness is of two kinds. One kind is that not vitiated by attachment; it is destroyed by spiritual practice. The other is awareness vitiated by attachment.

Part Thirteen: Consciousness Destroyed by the Instrumentality of its Objective Field

(E20) This consciousness is that awareness, when knowledge of the frustration-truth has arisen but knowledge of its origin has not, that is to be destroyed by vision of the origin, whose supporting object is destroyed by the vision of frustration. To this consciousness 21 kinds of traces adhere. It is not a single awareness.

Chapter Three: Personality

Part One: Dependent Origination

(E21) The birth of a single person is conditioned by 12 factors past, future and simultaneous. Two are past: ignorance and conditioning. Two are future: birth and old age/death. The rest are simultaneous.

Part Two: Conditions

(E21-22) The Lord said: "Conditioning factors are conditioned by ignorance, and existence is conditioned by grasping." By "conditioning factors are conditioned by ignorance" is meant that when action has been done in another earlier birth there is maturation in existence and this maturation is in the form of experience. By "existence is conditioned by grasping" is meant that when actions are dependently originated with a birth there will be maturations in future existence. The difference between the two statements is that the former refers by "ignorance" to a single defilement, while the latter refers by "existence" to all defilements.

Are there conditioning factors that dependently originate with

ignorance but not with knowledge? No. Are there factors that dependently originate with knowledge and not with ignorance? Yes. Are there factors that are dependently originated with neither? No. The reason is that there is no being who has not been either on a noble path or not on a path in the past. Having first taken up a path one subsequently performs actions and accumulates karma relating to earthly things, or as a prince or king, etc. In this way he gets by the noble path prosperity and wealth appropriate to an earthly being in a town or city, as a man or animal or otherwise. So there are four conditions of previous awareness. But there is only one dominant factor of subsequent awareness.

But indeed there are conditioning factors that are originated in dependence on ignorance and not on knowledge—namely, the maturations of ignorance and defiled things. There are factors that are originated in dependence on knowledge and not on ignorance, viz., other pure factors that occur at the first knowledge. There are no factors dependently originated by both knowledge and ignorance. But there are factors which are dependently originated by neither, viz., neutral factors, maturations of ignorance, which are the first knowledge, good, and pure factors.

Part Three: The Locus of Breathing

(E23) Breathing in and out are said to be actions having the body but not awareness as locus. But it should be said that breathing is an action of both. If it were only a bodily action then breathing should occur also in the states of trance free from conceptual identification and the cessation-trance. If it were only a mental action then those in the immaterial realm should also breathe. If it were only a bodily action then those born of eggs, sweat, etc. should also breathe. Since it is both kinds of act, beings in hell, etc., also breathe.

Part Four: The Locus of Awareness

(E23) The activity of the stream of awareness of material beings is bodily. Likewise, immaterial beings must have their awarenesses in some locus? Which one? They are located in the life-faculty, the homogeneity force, and other motivating dispositions dissociated from awareness.

Part Five: Attachment to Nonbecoming

(E23-25) Attachment to nonbecoming is said to be destroyed by vision and by practice. But it should be said to be destroyed by practice.

Others say: Either it is destroyed by vision or by practice, depending on whether the factors to be destroyed relate to vision or to practice.

The correct view is that it is only destroyed by practice.

Objection: Attachment is undestroyed for a stream-enterer. So if it were as you say a stream-enterer should think "when I die I shall be nonexistent; so what is the use of satisfaction?" But he doesn't do so. So attachment is not destroyed for a stream-enterer. Furthermore, you say that the attachment of hell-beings, hungry ghosts and animals is destroyed by practice only. If you were correct the stream-enterer should think "I shall become the *nāgarāja* Maiyavana, or Yama, etc." But he doesn't. So your view is incorrect.

Moreover, you say that through a life established on defilements one is deprived of parents, but that this defilement is destroyed by practice. But defilements are not destroyed for a stream-enterer. If they were, a stream-enterer should be deprived of parents. But he is not, so you are wrong.

So your thesis must be that attachment to nonbecoming is one of the factors destroyed by practice. But the attachment of a stream-enterer is dependently originated by practice. If it were not so then it would be wrong to say that attachment to nonbecoming is destroyed by practice. But it is. Thus your thesis is entirely mistaken.

Part Six: Awareness is Free from Attachment, Etc.

(E25-26) The Lord said: 'Awareness is free from attachment, hatred, and delusion.' Now which kinds of awareness achieve liberation—awareness from attachment and hatred, or awareness free from them? The correct answer is that it is the second, awareness free from them.

Others say that awareness that attains liberation must be associated with attachment, hatred and delusion. But that is not right, because an awareness in which attachment, etc. is not destroyed is not liberating. By analogy the Lord said "O monks, know that the sun and moon, etc. do not shine when turned back by the five coverings."

Which awareness is liberated—past or future? At the time of the arising of the awareness of an adept there will be in the future liberation from all coverings. How? There will arise a destroying knowledge of the path to liberation when the diamond-like concentration is about to cease.

Though liberation belongs to the awareness free from attachment, it is wrong to say that liberation *is* liberated awareness, just as it is wrong to say that acquisition-force is attained, though there is acquistion-force on the part of one who has attained.

Part Seven: Locus

(E27) The Buddha said: "Monks, know that the locus of penetration is nonattachment, the locus of nonattachment, release, and the locus of release is liberation".

What is penetration? It is the agitation of all the traces of an adept, the contradiction of distress by a wise man. What is this nonattachment that is its locus? It is the dispassion of one associated with penetration, nonhatred, deluded or undeluded, the good roots. What is the release that is the locus of nonattachment? It is the resolve of awareness on the part of one associated with nonattachment. What is this liberation that is the locus of release? It is the final destruction of attachment, of delusion, of all the defilements.

Part Eight: Elements

(E27) The Buddha said: "There are three elements of abandoning the world, of nonattachment of the world, of cessation of the world". Abandoning is cutting of the other fetters while establishing the fetters of attachment. Nonattachment is the cutting off of the fetters of attachment. The element of cessation is the cutting off all the elements involved with other fetters.

Every element of abandoning is an element of nonattachment. Every element of nonattachment is an element of abandoning. Every element of cessation is an element of abandoning. Every element of nonattachment is an element of cessation. And every element of cessation is an element of nonattachment.

Part Nine: Identification

(E28) The Buddha said: "There are three identifications, of abandoning, of nonattachment, and of cessation". These are the awarenesses of the three elements of the preceding section.

Chapter Four: Affection and Reverence
Part One: Affection, Respect and Reverence

(E29) Affection is joy, delight. Reverence is fear of lords such as teachers, wise men and *brahmacārins*.

What is respect? There are two kinds. The first involves using pleasing things, e.g., offering alms. The second is respect through *dharma.*

Part Two: Power

(E30) Bodily power and inferiority are defined. Power is known through touch and through bodily and mental consciousness.

Part Three: Cessation

(E30) Calculated cessation is any cessation free from fetters. Uncalculated cessation is any cessation not free from fetters. The noneternality cessation is the destruction, cutting off, dissolution of all conditionings.

What is the difference between the uncalculated and noneternality cessations? The uncalculated cessation does not liberate through the force of any calculation, but through sickness, failure, grief, intoxicants, Māra or karma. It does not lead one from sensual desires nor does it cause one to be delivered. The noneternality cessation is the destruction of all conditionings, all changes.

Part Four: Liberation

(E31-32) Liberation while living occurs for the perfected being when the elements have been banished and the great elements are cut off. But the series of awarenesses based on the five senses is still operative. And because there is still something remaining the experience of contact is recovered. The perfected being loses all retention at cessation of the liberation-after-death sort. But what is the nature of the series of awarenesses then? It is cut off completely.

Some people say that there are three kinds of practitioners: (1) those called seekers who abide in the initial three states of sainthood while still requiring further practice in the spiritual path; (2) those called adepts who have reached the fourth and final state of sainthood, having no further steps to practice; and (3) those called neither seeker nor adept, who have reached neither of the states described in (1) and (2).

Some think that there is liberation only for type (3). But there is liberation for all three.

What is your opinion? Is it that first everyone gets rid of desire and attachment by the worldly path and so reaches neither of the states described in (1) and (2)? It is *these* who are the seekers? Or perhaps you think that they are first neither seekers nor adepts, becoming seekers later when they gain nonreturnership. But if these are seekers they must have been seekers before because of eternally operating according to their nature. So it is not right that they can be a seeker without being a nonreturner.

Or is your opinion that the seeker when all fetters are destroyed directly obtains the fruits of perfected being? How could this be? Your notion of adept is unintelligible. For if they are now adept they must be so eternally be nature. Since perfection is a result and not eternal this cannot be right.

Or is your opinion that a seeker first becomes perfect and then becomes adept subsequently? But if one who is already adept becomes adept he must be so forever. This is not right either.

Or is your opinion that a perfected being who is an adept becomes a seeker when his fetters are destroyed? But if a seeker reenters rebirths he will be eternally a seeker, and so the perfected being will never get free.

Liberation does not come either before or after becoming a seeker, since both before and after he is an adept. For one is first seeker and later adept, or vice versa. This is bewildering, and since no clarity is attainable, liberation would be unattainable.

Therefore, liberation is proved to belong to neither the seeker nor the adept. All factors must be forever unmixed with liberation. One's nature is never attained and never destroyed. Liberation is always present, never absent. Thus neither the seeker nor the adept can be liberated.

Part Five: Aggregates

(E33) In the *sūtra* five aggregates of adepts are indicated: the aggregates of (1) precepts, (2) concentration, (3) wisdom, (4) liberation and (5) appreciating the knowledge of liberation.

Which are the adept's aggregate of precepts? The adept is a pure person who has stopped his body and speech. Which are the adept's aggregates of concentration? Emptiness, dispositionlessness and signlessness. Which are his concentrations of wisdom? Right awareness. Which are his concentrations of liberation? Past, present and future awareness conjoined mentally with an adept's attentions. Which his awareness of the knowledge of liberation? The cessation and nonarising of awareness.

Part Six: Basis

(E33-34) The Buddha sometimes speaks of bases meaning the path, and sometimes meaning cessation. Passages are quoted.

Part Seven: Grasping Ascertainment

(E34-36) When the Buddha speaks of "ascertainment" he is

referring to the five obstructions. They are what sap the strength of ascertainment and postpone liberation. Awareness is halted by the four applications of mindfulness, and that is practiced over and over with the seven conditions of enlightenment.

Why does only the heretic proclaim things defiled by the three defilements but not by the theory of self? Though they have a belief in the self as person, this belief does not become a theory. The heretic also proclaims the ascertainment of all the defilements. Thus they repeat the right words without understanding them.

Part Eight: The Three Treasures

(E37) One who knows that the Buddha exists, knows his name and understands, his behavior is enlightened. Likewise one who knows the *dharma* knows its name and understands it, and the one who knows the order knows its proper name and understands it.

Chapter Five: Shamelessness
Part One: "Black/White"

(E38) Shamelessness is absence of humility, and disregard is lack of any feeling of indignation. The difference is that one who is shameless has no fear of God, while one without indignation is unafraid of any kind of ignorance.

Part Two: Two Faculties

(E39) There are two bad faculties, one excessive, the other minor. They should be avoided.

Part Three: Awareness

(E39-40) All past awareness is conditioned, but some conditioned awareness is not past. Again, all attached awareness is conditioned, but some conditioned awareness is not attached. For example, past awareness is devoid of attachment, but present and future awareness are saddled with hatred.

Part Four: Excitedness and Regret (E40)
Part Five: Stolidity and Sleepiness (E40-41)
Part Six: Dream

(E41) Are dreams meritorious or not? Neither. Then what factor is designated by the term 'dream'? Even at the time of deep sleep

objects of awarenesss and mental states are still active, which is why we remember dreams. Thus dreams are actual existents.

Part Seven: Obstructions

(E42) The *sūtra* says: "There are five obstructions". Are all obstructions comprised within the five, or are the five obstructions comprised within the class of obstructions? The latter, since ignorance is an obstruction.

The five past and future obstructions are not obstructed. The five present obstructions are conditions of and conditioned by all the defilements and afflictions. What are other than the five obstructions are conditioned and gone. There is no obstruction that is unconditioned.

Part Eight: Ignorance

(E42-43) All latent dispositions of ignorance are bound to sensual pleasure. Among them which are the bad ones? All bad factors are dispositions of ignorance which are bound to sensual pleasure. An example is ignorance bound by the belief that the body is real.

Everything bound to the material and immaterial realms is a latent disposition to ignorance. Among them which are the neutral ones? All of them. But there are dispositions to ignorance which are neutral and not bound to the material or immaterial realms.

Everything that is a cause of seeing an assemblage of frustrations is a consequence of ignorance. Are they omnipresent? There are causes of seeing an assemblage of frustrations that are not consequences of ignorance.

Is every consequence of ignorance that is a cause of seeing the path of cessation nonomnipresent? Yes, but there are nonomnipresent consequences of ignorance that are not causes of seeing the path of cessation. E.g., ignorance can be conjoined with consequences that are not omnipresent which are causes of seeing an assemblage of frustrations.

Part Nine: Unconnected Things

(E43) All ignorances are the unconnected consequences of ignorance. In frustration there is nonperception of the origination- and cessation-paths. There is no unconnected contradiction of arrogance.

Chapter Six: Characteristic Marks
Part One: Two- and Three-fold Distinctions

(E44-46) Are the impermanences of birth, life, and old age of

material factors to be called material or immaterial? Immaterial. The impermanences of birth, life, and old age are also termed immaterial. Likewise visible, resisting, impure and conditioned factors.

The impermanences of birth, life and old age of past, present and future factors are called past, present and future respectively. Likewise the ages of good, bad and neutral factors, the sensual, material and immaterial realms, the seeker, adept and one who is neither seeker nor adept, and those factors which are to be removed by the visual and spiritual paths and those not to be so removed—all are known by the names provided.

Part Two: Characteristic Marks

(E46) The difference between death and impermanence is that all death is impermanent, but there are impermanent things which do not die, e.g., stopping death by suppressing the other conditioning factors.

Part Three: Three Momentary Things

(E46-47) The Buddha said there are three things that are defined as conditions of what is conditioned: what arises at a single moment, cessation, and what is otherwise than static. The first refers to birth, the second to noneternality, and the third to old age.

Chapter Seven: Unprofitable Things
Part One: Unprofitable Things

(E48) Self-mortification, practiced by heretics, is unprofitable.

Part Two: Mindfulness

(E48) Discussion of yogic methods of developing mindfulness.

Part Three: Inauspicious Things

(E49) There are six kinds of inauspicious things, divided into those which have to do with faith and those having to do with *dharma*.

Part Four: Knowledge of the Wheel of *Dharma* (E49)
Part Five: Those with Song Gone, and Self-Produced (E50)
Part Six: Being Satisfied with Desires

(E51) The virtue of not being satisfied with having many desires is extolled.

Part Seven: Indulgence and Incontinence

(E51-52) Indulgence is excessive eating and drinking. Incontinence is excessive taste for food and drink. Their opposites are moderation and restraint.

Chapter Eight: Thinking
Part One: Thinking, Initial Thought and Excitedness

(E53-54) Thinking is any awareness. Conceptual construction is a determination or a measuring. What is the difference? Thinking is an act; construction is an intellectual opinion.

Initial thought is inference, a sifting undertaken by all minds. Sustained thought is inquiry. What is the difference? Initial thought is gross; sustained thought is subtle.

Excitedness is disturbance of the mind. Distraction is infirmity, disturbance. What is the difference? Excitedness is the absence of peace; distraction is the division of attention among many things.

Part Two: Delusion and Wrong Awareness

(E54-55) Ignorance pertains to the three worlds. Wrong awareness is an opinion not confirmed by logic.

Objection: Even one who has correct knowledge may speak falsely and often does, for his memory is imperfect inasmuch as he also lacks correct knowledge.

Answer: Not so. Only he who has wrong awareness speaks falsely. Otherwise it cannot be asserted that wrong awareness is an opinion not confirmed by logic. Wrong awareness arises from imperfect memory.

Why is every ignorant act conjoined with wrong awareness? Since even he who has right awareness must speak falsely because his memory is conditioned by ignorance, it will be as well to say: he speaks falsely who has incorrect knowledge. So it is illogical to assert that he who has correct knowledge may speak falsely.

Part Three: Arrogance and Pride

(E55-57) Arrogance is infatuation, disturbance, a fixing of the mind, a grasping for the essence of awareness. Pride is also a grasping for the essence of awareness; it supports the arising of awareness, for it passes away and is not yet arisen. What is the difference? Arrogance is pursuit of fixity of mind without reference to other things; pride is pursuit of fixity of mind with reference to other things.

One who is filled with excessive pride says "I see frustration as frustration" or "I see birth as birth". What is the point? Someone listening to a competent teacher memorizes the entire *dharma* from the beginning. Basing himself on that, he reaches patience consistent with truth. He comes to complete understanding of frustration or of birth, and no false views or doubts arise, or if they do, he does not understand them. And so he sees himself as visited by frustration or by birth, and accordingly pride arises and this excessive pride becomes a support for frustration or rebirth. By the same line of reasoning, a proud man who says "I see cessation as cessation" or "I see the path as the path" develops the same excessive pride with the same results. Likewise, one who thinks "this is correct conduct; this is the path" becomes arrogant and rebirth is generated. The same result accrues for one visited by pride in celibacy, doing one's duty, asserting that this is one's final life, and humility—if these are believed by one with excessive pride they lead to suffering and rebirth.

Part Four: Sickness

(E57-58) Desire, anger, violence lead to sickness of self, other or both. Some cause frustration in their mind and body, being possessed by passion. Concentrating on that, they experience for many long nights sickness, frustration and the various fruits of the karmic cycle. Others lust after the wife of another, or abduct her, are followed and beaten by her husband, the result being sickness in all parties.

Part Five: Excess

(E58) Is knowledge in excess or is it the object of knowledge that is in excess? The object, not the knowledge, since knowledge is itself an object.

Is knowledge in excess, or the consciousness of it? The consciousness is in excess, not the knowledge, since every knowledge is associated with consciousness, but not every consciousness is associated with knowledge.

Are impure or pure factors in excess? The impure are, because impure factors are partially comprehended in all twelve bases, but the pure are comprehended in only two.

Part Six: Career and Faculty

(E58) What is the *bodhisattva*'s career? He becomes a perfected being, restrains speech, remains pure.

Part Seven: Ordinariness

(E59-60) The ordinary person is described. Should he be spoken of as good, bad or neutral? Neutral. But why not good? Because one becomes good by applying oneself, but that is not the nature of ordinary folk. Rather, one whose nature is good, since his good qualities are also eliminated, must be considered extraordinary. Why not bad, then? Because when desire and passion are destroyed, and the quality of badness entirely departed, the attainment of bad qualities cannot lead to ordinariness. Such a one is extraordinary, not ordinary.

Does ordinariness produce desires of the corporeal or incorporeal body? Answer: Either.

Is ordinariness gotten rid of through vision or through spiritual practice? Answer: The latter, since all the qualities that can be destroyed through vision are produced by attachment, but ordinariness is not produced by attachment. Furthermore, when one is patient and has repressed mundane qualities, the ordinariness known in the three realms departs and is no longer produced. But the qualities to be gotten rid of through vision still persist at the time, and have not departed.

What quality is ordinariness? Answer: All the conditions known in the three realms which are free of awareness and not produced by passion.

Part Eight: Falsehood

(E60-61) A tetralemma is developed. There are qualities accompanied by (1) false vision and wrong practice, (2) wrong practice but not false vision, (3) false vision but not wrong practice, (4) neither false vision nor wrong practice.

Likewise, there are four alternatives connecting the coexistence or absence of false memory and false concentration.

BOOK TWO: BAD FACTORS
Chapter One: Bad Factors
Section One: Headings

(E65-69) The triplets: three fetters—belief that the body is real, addiction to moral precepts and vows, doubt. Three bad roots—greed, hatred and delusion. Three impurities—desire, existence and ignorance.

The fours: four floods—desire, existence, false views, ignorance. Four bonds—desire, existence, false views, ignorance. Four

graspings—desire, false views, attachment to false views and observances, belief in a self. Four bodily knots—covetousness, malice, attachment to false vows and observances, persistence in asserting "this is real".

The fives: Five obstructions—desire-and-interest, malice, solidity, attachment to vows and observances, excitedness-and-regret. Five fetters—passion, repugnance, pride, envy and selfishness. Five lower internal fetters—desire and passion, repugnance, belief that the body is real, attachment to false views and observances, doubt. Five higher external fetters—attachment to bodily form, attachment to formlessness, repugnance, excitedness and ignorance. Five false views—believing the effect to be real, extreme views, false views, adherence to views, and attachment to false views and observances.

The sixes: Bodies of craving—born of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind contact.

The seven latent dispositions—desire and attachment, repugnance, desire for existence, pride, ignorance, false views and doubt.

The nine fetters: craving, repugnance, pride, ignorance, false views, adherence, doubt, envy and selfishness.

The ninety-eight latent dispositions: thirty-six propensities accompanied by desire, thirty-one propensities accompanied severally by bodily form and formlessness. (31 + 31 + 36 = 98).

Section Two: Essential Nature of Three Fetters, Etc.

(E69-73) Of the threes, which are bad and which neutral? Among the fetters, belief that the body is neutral, attachment to moral precepts and vows and doubt are either bad or neutral. The rest of the headings are analyzed in like manner.

Part Two: Maturation

(E73) Of the above, which mature and which do not? Answer: All that are bad come to fruition; those that are neutral do not.

Part Three: What is To Be Destroyed

(E73-76) The headings are categorized as to which are to be destroyed by vision and which by spiritual practice. For example, of the fetters, the first, belief that the body is real, if it has been preceded by vision, is either to be destroyed by vision or both by vision and practice. But if it is to be destroyed by those who are receptive to the frustrations preceding final illumination, who follow the *dharma* and are faithful, and is associated with neither conscious-

ness nor unconsciousness, then it is to be destroyed by vision; but if it is to be destroyed by the common man, it is to be destroyed by wrong effort; if by the mendicant, then by vision.... (This sort of treatment is repeated for all the headings.)

Of these headings, which are to be destroyed by a demonstration of the first noble truth, that existence is frustrating, and which by effort? Answer: Belief that the body is real is to be destroyed by a demonstration of frustration. (Similar considerations pertaining to all the headings follow.)

Part Four: False Views

(E76) Which of the headings are false views and which are not? Answer: Among the three fetters two are false views, one is not.... (The question is repeated for the remaining headings.)

Part Five: Initial and Sustained Thought

(E77) Those of the headings that are accompanied by both initial and sustained thought, that are accompanied by sustained but not by initial thought, that are accompanied by neither, are distinguished.

Part Six: Connection with the Sense-Organs

(E77-80) Those of the headings that are conjoined with the senses pleasantly, unpleasantly, with good intention, with bad intention, and with the senses disregarded, are distinguished.

Part Seven: Connection with the Elements

(E80-81) Those of the headings conjoined with the element of desire, with the element of matter, and with formlessness, are distinguished.

Part Eight: Bases

(E81-84) Are all three fetters descended from desire, based on desire? Four alternatives must be distinguished. Some fetters are descended from desire but not based on desire. For example, he who, possessed by vice, falls from the element of matter and is reborn into intermediate existence based on desire. The evil Māra, formerly situated in Brahmaloka, was reborn in the retinue of the Buddha because he was possessed by depravity.

Some fetters are based on desire but are not descended from desire.

For instance, he who, possessed by depravity, falls from the element of desire and is reborn into an intermediate state of existence based on bodily form, situated now in desire, finds himself fettered from a former existence with the elements of matter and formlessness.

Some fetters are descended from desire and based on desire. For instance, he who, possessed by depravity, falls from the element of desire and is reborn either into an intermediate state of existence or a new existence based on the element of desire, situated in desire finds himself fettered with the element of desire.

Some fetters are neither descended from desire nor based on desire. For instance, those who, possessed by depravity, fall from the element of bodily form, are reborn either into an intermediate state or a new existence based on matter. Or they may fall from matter to be reborn in formlessness, or fall from formlessness and be reborn in material form, or fall from formlessness and be reborn in formlessness. Situated in bodily form they find themselves fettered with the elements of bodily form.

Part Nine: Provisions

(E84) The Buddhist disciple is provided with a demonstration of frustration, its origin, etc. Is his entire form which is not used up still connected? Yes. Is his form which is connected not used up? Yes. Likewise his frustrations, knowledge, conditions etc. which are not used up, remain connected and vice versa.

Part Ten: Fulfilment

(E85-89) There are five kinds of people: the faith followers, the followers of *dharma*, those resolved in faith, those seized by false views, and those attending the body.

For each of these, how many of the fetters, etc. are fulfilled and how many unfulfilled? Answer: For the faithful, if the consciousness of frustration has not yet arisen, all are fulfilled; if it has arisen, two are fulfilled, one (doubt) not fulfilled. The same is true of the followers of *dharma*. For those resolved in faith, all the fetters are unfulfilled, and likewise for those seized by false views. For those attending the body all fetters and all roots of unrighteousness are unfulfilled.

Part Eleven: Conditions

(E89-92) How many causes does the view that the body is real have vis-a-vis the view that the body is real, attachment to false vows and observances, etc? Answer: Either four, three, two or one cause,

depending on how many types of conditions are taken into account. The same formula is repeated for each category.

Chapter Two: Association
Part One: Association of the Fetters

(E93-104) The nine fetters are listed. Is the fetter of craving accompanied by the fetter of selfishness? Not altogether. Where the qualities of materiality and immateriality are present, the fetter of craving is not used up.

Similar questions are asked about the combinations of each of the nine fetters with each of the others, with various answers.

Part Two: Six Enumerations

(E105-108) A series of questions along these lines "If there is contact with a fetter of craving that is past, is there also contact with a future fetter of that sort"? Answer: Yes. If there is contact with a fetter of craving that is future, is there also with that which is past? Answer: If what is past has been used up, yes; otherwise no.

Similar questions are raised about the possible temporal combinations of craving, as well as similar questions for the other eight fetters.

Part Three: Seven Great Honeys

(E109-122) The seven honeys are (1) past-past, (2) past-future, (3) past-present, (4) past-past and present, (5) past-future and present, (6) past-past and future, and (7) past-past present and future. A series of pairs are examined as to whether if an occasion is accompanied by the fetter of past A, whether it is also accompanied by past B? For example, the first pair is craving and repugnance, the second is craving and envy, the third desire and selfishness, etc.

Part Four: Comprehension

(E122-125) Of all the qualities from the three fetters to the 98 latent dispositions, which are comprehended within which? Each case has to be examined separately and this is done.

Part Five: Existence

(E125-126) Of all the qualities from the three fetters to the 98 latent dispositions, which produce a series of desire? which a material series? which an immaterial series? Each must be examined separa-

tely. For example, all three fetters produce all three forms (desire, material and immaterial). But the three bad roots and the impure influence produce the series of material and immaterial forms. And so forth.

Part Six: (Cessation by) Dependence on Meditative Attainments

(E126-127) By taking refuge in which attainment is there cessation of the qualities from the three fetters to the 98 latent dispositions? Again, the cases are separated and discussed.

Part Seven: Relation

(E128-129) Are all past fetters related? Yes, but some related fetters are not past. Are all future fetters going to be related? Some are and some aren't. Are all fetters now present in relation? Yes.

Part Eight: Path

(E129) Will those who by this path have cut off the fetter whose root is desire again be visited by that fetter if they deviate from the path? Yes. Likewise for the fetters whose root is material and immaterial.

Part Nine: Ascertainment

(E129-131) There are nine ascertainments. By the first, the fetters whose element is desire and which may be destroyed by seeing the origin of frustration are abandoned. By the second, the fetters whose element is material or immaterial form and which may be destroyed by seeing the origin of frustration are abandoned. By the third, the fetters whose element is desire and which may be destroyed by seeing the cessation (of frustration) are abandoned. By the fourth, the fetters whose element is material or immaterial form and which may be destroyed by seeing the cessation of frustration are abandoned. By the fifth the fetters whose element is desire and which may be destroyed by seeing the path are abandoned. By the sixth, the fetters whose element is material or immaterial form and which may be destroyed by seeing the path are abandoned. By the seventh, the fetters of material form and attachment are abandoned. By the eighth, the fetters of material form and attachment are abandoned. And by the ninth all fetters are abandoned.

Is there comprehension of all the ascertainments by the nine ascertainments or vice versa? Of all the nine by all, but not all by

the nine. Of which is there no comprehension? There is no comprehension by the nine of the used-up portion of the worldly fetters, which are to be destroyed after seeing suffering but not yet having cognized its origin, etc.

There are eight persons: (1) stream-enterers, (2) those who have gained the fruit of stream-entry, (3) once-returners, (4) those who have gained the fruit of once-returning, (5) non-returners, (6) those who have gained the fruit of non-returning, (7) perfected beings, (8) those who have gotten the fruit of perfected being. Now which of the nine ascertainments do each of these eight persons attain? (1) attains none, or one or two or three or four or five, (2) achieves six, (3) is like (1), (4) is like (2), (5) achieves six, (6) achieves one (viz.; the using up of the five lower fetters), (7) also achieves one, or two (depending on whether the material element is used up or not), (8) uses up all the fetters.

Chapter Three: Beings

Part One: Sequential and Simultaneous Association and Dissociation

(E132-133) For each of the three elements there are two types of fetters—those to be destroyed by vision and those to be destroyed by spiritual practice. Is it possible, with respect to the single element of desire, to have simultaneous association with both types of fetters? It is. For instance, when a common man, who has used up his passion for desired things, turns away from dispassion for desire, or when he falls from the material and immaterial elements and is reborn in the element of desire.

Is it possible to have simultaneous dissociation? Yes, for example when the common man experiences a dispassion toward desire.

It is not possible to have sequential association, but it is possible to have sequential dissociation, e.g., when the mendicant, having used up those fetters to be destroyed by vision, later uses up those fetters to be destroyed by practice.

A parallel set of questions relates to the material element.

Can a single immaterial element have simultaneous association with both types of fetter? Simultaneous dissociation? No. Sequential association? No. Sequential dissociation? Yes, e.g., when the mendicant, having used up those fetters to be destroyed by vision, later uses up those fetters to be destroyed by practice.

Part Two: The Seven Forms of Attraction to Results

Section One: Destruction of the Twofold Fetters

(E133-138) In which of the results is the destruction by vision

of the fetter whose root is desire included? The results of the first four kinds of person (see above, 2.2.9). Or it is not included.

In which of the results is the destruction by practice of the fetter whose root is desire included? The results of non-returning and of perfection, or it is not included.

Section Two: Destruction of the Five fold Fetter

The five fetters are those four which are destroyed by vision of the four noble truths, and a fifth which is destroyed by practice.

Cessation of the first three sorts of fetter is included within the results of being one of the first four kinds of person, or else it is not included. Cessation of the fourth sort is definitely included in the results of being the first four kinds of person. Cessation of the fifth sort is included in the result of perfection.

Section Three: Destruction of the Ninefold Fetter

The nine fetters are those four which are destroyed by knowledge of frustration and *dharma* of each of the four noble truths, plus that suppressible by practice.

Section Four: Destruction of the Fifteen-fold Fetter

The foregoing five are each considered according to three elements: of desire, material and immaterial elements. Then

desires 1-4 are attracted toward the results of the first four kinds of person, or not
desire 5 is attracted toward the non-returner, or not
material elements 1-4 are like desires 1-4
material element 5 is attracted toward the result of perfection, or not
immaterial 1-3 are like desires and materials 1-4
immaterial 4 is like desires and materials 1-4
immaterial 5 is attracted toward perfection.

Section Five: Three Fetters through Destruction of 98 Fetters

The same question is asked for every factor in this list. Answers conform to those already given.

Section Six: Engaging in the Path and Reaching the Result

The destruction of all the fetters for one who enters the stream comprehends which results? None.

The destruction of all the fetters for one who has gotten the fruit of stream-entry comprehends which results? Stream-enterer, or none.

The destruction of all the fetters for one who starts becoming once-returner comprehends which results? Stream-enterer.

The destruction of all the fetters for one who has become a once-returner comprehends which results? Once-returner.

The destruction of all the fetters for one who starts becoming a non-returner comprehends which results? Non-returner.

The destruction of all the fetters for one who starts becoming a perfected being comprehends which results? Perfection, or none.

The destruction of all the fetters for one who has become a perfected being comprehends which results? Perfection.

Section Seven: False Views

Toward which result is the mendicant with false views, whose passion for desire is not used up, attracted? Toward the once-returner, or not attracted.

Toward which results is the person whose sensual desires are used up, but whose desire for material form is not, attracted? None.

Toward which result is the person whose desire for material form is used up, but whose desire for immaterial form is not attracted? None.

Chapter Four: Three Kinds of Fulfilment

(E138-143) Section 1: The Qualities of the Trainee and Adept

The qualities of the trainee are attained by all stream-enterers. Are these qualities included in the result of stream-entering? Yes and no. The conditioned result of stream-entry, attained and not wasted, is included, while the conditioned qualities of evil, the senses, etc., are included in all stream-entry as a sign of excellence.

The conditioned result of stream-entry pertains to the trainee, while the unconditioned result pertains to the adept.

The same questions are raised about the once-returner, the non-returner and the perfected being.

Section 2: Pure Qualities

Pure qualities are attained by all stream-enterers. The argument parallels that just given.

Section 3: All Factors

All factors are to be attained by stream-enterers. Are they all included in the results of stream-entry? Four possibilities have to be distinguished.

Some factors attained by stream-enterers are not attracted to those who gain stream-entry. For example, the conditioned qualities concerning evil, the sense, etc., which are to be attained by every stream-enterer as a sign of excellence, destruction of all the fetters, cessation, worldly qualities.

Some qualities attracted toward stream-entry are not attained by the stream-enterer: for example, the result of stream-entry attained and then wasted.

Some qualities are attained but not attracted (same example).

Some qualities are not attained and not attracted—those not previously noted.

The same questions are considered in respect to the once-returner, the non-returner and the perfected being.

Section 4: Six Kinds of Fall and Rebirth

(E143-144) Part 1. Apprehension and Nonapprehension of Existence on the Part of One Fallen and Reborn in his Own Realm

Does one fallen and reborn in the realm of desire apprehend his existence in desire? Four possibilities must be considered.

Some fallen and reborn in the realm of desire do not apprehend their existence in desire, e.g., someone in an intermediate state in the realm of matter.

Some, not fallen and reborn in the realm of desire, do apprehend their existence in desire, e.g., one in an intermediate existence in the realm of desire.

Some fallen and reborn in the realm of desire do apprehend their existence in desire, e.g., one who has fallen from the realm of matter and is reborn into it or into the immaterial realm, or one who has fallen from the immaterial realm and is reborn in the material or immaterial realm.

Some, not fallen and reborn in the realm of desire, do not apprehend their existence in desire, e.g., one who has fallen from the material realm and is reborn there or in immaterial form, or one who has fallen from immaterial form and is reborn in either material or immaterial form.

The same discussion, *mutatis mutandis*, for one who is fallen and reborn in the realm of matter.

Does one fallen and reborn in the realm of immaterial form

apprehend his existence there? Yes. Some apprehend their existence there who have not fallen from it, e.g., one who has fallen from the realm of desire and is reborn in the realm of formlessness.

How many kinds are there who are fallen and reborn in the realm of desire? Four kinds: the perfected person and the common man, each of whom may have his realm in each.

How many kinds are there who are fallen and reborn in the realm of matter? Three kinds: the common man whose realm is desire, the perfected being, or the common man, each being in the realm of matter.

How many kinds are there who are fallen and reborn in the immaterial realm? Two, the perfected being and the common man.

(E144-146) Part 2: Apprehension and Nonapprehension of Existence by One Fallen and Reborn in a Realm Other than His Own

Does one fallen and reborn in a realm other than desire fail to apprehend his existence in desire? There are four cases to consider.

Some fallen and reborn elsewhere than in desire apprehend their existence in desire, e.g., one who has risen from the material realm to an intermediate existence in the material realm.

Some not fallen and reborn elsewhere than in desire fail to apprehend their existence in desire, e.g., one in an intermediate existence in the material realm.

Some fallen and reborn elsewhere than in desire fail to apprehend their existence in desire, e.g., one fallen from the material realm and reborn in the material or immaterial realms, or one fallen from the immaterial realm and reborn in the material or immaterial realms.

Some not fallen and reborn elsewhere than in desire apprehend their existence in desire, e.g., one who has arisen from the realm of desire and gained an intermediate existence in the realm of desire, as well as he who has been reborn.

The same discussion, *mutatis mutandis,* for one who is fallen and reborn in the realm of matter.

Does one fallen and reborn in a realm other than immaterial fail to apprehend his (former) existence in the immaterial realm? Yes. Some fail to apprehend their (former) existence in the immaterial realm who have fallen from formlessness and been reborn in another realm.

How many kinds are there who have either fallen or been reborn in a realm other than the realm of desire? Five kinds: the common man in the realm of desire, material or immaterial realms, and the perfected being in the material or immaterial realms.

How many kinds have either fallen or been reborn in other than the material realm? Six—the common and perfected beings in any

of the three realms.

How many kinds are there who have either fallen or been reborn in a realm other than the immaterial one? Four—the perfected being and common man, each of which is of the realm of desire or matter.

(E146-147) Part 3. Nonrebirth of One Who has Fallen from Realms in That or Another Realm

Is there one who, fallen from the realm of desire, is not reborn in the realm of desire? Yes, e.g., one who rises from an intermediate existence in desire to the immaterial realm, or one who has extinguished existence.

Is there one who, fallen from the realm of desire, is not reborn in the realm of matter? Yes—same as previous paragraph.

And is there one who, fallen from the element of desire, is not reborn in the immaterial realm? Yes, same answer as in previous two paragraphs.

The possible rebirths are further permuted in like vein.

(E148) Part 4. Nonrebirth in the Three Realms of One Who Has Fallen from His Own Realm

One who has fallen from either of the three realms and is not reborn in one of the three is either somebody in an intermediate existence in the realm of desire or a liberated one.

The number and kinds of such are reviewed as before.

(E148-149) Part 5. Nonrebirth of One Who Has not Used His Attachment

Is there one who, his passion for attachment not used up and his life at an end, is not reborn in one or another of the three realms? Yes—one in an intermediate existence whose realm is desire.

Again the kinds are listed.

(E149) Part 6. The Connection of the Contaminants and Fetters with the Common Man and the Perfected Being

How many contaminants and how many fetters is the common man whose realm is desire subject to? 98 contaminants and 9 fetters. How many is the perfected being whose realm is desire subject to? 10 contaminants and 6 fetters.

How many dispositions and fetters is the common man whose realm is material subject to? 62 contaminants and 6 fetters. How many is the perfected being whose realm is matter subject to? 6 contaminants and 3 fetters.

How many contaminants and fetters is the common man whose realm is immaterial subject to? 31 contaminants and 6 fetters. How many is the perfected being whose realm is immaterial subject to? 3 contaminants and 3 fetters.

Chapter Four: Ten Doors

(E150-155) Part 1: 42 Topics of Contaminants

Question: What are the 42 topics and what is the relation between them and the (98) contaminants?

Answer: 1. 22 faculties; external senses related to all passion-rooted contaminants; faculty of femininity related to all desire-rooted contaminants, plus the contaminants to be destroyed by practice; faculty of life force, related to the contaminants of all three roots and to those to be destroyed by practice; the five faith-faculties; the mind, related to all the contaminants; the faculty of satisfaction, related to all contaminants rooted in the realm of desire and matter and those to be destroyed by practice; the faculty of contentedness in all those in the realm of matter—with the exception of pure doubt and the ignorance related to it—and to all the other contaminants rooted in desire; depression of all those rooted in desire; the three pure senses are not related to any contaminant.

2. 18 elements (5 external senses plus mind, their objects and their awarenesses). Most of these (except mind, etc.) related to all desire-rooted contaminants plus the contaminant to be destroyed by effort. Mind, etc. are related to all.

3. 12 senses related to all the desire-rooted contaminants plus the contaminants to be destroyed by practice.

4. 5 aggregates.

5. 5 aggregates which still have grasping inherent in them.

6. 6 elements.

7. Material and immaterial factors.

8. Visible and invisible factors.

9. Resisting and unresisting factors.

10. Pure and impure factors.

11. Conditioned and unconditioned factors.

12. Past, present and future factors.

13. Good, bad and neutral factors.

14. Factors of the realm of desire, the material and the immaterial realms.

15. Factors belonging to the seeker, the adept and neither.

16. Factors to be destroyed by vision or by practice or not to be destroyed.

17. 4 truths (frustration, its cause, cessation and the path).

18. 4 meditations.

19. 4 boundless things.

20. 4 immaterial things.

21. 8 liberations.

22. 8 stages of mastery.

23. 10 spheres of totality.
24. 8 awarenesses.
25. 3 concentrations.
26. 3 kinds of concentration.
27. 3 fetters.
28. 3 bad roots.
29. 3 pure influences.
30. 4 floods.
31. 4 bonds.
32. 4 graspings.
33. 4 bodily knots.
34. 5 obstructions.
35. 5 fetters.
36. 5 obstructive fetters.
37. 5 upper fetters.
38. 5 false views.
39. 5 desirous bodies.
40. 7 contaminants.
41. 9 fetters.
42. 8 contaminants not included above.

The relations between each of these 42 sets and their relative contaminants are explained.

Parts 2-3: The Respective Bases of the Corresponding Contaminants

(E156-162) Essentially the same lists of categories are taken first as "sense" and then as cognitions of that sense. Relations to the various dispositions conform *grosso modo* to the treatment of the preceding section. It is explained what awareness of a sense corresponds to each of the collections of contaminants.

Part 4: Immediate Rebirth of Awareness

(E162-164) How many minds, among the 15-fold 3-rooted awarenesses, are generated immediately by each one of these factors beginning with awareness? The same list of categories is presumed. Answer: The awareness-sense generates immediately 15 awarenesses, the evenminded-sense and the five sense-organs beginning with faith. The numbers generated by the rest are reviewed.

Part 5: Initial Thought

(E164-165) Each of the contaminants, when compounded with

topics listed previously, is to be described as (a) accompanied by both initial and sustained thought or (b) by sustained thought but not initial thought or (c) neither.

Part 6: Applications of the Sense-Organs

(E166-168) Are each of the contaminants to be described as connected through the sense of satisfaction, through the sense of frustration, through the sense of joy, through the sense of contentedness, through the sense of depression, or through the sense of evenmindedness?

As answer it is explained how each of the 98 contaminants operate through sense-organs, etc.

Part 7-8: Presence and Absence

(E168-172) Which kind of person do each of the contaminants belong to, and from which are they lacking? Answers are given for each of the 42 topics.

Part 9: Ascertainment

(E173-177) Which of the 98 contaminants, when known, provide knowledge of which others? And which of the 9 fetters are gotten rid of when that knowledge is gained? Answer: At the time one gains knowledge of the visual sensual desire for matter is gotten rid of. Etc.

Part 10: Evidence

(E176-185) With respect to each of the 98 contaminants, when its cessation is made evident, of which of the others is there also evidence of cessation? And which of the 9 fetters are gotten rid of when its cessation is made evident? Answer along the same lines.

(BHADANTA) DHARMAŚRĪ, ABHIDHARMA-HṚDAYA or ABHIDHARMASĀRA

Summary by Charles Willemen

This work, T.1550, is preserved only in Chinese, having been translated into that language by Saṃghadeva and Hui-yuan in 391 A.D. The work has been translated by Charles Willemen[1] into English (our "T") and by I. Armelin[2] into French. Leon Hurvitz studies the section on the *abhisamayas*,[3] and P. Pelliot the introduction.[4] There is a Japanese translation by Baiyu Watanabe, Kogen Midzuno and Shuten Watanabe in KIK. Bidonbu, vol. 21, according to Hajime Nakamura.[5]

Willemen estimates that Dharmaśrī's date must be prior to the time of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, since he is mentioned by Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, one of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* masters. How much before is unclear. Willemen thinks Dharmaśrī must date after 130 B.C., when the Yüeh-chih came to Bactria where Dharmaśrī lived. He also reports Chinese opinions placing Dharmaśrī before the time of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, though the reasons given would seem only to suggest he is at least prior to the time of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. Frauwallner[6] and Armelin also date Dharmaśrī prior to the *Jñānaprasthāna*. But Hajime Nakamura writes that "Dharmaśrī composed the Abhidharmahṛdaya-śāstra in about 200 A.D."[7]

Frauwallner's opinion of the contribution of this work is interesting. He calls it "the oldest dogmatic work of the Sarvāstivāda",[8] crediting its author with having made a notable, if ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to systematize Sarvāstivāda tradition. "The various components out of which it is compiled do not support one another. E.g., the account of the *dharmas* in Chapter Two does not accord with that of the latent dispositions in Chapter Four, and the teaching concerning the six causes. The supplementary attempts to bring these teachings into harmony with one another are purely superficial and do not pertain to the core of the teachings. That means that Dharmaśrī

in his system often had to work with older, contradictory teachings which he hesitated to alter wilfully."[9]

Chapter One: Elements

1 (T1-2) Salutations are offered to the Buddha, the *dharma* and the order. The question is raised as to why the characteristic marks of factors need to be known. One answer is that only ascertained factors can be the contents of convincing awareness. But ordinary people also know the differentiating features, e.g., of the elements in terms of their empirical characteristics, viz., that earth is solid, water wet, fire hot, and so on. So they already know the differentiating features of things and do not need to be taught them all over again. So this answer cannot be the right one.

In fact, ordinary people do not know the differentiating features of factors. If what they are aware of—the empirical characteristics mentioned above—were those features, then they should never be doubted, i.e. they should be certain, but they are not. Furthermore, earth, in addition to being solid, is also impermanent, frustrating, and without a self-nature. But ordinary people, though they are aware of the solidity of earth, are not aware of these other features.

2-5(T2-4) The Buddha taught the actual differentiating features of factors. Ordinary people ascribe to impure conditioning factors features which only belong to things different from those impure factors—features of permanency, possession of a nature, satisfactoriness and cleanliness. However, these impure factors are impure because they produce defilements such as perverse views about individuality, or latent dispositions. These impure factors are also known as defilements, aggregates of grasping, and strife, because they trouble beings, because they take hold of us, because they produce angry thoughts.

6-9(T4-6) Aggregates comprise all the conditioned factors, both pure and involving grasping, i.e., impure. There are five of them: material form, feeling, identification, conditioning factors and consciousness.

Material form has ten bases: the five organs and the five corresponding qualities. In addition, the unmanifest is explained to belong to material form in Chapter Three on Karma.

Consciousness is the sense-organ mind. Seven of the elements pertain to it, viz., visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and mental consciousnesses and mind itself.

The remainder includes the other three aggregates, the unmanifest, and the three unconditioned factors, viz., space, calculated cessation

and uncalculated cessation. These six are collectively termed "factor-sense" (*dharmāyatana*) or "factor-element" (*dharmadhātu*).

Aggregates are conditioned only. Senses and elements may be conditioned or unconditioned.

10-13(T6-10) Discussion of the elements. One element is visible: matter. Ten elements possess resistance, viz., the five sense-organs and their respective qualitative contents (color, sound, smell, etc.). Eight elements are said to be neutral: the five sense-organs and the qualities of smell, taste and touch. The rest (color, sound, mind, the factor-element and the six consciousnesses) are either good or bad. Specifically, good bodily movements involve good matter, bad bodily movements bad matter. The other matter is indeterminate. Likewise with sound and vocal movements. The seven elements of awareness—the six consciousnesses and mind—are good when pure, bad when associated with defilements, and otherwise neutral. As for the factor element, they say that when it is associated with thought it is explained as above; otherwise, it is explained as in the chapter titled "Miscellaneous" (i.e., Chapter 9 below).

Fifteen elements are impure: 5 internal elements, 5 external elements, and 5 consciousness-elements. The rest—mind, representative cognition and the factor-element—are either pure or impure. Three (mind, factor-element and representative cognition) are found in all the three realms. Four (smell, taste, gustatory and tactile consciousnesses) are found in the sensual realm alone, since those in the other two realms have no attachment to solid food, and all smells and tastes have the nature of solid food. Eleven (5 internal elements, color, sound, touch, and the awarenesses which take these last three as contents viz., visual, auditory and tactile consciousnesses) are found in both the sensual and material realms, but not in the immaterial realm, since that is free from form.

Five elements are accompanied by initial and sustained thought, viz., the five consciousness-elements, which are associated with grossness. Three elements—mind, the factor-element and representative cognition—are such that, in the first trance state and in the realm of desire they have initial and sustained thought, but in the intermediate meditative stage they only have sustained, not initial thought, and at higher stages they have neither. The elements other than these eight are accompanied by neither initial nor sustained thought, since they are not associated with thought.

Seven elements have a supporting object: the six consciousnesses and a bit of the factor-element. The latter has the factor supporting object as its basis. Only the concomitant mental factors have supporting objects.

Nine elements are appropriated—sound, the seven awareness

elements and the factor-element. The rest may or may not be appropriated. An element is said to be "appropriated" when, integrated in the sensorial organism, an awareness or concomitant mental factor takes it and appropriates it as its support.

The factor-element is both conditioned and unconditioned. The part corresponding to the unconditioned factors is not, and the rest is. The other 17 are conditioned only.

14 (T10-11) Everything is included within things of its own nature, and separated from things of a different nature. So, a visible thing is included within one element, one aggregate and one sense. This will be explained later.

Chapter Two: Conditioning Factors

15-19(T12-15) Question: Since everything is included only within something of its own nature, mustn't they come into existence through their own power?

Answer: Ultimately nothing can come into existence that way, since nothing has anything accompanying it (which could occasion its rise). A conditioning factor is weak and cannot arise by itself. But like a sick person who can get out of bed when assisted by others, a thing can come into existence when supported by other things.

Awarenesses arise accompanied by concomitant mental factors and factors dissociated from awareness. "Awareness", "mind" and "consciousness" are synonyms. When a thought comes into existence dependent on something, with a supporting object, and at a particular moment, its concomitants come into existence along with it. These concomitants include: identification, interest, contact, wisdom, mindfulness (memory), thinking, resolve, attention, concentration and feeling. Identification occurs when something established is experienced according to its sign. Interest is the desire to experience while an object is being experienced. Contact occurs when thought, its sense and its supporting object are not separated from each other. Wisdom is certainty about an object. Memory is not being forgetful. Thinking is the framing of something meritorious or evil or neither in relation to thought. Resolve is the belief, when experiencing an idea in relation to an object, that that object is certainly the right one. Attention is being active in a resolute way toward an object. Concentration is experiencing an object when one's thoughts are not scattered. Feeling is the experiencing of a pleasant or unpleasant object or one that is neither. All ten of these concomitants come into existence associated with each thought; thus they are called generally permeating. And they are permanent accompaniments of each thought, and incapable of increase or decrease.

Initial thought is a series of coarse thoughts; sustained thought a series of subtle thoughts. Faith is sincerity and true purity. Tranquility is satisfaction with good thoughts. Heedfulness is application in doing good things. Energy is strenuousness. Equanimity is acting without acting, seeking without seeking, guarding oneself and thus not producing conditioning factors. Defilements are explained in the chapter on latent dispositions. These factors, together with the three good roots: absence of greed, lack of hatred and understanding, do not all accompany every thought; sometimes they accompany, and sometimes not.

20-22(T15-18) The concomitants of bad thoughts in the realm of desire number 21: the 10 generally permeating factors, initial thought, sustained thought, 2 defilements, shamelessness, disregard, lethargy, excitedness, lack of confidence, heedlessness and sloth.

By subtracting shamelessness and disregard from the above list one gets 19 concomitants of the thoughts of the defiled person in the realm of desire. Such persons are not bad, and those two factors that were subtracted are bad only.

There are 20 factors that fall into the category of special factors. A "unique" factor is one that is produced only by ignorance. The 20 factors of the present group are the same as those in the group of concomitants of bad thoughts minus one of the two defilements (viz., the one that is not itself ignorance). Concomitants of good thoughts are: the ten generally permeating factors, initial thought, sustained thought, faith, energy, tranquility, heedfulness, three good factors, equanimity, shame and modesty.

There are 12 neutral factors, the concomitants of the undefiled thoughts. These are the 10 generally permeating factors, initial and sustained thought. Thus there are five classes of thoughts, viz., good, bad, defiled, unique and neutral, with concomitants as mentioned. Regret increases the list of good and bad factors by one, and sleepiness may increase all five classes by one.

The above relates to the realm of desire. As for the material realm: the first trance excludes bad thoughts, but the rest are to be understood to include all the other four classes of thoughts and concomitants described above, except that shamelessness and disregard, concomitants of bad thoughts only, do not arise in the unique class. In the intermediate meditative states of the material and immaterial realms sustained thought also goes.

23(T18-19) For each atom constitutive of a visual, auditory, gustatory or olfactory faculty there are 10 seeds, viz., earth, water, fire, air, color, smell, taste, touch, the visual faculty and the bodily faculty. For each atom in the bodily faculty there are nine seeds, viz., the above 10 minus the bodily faculty itself. In the atoms

constituting the remaining faculties there are eight seeds (viz., the first eight listed above). In the material realm smell and taste are absent.

24(T19-20) The contaminants dissociated from awareness of material factors are birth, duration, change and disappearance. And each of these in turn has its own secondary mark, viz., coming to be for birth, maintaining for duration, changing for change, disappearing for disappearance. No infinite regress occurs, for each of the secondary marks produces that which it marks and vice-versa.

25-29(T20-24) Every cause is included among the six kinds of cause. These are: (1) efficient cause, e.g., the production of all sorts of earthy products from earth; (2) simultaneous cause, when things spring up together, as, e.g., the factors which are thought together with their concomitants and the dissociated dispositions appropriate to them; (3) homogeneous cause, where a kind of thing causes something of its own kind, e.g., when good activity produces good factors, etc.; (4) pervasive cause, e.g., the process by which the defilements are produced in a series by urges; (5) connected cause, the specific association between, e.g., a thought and its specific concomitant; and (6) maturation cause, when a disposition matures, e.g., when a good disposition ripens into a good outcome.

Now it is shown that everything is a product of causes, indeed, practically everything of at least two and at most five of the above types of causes. For example, thoughts arising from maturations, their concomitants and the defilements are produced by five causes; matter born of a retributory cause and dissociated from awareness, defiled matter dissociated from awareness and, associated factors excluding the initial pure ones are produced by four causes; the remaining dissociated factors—excluding the initial pure ones—as well as the initial pure associated factors have three causes; the initial pure dissociated factors are produced by two causes.

30-32(T24-26) The conditions are now explained. They are four: (1) the directly antecedent condition, relating a factor to its predecessor in a series; (2) the consciousness-supporting condition, the conditioning of a thought and its concomitants by its object; (3) the dominant condition, which is the efficient cause; (4) the condition as cause, which includes the remaining five causes in the previous section.

Thoughts and their concomitants are produced by all four conditions. Trance free from conceptual identification and cessation-trance are produced by three conditions—the thought immediately producing the trance is the directly antecedent condition, the qualities conducing to the trance are the conditions as cause, and all the factors other than the trance itself are the dominant conditions. The remain-

ing factors—e.g., the dissociated ones other than trances—have two conditions, viz., the condition as cause and the dominant condition.

Question: Why are these factors not associated with thought called "conditioning factors"?

Answer: Because many factors, each formed by many conditioning factors, conspire to produce a single factor. Thus they work together (*saṃskṛ*) to produce.

Chapter Three: Karma

33-35(T27-28) When these factors, so produced, bear fruit, different kinds of birth result. The three worlds (past, present, future) with their bodies in five courses (viz., hell, ghostly, animal, human, heaven) result from karma. Actions are bodily, mental or vocal.

Bodily karma can be either manifest or unmanifest. Likewise for verbal karma. Mental karma is only unmanifest. Karma is manifest inasmuch as it is good, bad or neutral depending on the thought which gives rise to it. Karma is unmanifest when it arises as a result of habit despite thought preceding it which are of a different sort than it, so that even one having bad or neutral thoughts may yet do a good act, and likewise a person with good habits does evil actions despite himself. Mental acts have only unmanifest karma because they are not evident, being a subtle series of thinkings.

36-39(T28-31) Manifest and mental acts are of one among three kinds, viz., they are either good, bad or neutral. Bodily and vocal unmanifest acts are never neutral—they are either good or bad, because a neutral thought is too weak to produce an action forceful enough to produce a bodily or vocal action of its own kind.

Neutral karma is either obstructed or nonobstructed. An obstructed act is one which is defiled; a nonobstructed one is not defiled. Obstructed neutral karma only occurs in the material realm; this is because in the realm of desire only bad defilements occur and they cannot produce neutral karma. Nonobstructed karma, on the other hand, can occur in both the realm of desire and the material realm.

Mental actions are just the 21 kinds of thought described above (in stanzas 20-22). Good nonmanifest bodily and vocal karma is marked by one of the three kinds of restraint: meditative, pure and liberation-oriented. "Pure" here means the noble path, viz., right speech, right action, right living. "Liberation-oriented restraint" is the restraint of desires through the code of discipline.

Unmanifest results of action in the realm of desire are not companions of awareness, since though thoughts of three kinds (good, bad and neutral) do occur after liberation-oriented restraint, they do not correspond to the kind of action undertaken there. Manifest

results of action in both the realms of desire and matter are not companions of thought, since they involve the body. Meditative and pure unmanifest results of action, however, are companions of awareness, since they depend on thoughts of a corresponding nature.

40-45(T31-34) Pure restraint arises from understanding the four noble truths. Meditative restraint involves entering a meditative state. Liberation-oriented restraint comes from being ordained.

Unmanifest karma of liberation-oriented restraint is permanent. When such a person brings about manifest karma he brings about a "present", and when that karma ends but is not lost, it is "past".

It is said that one who has unmanifest karma through meditation accomplishes what is past (as above) and what is future (since the meditative restraint is to come). A person in concentration accomplishes what is present, since his unmanifest karma is companion of his concentration.

Pure meditative restraint is accomplished by all that have gotten on the path, and so its unmanifest karma is future; the ghosts of the path are present in it.

One who is restrained may nevertheless do bad actions and reap their fruit; as long as he is bound by fetters he produces both manifest and unmanifest karma as a result. But when his fetters are destroyed, both manifest and unmanifest karma end.

46-48(T34-36) One not restrained produces present unmanifest karma as a foul fruit. Likewise if he produces bad manifest karma. But when good it is the opposite. One who is nonrestrained is bad as long as good thoughts continue.

One neither restrained nor nonrestrained may be either good or bad, and so have manifest or unmanifest karma.

49(T36-37) Question: How does one obtain restraint in the material realm?

Answer: Through good thoughts in the material realm meditative restraint of that realm results whether one has or has not renounced desires; for restraint is always a companion of good thoughts in the material realm. But when good thoughts of that sort are lost, this meditative restraint is lost too.

Pure restraint in the material realm accompanies pure thoughts of six stages, viz., nonreturning, noninterrupted trance and the four fundamental trances.

50-51(T37-38) Question: What interrupts these three restraints?

Answer: The Buddha has said that the liberation-oriented meditation can be interrupted in five ways—by abandoning the moral rules, by breaking precepts, by dying, by increasing wrong views, or when the law vanishes. Whereas meditative trance may be interrupted in two ways—by falling away and by being born into a higher stage,

pure trance may be interrupted either by falling away or by maturing a result.

Question: And what interrupts bad restraint, good formless acts and defiled acts (in the realm of desire)?

Answer: Bad restraint is interrupted either when one is not applied to it any more or by death. Good formless acts are interrupted when the good roots are cut and when one is born into a higher stage. As for defiled acts, they are interrupted when desire is renounced mentally.

52-54(T38-40) Bad actions bring evil fruits; they are dominated by covetousness, malice and wrong views. The opposite is called good conduct by the Buddha, lacking these dominating attitudes.

There are ten paths of bad conduct: (1) taking life premeditatedly and with full cognizance of who the victim is; (2) stealing, which is taking things which are not offered to one; (3) wrong conduct, having intercourse with another's woman or abusing one's own woman sexually; (4) lying, that is, intentionally uttering falsehoods; (5) slander, when one speaks ill of someone else out of hatred; (6) frivolous talk, senseless words uttered by one with unwholesome thoughts; (7) covetousness, which is desirousness; (8) malice; (9) hatred; (10) wrong views.

It is thinking (or volition [*cetanā*]) which is the fundamental action.

Actions of these sorts produce their results either in the present or in some next life. Other actions are not fixed as to the times of their maturation.

55-58(T40-43) Question: What about the Buddha's classification of actions into those that produce satisfaction or frustration or neither?

Answer: Good acts in the realm of desire and good acts in the (first) three stages of the material realm involve satisfaction as a product, whether they are fixed or not fixed as to the time of their maturation. Good actions at higher stages produce neither satisfaction nor frustration. Bad actions produce frustration.

Question: What about the Buddha's classification of actions into (a) black with black results, (b) white with white results, (c) black and white with black and white results, (d) neither black nor white and without results?

Answer: Good action in the material realm is white and involves white results. Good actions in the realm of desire are black and white and have black and white results, involving mixed retributions. What is foul, i.e. the bad acts, are black and have black results. But when volitions in the course of the noninterrupted path oppose these three kinds of action, the action which results is of the fourth sort, i.e.

neither black nor white and without results. (For the noninterrupted path and details, cf. below, 204 and following).

59-60 (T43-44) The Buddha speaks of verbal and mental crookedness, defects and faults. Crookedness is produced by craftiness, defects by hatred, and faults by passion.

The Buddha also speaks of three purifications, which are forms of good conduct. Sageliness consists of good verbal and corporal conduct, characteristic of the adept. It is also mental.

61 (T44-45) Now we explain the results of actions. Normally actions, whether good or bad, have two kinds of results, their natural kind of outcome and their karmic maturation. Pure actions have a natural result and the resulting disjunction (of defilements). Good impure actions can have three kinds of results—natural, karmic maturation and disconnection (of defilements). All other acts have only one kind of result, the natural kind.

62-63 (T45-47) Which of the great elements produce which actions? It depends on the stage which one is in.

Actions leading directly to hell, defilements and bad results are called 'obstructions'; they preclude experiencing the factors of the noble ones. The worst among actions is that kind which ruins the order; one will dwell in the great *avīci* hell for a *kalpa* for such an act. The best action is the volition in the sphere of neither-identifying-nor-nonidentifying.

Chapter Four: Contaminants[10]

65-70(T48-49) There are 98 contaminants, which can be divided into two kinds: (a) those which are to be abandoned through vision of the truths, and (b) those to be abandoned through practice. Of type (a), (1) 28 disappear when one attains the vision of frustration, (2) 19 disappear on the vision of its origin, (3) 19 at the vision of cessation, (4) 22 through vision of the path. Of type (b), 10 disappear through practice.

Thirty-six of these contaminants are to be found in the realm of desire—10 of those from (a1), 7 from (a2), 7 from (a3), 8 from (a4), and 4 from (b). Of the remainder, 31 are in the material realm and 31 in the immaterial realm.

71-73 (T49-52) All the contaminants are now explained. There are five defilements of view: (1) extreme view, (2) false view, (3) view that there is a self, (4) adherence to views, and (5) overadherence to rules and vows. (1) involves the views of eternalism or annihilation; (2) involves the denial of the truth; (3) is the view that there is something with feelings and consciousness; it is also called the belief that the body is real; (4) is believing impure factors to

be best; (5) is taking what is not a cause as a cause. Since these five involve wisdom they are called "views".

The following are not views: (6) attachment to satisfactions; (7) perplexity, when one is uncertain about something already seen; (8) resistance, when one's actions meet with opposition; (9) pride, which is self-elevation; and (10) delusion, i.e. ignorance.

These ten are the defilements. They are differentiated by what they deal with. Some proceed within frustration, some within origination, some within cessation, some with the path. Those which proceed within frustration are abandoned when there is the vision of frustration; those proceeding within origination when there is the vision of origination, etc., up to the path. The rest are abandoned through practice. All ten defilements proceed within frustration. The seven excluding (1), (3) and (5) proceed within origination and within cessation. The eight excluding (1) and (3) proceed within the path. (8) does not proceed in the two upper realms, but all the rest do proceed there. (1-5) and (7) are not to be abandoned through practice in the realm of desire, but the other four are; three (those four minus 8) are to be abandoned through practice in the material realm, and the same in the immaterial realm.

74-76(T52-53) Question: How are they differentiated by what they deal with?

Answer: a1-a5, and a10 of the kinds to be abandoned through the vision of frustration, and b2, b4, b7 and b10 to be abandoned through the vision of origination, are said to be pervasive. There are 11 such kinds. The rest are not pervasive, being restricted to a particular object that they deal with.

75-77(T53-54) The *a*s (minus a1 and a3) and *b*s may have their object in the material and immaterial realms.

(2) and (7) proceeding within cessation and the path, along with the ignorance associated with them or not associated with them, deal with pure contents. These six in the three realms make a total of eighteen.

77-79(T54-55) A defilement may be developed by its object and/or by association. Its object may be (a) impure or (b) pure. In the case of (a) all universal contaminants deal with all five kinds of contents (viz., destruction of the vision of frustration, etc.) in their particular stages, and they are developed by them. All other contaminants deal with and are developed by factors within their own kind, in their own realm. Both universal contaminants and the other kind are developed by association with contaminants of their own kind, in their own stage. In the case of (b) the object is in a higher stage. In that case the contaminant is developed by association with elements of its own class or kind.

80(T55-56) In the realm of desire (1), (3) and the ignorance associated with them are neutral, for if it were not so one doing a good deed could not gain merit, since he would do so with a wrong view (of self). Likewise, holding to permanence is not bad, for the same reason. And holding the view of annihilationism is not bad, since it involves disgust with birth and death. The rest of the defilements are bad.

On the other hand, in the material and immaterial realms all the contaminants are neutral since they are destroyed by concentration rather than maturing into frustrating results.

81-82 (T56-57) (6), (8) and (9) deal with a specific past content, but deal with all future impure factors. The remaining contaminants deal with all factors, past or future.

The defilements grow gradually within the relevant realm, and those found in higher realms will be reproduced in the lower ones.

83-86 (T57-59) The old list of seven contaminants is related to Dharmaśrī's present series of ten. The seven are also called bonds, grasping, floods and evil influences.

87-89 (T59-61) The relations between the contaminants and the faculties is explored. All 98 contaminants are associated with equanimity in all their realms. In the material realm contaminants are associated with contentedness and satisfaction. In the realm of desire contaminant's (2) and (10) provide both satisfaction and frustration. (7) and (8) provide only frustration. The rest provide only satisfaction. Those which are (b) abandoned through practice are associated with bodily and mental feelings, both satisfactions and frustrations.

90-92 (T61-63) The afflictions are now explained. These are the following eight: (1) shamelessness, (2) disregard, (3) lethargy, (4) regret, (5) selfishness, (6) envy, (7) excitedness and (8) torpor. (3), (7) and (8) accompany all the dispositions. (1) and (2) accompany the bad ones. (4) is to be abandoned through practice; it is only associated with frustration and depression. (8) is associated with all defilements of the realm of desire. The other two (viz., (5) and (6)) are not associated with the others.

93(T63) Question: How many consciousnesses are the defilements associated with?

Answer: Sensual desire, resistance and ignorance, to be abandoned through practice, are based on all six consciousnesses in the realm of desire. In the material realm desire and ignorance are associated with four consciousnesses in the *brahmaloka*, i.e. trance 1, and with representative cognition alone in the higher stages. The other defilements are related to representative cognition.

94-95 (T63-65) One abandons each defilement in a single moment

by the noninterrupted path, and they do not have to be abandoned again. Disjunction from the defilements takes several moments—e.g., the defilements in the realm of desire which are to be abandoned through vision take a moment to be destroyed, and a moment is taken for the destruction of each of the four results of monkhood.

Complete destruction constitutes full overcoming of abandonment. One such comprehension occurs through the visions of frustration and origination, a second through the vision of cessation, a third through vision of the path, and a fourth through abandonment through practice.

96 (T65-66) Contaminants defile awareness and so are associated with awareness. They are obstructions, and opposed to that which is pure.

Chapter Five: Nobility[11]

97-103 (T67-71) We now explain how noble persons eliminate the defilements. First one practices four applications of mindfulness; viz., concentration on the body, feelings, awareness and the factors, both awareness and concomitant mental factors, including those dissociated from awareness. One contemplates the factors in general, their common characteristics of impermanence, voidness, selflessness and frustration. Then a factor called heat is produced in the mind, the fire of pure knowledge. This heat has sixteen forms and it ranges over the four noble truths. The four forms relating to the first noble truth are impermanence, frustration, voidness and selflessness; the four relating to the second truth are cause, origination, source, condition; to the third truth are cessation, calm, excellence, relation to deliverance; the four relating to the fourth truth are the path, correctness (*nyāya*), leading (*pratipatti*) and liberating (*nairyāṇika*). Doing this gives rise to the summit, which leads to patience. And this in turn leads to the higher worldly factors, which open the gate to liberation.

These higher worldly factors proceed within the four forms of frustration, and are comprised within six stages. Their content is like that of the first pure awareness. So also is patience comprised within six stages. Summit and heat are comprised within seven stages, since in addition to the six trances the realm of desire must also be included.

104-112 (T71-77) This is the noble path. From the higher worldly factors comes patient acceptance of frustration. This is the pure immediate path. From this comes knowledge of *dharma* in relation to frustration and deliverance from it. Both the acceptance and the knowledge have as their content the lower frustration (in the realm

of desire), but the same is true of the upper frustration (in the material and immaterial realms). So there are four awarenesses: in the realm of desire: acceptance of the *dharma* (i.e. the truth) of frustration, knowledge of it; in the two higher realms: subsequent acceptance in relation with frustration, and subsequent knowledge in relation with frustration. Likewise, with respect to the other three truths (viz., origination, cessation and path) there are likewise four awarenesses, so a total of sixteen awarenesses constitute the path of vision. The characteristics of those who practice this path are delineated. Those with keen faculties follow the *dharma*. Those with weak faculties follow faith. Persons can be distinguished according to the number of strength of defilements they have abandoned. There are nine kinds of strength of each defilement (permute weak, medium and strong into weak-weak, weak-medium, etc.). Those who have not yet renounced desire through practice while in the realm of desire progress toward the result of being a stream-enterer; those who have abandoned six of the nine strengths of defilements progress towards the result of being once-returners; when all nine are abandoned, they progress towards the results of being non-returners. The tenth moment of the path of vision, the *dharma*-follower is called "view-attainer", and the faith-follower is called "enlightenment-resolved". At that moment these persons are called stream-enterers, once-returners, or nonreturners. A stream-enterer who has not yet renounced a defilement through practice in the realm of desire is called "destined for seven births". One who has destroyed three kinds of defilements (viz., strong-weak, strong-medium and strong-strong) will be reborn in several families (*kulaṃkula*). A once-returner who has destroyed eight kinds of defilements will germinate one more time.

The nine kinds of defilements are found in the realm of desire and in the upper realms, of which eight are identified. All defilements are eliminated through a twofold path: the noninterrupted path and the path of liberation. He who, in the last stage of the immaterial realm, has obtained cessation-trance, is called "bodily witness".

113-116 (T77-80) (Up to here the seeker's path has been described. Now we turn to the adept's path.) The culminating thought of the seeker's path, when in the highest (eighth) stage listed above, destroys all defilements forever; it is the diamond-like concentration. This automatically triggers the knowledge of extinction, the first moment in the adept's path. It destroys all impurities and destroys all subsequent births. Such a one is nonattached, a noble person. He is of six kinds: (1) one who falls away, whose knowledge and energy are weak; (2) one who wills (his own destruction), who because of weak knowledge and energy dislikes his body and wants

to destroy it; (3) one who guards, who has weak knowledge but vigorous energy and guards his thoughts carefully; (4) one who abides unshakable, with medium knowledge and medium energy; (5) one who will penetrate, who because of lack of sharpness yet much energy certainly attains immovability; and (6) immovable, whose knowledge is sharp and energy vigorous and is thus immovable. (1)-(5), who were faith-followers, obtain knowledge of destruction and the view of those who have no more training to do. They are now called "temporarily released", which is to say that they cannot always do good on every occasion, their liberation depends on an appropriate occasion. The immovable one (6) is fully liberated, he always does good on every occasion. He has knowledge of destruction, knowledge of nonarising, and the view of those who have no more training to do.

He who is "liberated through wisdom" has not attained cessation, though he be one of the above six kinds. But one who is liberated through both the power of wisdom and through the cessation-trance is called "twice-delivered" and is fully liberated.

117-119 (T80-82) The factors of the nobles are now explained. They are called the path of vision and are common to faith-followers, *dharma*-followers and the noble path of vision of the noble truths. These factors comprise the faculty of being one who will come to understand what is not yet understood (*anājñātam ājñāsyāmīndriya*) in the path of vision. In the path of practice this faculty is called "faculty of understanding" (*ājñendriya*). In the adept's path this faculty is called perfect knowledge (*ājñātāvīndriya*).

120-122 (T82-83) The defilements are gradually destroyed by a double ninefold path. Then the result which is discerned is obtained. In the case of, e.g., good impure factors, this result is obtained directly by the ninth noninterrupted path. Not everyone who is nonattached obtains immovability, but only the one who will penetrate.

Chapter Six: Knowledge[12]

123-129 (T84-88) The Buddha expounded three kinds of knowledge: (1) knowledge of *dharma*, visible to the faculties, the content of which is the four truths in the realm of desire; (2) connected knowledge, in which the concomitants of the truths that are invisible to the faculties in the material and immaterial realm are known; and (3) conventional knowledge, which is impure cognition grasping what is only conventionally true in terms of conceptual distinctions such as male/female, long/short, etc. Śākyamuni speaks of four knowledges, corresponding to knowledge of each of the four truths. E.g., *dharma*-knowledge and knowledge of connection of which the

content is the truth of frustration is called "knowledge of frustration". There is also knowledge of the thoughts of others (*paracitta-jñāna*). The others' thoughts may be conventional or pure (*dharma*- and connection-knowledge). Finally, there are two adept's knowledges: the knowledge of destruction ("that which should be done, is done"), and the knowledge of nonarising ("one will not do it again"). The former represents knowledge of *dharma*, and the latter subsequent knowledge.

The sixteen aspects of their relation with the knowledges are explained. E.g., the two adepts' knowledges have fourteen forms (excluding voidness and selflessness from the sixteen listed).

130-138 (T88-95) Now it is explained how these kinds of knowledge are acquired. The first pure awareness in the noble path (see sec. 104-112 above) or acceptance of frustration produces only conventional knowledge if desire has not been abandoned. If it has been abandoned, the resulting awareness is knowledge of the awareness of others.

The second awareness, viz., knowledge of *dharma* in relation to frustration, produces knowledge of *dharma*, knowledge of frustration, and conventional knowledge. The third (viz., acceptance of what is concomitant with frustration) produces the above three plus knowledge of connection. The same pattern is recapitulated in discussing the other three knowledges (of *dharma*) in relation to arising, cessation and the path respectively. Nine of the resulting knowledges are found in the upper stages, ten in the meditative trance states, and eight in the immaterial realm.

There are two kinds of practice: practice which means obtainment of merit previously unobtained and practice which involves practise. The former involves acquiring new qualities, the later practising qualities already acquired. The number of acts of awareness involved in these developments are elaborately laid out. The entire section spells out the path to liberation in terms of acts of awareness.

139-142 (T95-98) Question: Is there any difference between vision, knowledge and wisdom?

Answer: Vision and knowledge are varieties of wisdom. Vision involves seeking. Knowledge is certain. E.g., patience is not knowledge; rather, it is vision since it involves seeking. Likewise, knowledge of destruction is not vision, since it does not form (*saṃskṛ*) anything, it does not seek.

The number of acts of awareness comprising the knowledge of *dharma*, subsequent knowledge, and other kinds of knowledge are expounded.

143 (T98-99) Question: The Buddha has said that one obtains nonattachment through subsequent knowledge involving aban-

donment of the highest stage (viz., of neither-identification-nor-nonidentification). Since subsequent knowledge is thus said to be the path, isn't it the only path?

Answer: There are also knowledges of *dharma* which constitute paths in the material and immaterial realms. Knowledges of *dharma* in relation to cessation and the path extinguish the three realms, but subsequent knowledge cannot extinguish desire, since it does not relate to it.

144-147 (T99-104) It is explained which knowledges are involved in the divine higher faculties, in application of mindfulness with respect to the body, in the Buddha's knowledge, in the four confidences, in discrimination, and in the knowledge resulting from vows.

Chapter Seven: Concentration

148-161 (T105-115) The Buddha says there are eight concentrations: four meditative trance states and four meditative attainments. All but the eighth trance state are threefold: associated with relishing, i.e. associated with the defilements; or associated with impurity, i.e. good and impure; or associated with purity, i.e. not defiled.

The first trance state has five members: (1) initial thought, involving gross things; (2) sustained thought, involving subtle things; (3) joy; (4) satisfaction; and (5) one-pointed awareness. (1) and (2) occur only in good trance states. In the first trance there are: 3 feeling-faculties (pleasure, contentedness, equanimity), 2 godly realms, 4 consciousnesses (eye, ear, body, mind-consciousness).

The second trance state has four members: (1) serenity, (2) joy, (3) satisfaction, and (4) one-pointed awareness. It has two faculties (contentedness and equanimity) and three kinds of godly realms.

The third trance state has five members: (1) satisfaction, (2) equanimity, (3) mindfulness, (4) comprehension, and (5) one-pointed awareness. It has two faculties (contentedness and equanimity).

The fourth trance state has four members: (1) neither satisfaction nor frustration, (2) indifference, (3) pure mindfulness, and (4) one-pointed awareness. It is free from breathing out and in.

Other states are also explained. The nonreturning state involves initial and sustained thought. The intermediate trance is where sustained (but not initial) thought is present.

The qualities of these trance states include three concentrations—of voidness, of aimlessness, of signlessness; six higher faculties, viz., knowledge of the base of supernatural power, knowledge of the divine ear, knowledge of the awarenesses of others, remembrance of

former lives, knowledge of birth and death, and knowledge of the extinction of the evil influences; ten all-bases (*kṛtsnāyatana*), viz., earth, water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red, white, ether and consciousness; eight spheres of mastery, viz., the ten knowledges of section 123-126; eight liberations, viz., reflection on impurity while still having the idea of form, reflection on impurity having removed the idea of form, clean practice, the four immaterial trances, and cessation trance (they are called "liberations" because one abandons their ranges and doesn't acquire anything in so doing).

The state in which each of these qualitative states are accomplished is now explained. Then it is shown which of the qualities are pure and which impure.

126-173 (T115-124) Now the steps in accomplishing these trance states are set forth. While one still has desires one accomplishes what is associated with relishing. When one has renounced desire in the realm of desire but has not yet reached beyond the *brahmaloka* (the first meditative trance state) one accomplishes the pure first trance state with its impure qualities. And then, as one moves up to each subsequent trance state, one practises a pure meditation of the kinds below. Some qualities are produced through application, not through renouncing desires. The causes, conditions, antecedents, and supporting objects of the trance states are explained.

There are mixed trances, mixing the pure ones with the impure ones, but these only occur after one has gained the fourth trance state.

174-175 (T124-125) The pure trance-states remove afflictions, and so do the adjacent concentrations, which are preparatory paths to the fundamental trance states.

Eight kinds of magical creations are produced by the thoughts of one who has supernatural power, four in the realm of desire and four in the stage of the first trance.

Chapter Eight: Sūtra

176-179 (T126-129) In the realm of desire there are 10 abodes: hell, animal birth, ghost, man, and six desiring gods, viz., the gods of the four kings, the 33 gods, the *yama* gods, the *tuṣita* gods, the gods who enjoy magical creations, and the gods controlling enjoyment of magical creations of others. In the material realm there are 17 abodes (classified by their belonging to one of the four trances each). In the immaterial realm there are 4 abodes: unlimited space, unlimited consciousness, nothingness and neither-identification-nor-nonidentification.

The Buddha speaks of seven abodes of consciousness. These are

the first three stages of the material realm and the first three of the immaterial realm plus the realm of desire good abodes. The rest are not abodes of consciousness, either because they involve frustration or because they are beyond consciousness altogether.

180-181 (T129-130) The twelvefold path of dependent origination is now explained. It gradually produces defilements, actions and entities. The defilements are ignorance, craving and grasping. Action includes conditioning factors and existence. The rest are entities.

182-185 (T130-133) The four great elements are explained. When the Buddha speaks of six elements he has in mind the roots of birth and death, viz., earth, air, water and fire, space and consciousness.

The four noble truths are reviewed. The four results of monkhood are said to have six elements, viz., the five pure aggregates plus calculated cessation. Of them, the stream-enterer and once-returner are comprised within the pre-trance state; the nonreturner result is comprised within the four trances, the pre-trance, and the intermediate trance; and the result of nobility is comprised within the four trances, the pre-trance, the intermediate trance, and three immaterial realms.

186-192 (T133-138) Other classifications found in the *sūtras* are explained. The qualities of the faith-follower and *dharma*-follower are distinguished. Four perfect faiths (*avetyaprasāda*) are expounded: faith in Buddha, *dharma*, the order and in noble virtue.

Four ways of developing concentration are distinguished: (1) the developing of concentration in the visible world that brings satisfaction, (2) the developing of concentration that obtains knowledge and vision, (3) the developing of concentration which distinguishes wisdom, and (4) the developing of concentration which destroys the impure influences. (1) is obtaining satisfactions through the first trance. One who knows birth and death is one who practises (2). The wisdom gained in (3) includes the restraint of the realm of desire, good factors of the material and immaterial realms, and all pure conditioning factors. (4) involves the four supernatural powers, the four right abandonments, and the four applications of mindfulness. The qualities involved are also called the four traditional practices of the noble person.

193-196 (T139-141) Ten factors contribute to enlightenment: faith, energy, mindfulness, joy, wisdom, tranquility, equanimity, (right) conceptualizing, virtue and concentration. These are each explained. The Buddha generates 37 varieties by considering the degrees of intensity, exertion and so forth. And by considering which of them occur in which meditative stages one generates a much larger number.

197-198 (T141-143) Four foods are distinguished: solid food, the food of contact, the food of representative cognition, and the food of consciousness. The latter three are called "foods" because, when impure, consciousness, volition and contact do not interrupt the cycle of rebirth.

The three concentrations of emptiness, of aimlessness, and of signlessness are explained. Aimlessness has ten forms: noneternality, frustration, the four forms of the second noble truth, and four forms of the fourth noble truth. Emptiness has two forms, viz., emptiness and selflessness. Signless concentration has four forms, viz., the four forms of the third noble truth.

199-209 (T143-151) The four perverted views are those of awareness, of identification, and of view with respect to (1) permanence, (2) satisfactoriness, (3) purity and (4) possession of self.

The Buddha speaks of many views, e.g., of 62 views, etc. They can all be comprised within the five views of stanza 71. Likewise, the Buddha's 22 faculties are equated with the canonical nine (eye, ear, nose, tongue, mind, body, male, female, life), and it is shown which belong in which realm, and when they produce karmic retributions. Some of them (e.g., body, life) come when one is born, the others are gradually acquired. It is also explained how they are lost at death. Some are to be abandoned by development, others not.

210-215 (T151-155) It is explained which factors are the contents of consciousness, which of knowledge, and which dispositions are produced by which defilements.

Chapter Nine: Remaining Topics

216-240 (T156-174) Further classifications of the factors. The factors associated with awareness and dissociated from awareness are distinguished, and all factors are classified in terms of what they are associated with, what they are produced by, whether and when they are good or bad, what they produce. A number of questions are raised regarding some of the Buddha's pronouncements about, e.g., the craving for existence and for nonexistence, the elements called abandonment, nonattachment and cessation, and other matters.

Chapter Ten: Conclusion

241-250 (T175) A few puzzles are posed and answered.

22

MILINDAPAÑHA

Summary by Karl H. Potter

The *Questions of King Milinda* is perhaps the most popular early Abhidharma treatise, and has been edited and translated many times. The work recounts a discussion between a Buddhist monk named Nāgasena and "King Milinda", assumed by many to be Menandros or Menander, an Indo-Greek king who ruled somewhere around 155-130 B.C. in Sāgala or Siyālkoṭ in the area of the Punjab in northern India. The discussion is available in several versions belonging to Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda and other sects of early Buddhism. It is available in Chinese in several versions as well as in Pali, Sanskrit and Prakrit. One can presume that the text must have been composed near the time of Menander, perhaps within a century of his reign.

Of the numerous editions the one that is cited as "E" is by V. Trenckner in the Pali Text Society in 1880 and reprinted in 1928. "T" references are to the translation by T.W. Rhys Davids in the Sacred Books of the East Series, Volumes 35 and 36, Oxford 1890 and 1894, and reprinted in New York in 1963. Translations into English have also been published by Nyanatiloka in 1919, and Irene Blew Horner in 1963-64. The work has also been translated into German, French and Dutch among Western languages.[1]

Book One: The Narrative Setting[2]

(E1-24; T1.1-39) After a description of the city of Sāgala where Nāgasena and King Milinda met, this chapter recalls the karmic predecessors of the two, who were once brethren in the Buddha's community. One of them, reborn as Milinda, King of Sāgala, who knew various arts and sciences and was a formidable debater, one day went forth and asked for someone to discuss with. Being directed to them, he went in turn to Pūraṇa Kassapa and Makkhali Gosāla, posing questions to each of them they could not answer. In the

Himalayas there lived at that time a company of perfected beings headed by Assagutta, who heard of Milinda's questions and, seeking someone who could answer them, went to the gods and in particular to Mahāsena, who predicted his own reincarnation as Nāgasena, son of Soṇuttara. Nāgasena learned all there was to learn from his Brahmin father, then retired to meditate, where he was found by Rohana, one of Assagutta's perfected beings, who taught him the Abhidharma—including the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi, Vibhaṅga, Dhātukathā, Puggalapaññatti, Kathāvatthu, Yamaka* and *Paṭṭhāna* (each briefly characterized). Having mastered the *Abhidhammapiṭaka* so well that he recited it completely within a new threefold division of its contents, he was sent through Assagutta to Pāṭaliputra, where he learned the other two *piṭakas* and himself became a perfected being. Eventually Milinda found Nāgasena out and was able to recognize him without an introduction, and the discussion began.

Book Two: Questions About Characteristic Marks
Chapter One

(E25-39; T1.40-62) 1. Milinda asks Nāgasena his name, and Nāgasena identifies himself, but adds that his name is a mere designation and that there is no personality indicated by it. After reviewing a number of possibilities concerning what Nāgasena is, Milinda concludes he is nothing, which is absurd. Nāgasena responds by analyzing a chariot in a similar fashion—the chariot is not the axle, not the wheels, not the spokes, etc., nor the sum of them, nor anything else—and concludes that there is no chariot either, which is likewise absurd. He solves the puzzle by pointing out that though the chariot is not any of those things, still it is in virtue of all the aspects mentioned that the thing is called a "chariot", and likewise it is because of the coexistence of the various elements Milinda had reviewed that he is called "Nāgasena", a "being".

2. Milinda: Is it you, Nāgasena, who are seven (years older than I) or is it the number seven which is seven?

Nāgasena: Just as your shadow or your reflection in the water is not you, the King, but depends on you for its existence, so the number seven depends on him, Nāgasena, for its existence.

4. Nāgesena shows Anantakāya (one of the King's followers) that the self is not the vital breath, since a trumpeter's breath does not return after he blows and still he does not die.

6. Those with defilements are reborn, those without are not.

7. Attention and insight are not the same, since animals have the former but not the latter.

8. The monk by reasoning grasps his mind and by insight cuts off

his defilements, just as farmers grasp the barley with their left hand and cut it off with their right.

9. An account of good conduct, involving five qualities (morality, faith, energy, mindfulness and concentration). Morality is distinguished by the marks of the faculty powers, the conditions of enlightenment, the path, mindfulness, right endeavor, supernatural powers, meditations, the eight liberations, the four kinds of concentration and the eight meditative attainments. Some similes to illustrate how one of good conduct will develop.

10. Faith is characterized by tranquilisation and aspiration. The former cuts the defilements, and the latter motivates the aspirant.

11. The mark of energy, viz., perseverance, is discussed and illustrated.

12. The marks of mindfulness are repetition and keeping up.

13. The marks of concentration include all good qualities.

14. The marks of insight are cutting off and enlightenment.

15. All these five qualities work together in ending the defilements.

Chapter Two

(E40-50; T1.63-78) 1. The continuity of a person is likened to that of a flame, or of milk which turns into curds, butter, ghee.

2. A man who will not be reborn knows that fact, because he knows that the causal conditions for rebirth have ceased to operate for him, just as a farmer knows whether or not his granary is getting filled.

3. Discussion of knowledge and wisdom: they are synonyms. Just as the villager puts out a fire in his house with five waterpots placed there for the purpose and the fire stays out without continued application of the water, so the disciplined man puts out the fire of the defilements with the five waterpots or faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and insight, and the sinfulness does not return.

4. Does the nonreturner have frustrating feelings?

Nāgasena answers: Bodily feelings yes, mental feelings no, since the conditions for the latter have ceased.

Milinda: Then why doesn't he die immediately?

Nāgasena: He waits for his proper time.

5. Satisfying feelings can be good or bad or indifferent, since the nature of a feeling does not arise from its moral quality, any more than if a man holds a red-hot ball in one hand and ice in the other and feels pain in both hands, the pain can come from the quality of what is held.

6. Milinda: What is reborn?

Nāgasena: 'Name and form', i.e. the psychophysical complex, is reborn, and then another psychophysical complex produced from the actions of that one, etc.; still, since the second complex is produced from the actions of the former one the person is not released from sin every time he is reborn.

8. In the expression "name and form", "form" refers to what is gross (the body) and "name" to what is subtle (psychical); they are dependent on each other.

9. Milinda: What does "time" mean? Is there such a thing?

Nāgasena: There is time that exists, and time that does not. For the conditioning factors that have ceased or changed altogether, time doesn't exist; but for the factors which are still producing or have the potential to do so, time exists. So there is time as long as there are beings who will be reborn; for those who have died and are not reborn, i.e. who have achieved final liberation, there is no time.

Chapter Three

(E50-63; T1.79-99) 1. Ignorance is the root of the notion of the beginning point of time, since the temporal series is infinite or circular.

2. Examples of infinite series (seed and sprout; chicken and egg), and of recursive series (portions of the twelvefold chain of dependent origination).

3. The beginning point of all becomings is unknown, but the beginning of each becoming is known.

Milinda: But if everything is destroyed as soon as it is born, nothing comes into being.

Nāgasena: Like the seed which becomes a tree, the aggregates are seeds of life.

4. Conditioning factors which are produced include sight, desire, grasping, becoming, birth, old age and death, frustration.

5. No conditioning factors come into being suddenly; they have a gradual becoming, depending on causal conditions.

6. There is no soul (*vedagu*), i.e. no inner cognizer which can operate indiscriminately through any of the sense-doors, since experience shows that the eyes can only see, the ears only hear, etc.

7. Representative cognition accompanies sight, follows upon it but is not influenced by it, just as the rainwater flows down the slope over and over without the earlier water influencing the later.

8. Representative congnition is always accompanied by contact, feeling, identification, will, initial and sustained thought.

9. Discussion of contact.

10. Explanation of feeling, explained as experiencing (*anubhava*).

11. Explanation of identification as *saṃjanana* (recognition? classification?), as, e.g., when the king's treasurer cognizes the items in the king's treasure according to their colors.

Explanation of will, which involves being thought of and being prepared. The examples are of persons who perform intentional acts with deliberate forethought.

12. Explanation of consciousness as awareness of objects presented to the organs of sense and the mind.

13. Explanation of initial thought. It is the faculty of effecting an aim, illustrated by the carpenter's creation.

14. Explanation of sustained thought as "threshing out again and again", illustrated by the sounds a copper vessel makes as it is beaten into shape.

15. Milinda: Can these various factors (contact, etc., explained in the preceding sections) be clearly distinguished from each other?

Nāgasena: No, any more than the ingredients in a sauce can be picked out after the blending.

Book Three: Removal of Difficulties
Chapter Four

(E65-70; T1.100-108) 1. The five senses are produced by many acts, not just one, since they arise from many distinct seeds.

2. Differences among human beings arise from differences in karmic seeds.

4. Just as bits of stone are digested in the stomach's heat but an embryo, because of the force of karma, is not, so the fires of purgatory, though terribly hot, do not burn up those who reside there because of their karma until that karma is exhausted.

6. Liberation is cessation.

7. Not all men achieve liberation. A brief description of those who do.

Chapter Five

(E70-73; T1.109-114) 5. Analogies for rebirth without transmigration—lighting a lamp from another lamp, recollecting a verse learned once but since forgotten.

8. The deeds committed by a psychophysical complex follow it and never leave it, but they cannot be perceived, any more than one can perceive the fruit on a tree that has not yet produced it.

10. The Buddha exists despite his having passed away; he is locatable in his doctrine.

Chapter Six

(E73-78; T1.115-121) 1. A monk's care for his body is like a king's care for his wound—he cares for it but does not love it.

4. The Buddha was no more a follower of Brahmā, even though a *brahmacārin*, than the state elephant is a follower of gulls, even though it emits trumpeting like a heron. Anyway, since Brahmā has awareness (*buddhi*) he must be a follower of the Buddha!

7. A passionate man is overpowered by his cleaving where the nonattached man is not; the difference is like that between one who in eating enjoys both the taste of the food and the desires that arise from the taste, as opposed to the man who experiences only taste and not the desires.

8. Insight exists, as the wind does, even though neither are locatable in any place.

10. It is by memory, not be the mind, that we remember.

Chapter Seven

(E78-89; T1.122-136) 1. Memory arises in sixteen (seventeen?) ways—by personal experience, by outward aid, by the impression made by the greatness of some occasion, by the impression made by joy, by the impression made by sadness, from similarity of appearance, from difference of appearance, from someone's speaking, from a sign, from an effort, by calculation, by arithmetic, by learning by heart, by meditation, by consulting a book, or by a pledge, or by association.

2. One good deed or thought can save a man, just as a hundred loads of rock, each bit of which would sink by itself, is supported by a boat.

4-5. Transmigration from one world to another occurs almost instantaneously regardless of distance, just as one can think of each of two places in the same amount of time regardless of their respective distances from here.

7. There is more merit than demerit, since demerit brings on remorse and no increase, while merit brings on increasing happiness without remorse.

8. One who sins inadvertently is worse than one who does so intentionally, just as the one who grasps a red hot piece of iron inadvertently will be more badly burned than one who grasps it intentionally.

9. It is possible for a monk with supernatural power to take one's body to the Brahmā world by making one's body light through mastering it by his mind.

13. The sea is completely saturated with salt because it has stood there so long.

14. The subtlest thing, viz., *dharma*, can be divided—by insight.

The King was pleased with Nāgasena's answers, gave him a valuable coat and ordered him provided with meals for 800 days and a choice of whatever he wanted from the palace. And both concluded that Nāgasena had answered well.

Book Four: The Solving of Dilemmas
Chapter One

(E90-142; T1.137-201) 1-3. Milinda resolved to get Nāgasena to solve a number of puzzles concerning Buddhist thought, and undertook the eightfold vow for seven days, after which he asked Nāgasena to discuss with him privately in a secluded place suitable for a recluse.

4-9. Having withdrawn, Milinda demonstrated his understanding by listing the eight kinds of places where discussion should not be carried on (because of distractions and difficulties), eight kinds of people who spoil a discussion (because of pride, anger, confusion and the like), nine kinds of people who cannot keep a secret, eight causes of the growth of insight, and twenty-five virtues of a teacher who teaches a pupil who is as Milinda is. Nāgasena responded by listing ten good qualities of a lay disciple, and agreed to answer the King's questions.

10-18. Milinda: Here is a dilemma: If the Buddha accepts respect he cannot have achieved final liberation; but if he has achieved final liberation, he cannot receive respect. Now any worship paid to one who doesn't receive it is vain.

Nāgasena: Neither before nor after his final liberation did the Buddha accept respect—he neither accepted it nor refused it.

And it is not the case that respect paid to one who doesn't receive it is vain, any more than it is the case that rekindling a fire that has gone out is vain, or that creating a breeze in the absence of the wind fails to cool. Furthermore, just as living things do not assent to the birth and reproduction of worms within them but they nevertheless arise there due to karma which has passed away, so by the power and wisdom of the Buddha which has passed away does an act of worship toward him have result.

19-27. Milinda: Was the Buddha omniscient?

Nāgasena: Yes, but only when he was reflecting.

Milinda: Then he was not omniscient.

Nāgasena: There are seven kinds of minds: (1) those whose awareness is slow and heavy because of the traces of wrong actions;

(2) those stream-enterers who, having attained to right views, are easily and accurately aware of things in the three lower stages but are unclear about things in the higher regions; (3) those once-returners who are clearly and easily aware of things in the five lower stages but are unclear about things in the higher stages; (4) the nonreturners who have gotten clear about the ten lower stages but are still unclear about the higher ones; (5) the perfected beings, who through their purity understand everything except what is understood by Buddhas alone; (6) the enlightened-for-themselves, who understand everything except what is understood by complete Buddhas; (7) the completely enlightened, who understand easily and accurately everything they think of. The enlightened ones' understanding is far greater than the previous six stages. Nevertheless, it takes an act of attention on their part to become aware of something.

Milinda: But reflection involves seeking (more clarity, which the enlightened one allegedly already has).

Nāgasena: A rich man is not poor merely because he happens to have no cooked food ready for a traveller arriving unexpectedly, nor is a tree called barren when its fruit has not yet fallen; just as the riches, or the fruit, are the necessary conditions of the enjoyment of them, so reflection is a necessary condition of the Buddha's awareness of whatever he wants to know.

28-34. Milinda: If the Buddha was aware that admitting Devadatta to the monastic order would lead to evil results, he cannot have been kind and compassionate. If he was not aware of that, he cannot have been omniscient.

Nāgasena: The Buddha knew Devadatta's evil karma, and knew that if he did not enter the order he would brew more such karma, so he mercifully admitted him.

Milinda: Then the Buddha is inconsistent—first he wounds, then he binds; first he throws a man over a cliff and then tries to save him!

Nāgasena: The Buddha does wound people but for their good; he does throw them over, but to their profit. Just so do loving parents sometimes hurt their children for their own good. Or consider the case of a robber being hurried toward execution when an officer stops them and pleads on the robber's behalf, asking that they only cut off a hand or a foot but spare his life—the officer's action is meritorious despite the pain caused by the robber's losing his hand or foot; just so, the Buddha's action in saving Devadatta from greater frustration is meritorious, though it led to some frustration. Or, likewise, the doctor who causes pain in the course of curing is not acting inconsistently.

35-41. Milinda: The Buddha said that there are precisely eight

causes of earthquake, but there is another, viz., Vessantara's giving a gift (in the *Vessantara Jātaka*). So the Buddha's statement is false.

Nāgasena: When one lists causes he lists types of events repeatedly followed by earthquakes, not isolated instances of earthquake. (Nāgasena adds a lengthy panegyric on Vessantara's act.)

42-48. Milinda: King Sivi gave his eyes away and got new eyes from heaven, but the passage says that when there is no cause the divine eye cannot appear. So there is a dilemma.

Nāgasena: The new eyes were caused in this case by the power of truth. Various examples of how truth operates, including the story of the courtesan Bindumati who performed an act of truth and rolled back the Ganges.

49-55. A dilemma about conception.

55-61. The Buddha at one point said to Ānanda that *dharma* would only remain in existence for 500 years, but at another point, just before he died, he told Subhadra that if the brethren live the perfect life the world would not be bereft of perfected beings. There is a dilemma here.

Nāgasena: The two statements are about different things; the first is about the limit of the duration of the doctrine, the other about the religious life. There are three aspects to the disappearance of *dharma*: when intellectual comprehension of it ends a man may still conduct himself according to it but won't know he is doing so; when right conduct ceases only the outward form of *dharma* remains; and when even the outward form ends, the tradition is cut off. When the Buddha said *dharma* would only remain 500 years he was not predicting the end of *dharma* but indicating how much temporal credit, so to speak, Buddhism has, just as a man whose income has diminished might say "I've lost half of my property, but half still remains".

62-66. Milinda: The Buddha is said to have burnt off all demerit, and yet we hear that he suffered from various diseases and wounds. Since all pain comes from karma, how can this be? Here is a dilemma.

Nāgasena: Not all pain arises from karma. There are eight causes of pain: too much wind, too much bile, too much phlegm, a combination of these humors, variation in temperature, avoiding of dissimilarities(?), external agency and karma.

Milinda: But the first seven are themselves produced from karma.

Nāgasena: It is not so; each one in turn has a variety of causes only one of which is karma. And the Buddha did suffer pain from pain brought on by six of the above causes (excluding karma and avoidance of dissimilarities).

67-70. Milinda: Buddhism says that when the Buddha sat under the *bodhi* tree he had accomplished everything he had to do, yet

it also says that after enlightenment he remained in ecstatic concentration. But one who has accomplished all has no need for concentration. There is a dilemma here.

Nāgasena: There are many virtues to concentration (he lists twenty-eight of them) and several reasons why Buddhas meditate (four of these). A Buddha does not meditate because he has anything left to do or to add to what he has already done, but because the advantages he appreciates arise from meditation.

71. A Buddha can stay alive for a *kalpa*, or the remainder of the *kalpa* in which he receives enlightenment, it is said; but it is also said at a certain point that the Buddha will die three months from now. There is a dilemma here.

Nāgasena: In this context "*kalpa*" means the duration of a man's life. In any case, when the Buddha said the first thing he was praising the powers of saintliness, not boasting about his own powers. In point of fact the Buddha is free from desires of any sort about his future life.

Chapter Two

(E142-161; T1.202-228) 4-5. Milinda: The Buddha should be a teacher that keeps nothing back, and yet he failed to reply to Māluṅkyaputra's question (in the *Majjhima Nikāya*). There is a dilemma here.

Nāgasena: There are four ways in which a problem may be explained. First, there are questions (such as "is material impermanent?") that require a definite yes or no answer. Second, there are questions (such as "how is material impermanent?") which require going into details. Third, there are questions (such as "can the eye perceive all things?") that require to be answered by asking another question. Fourth, there are questions (such as "is the universe eternal?") which should be put aside because there is no purpose in answering it. Māluṅkyaputra's question was of the fourth sort, which is why the Buddha didn't answer it.

6-14. When the Buddha said "all men are afraid of death" he didn't mean to include perfected beings, whose fear of death has disappeared. Examples of other statements where "all" doesn't mean everyone without exception. As for others, everyone is afraid of death, even those suffering torments in purgatory who might be otherwise supposed to welcome it, just as a man whose boil is about to be lanced fears the lance despite its being the source of his cure.

20-26. Milinda: How can the merit of a Buddha be obstructed by the evilness of Māra, as Nāgasena says he was when he went to the village called Pañcasāla and received no alms?

Nāgasena: There are four kinds of obstacles: one against a gift not intended for anyone in particular, a second against a gift intended for someone in particular, a third against a gift got ready, and a fourth against the enjoyment of a gift. Māra's obstacle was of the first sort, not against the Buddha alone. No one, even Māra, could obstruct gifts of the second, third and fourth sorts. There are four kinds of things connected with a Tathāgata to which no one can do any harm: gifts gotten ready for and intended for him, to his halo, to his omniscience, and to his life.

27-28. Milinda: The Buddha said that whoever kills a living being unknowingly earns serious demerit; he also said that no blame attaches to one who acts in ignorance. There is a dilemma here.

Nāgasena: When the Buddha said the second thing you quote, he had in mind actions which are free from identification, not actions in which identification is present. So the two statements are not opposed.

Chapter Three

(E162-188; T1.229-260) 1-4. Milinda: If the *dharma* is the best in the world, as Buddhism claims, then there is a dilemma presented by the statement, also accepted by Buddhists, that a layman who has attained insight and who practices the *dharma* should pay reverence to any monk, though he be a novice and unconverted.

Nāgasena: There are twenty qualities and two outward marks of a monk. Now one who has these marks is going forward toward perfection, and because the layman sees him in that company he reveres him. And furthermore, if a layman achieves perfection himself, either he immediately dies or else he becomes a monk himself, for membership in the order, which is the state of non-attachment, is immovable.

15-18. Milinda: The Buddha is perfect in the courtesy of speech, said Sāriputta; yet when dealing with the offence of Sudiñña Kalānaputra he reviled him, calling him a useless fellow. There is a dilemma here.

Nāgasena: Well, he was a useless fellow, and the Buddha only said what was true and did him no harm.

19-20. Milinda: The Buddha said that trees are unconscious, and yet elsewhere he speaks of an aspen tree making reply to Bhāradvāja. There is a dilemma here.

Nāgasena: He was referring to the dryad who lives in the aspen tree.

21-23. Milinda: The Buddha died from Cunda's food, and yet he referred to that food as even greater in result than that which produced

his enlightenment. There is a dilemma here; how can the food be great if it produced disease and death?

Nāgasena: The disease was occasioned by the weakness of his body, and his death came about because he had lived through the period of life he was to live, so the food wasn't responsible for those things. Yet it brought about the states leading to final liberation so is greater in result than any other food.

24-26. The Buddha advised against relic-worship and also prescribed honoring them. Nāgasena explains that the two directives were issued to different audiences—members of the Order are advised not to honor relics, for that is not their business, while it is the business of others, whether gods or men, to do reverence.

35-37. Milinda: The Buddha said do no injury to anyone, but he also said to punish him who deserves punishment. Dilemma.

Nāgasena: You misunderstand the latter statement: what he meant was that one should subdue pride and cultivate modesty, subdue wrong views and cultivate right ones; thus the noble one is to be cultivated, the non-noble one subdued, the honest one cultivated and the robber subdued.

Milinda: Yes, and how is the robber to be subdued?

Nāgasena: If he deserves rebuke he should be rebuked, if a fine he should be fined, if death he should be executed.

Milinda: Is execution of robbers part of Buddhist doctrine?

Nāgasena: No, and the robber's death is not due to Buddhist teaching, but to his own actions.

Chapter Four

(E188-210; T1.261-302) 1-3. Though Moggallāna was identified by the Buddha as the one among his disciples with the greatest supernatural power, Moggallāna was nevertheless clubbed to death, and this is consistent, since the power of karma is greater than that of supernatural power.

11-12. Milinda: It is said by the Buddha that the parents of a Bodhisattva are determined from long ago. The Buddha also lists eight things a Bodhisattva investigates while in the Tuṣita heaven (before he is reborn), viz., the time of his rebirth, the continent of it, the country of it, the family into which he will be born, the father who will bear him, the time he will be in the womb, the month he will be born, and the time he will renounce. There is a dilemma here, for how can he investigate his future family if it is already predestined?

Nāgasena: What a Bodhisattva does is to consider what sort of

a family it should be—whether a family of noblemen or a Brahmin family. Indeed, there are eight matters one should investigate about the future: a merchant should investigate goods before he buys them, an elephant should try with its trunk a path not yet trod, a cartman should test a ford he hasn't yet crossed, a pilot should test the shore he is about to land on, a doctor should determine the patient's future before treating him, a traveller should test the bridge before crossing it, a monk should find out how long it is till sunset before beginning his meal, and a *bodhisattva* should investigate whether his future parents should be noblemen or Brahmins.

13-15. Milinda: The Buddha taught both that a member of the order is not to commit suicide, and also that they should bring about the destruction of birth, old age, disease and death. These are inconsistent teachings.

Nāgasena: The Buddha counselled good men to preserve their life in order to maintain their good qualities for their own good and that of others. But he also counselled overcoming frustration completely without rebirth. (There is a long list of examples of frustration, many but not all of which are of extremely painful character.)

16. Though the power of love wards off all evil intended toward one, still Prince Sāma (in the *Jātakas*), a loving person, was shot by a poisoned arrow by Piliyakkha the King. This, Nāgasena explains, was because at the particular moment he was shot he had upset a water-pot without love. Love and other virtues are not inherent in a person but must be practiced at every moment.

17-41. Milinda: Good actions are supposed to lead to heaven, and bad ones to hell. Yet Devadatta, a very wicked person, was reborn over and over in positions in life equal to or superior to the Buddha in his previous lives (Milinda gives a long list of examples from the *Jātakas*). So there is a problem. Good and evil actions seem to have the same results.

Nāgasena: No indeed. Devadatta's hostility to the Buddha bore fruit in each birth, even though because of his good deeds as king, etc., he achieved prosperity. And in any case you are only selecting a few lives; you must remember that Devadatta spends countless ages in purgatory reaping the reward of his sins, while the Buddha lived countless ages in heaven as a god, and finally, of course, was liberated.

46-47. The Buddha was gotten to change his mind by the Sākyas of Cātumā and Brahmā Sahampati, so how can he be supposed to be omniscient? But, says Nāgasena, what they reminded him of were parables he had taught himself.

Chapter Five

(E211-234; T2.1-42) 12-15. Milinda: The Buddha said he had discovered a way previously unknown, but elsewhere he speaks of the ancient path along which previous Buddhas walked. This is a dilemma.

Nāgasena: Though Buddhas of old walked that path, it had since been forgotten; now the Buddha rediscovered it.

35-37. Why did the Buddha, having attained omniscience for the sake of saving the people, have a moment when he inclined not to proclaim the truth but to rest in peace? Not because he was afraid, nor because he was not in fact omniscient, but because he saw how abstruse the doctrine was and how firmly held opinions contrary to it were, and so perceiving the difficulty of teaching he wanted to take counsel with himself concerning whom he should teach and how he should go about it.

Chapter Six

(E235-262; T2.43-91) 1-3. Milinda: The Buddha says at one point he has no teacher, but at another that Āḷāra Kālāma was his teacher. How do you reconcile this?

Nāgasena: The Buddha had five teachers while he was a *bodhisattva*—the eight Brahmins who identified his future glory; Sabbamitta of the land of Udīcya whom Suddhodana the king, the future Buddha's father, sent for; the god who raised the anxiety in the future Buddha's heart which led to his going out from the world; Āḷāra Kāḷāma; and Uddaka the son of Rāma. But they only taught him worldly wisdom. The Buddhist doctrine was taught him by no one.

4-9. Why shouldn't more than one Buddha be alive in this world at the same time? Nāgasena gives several reasons: one, there would be too much goodness for the world to support; two, their followers would quarrel; three, scriptures which point to the speech of the one Buddha would be falsified; four, that wherever very powerful things arise, there is no room for a second which would mitigate their power.

23-29. Backsliders do not sully the purity of Buddhism, since it is the backslider's demerit, not Buddhism's.

40-44. Ordinary persons experience both bodily and mental frustrations, but perfected beings, because of their mental discipline, experience only bodily but not mental frustrations.

Chapter Seven

(E262-274; T2.92-113) 1-6. Milinda: Why do the members of the order study texts, engage in reasoning, and concern themselves with doing good deeds, if by getting on the path they will overcome all obstacles?

Nāgasena: A pure person can become a perfected being in a moment; but impure persons require these means to become perfected beings.

9-10. A perfected being, though he is neither careless nor thoughtless and cannot thus be guilty of breaches of the canons of conduct of ordinary persons, may be ignorant of the special rules of conduct for monks, since perfected beings are not omniscient.

11-12. Three things which one cannot find in this world: something not subject to decay or death, any quality that is not impermanent, and any acquisition of being.

13-17. Milinda: Are there any uncaused things?

Nāgasena: Two: space (*ākāśa*) and liberation (*nirvāṇa*).

Milinda: Surely liberation must have a cause!

Nāgasena: The realization of liberation has a cause, but liberation itself does not, since liberation is uncompounded.

Milinda: What is liberation? And how can we know it exists?

Nāgasena: It is perceptible to the mind of a noble person who has attained the path. And just as the wind is not visually perceptible and yet exists, so liberation is not perceptible by the external organs and yet it exists.

Chapter Eight

(E274-328; T2.114-205) 1-17. Milinda: When Vessantara gave his wife and children away to the ogre he did a hard, indeed an awful, thing. Should he not have rather given himself away than to bring such misery on others?

Nāgasena: If a man were to assist a paralytic virtuous monk or Brahmin by providing him a carriage and having him taken where he wants to go, he would accrue great merit, even though the action involved pain to the bullocks who have to drag the carriage.

Milinda: But this giving of Vessantara's was excessive, and excessive giving is held blameworthy in the world.

Nāgasena: Since there is nothing in this world which should be withheld and not given if it is one's duty to give and one worthy of receiving is there, if Vessantara's giving satisfied these two conditions it was not excessive or blameworthy.

Milinda: I don't blame him for giving them, rather I asked why

he didn't rather give himself to the ogre?

Nāgasena: But he wasn't asked for himself, he was asked for his wife and children, and he deemed it best to give what he was asked for. He was unhappy about doing so, and wept according to the story, but he knew that they would come back to him later on, and thus he deemed it proper for him not to interrupt his practice of giving in this instance.

24-32. Despite appearances to the contrary, virtue is stronger than vice, because it lasts longer.

33-38. A dream is a sign in the mind. There are six kinds of people who have dreams—those in whom wind dominates, or bile, or phlegm, one who dreams under a god's influence, one who dreams influenced by himself, and one whose dreams are prophetic. Only the last kind of dream is true, the others false. In the prophetic dreams the sign appears in awareness as a reflection does in a mirror. Dreams require interpretation, their meaning may not be immediately apparent. Dreams do not occur in deep sleep because the awareness has retired to the life-continuum and thus being veiled by sleep does not act, though it persists, just as the sun's rays, though they are there, do not penetrate a thick fog. There are three stages of sleep: the beginning, where one feels tired, the middle or "monkey's sleep", and the end, when the awareness enters the life-continuum. Dreams occur in the middle stage.

39-50. Premature death can occur from seven kinds of causes: starvation, thirst, snakebite, poison untreated by medicine, being burnt to death, drowning, and from being wounded. Now of the eight causes of pain leading to human death (see above, IV.62-66), only the last, karma, always causes death at the appointed time; the rest cause premature death. On the other hand, there are certain deaths arising from the seven causes just listed which are also the result of karma, as when a man who has starved others to death starves to death himself as retribution, etc. A number of analogies to show how external causes can cause premature curtailment of natural results.

53-57. Not everyone who conducts himself correctly achieves insight. Nāgasena lists sixteen reasons for insight not arising, ranging from the person being born as an animal or a hungry ghost to those who commit various sins. The last case is of a child under seven years of age. Milinda wonders why, if such a child is ready for arhatship, he doesn't achieve insight?

Nāgasena: The child's mind is too weak to gain insight.

58-60. Milinda: Liberation cannot be free from frustration, since we see that those who seek liberation carry on life's activities which breed frustration.

Nāgasena: No, liberation is completely free from frustration; it is complete satisfaction. What you are referring to is the state of seeking liberation, not liberation itself.

61-75. Analogies to show why liberation is inexplicable—just as one cannot tell the amount of water in the ocean or the number of beings dwelling in it, so likewise liberation is measureless, formless. On the other hand, certain qualities which can be understood in empirical instances can by analogy be appealed to in order to understand liberation—for example, just as a lotus is pure, untainted by water, so liberation is pure, untainted by defilements, or just as water is cool, so does liberation cool the fever arising from the defilements, etc.

76-84. Milinda: Since Buddhists say that liberation is neither past, present nor future, neither produced nor not produced nor to be produced, does one who realizes liberation realize something already produced, or does he produce it first and then realize it?

Nāgasena: Neither, and yet liberation exists. It is that which one who conducts himself correctly and understands all the conditioning factors according to the correct teachings understands by his insight, and it is gained by freedom from fear, from confidence, satisfaction, purity.

85-88. Milinda: If liberation is not located at any place, as you say, it must not exist.

Nāgasena: Fire doesn't exist (i.e. isn't stored up) at any specific place, and yet it exists and will appear if the proper materials are provided.

Milinda: All right, but is there a place where a man may realize liberation?

Nāgasena: Yes, and that is virtue.

Book Five

(E329-347; T2.206-243) 1-25. Milinda: What is the evidence that the Buddha existed? Nāgasena replies by an analogy: just as one may know that a great king of the past existed by finding in a city the bazars that king built for the people, so one may know the Buddha existed by finding his 'bazars'—his doctrines, the conduct he prescribed, the meditative stages one can achieve, the noble truths, etc.

Book Six

(E348-362; T2.244-274) 1-26. Milinda: Do laymen achieve liberation?

Nāgasena: Countless numbers of them.

Milinda: Then what is the point of taking vows?

Nāgasena: Merely taking vows produces 28 good qualities; carrying those vows out generates another 18 good qualities. Laymen who realize liberation in every case have taken vows in previous lives. A long review of the vows.

Book Seven

(E363-420; T2.275-375) The good qualities which a monk must have in order to become a perfected being are listed in similes. So there is one quality "of the donkey," that he does not remain lying down long; five qualities "of the cock," who goes to bed early, gets up early, is strenuous in scratching the earth, is blind to distractions, and does not leave home even though buffeted about; etc. Some 67 different similes are thus employed.

This concluded the questions posed by the king, who pronounced himself satisfied with Nāgasena's answers and a convert to the Buddhist faith. The king eventually handed over his kingdom to his son and became a perfected being.

GHOṢAKA, ABHIDHARMĀMṚTA

Summary by Robert Kritzer

The author Ghoṣaka, we are told by Louis de la Vallée Poussin, was invited, after the death of King Kaniṣka, to Tokhara in the western part of Kashmir. He is cited in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, so his life can be dated close to that text's era, say the first half of the second century A.D. The text was translated into Chinese in 220-265 A.D.[1]

The work has been rendered into Sanskrit (our E) by Śānti Bhikṣu Śāstrī, Visvabharati Studies No. 17 (Santiniketan, 1953). In the Introduction to this work Śāstrī picks out the special views of Ghoṣaka and tells us his theory was known as *Lakṣaṇānyathātvavāda*, "that the changes undergone by the object are in its character".[2] Ghoṣaka's views are referred to regularly by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharma-kośa.*

Chapter One: Giving and Virtue

(E27-32)

1. Definition of giving.
2. The good results of giving depend on the giver's purity of mind, on the purity of the recipient, and on the purity of the gift.
3. Definitions of faith, respect and analysis.
4. Descriptions of the fruits obtained by giving to various recipients.
5. List of six hindrances to giving.
6. Definition of virtue. There are two types of behavior, good and bad. Bad behavior consists of killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, slander, abusive language, lying, frivolous talk, covetousness, ill-will and false views.
7. Definitions of the first three types of bad behavior, which consist of bad physical actions.
8. Definitions of the next four types, which consist of bad vocal actions.

9. Definitions of the last three types, which consist of bad mental actions.
10. Good actions are the abstention from these bad actions.
11. List of thirty fields of merit.

Chapter Two: Worldly Matters

(E32-39)
1. Lists of three realms and five courses, as well as birth in the intermediate existence.
2. Lists of the eight major and sixteen minor hells, of the seven animal births and the various ghostly births. The hells are the result of the worst actions, animal births are the result of middling-bad actions, while ghostly births are the result of less serious bad actions.
3. Lists of the four types of human births and the six types of births as gods of the realm of sensual pleasure, all of which are the result of good actions.
4. List of the seventeen material heavens and discussion of the connection between practice of the four material meditations and birth in these heavens.
5. List of the four immaterial heavens and explanation of how they are attained.
6. Explanation of the names of the three realms.
7-16. Comparison of time scales among the various births (e.g., 50 human years make up one day and night among the *Cāturmahārājika* gods, while the life-span in living (*saṃjīva*) hell is 1,620,000,000,000 human years).

Chapter Three: Duration and Nourishment

(E40-42)
1. There are four durations of consciousness: of material things, feelings, identification and conditioning. The duration of the consciousness of material feelings is prevalent in the sensuous and material realms, while the other three are prevalent in various immaterial heavens.
2. List of four types of food: solid, tactual, of representative cognition, and consciousness.
3. Explanation of why solid food consists of smell, taste and touch, but not of vision: mere perception of food by the eyes (and material food is only perceived by the visual organ) does not contribute to the growth of a being's elements.
4. There are two types of solid food: gross and subtle.
5. Definition of tactual food.

6. Explanation of which types of food are prevalent in which births.
7. Explanation of which types of food are prevalent in which realms.
8. Solid is the grossest, tactual food is subtle, representative food is more subtle, and consciousness is the most subtle food.
9. There are four types of beings: egg-born, womb-born, moisture-born and apparition-born. Discussion of which kinds of beings are apparition-born, etc. Apparition-born beings acquire the six sense-organs simultaneously, while the other types of beings acquire them gradually.
10. There are four types of existences: birth-existence, death-existence, root-existence and intermediate-existence.
11. Definition of intermediate existence and explanation of its relationship to birth-existence.
12. Explanation of which beings obtain intermediate existence.

Chapter Four: Karma

(E43-51)
1. Definition of defiled karma and maturation. Defiled karma includes physical, vocal and mental action; good, bad and neutral action; action performed by seekers, action performed by adepts, and action different from these two types, and action to be destroyed by vision of the truth, action to be destroyed by meditation, and action that is not be destroyed.
2. Karmic maturation can be experienced in the same lifetime, in the next lifetime, or in subsequent lifetimes. It can be pleasant, unpleasant or neither. And it can be black (bad), white (good) or mixed.
3. There are three types of karma: karma that is neither black nor white and has no maturation, karma that has a definite maturation, and karma that has an indefinite maturation.
4. Detailed definitions of the types of karma listed in Section One.
5. Detailed definitions of the types of maturations listed in Section Two.
6. Detailed definitions of the types of karma listed in Section Three.
7. Physical and vocal karma can be of two types, manifest and unmanifest; mental karma can only be manifest.
8. Definitions of manifest and unmanifest karma.
9. There are two types of neutral factors: obscured and unobscured by defilements.
10. List of obscured neutral factors.
11. List of unobscured neutral factors.
12. There are three types of unmanifest karma: karma of pure

influence, which consists of right speech, right action, and right livelihood; karma conascent with concentration, which is the obtainment of trance and the abandonment of the bad factors of the sensory realm; and karma of virtuous behavior, which is the acquisition of good but impure physical and vocal karma at the time of obtaining virtue.

13. At different stages one obtains past, present and future unmanifest karma.

14. Discussion of which kind of actions produce which kind of manifest and unmanifest karma. The principle seems to be that only strongly volitional actions produce unmanifest karma.

15. Explanation of the conditions for obtaining meditative discipline.

16. Explanation of the conditions for obtaining pure behavior.

17. Discussion of the causes for falling away from pure behavior, meditative behavior and virtuous behavior respectively. Ghoṣaka mentions a controversy as to whether virtuous behavior is destroyed at the time of the destruction of factors and gives his reasons for believing that it is not.

18. List and discussion of the five kinds of fruits of the destruction of defilements: karmic maturation, the results of one's locus, of one's dominating conditions, of one's body and of liberation.

19. Definitions of the above five fruits.

20. List of the three roots. Good roots consist of absence of greed, lack of hatred and understanding. Bad roots consist of greed, hatred and delusion. Neutral roots consist of neutral attachment, views, ignorance and pride.[3]

21. Discussion of good, bad and neutral factors.

22. Explanation of the ten good and ten bad paths of action.

23. Discussion of certain actions that are not considered paths.

24. List of three types of deaths: destruction of life, but not of merit; destruction of merit, but not of life; and destruction of both.

Chapter Five: Aggregates, Elements and Bases

(E52-59)

1. Discussion of impure factors and explanation of the terms "intoxicant" and "defilement". The 108 defilements consist of 98 bonds and 10 fetters.[4] The five aggregates are of two types, pure and impure (or grasping).

2. Explanation of the material aggregate and what it consists of. Matter can be visible or invisible; it can be resisting or unresisting.

3. Explanation of the feeling aggregate. Lists of 2 to 108 different types of feelings.

4. Explanation of the identification aggregate. There are three types of conceptual identification, small, large and immeasurable.

5. Explanation of the conditioning aggregate. There are two types of conditionings, those associated with awareness and those not.

6. Explanation of the consciousness aggregate. List and explanation of the six types of consciousness: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and mental.

7. Lists of the twelve senses and eighteen elements.

8. Explanation of why the five sense-organs are considered the causes of the first five types of consciousness.

9. Discussion of the objects of the six types of consciousness.

10. Only representative cognition, and none of the five ordinary sense-consciousnesses, can discriminate. The terms "awareness" (*citta*), "mind" (*manas*) and "consciousness" (*vijñāna*) are fundamentally the same in meaning.

11. Conduct is the interaction among sense-organs, object and consciousness; feelings and the other conditionings arise simultaneously with contact.

12. Of the eighteen elements eight are neutral, while ten can be good, bad or neutral. These ten are matter, sound, the seven consciousnesses (including representative cognition), and the factor element.

13. Definition of good, bad and neutral matter and sound.

14. Definition of good, bad and neutral consciousness.

15. Definition of good, bad and neutral factors.

16-18. Fifteen of the eighteen elements are defiled. Three, mind, the factor-element and representative cognition, can be either defiled or pure.

19. Explanation of why certain elements are associated with certain realms. Four—smell, taste, olfactory and gustatory awareness—are exclusively associated with the sensual realm. All five sense-organs, as well as the remaining three sense objects, can be associated with the sensual realm.

20. All five sense-organs, as well as color, sound and tangibility, can be associated with the sensual realm.

21. Visual consciousness, auditory consciousness and bodily consciousness can be associated with either the sensual or material element.

22. Mind can be associated with any of the three elements, or it can be unassociated if a state of pure consciousness prevails. The same is true of representative cognition.

23. Factors likewise can be associated with any of the three realms or can be unassociated.

24. Of the eighteen elements the six objects of consciousness are external, while the rest are internal.

25. Ten elements, namely, the five senses and the five sense-objects, do not involve initial and applied thought. The five sense-consciousnesses do involve initial and applied thought. Mind can involve initial and applied thought (in the first trance), involve initial but not applied thought (in the middle trances), and not involve either initial or applied thought (in the last trance). The same is true of representative cognition. As for the factor-element, those factors that are not associated with physical or vocal actions and those that are unconditioned do not involve initial and applied thought. The remaining factors are like mind.

26. Seven elements (the five sense-consciousnesses, mind and representative cognition) possess a supporting object. The five senses and the five sense-objects have no supporting objects. As for the factor-element, all factors possess supporting objects except for physical and vocal actions, dissociated factors and unconditioned factors.

27. Explanation of which elements are appropriated and which are not appropriated.

28. Except for three factors within the factor-elements, namely, calculated cessation, uncalculated cessation and space, all of the eighteen elements are conditioned.

Chapter Six: Conditions

(E60-69)

1. All conditioned factors have four marks: birth, duration, decay and impermanence.

2. List and explanation of the secondary marks: arising of birth, duration of duration, decay of decay and impermanence of impermanence.

3. List of contaminants associated with awareness. This list[5] includes feeling, identification, thinking, contact, attention, interest, resolve, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, intellection, initial thought, sustained thought, false conditioning, correct conditioning, good roots, bad roots, neutral roots, the fetters binding to all the afflictions and complete wisdom.

4. List of contaminants dissociated from awareness. This list[6] includes acquisition-force, birth, duration, decay, impermanence, trance free from conceptual identification, cessation-trance, sense basis free from conceptual identification, acquisition of place, acquisition of things, acquisition of sense-bases, collection of words, collection of phrases, collection of syllables and ordinariness.[7]

5. There are four conditions: condition as cause, directly-antecedent condition, consciousness-supporting condition and predominant condition.

6. Explanations of the four conditions.

7. List and explanations of six causes, namely, connected, simultaneous, homogeneous, pervasive, retributory and efficient causes.

8. Discussion of which kinds of factors are produced by which causes.

9. Similar discussion regarding conditions. Awareness and concomitant mental factors are produced by all four conditions, the trance free from conceptual identification and the cessation trance by three, and the other dissociated conditions, as well as matter, by two. Of course no factor is produced by a single condition.

10. Explanation of awareness. The first step is contact, which arises from the coming together of three factors (an object, a sense-organ and awareness). At the same time arise identification, thinking, attention, interest, resolve, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom and equanimity.

11. Explanation of each of the factors involved in awareness, beginning with contact.

12. List of ten factors present in every moment of awareness.[8]

13. Definition of connection, the union among these factors in which the factors themselves remain unchanged.

14. List of ten factors present in every defiled moment of consciousness.[9]

15. Definitions of the factors present in every afflicted moment.

16. List of bad factors of limited occurrence.[10]

17. Definitions of them.

18. Explanation of which defilements are associated with which realms.

19. List of the ten factors present in every good moment of awareness.[11]

20. Definitions of them.

21. There are three groups of defilements. All those associated with attachment belong to the sense of attachment, those associated with hatred to the sense of detachment, and those associated with ignorance to both senses.

22. All defilements are the products of the three bad roots, which are "poisons" that destroy the good roots.

Chapter Seven: Dependent Origination

(E70-73)

1. List of the twelve links in the chain of dependent origination.

2. Of these twelve, three (ignorance, craving and grasping) can be considered defiling, two (conditioning and existence) karma, and seven (consciousness, the psychophysical complex, the six sense-organs, contact, feeling, birth and old age/death) frustrating. Moreover, two belong to the past, two to the future, and eight to the present.

3. Explanation of the causal relationships between defilements, karma and frustration.

4. Explanation in detail of the relationship between each condition and the one that follows it.

5. Definition of ignorance.

6. Those afflicted by ignorance perform three types of action: good action, which yields good results; bad action, which yields bad results; and neutral action, which yields birth in the material or immaterial realms.

7. Good action consists of giving, observing precepts and meditation.

8. Bad action consists of the three roots of evil, the ten bad paths of action, and the various crimes. Neutral action consists of the meditational states from the first meditation to the basis of neither-identification-nor-nonidentification.

9. Detailed definitions of consciousness, the psychophysical complex, the six sense bases and contact.

10-11. Detailed definition of feeling.

12-13. Detailed definitions of craving and grasping.

14. Detailed definitions of existence, birth and old age and death.

15. Definitions of the various forms of mental frustration experienced in the conditioned world, namely, sorrow, lamentation, frustration, depression and irritation.

16. The cause of this frustration is ignorance and the other members of the chain. Only when the links are eliminated and all karmic results are destroyed will the frustration cease.

17. Description of the factors necessary for a human body. These include the four great elements, space and consciousness, all of which are explained in detail.

18. Explanation of the functions of these six factors within the human body.

Chapter Eight: Pure Senses

(E74-76)

1. There are three ways of eliminating defilements: restraint, which is the practice of moral precepts by one who has not yet obtained purely influenced awareness; abandonment, which is the giving up of sexual misconduct and bad factors by one who has achieved

meditational states; and destruction by wisdom, which is the destruction of defilements through practice based on an understanding of frustration by one who is enlightened. Only the last really leads to a purified mind.

2. List and explanation of the sixteen external faculties.

3. Definition of the term "faculty".

4. Explanation of which faculties are associated with which realms.

5. Explanation of which faculties are appropriated and which are not.

6. Explanation of which faculties can be good, which can be bad, and which can be neutral.

7. Explanation of which faculties can be pure and which impure.

8. Explanation of which faculties are obtained in which births and realms.

9. Explanation of which faculties can be destroyed by the vision of the truth and which by meditative practice, and of which are not to be destroyed.

Chapter Nine: Contaminants

(E77-82)

1. There are 98 contaminants that can be destroyed by two different means, the vision the truth and meditative practice. Twenty-eight can be destroyed by insight into the truth of frustration, 19 by insight into the truth of origin, 19 by insight into the truth of cessation, and 22 by insight into the path. Ten can be destroyed by practice.

2. Explanation of how many of the 36 contaminants in the realm of sexual passion can be destroyed by each of the various means.

3. Both the material and immaterial realms have only 31 contaminants; they both lack the five types of resistance.

4. There are ten basic contaminants: belief that the body is real, extreme view, false view, adherence to particular views, addiction to moral precepts and vows, perplexity, attachment, resistance, pride and ignorance.

5-6. Definitions of each of the ten basic contaminants.

7. In the realm of sexual passion all the fetters can be destroyed by insight into the truth. Explanation of how many fetters are destroyed by insight into each of the four truths.

8. Explanation of how many fetters are destroyed by practice in the realm of sexual passion and how many in the material and immaterial realms. Explanation of which fetters are destroyed by which means in the material and immaterial realms.

9. Explanation of which fetters in the realm of sexual passion are

destroyed by insight into frustration and which by insight into its cause.

10. Two types of ignorance are to be destroyed by insight into frustration.[12]

11. There are two types of ignorance, pervasive and nonpervasive. Explanation of when ignorance is pervasive and when it is nonpervasive.

12. All other fetters, except for attachment, hatred and pride, are pervasive. Explanation of when contaminants are pervasive within their own realm alone and when they are pervasive in other realms as well.

13. In each realm there are six contaminants that are pure in their sphere of action: wrong belief, perplexity and ignorance that are to be destroyed by insight into cessation, and the same three when they are to be destroyed by insight into the path. All the other contaminants are impure.

14. Explanation of which contaminants are associated with which of the five organs of feeling in the various realms.

15. In the realms of passion all the contaminants that are to be destroyed by practice, except for pride, are associated with all six consciousnesses. Pride, as well as those dispositions that are to be destroyed by insight into the truth, are only associated with representative cognition.

16. List of ten envelopers.[13]

17. Definitions of the ten envelopers.

18. List of three bonds (attachment, hatred and delusion). Explanation of which bonds are associated with which awarenesses in the sensory and material realms.

19. The noninterrupted path results in a threefold comprehension that causes the destruction of the fetters of the sensory realm.

20. Explanations of the nine ascertainments of abandonment.

21. Explanation of why all fetters, when they are active, must be associated with awareness.

22. All fetters are to be destroyed by meditation and wisdom, and liberation is obtained by practicing the two together.

23. When one's mind is soft and pliant, one should practice energy. When it is in a state of equilibrium, one should practice meditation. But when it is neither pliant nor in a state of equilibrium, one should bring its activity to rest.

24. A simile explaining why one should sometimes practice energy, sometimes meditation, and sometimes equanimity.

Chapter Ten: the Person of Pure Influence

(E83-88)

1. Discussion of the first rule of meditation, that the mind must have only one object.

2. One obtains the factor of heat by realizing that dispositions are really impermanent, frustrating, empty and nonself. At the same time faith in the purified good roots arises.

3. Explanation of the sixteen aspects of the four truths. Seeing these aspects and at the same time maintaining energy constantly, one achieves the factor of heat.

4. Definition of the summit, the next stronger type of good root.

5. Definition of patience, the next type of good root.

6. Definition of higher worldly *dharma*, the highest form of good root.

7. The higher worldly *dharma* is said to be capable of opening the doors of liberation and is dependent on an understanding of the truth of frustration.

8. List of six stages of meditation: nonreturner, intermediate, the fourth material trance, patience, summit and heat.

9. Explanation of the first two moments of insight into the truth. The first is patient forbearance of frustration and is the noninterrupted path. The second, awareness of frustration, is the path to liberation. They have as their objects the frustration of the sensual realm.

10. The third moment, forbearance of connection, is likewise the noninterrupted path, while the fourth, awareness of connection, is a path to liberation. Their objects are the frustrations of the material and immaterial realms. Similarly, each of the remaining three truths requires four moments of insight.

11. Explanations of the various noble persons, namely, conformers to *dharma*, conformers to faith, experiencers of the fruits and those abiding in the fruits.

12. Definitions of the stream-enterer, once-returner and nonreturner.

13. Explanations of the various types of stream-enterers: view-attainers, resolved in faith, committed to seven returns and clan-to-clan.

14. Explanation of the two types of one who has destroyed six types of fetters is simply called once-returner, while one who has destroyed eight types is called "single-seeker" (*ekavicika*).

15. Explanation of the term "nonreturner" and list of five types of nonreturners: intermediately liberated, repeatedly liberated, conditionally liberated, unconditionally liberated and "highest

stream". Furthermore, there are nonreturners who are headed for the *Akaniṣṭha* heaven and who are first for the material and immaterial realms.

16. The nine types of fetters in the sensual realm and nine each in material and immaterial realms are destroyed by the nonreturner's path and the path of liberation. First the nonreturner's path destroys them, then the path of liberation finishes the job. The simile given is of a person who first captures a poisonous snake and puts it in a bottle and then caps the bottle.

17. The supramundane path destroys the defilements of all three realms, while the worldly path destroys only those of the higher realms.

18. Description of the eye-witness nonreturner.

19. Definition of lightning-minded concentration, which leads to awareness of destruction.

20. Definition of the term "perfected being".

21. List and definition of nine types of perfected being:[14] one of fallible nature, of nonfallible nature, of a thoughtful nature, one who is competent in watchfulness, of a maintaining nature, of a *prativedhana* nature, steady-natured, liberated in wisdom and completely liberated.[15]

22. Explanation of the distinction between faith-following and *dharma*-following perfected beings.

23. Discussion of the nine faculties of the faith-following perfected being. In the fifteenth moment of the path of vision they are called *ājñasyāmīndriya*; in the sixteenth moment of the spiritual path they are called faculties of understanding; and when the perfected being is on the adept's path, they are called faculties of a perfected being.

24. Discussion of why there are two types of fruit, conditioned and unconditioned, and explanation of why insight into the truth is gradual and not instantaneous.

Chapter Eleven: Knowledge

(E89-93)

1. List of ten knowledges: of *dharma*, of connection, conventional, of familiar things, of frustration, of its origin, of cessation, of the path, of destruction (of bondage) and of nonorigination.

2-11. Definitions of the ten knowledges.

12. Enumeration of the aspects of the various knowledges.

13. Enumeration of the knowledges to be found in the various trance states and moments of pure influence.

14. There are two types of spiritual practice, the first of which, of acquisition, is the obtainment of previously unobtained merit; the

second, of development, is the realization of previously obtained merit.

15. Explanation of which knowledges are practiced in which of the path-moments.

16. In the first adept moment one practices both pure and impure good roots. This moment is associated with knowledge connected with frustration.[16]

17. Explanation of the differences between vision and knowledge, and between insight and vision.

18. Explanation of the supporting object of each of the knowledges except for knowledge of cessation.

19. Knowledge of cessation and of the path are capable of destroying the fetters of the three realms.

20. List of six higher faculties,[17] namely, of destruction of bondage, of hearing, of vision, of previous events, of others' awarenesses and of the destruction of impurity, and explanation of their relation to the knowledges.

21. Explanation of the relation between the four applications of mindfulness and the knowledges.

22. Explanation of the relationship between the four discriminations and the knowledges.

23. Explanation of the relation between knowledge of vows and the knowledges.

24. Explanation of the relation between the ten powers and the knowledges.

25. Explanation of the relation between the four confidences and the knowledges.

Chapter Twelve: Trance

(E94-98)

1. Comparison between the consciousness of one who has obtained attainment of trance and a lamp, sheltered from the wind, that is brilliant and pure.

2. Enumeration of the eight trances (four material and four immaterial). Discussion of the various trances in terms of whether or not they are flavorful, tranquil or pure.

3. Detailed explanation of the first trance. The first trance has five limbs, namely, initial thought, sustained thought, joy, satisfaction and concentration. It is associated with three organs of feeling, namely, joy, satisfaction and equanimity. It encompasses existences in which beings have both different thoughts and different bodies and those in which they have different bodies but the same thoughts.

The first trance contains four types of consciousness: eye, ear, body and mind consciousnesses.

4. Detailed explanation of the second trance. The second trance has four limbs: internal tranquility, concentration, joy and satisfaction. It is associated with only two organs of feeling, joy and equanimity.

5. Detailed explanation of the third trance. A pure person who has abandoned joy, who is characterized by equanimity, who is mindful, and who dwells in satisfaction is said to have entered the third trance. The third trance has five limbs: satisfaction, equanimity, mindfulness, comprehension and concentration.

6. Detailed explanation of the fourth trance. After abandoning satisfaction as well as frustration, and having destroyed both contentedness and depression, one enters the fourth trance, which has four limbs: equanimity, mindfulness, comprehension and concentration.

7. Discussion of the nonreturner's trance.

8. Descriptions of the four immaterial trances: of endless space, endless consciousness, of nothingness and neither-identification-nor-nonidentification.

9. The road to liberation is twofold, consisting of the realization of the impurity of the body and mindfulness of the breath. Explanation of mindfulness of the breath and its importance.

10. The nonreturner, intermediate, the four material and the first three immaterial trances can be either pure or impure. The fourth immaterial trance can only be impure.

11. List of ten identifications: as noneternal, frustrating, frustrating not-self, contemplation of nutrition, nonsatisfyingness in the whole world, of hell, of death, the nonattachment of abandonment and cessation. Explanation of what it means to practice each of these. By practicing them one can obtain cessation of frustration.

Chapter Thirteen: Complete Concentration

(E99-112)

1. Topics discussed in this chapter include concentration, the boundless states, the higher faculties, etc.

2. Definition of concentration. Explanation of three types: emptiness, the dispositionless, and the signless concentrations. Enumeration of the aspects of each of these three types.

3. Detailed explanations of the four boundless states: loving kindness, compassion, sympathy and equanimity.

4. Detailed explanations of the six higher faculties: supernatural footing, divine eye, divine ear, knowledge of previous lives, know-

ledge of others' awarenesses and knowledge of the destruction of impure influences.

5. Explanation of why three of the higher faculties, the second, fourth and sixth of the list just given, are designated as understandings.

6. Brief explanation of the ten spheres of totality.

7. Brief explanation of the eight liberations.

8. Explanation of the eight senses of mastery.

9. Explanation of the eight boundless senses.

10. Explanation of which meditational accomplishments (which of the boundless states, higher faculties, etc.) are to be experienced in which trance or stage.

11. Explanation of which accomplishments are pure, impure and neutral in which trance or stage.

12. Explanation of the gradual elimination of fetters and the consequent attainment of the trance states.

13. Discussion of the trances with respect to time (present and future).

14. Discussion of the four material trances and the first three immaterial trances with respect to the path (pure and impure).

15. Discussion of the trances practiced in the life-continuum, the fourth immaterial trance.

16-17. Discussion of the pure trances.

18. Discussion of the flavorful trances.

19. The four boundless states, the eight bases of mastery, the first three liberations, and the first eight spheres of totality are all based in the realm of desire. The first five higher faculties are based on both the realm of desire and the material realm.

20. Discussion of the perfuming trances.

21. Enumeration and discussion of the four discriminations—of *dharma*, grammatical, perspicuous and of meaning—as well as nonconflict and awareness of vows.

22. Discussion of the times at which the three types of trances, namely, impure, flavorful and of pure influence, are obtained.

23. Discussion of the fourteen magical awarenesses and the realms in which they are found.

24. Discussion of the difference between trance when it is fulfilled and when it is unfulfilled.

Chapter Fourteen: Allies of Enlightenment

(E113-117)

1. There are seven groups of allies of enlightenment: the applications of mindfulness, the right exertions, the supernatural footings,

the faculties, the powers, the conditions of enlightenment and the parts of the path. Of these the seven conditions of enlightenment are always pure, while the others can be either impure or pure. According to another opinion the eight parts of the path are also always pure.

2. Explanation of the four applications of mindfulness and of why an application of mindfulness is a form of wisdom.

3. Explanation of why there are exactly four applications of mindfulness: each destroys one of the four perverted views.

4-7. Detailed definition of bodily feeling, awareness and *dharma* applications of mindfulness.

8. Definition of the four right exertions.

9. Definition of the four supernatural footings, namely, the concentrations of interest, energy, awareness and deliberation.

10. Definition of the five faculties, namely, faith, energy, memory, concentration and wisdom.

11. Definition of the five powers; the five that are faculties when they are limited are called powers when they are large.

12. Definition of the seven conditions of enlightenment, namely, memory, investigation of *dharma*, energy, joy, tranquility, concentration and equanimity.

13. Definition of the eight parts of the path, namely right view, right conceptualizing, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration.

14. Ten basic factors encompass the thirty-seven allies of enlightenment:

(a) faith (a faculty and a power)
(b) energy (a faculty, a power, four right exertions, energy as condition of enlightenment, and right effort)
(c) memory (a faculty, a power, memory as condition of enlightenment, right mindfulness)
(d) joy (as condition of enlightenment)
(e) wisdom (a faculty, a power, four applications of mindfulness, the condition of enlightenment called investigation of *dharma*, and right view)
(f) tranquility (a condition of enlightenment)
(g) concentration (a faculty, a power, four supernatural footings, concentration as condition of enlightenment, and right concentration)
(h) equanimity (a condition of enlightenment)
(i) conceptualizing (right conceptualizing)
(j) virtue (right speech, right action, right livelihood).

General discussion of each of the seven groups of allies of enlightenment.

15. Enumeration of how many allies of enlightenment are to be found in each of the trances.

Chapter Fifteen: Four Noble Truths

(E118-125)

1. Definitions of the four noble truths: frustration, its origin, cessation and the path.

2. Explanation of the sequence of the four truths. Frustration is the first truth because it is the least subtle and the easiest to understand.

3. The five grasping aggregates are considered frustration when they are result and both frustration and its origin when they are cause. This is compared to a man who is both a son and a father at the same time.

4. The truth of the origin of frustration consists of nine fetters: attachment, resistance, pride, ignorance, (wrong) views, adherence (to views), doubt, selfishness and envy.

5. The truth of cessation encompasses two types of cessation, impure (with residue) and pure (without residue). Both consist in the destruction of fetters.

6. Discussion of the four discriminations (see 13.21 above) as examples of pure factors.

7. Explanation of the four indestructible faiths of the stream-enterer, faith in Buddha, *dharma*, order and precepts.

8. There are four practices of concentration. The first is the attainment of satisfaction in the present life. The second is the attainment of intuition. The third is discrimination of wisdom. And the fourth is the destruction of impure influences in the fourth trance by means of lightning-minded concentration.

9. Discussion of the four paths: modes of progress. The path of the *dharma*-follower (one whose faculties are strong) is unpleasant and leads to higher faculties. The path of the faith-follower (whose faculties are weak) is unpleasant and leads to a slow higher faculties. The path of one who is in the midst of practicing the basic trances and who has strong faculties is pleasant and leads quickly to higher faculties, while that of one who has weak faculties is pleasant and leads slowly to higher faculties. In the basic trances peace and insight are balanced, while in the other stages one or the other predominates, causing the path to be unpleasant.

10. Explanation of the seven durations of consciousness: existences in which the bodies and thoughts of the beings dwelling therein

differ; existences in which bodies are different while thoughts are the same; existences in which bodies are the same while thoughts are different; existences in which both bodies and thoughts are the same; and the first three immaterial states. These existences are called durations of consciousness because consciousness is not interrupted in them.

11. The woeful courses are not considered durations of consciousness because the unpleasant sensations experienced in them interrupt consciousness. Nor are the fourth meditative state, the trance free from conceptual identification, the sense of neither-identification-nor-nonidentification and the cessation trance considered durations of consciousness because in them, too, consciousness is interrupted.

12. The nine abodes of beings consist of the seven durations of consciousness as well as the nonidentifying beings and the neither-identifying-nor-nonidentifying sense.

13. There are four noble seeds: satisfaction with one's clothing and blanket, with one's food and drink, and with one's bed, and happiness in renunciation.

14. Explanation of the 108 different feelings that arise from contact between an object and the six organs.

15. Explanation of how memory functions.

16. Explanation of dreams.

17. Definition of *sammoha*, a state of distraction or illusion that arises from bodily illness or possession by demons, or is the result of things one has done in previous births.

18. Definition of three aggregates that refer to the qualities of the perfected being: virtue, concentration and wisdom.

19. Definitions of two types of restraint, virtuous restraint and restraint of the faculties.

20. Definitions of three types of obstacles that prevent the obtainment of perfection: defilements, karma and its maturation.

21. Discussion of three types of unwholesome initial and sustained thought: attachment, hatred and defilements (delusion). These can be seen as sicknesses which can be cured, respectively, by the understanding that the body is impure, the practice of friendliness towards all beings, and the recognition of the twelvefold chain of causation.

22. Definitions of four types of practice: bodily, moral, of awareness and of wisdom.

23. Explanation of why good people sometimes obtain bad rebirths, while bad people sometimes obtain good ones.

Chapter Sixteen: A Mixed Bag

(E126-134)

1. The four fruits of the recluse consist of six factors: the aggregates and calculated cessation.

2. Discussion of the four fruits and the stages within which they are contained.

3. There are four perverted views: belief that the impermanent is permanent, that the unpleasant is pleasant, that the impure is pure, and that the selfless possesses a self.

4. Explanation of why all perverted views are destroyed by insight into the truth of frustration.

5. Definitions of the five false views.

6. Explanation of how the five false views are destroyed by the various truths and by insight into these truths.

7. Definitions of six kinds of spiritual practice: acquisition, conditioning, abandonment, riddance, discrimination and restraint.

8. There are five faculties. The faculty of depression is destroyed in the first trance, that of frustration in the second trance, that of contentedness in the third trance, that of satisfaction in the fourth trance, and that of equanimity in the trance free from conceptual identification.

9. There are three all-encompassing realms. In abandonment all the defilements except for attachment are destroyed. In non-attachment attachment is destroyed. And in cessation all the other factors are destroyed.

10. One obtains consciousness-liberation from the destruction of attachment, while one obtains wisdom-liberation from the destruction of delusion.

11. Explanation of the ability of attachment to link internal and external bases.

12. List of ten factors: of desire, material, immaterial, pure, connected, separated, good, bad, neutral and unconditioned.

13. Five types of factors are the basis of the awareness of *dharma*: factors, either connected or separated, that are connected with desire; factors, either connected or separated, that are pure; and good unconditioned factors.

14. Seven types of factors are the basis of knowledge of connection: the five mentioned in Section 13 as well as connected and disconnected factors connected with immaterial realm.

15. Three types of factors are the basis for knowledge of the awarenesses of others: connected factors that are connected with desire and matter and pure connected factors.

16. Ten types of factors are the basis for conventional awareness:

connected and disconnected factors connected with each of the three realms, connected and disconnected pure factors, and good and neutral unconditioned factors.

17. Six types of factors are the basis for knowledge of frustration and of its cause: connected and disconnected factors of the three realms. Only one type of factor is the basis for knowledge of cessation, namely, good unconditioned factors. Two types are the basis of knowledge of the path: associated and dissociated pure factors.

18. Nine types of factors are the basis for knowledge of destruction and of nonorigination: those that are the basis for conventional awareness, minus neutral unconditioned factors.

19. Definitions of two types of defilements: specific, which are restricted to a single stage, and pervasive, which are universal.

20. Explanations of the two types of factors, associated and dissociated. List and definitions of the seventeen dissociated conditions (see Chapter 6, Section 4).

21. Discussion of which dissociated conditions are good, which bad and which neutral.

22. Discussion of which dissociated conditions are associated with which realms.

23. Discussion of which dissociated conditions are pure and which impure. All of them can be impure, while birth, old age and death, duration and noneternality can be either.

24. Brief definitions of the three unconditioned factors.

25. List of six causes: homogeneous, connected, simultaneous, efficient, pervasive and maturation causes.

26. Explanation of why liberation is also a fruit of conditioned factor.

27. Explanation of why conditioned factors are effective at a single time with respect to a single supporting object.

28. Definitions of the terms "liberation path" and "liberation".

29. There are three kinds of attachment. Sensual desire is the desire for things. Lust for being is stinginess with regard to what one possesses. And passion for destruction is the desire to destroy.

30-31. Discussion of which allies of enlightenment can be considered faculty factors.

32. All factors are associated with another and are dissociated from self.

33. Definition of *aśeṣaprahāṇa*, the destruction, without remainder, of defilements.

34. Discussion of the different kinds of faith that are based on the various truths.

35. All concomitant mental factors, as well as unmanifest virtue,

birth, duration and old age/death, follow consciousness because they have a single supporting object.

36. All impure factors are to be destroyed, because they are morally defiled.

37. All pure and impure factors are to be understood because they all have wisdom as supporting object. Past and future factors are considered distant because of their lack of efficacy, while present factors are considered near because they can cause effects.

38. Discussion of nineteen indestructible faculties.

39. Definitions of five types of conjunction of sense-organ, sense-object and consciousness: resisting, full of conceptual construction, defiled ignorance, or pure influence (knowledge) and undefiled impure relation (neither knowledge nor lack of knowledge).

40. One obtains fruits by means of two paths, the path of destroying fetters and the path of obtaining release. The matured awareness of the perfected being brings him to final liberation because he has abandoned all factors.

41. Definitions of the four types of existence: birth, death, root and intermediate.

42. Definitions of aversion and nonattachment.

43. Definitions of three types of influences. The sensual influence consists of all the defilements of the sensual realm, except for ignorance. The influence of being consists of all the defilements of the material and immaterial realms, except for ignorance. The influence of ignorance is confusion associated with all three realms.

44. At the time of cessation, when all influences have been destroyed, one obtains the destruction of all frustration and the ambrosia of total wisdom.

MAHĀVIBHĀṢĀ

Summary by Shohei Ichimura with Kosho Kawamura, Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Collett Cox

This summary is based on the following materials:

(1) Ryogen Fukuhara's Japanese itemization of the subjects treated in the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra*, selectively rendered by Shohei Ichimura into English; (2) translations of selected passages from Louis de la Vallée Poussin's French, and by Robert Buswell and Collett Cox into English; (3) a partial summary of the opening portion by Kosho Kawamura. The work is available in Chinese translations, numbered as T.1545, T.1546 and T.1547. The present version is based on Taisho 1545. Some of the passages provided further treatment on the basis of the translations of Poussin, Buswell and Cox are culled from versions other than T. 1545. However, since the work is, in each of its versions, a commentary on the *Jñānaprasthāna*, it is possible for us to follow the overall plan of that work in organizing this summary. Nonparenthetical numerical references connect the summary to the sections in the summary of the *Jñānaprasthāna.* The numbers in parentheses refer first to the page and column in the Chinese text.

T.1545 (Nanjio 1264) was composed shortly after Kaniṣka's council, which according to Etienne Lamotte took place around 128-151.[1] The Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang, made in 659, numbers 200 volumes. Hajime Nakamura tells us that "it is likely that the fourth congress, in which it is said that this text was compiled, did not actually take place".[2]

T.1546 (Nanjio 1263) was written by Buddhavarman in 439,[3] in 60 volumes. It seems to be an earlier form of T.1545.[4]

T.1547 (Nanjio 1299) is "attributed to Saṅgabhadra, and most probably revised by Saṅghadeva"[5] in 383.[6] It seems to be an independent work.[7]

Louis de la Vallée Poussin provides French translations of sections of these texts in several of his articles: "The two *nirvāṇadhātus* according to the *Vibhāṣā* ", *Indian Historical Quarterly* 6, 1930, 39-45 concerns the *pratisaṃkhyā-* and *aprati-saṃkhyā-nirodhas*. Other passages are rendered in his *Documents d' Abhidharma*, Bulletin de l'École Francaise d'Extrème-Orient 1930, 1-28, 247-298, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhique 1, 1932, 63-125, and 5, 1936-37, 1-87. There are also some passages translated in various volumes of Poussin's translation of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, op. cit.

BOOK ONE : MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS
Chapter One: Higher Worldly Factors

(1.1a-4c) Different opinions are recorded about what the *Jñānaprasthāna* represents. One master believes that it constitutes the Buddha's answers to questions addressed to him. Another believes it is a treatise composed by Kātyāyanīputra.

There is a discussion of the meaning of "*abhidharma*". It is held to mean "extreme", i.e. higher *dharma*. The essential nature of *abhidharma* is said to be the pure faculty of wisdom. Various theories are also cited and identified as those of various masters, specifically the views of Vasumitra, Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra, Ghoṣaka, Buddhagupta, Buddhadeva, and members of the Dharmaguptaka, Mahīśāsaka, Dārṣṭāntika and Śābdika sects are mentioned.

In connection with the notion of intoxicant, it is remarked that the real intoxicants are greed, hatred and delusion, so that e.g. woman, though perhaps a cause of impurities blocking the practice of spiritual training, is not an actual evil influence. The power of karma is illustrated: an alms-offering, even a single meal, can be a cause that matures into seven rebirths among men and gods.

"Higher worldly factor" is defined as that which leads to the certainty of liberation.

(2.5c-9b) Various theories are cited as to why the *Jñānaprasthāna* begins by presenting the higher worldly factors and not others. The "earlier Abhidharmists" say that the higher worldly factors are states into which one enters by making the five faculties (of faith, etc.) a directly antecedent condition of the realization of enlightenment.

The Vibhajyavādins say that the five faculties are simply of the nature of nonattachment, and not the higher worldly factors.

The Vātsīputrīya school agrees for the most part, but adds that the higher worldly factors are still influenced evilly by a contaminant neither mental nor material, rather being of the category of dissociated conditioning factor. They add peculiar views of the school, such

as that there are three different types of seeker, that *asuras* belong to the sixth course rather than the third as usually supposed, and that personality actually exists.

Dharmatrāta: Awarenesses and mental factors are differentiated by will, and so the higher worldly factors have will as their essential nature.

Buddhadeva: Since the essential nature of awareness and mental factors is awareness, that is also the essential nature of the higher worldly factors.

Though patience in awareness of frustration occurs for one who abides in the higher worldly factors, since patience toward knowledge of the factor of frustration has not yet been gained, such a one is not yet termed "noble" (*ārya*).

Different views are considered concerning how the factors immediately precede entry into the realization that one is destined for enlightenment. One position is held by those who distinguish will from awareness, another by those who believe they are homogeneous and continuous.

1.1 (3.10c-15b) Question: Is acquisition-force one of the higher worldly factors? The approved answer given is no, that the four characteristics of conditioned factors (arising, maintenance, decay and dissolution) are marks of higher worldly factors, but not acquisition-force.

Part One: The Higher Worldly Factors

1.2. Now the passage in *Jñānaprasthāna*, which defines the higher worldly factors as those five faculties which immediately precede entry into the realization that one is destined for liberation, is examined. This realization occurs at the stage where the ordinary man leaves his worldly nature, and it is caused by his ordinariness, just as one mounts a horse in order to tame it. This ordinary nature is neutral with respect to defilement, though the defilements operate when that nature is present.

Other theories are reviewed. Some "nonorthodox masters" say that ordinary folk can be divided into three groups as (1) those whose nature makes them able to realize liberation, (2) those whose nature makes them unable to realize liberation, and (3) a neutral kind of nature. In contrast to this, the Dārṣṭāntika and Śābdika thinkers say that the term "destined" (in the phrase "destined to realize liberation") means that liberation is guaranteed.

1.3. The Mahāsāṃghikas say that the higher worldly factors share their nature with factors clinging to the realms of desire and matter, while the Vātsīputrīyas believe these natures belong to the material

and immaterial realms. The Mahīśāsakas say that they belong to all three. The Dharmaguptakas say they share their nature with factors belonging to the sensuous, material and immaterial realms as well as with factors that do not belong to any of those. But the correct view is that the higher worldly factors share their nature only with those factors belonging to the realm of matter.

There are two ways to counteract defilements, one direct, the other indirect. Both exist at the stage of the nonreturner. At the stage of the five upper meditational states of the sensuous realm the direct way, annihilation of defilements, is absent, but the indirect way, which magnifies aversion against defilements, is present. So these are the higher worldly factors. Thus the higher worldly factors do not cut off the defilements, but the steadiness of knowledge about frustration does.

(4.15c-19c) The higher worldly factors do not belong to the immaterial realm. After full understanding of the frustrations inherent in the realm of desire one proceeds to comprehend the frustrations inherent in the material and immaterial realms.

There are two kinds of ways of presenting arguments, expedient and fundamental. And likewise there are two ways of carrying on an argument, through affirmation and negation.

1.4. The higher worldly factors and the steadiness of knowledge about frustration both have the same subject-matter. The higher worldly factors are present at three levels of meditation: one associated with initial and sustained thought, a second associated with sustained but without initial thought, and a third without either.

When one enters into the path of vision from the sixth stage and so refines conventional knowledge concerning both worldly and otherworldly objects, he departs from the stage of the higher worldly factors. The awarenesses involved in those factors are confined to the realm of material form, while in the path of vision one becomes aware of other kinds of objects.

1.6 (5.20b-25a) A higher worldly factor lasts for only a single moment.

Question: Are higher worldly factors subject to retrogression? Answer: No. Neither is the path of vision. That path is approached in two ways, by steadily facing it or by suddenly encountering it.

Part Two: Summit

An aid to penetration may be one of three kinds: (1) disadvantageous, (2) conducive to maintenance, (3) advantageous. These three kinds of penetration or applications of mindfulness are found respectively in the stages of being (1) near to the "heat" of insight, of being

(2) at the summit of faith, and of being (3) at the stage of patience for the nonarising of factors. The fourth application of mindfulness is a higher worldly factor. These three kinds of aids to penetration must be distinguished from the four kinds of features discussed in the section on concentration. These three are (1) being near to the "heat" of insight (*uṣmagata*), (2) being at the summit of faith, and (3) being at the stage of steadiness in the nonarising of factors. Steadiness is the state of mind of one who is contemplative, involving only the material realm, and it comes to involve all four of the applications of mindfulness, at which point it becomes the path of vision. Indeed, the path of vision is itself a good root, the good root of pure influence.

(6.25c-30b) The summit involves a small amount of faith in the three jewels. It is called 'summit' since one cannot remain there long. After one achieves it, one either proceeds to stage (3) or retrogresses to stage (1). One cannot regress from steadiness or from the higher worldly factors. The faith achieved at the summit is the least degree of faith.

Faith has two aspects: faith and resolve. Both are required for the noble truths of cessation and path, while only the former is needed for the truth of frustration and origin. The faith-follower and the *dharma*-follower have faith in both these senses, while one who practices according to his own resolve and one who practices following wrong views have only faith as acceptance. Likewise, he who realizes liberation at no specific time, and the enlightened for oneself, have only faith as acceptance but not with active resolution, while the one who realizes liberation at an appointed time as well as the disciple have faith in both senses.

The Buddha taught the virtue of faith as essential to the climax of penetration for the sake of those who are endowed with wisdom but lack faith.

Those who lack faith fall away from the summit. Objection: This falling away from the summit is merely nominal and has no real essence. Answer: No. Falling away from the summit is one of several dissociated factors, an unobstructed neutral factor.

The Dārṣṭāntikas are cited as not believing in retrogression from the summit of penetration.

Why is the first aid to penetration called "heat"? Because it burns all the fuel of the defilements. What does it involve? Being only the first, it involves only a little faith. Evil men lack any heat.

The four good roots are (1-3) of the aid to penetration plus the higher worldly factors as a fourth. They all involve penetration into the five aggregates as their essence.

Ghoṣaka: The four good roots are possessed in the sensuous realm and in the material realm.

Our view: The four good roots are only found in the realm of matter.

Ghoṣaka, Buddhadeva and Vasumitra have different analyses of the qualities found in each of the four good roots, and indeed there are innumerable kinds of analyses.

Why are the aids to penetration so called? Because they aid in penetration of the noble path leading to the path of insight.

(7.30c-35c) The "venerable ones from the western region" (i.e., the Gandharans and Bactrians) are said to have analyzed the aids to penetration in terms of seventeen aspects. In the case of heat these are (1) heat's purport—all the good roots previously accumulated, (2) its locus in meditation, (3) its cause—good roots, (4) its supporting object, the four noble truths, (5) its result, immediate fruition, (6) its outcome, subsequent good roots, (7) its maturation in the five aggregates of the material realm, (8) its principal quality, to serve as the determinate cause of liberation, (9) its sixteen aspects, (10) its fruition as both name and purpose, (11) its being a product of spiritual practice alone, (12) its being associated with the material realm alone, (13) its being only present in meditative trance, (14) its involving either, neither or both of initial and sustained thought, (15) its being associated with the faculties of satisfaction, contentedness and equanimity, (16) its continuing through several moments, (17) its being subject to retrogression.

The four good roots in the cases of the *bodhisattva*, the solitary disciple and the disciple who practices with his colleagues are explained.

Though there is no fixed order in which the aids to penetration are developed by the other two, the *bodhisattva*, having developed the aids to penetration in past lives, develops all the aids in his single last lifetime as he practices the fourth meditation.

The four good roots can be developed by men and gods abiding in the realm of desire, except for those residing in the northern Kuru region. They can be achieved by one in a female body or that of a eunuch who has a male mentality.

Part Three: Heat

The first good root, being near the heat of wisdom, has as its characteristic features wisdom regarding what it heard, thought, and practiced. The differentiations (*svalakṣaṇa*) and shared features (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), as well as the content (*viṣaya*) of this stage are identified.

Three groups of good practices are distinguished that lead toward liberation: these are mindfulness of the inner peace of the five kinds of awareness, the mindfulness of the distributive features of things, and the mindfulness of the collective features of things. It takes three lifetimes to realize liberation swiftly, but for the slower it may take a *kalpa* or a hundred *kalpas*. Even those who are able to realize these stages of penetration may fall into a thousand lifetimes.

Part Four: Wrong Views

(8.36a-40b) Beliefs that the body is real are explained in twenty verses, and are distinguished into five kinds of wrong views about self and fifteen wrong views related to self, but there may be counted as many as 936 kinds of wrong views about self.

Part Five: What is Involved in and Excluded from Wrong Views

Five kinds of wrong views must be totally annihilated in the path of vision. They are (1) views insisting on the existence of a self and things belonging to it (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), explained in twenty verses;[8] (2) views insisting on one or another of extreme theses (*antagrāha-dṛṣṭi*), explained in twenty verses; (3) wrong views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) especially derived from rejecting moral and spiritual causation, explained in 80 verses; (4) views insisting on erroneous views as correct (*dṛṣṭiparāmarśadṛṣṭi*), expounded in 80 verses; (5) views insisting on wrong rules and vows as leading to liberation (*śīlavrata-parāmarśadṛṣṭi*), explained in 40 verses.

Other topics are discussed here, such as the concept of essential nature (*svabhāva*), whether self is material, whether anyone holds the view that a single atom has a self. But there is no self dissociated from the aggregates. The nature, antidote (*pratipakṣa*) and originating (*samutthāna*) of these views are examined. Ordinary men do not examine these matters, and even some teachers fail to do so and die without annihilating the delusions involved.

(9.40c-42c) There are two kinds of self: the self composed of factors, which exists, and the person (*pudgalātman*), which does not.

Views of wrong rules and vows are of two sorts: (1) regarding what is not a cause as a true cause—e.g., a belief in creator God; (2) regarding what is not a path as a path. The first kind is the same as wrong views.

There are five kinds of existence, beginning with real existence (*dravyasat*) and nominal existence (*prajñaptisat*). False awareness is of two kinds: afflicted (*upakliṣṭa*) and unafflicted (*anupakliṣṭa*). Afflicted awareness is so called from the higher standpoint (*para-

mārtha), while unafflicted awareness is so called from the conventional standpoint (*saṃvṛtti*).

Chapter Two: Awareness
Part One: Single Awareness

(42c-43c) Mahāsāṅghika: Awareness and its associated factors cognize their essential natures by themselves; they have the faculty of awareness as their essential nature, just as a candle illumines itself as well as others.

Dharmaguptaka: Awareness and associated factors cognize their connection.

Mahīśāsaka: Awareness and associated factors cognize their co-presence. The cognitive faculty of those factors which are correlative among themselves know those dissimilar that are not correlated with them. The cognitive faculty of the noncorrelative factors know those dissimilar factors which are mutually correlative.

Vātsīputrīya: The person has the faculty of awareness.

Vātsīputrīyas and others: Awareness and associated factors cannot cognize their essential nature, their association, or their co-presence. An awareness does not know any factor whatever, since it is other than those factors which are in possession of their essential nature, association and co-presence. An essential nature cannot know its essential nature.

All four views are rejected (it is remarked that this also refutes the view of the master of the western region).

Part Two: Single Consciousness

(44b-45c) Awareness and consciousness are not different in their essential nature. Awareness only acts on its proper contents, viz. the twelve senses. It cognizes both general and specific features.

Vātsīputrīya: Awareness constitutes only a part of the path, and consciousness only a part of phenomenal existence.

Dārṣṭāntika: Awareness and consciousness are not concomitant; one must precede the other.

The difference between the pure and impure features of nonself is discussed.

(11.45c-50c) Discussion of the functional features of nonself (i.e. of a collection of factors). That feature is found in seven stages, (e.g., the sensuous realm, the stage of the nonreturner, the stage between the first and second meditation, and the four states of meditation-concentration. Though it is found in the immaterial realm it does not act upon all factors there. It is impure. A perfected being may

set the impure feature of the nonself into action on the basis of four conditions.

Some say that causes and conditions have no essential nature.

Part Three: The Supporting Object of Two Awarenesses

Mahāsāṅghika: Two awarenesses may arise concomitantly within a person. Some even say that these awarenesses become the cause of the person, but that is not the correct interpretation of the Mahāsāṅghika view.

In any case, the Mahāsāṅghika theory is incorrect. The awareness of wrong views and the awareness of impurity mutually evolve in reciprocal interaction. One awareness in one series and another in the same series mutually evolve in reciprocal interaction. Likewise, there is reciprocal interaction among the mental states (classified into ten types) as well as among other mental and material factors classified into eighteen elements, ten good mental factors, etc.

Some say: A directly antecedent condition is not really existent.

The Mahāsāṅghika theory is refuted in detail.

The orthodox say that the six groups of awareness do not arise concomitantly or simultaneously.

A perfected being's last awareness and mental states are not a directly antecedent condition (of anything).

Vasumitra and others are surveyed on the properties on the directly antecedent condition. It is proposed that even if there is some difference between the preceding and succeeding moments of a factor there is no error in naming them as directly antecedent conditions.

(11.51a-55b) There is no directly antecedent condition within a future life.

Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra: Material factors cannot be directly antecedent conditions. Conditions dissociated from awareness are not directly antecedent conditions.

The directly antecedent condition does not explain the production of the meditative states whose maturations are without conceptual identification.

The two highest meditative states (of the basis of neither-identification-nor-nonidentification and the cessation trance) have no directly antecedent conditions in between for even one *kalpa*, and so are called "directly antecedent concentrations".

Direct antecedence of awareness and awareness free from interval are differentiated through use of the *catuṣkoṭi*, etc.

The reciprocal arising of twelve awarenesses is explained.

Vātsīputrīya: The person really exists.

The following are heretical views: that factors mutually withdraw

from existence; that factors mutually change their nature; that factors mutually pass away; that an awareness abides for two moments; that the mind element is without change; that change takes place between one moment of the aggregates to another moment of the aggregates; that the preceding awareness passes information on to the subsequent awareness.

(12.55a-57b) Even though there is no self, through the force of dispositions a homogeneous awareness arises in identifying the subsequent moment of experience in reference to it.

Visual consciousness and factors associated with awareness are produced in response to some corresponding material aggregate. Mental consciousness and factors associated with awareness are produced in response to the totality of factors.

Awarenesses and mental states are produced in response to objective spheres according to their epistemic bases. They are also determined according to their epistemic base.

Some say that since the moment of arising is still functionally in a future moment, awarenesses and mental states do not act upon objective spheres; whereas the moment of perishing is still functionally at the moment they are acting upon objective spheres.

The nature of the collection of awarenesses and mental states that belong to the preceding moment of the series can be explained in reference to volitional speech (*manośabda*), while the nature of the collection of awareness and mental states that belong to the subsequent moment of the series can be explained by reference to recollective speech (*smṛtiśabda*).

There are two features of the mind: one receives the functional features of awarenesses and mental states acting on the objective spheres, while the other receives the form of and becomes the objective sphere. There are up to twelve kinds.

Part Four: Memory

(57b-58b) Vasumitra: Even though there is no self, a person can recollect what happened earlier through three assisting conditions: (1) that awareness and mental states take a homogeneous form from the preceding collection of awarenesses and mental states; (2) that a commonly shared portion continues to survive from the preceding to the subsequent moment as constituents of the collection; (3) because of these two, there is no chance of losing the memory.

The homogeneous portion has three functional features:

(1) active process, (2) passive process (=objective sphere); and (3) conformity between the two. Because of these functional features recollection is possible.

Part Five: Faith

(58b-61b) Loss of memory is also traced to three features in the heterogeneous portion. Memory loss occurs to anyone who abides in the realm of desire, in the five stages of the cycle of rebirth, in the world of men; it also occurs to those saintly human beings who abide in the four states of sainthood, but not to the world-honored one (=the Buddha).

Among those who once abided in hell, anyone can recollect his past experience and can thereby know the mind of others who belong to the same group as regards their past experiences. This occurs only at the very beginning moment of rebirth.

Some kinds of animals can recollect past experiences. Ghosts can as well.

The phenomena of weather such as clouds, rainfall, heat, cold, etc. are induced by the dragon's active function but are at the same time concurrent effects of conditions in the vicinity. The water flowing out of the dragon's palace, however, is not an induction from its active function but rather an effect created by the common karma of all living beings.

Those born among heavenly beings can recollect past experiences.

In the world of men none have the power of recollecting past lives normally given to them by birth.

There is further discussion about the ghosts.

Part Six: Number of Sense-Faculties

(13.61c-65b) Vasumitra: Visual awareness perceives its material object.

Ghoṣaka: The wisdom correlative to visual awareness perceives the material object.

Dārṣṭāntika: The harmonious whole of these factors perceives the material object.

Vātsīputrīya: The visual faculty alone perceives the material object.

All four theories are mistaken. The correct view is that one perceives a material object through the interaction between the visual faculty and a material object. There are functionally two kinds of visual organ, one which can connect itself with consciousness and thereby perceives its material object, and the other which does not connect itself with consciousness and thereby does not see its object.

Both eyes simultaneously perceive a material object, no matter how far apart they may be. The sense-organs of hearing and smelling are also twofold, though they function as one.

A distinction is drawn between the visual organ acquired by karmic

maturation at birth and the organ that results from further accumulations.

The visual organ is atomically constituted. It is capable of going out to its object. But none of the five kinds of consciousness—visual, etc.— have an atom as locus or content.

The orthodox view (viz., of the Vibhāṣāśāstrins) is: There are twenty kinds of material sense bases. Some of us say there are twenty-one. An atom has various forms, e.g., rectangular; but it cannot be perceived.

Vasumitra: Vision depends on the four kinds of conditions, so that even when an object is present it may not be visually cognized.

Sāṃkhya: Vision depends on eight kinds of conditions so that even when the object is present it may not be seen.

The number of kinds of auditory sense bases are eight, of olfactory bases four, of gustatory bases six, and of tactual bases eleven.

The specific characteristic of a thing is twofold: (1) as objective fact, (2) according to its epistemic base. Externally existing smell, taste, touch, etc. are respectively the direct cause for the inner faculties of smelling, tasting, touching, etc. to produce their awarenesses.

A *bodhisattva*'s six faculties are so sharp that he could single out a single candle when extinguished out of five hundred other candles.

Part Seven: The Past

(65b-66a) Some say: Whatever does not exist in the past or future but exists at present must be an unconditioned factor. Whatever exists in its coming to be and going away is a conditioned factor at present.

There are two kinds of past: (1) the world that has passed away, and (2) the inner concentration that has passed away. There are two kinds of future existence, namely (1) the world that has not yet come into existence, and (2) the inner obstruction that does not bring itself into being.

When Brahmarāja hid himself the Buddha knew his presence, but when the Buddha hid himself Brahmarāja could not see his presence.

The five sets of alternatives in the text are analyzed.

Part Eight: Perplexity

(66b-69b) Is there or is there not a real perplexity about frustration? There are sixteen moments from the state of steadiness of insight into the nature of factors as frustrating up to the insight into the noble truth of the path regarding the material and immaterial.

Since some theorists hold that there are hundreds of thousands of lives and deaths that one has to pass through, in order to make

it easy to understand multiple moments are explained to make up a single awareness.

Part Nine: Of Names, Words and Phonemes

(69c-71c) Dārṣṭāntika: A collection of names, of words or of phonemes is not a real entity.

Śābdika: These collections have language (*śabda*) as their essence.

The "orthodox" view: Collections of words, etc. are real entities and belong to the class of conditions, dissociated from awareness. Without investigating the nature of such collections some fall into the hell-world, etc. But one should not feel anger upon hearing abusive words, etc.

The name is basic; it fills up any collections of words. The composition of *sūtras* and verse *śāstras* is analyzed. A phoneme is analyzed as an *akṣara.*

(15.71c-77a) Do words follow linguistic functions (*vākyabhūmi*) or the functions of persons (*pudgalabhūmi*)? Words belong to human kind and are not confined to any particular individual. Words are neutral in nature.

The Buddha is capable of responding to a moment of thought and of explaining a moment of speech by means of a single character, whereas disciples and those enlightened for themselves can do the former but not the latter.

Meanings are different from words. People in the unmemorable past organized words and thoughts among themselves.

Vasumitra: Speech leads to the rise of words, and words reveal meaning.

The four aggregates other than matter are called "names" because they can be expressed by their names, while the material aggregate because of its grossness reveals itself.

The number of kinds of names is variously said to be six, four and two. There are three kinds of word-referents—in the past, present and future. Their nature is explained. Vasumitra, Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra and Pārśva are cited as giving different reasons why there is no reference by higher worldly factors.

Four kinds of question and answer are distinguished: (1) categorical affirmation or rejection or negation; (2) analysis of the different meanings implied in a question; (3) answering by questioning the meanings implied in a question; (4) not answering at all when a question is not appropriate to answer. The last is illustrated by the story of the perfected being Vāsula, who answered the heretic Caṇḍāla by silence and thereby defeated him.

Part Ten: The Fatigue of the Buddha

(16.77a-78b) The Buddha totally annihilated all defilements without any conditionings remaining; the saintly disciples of the two vehicles also annihilate defilements, but do not completely overcome remaining conditionings. E.g., in Ānanda and Śāriputra one found such. When the Buddha reprimanded his disciples he was not teaching them.

Part Eleven: Six (Moral) Causes

1. Enumeration

(79a-79b) The six causes are propounded in order to refute the idea that there is no causality, that causality is imbalanced (i.e. that God is cause), or the Dārṣṭāntika theory that things do not really exist.

Some theorists hold that the six kinds of cause involve six kinds of effect. Thus the associated and corresponding causes both produce fruits of human action, etc.

The theory of four conditions is found in the *sūtras*, but not the theory of the six causes. That theory was taught in the *Ekottara Āgama*, but the information is hidden among the passages of the text, according to some theorists. Some also say that there is no single *sūtra* in which the six causes are propounded in proper order and contiguously, and yet they are treated in various *sūtras* scattered here and there.

2. The Connected Cause

(79c-81b) Dārṣṭāntika: Awarenesses and concomitant mental factors arise mutually alternating as preceding or succeeding moment but never arise simultaneously.

Vaibhāṣika: They arise simultaneously as well.

Some say: The essential nature of one group of factors and that of another can occur as co-originating. Various interpretations of a "co-originating occurrence" are refuted. The logic of co-originating occurrence is illustrated by the ten factors arising with every awareness. "Connected" (in the title of this section) means co-originating occurrence, that is, that two groups of factors are identical in their essential nature.

Dhumika or Kuha: The four aggregates occur co-originating, i.e. in association.

Vaibhāṣika: All five aggregates occur in association. But although the four great elements are invariably concurrent, because they have no epistemic basis they are not in correlated occurrence.

Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra: "Associated" means "identical companion".

Ghoṣaka: "Associated" means the identity as to the respective bases, contents, forms and goals between two groups of factors.

3. The Simultaneous Cause

(81b-82b) Awareness becomes simultaneous cause for those factors that are incurred by bodily and vocal acts evolving along with awareness. Explanation of the essential nature of "evolving along with" (*anuvartin*).

(17.82c-85b) What is it that evolves along with awareness in bodily and vocal acts? Not restraint in the immaterial realm. But the restraint that arises in pure concentration and in the concentration belonging to the material sphere both evolve along with awareness. This is tested with a fourfold alternation. Also, that restraint that arises while the practitioner investigates the knowledge of the path as the last step before completing the practice of undefiled insight into the nature of factors is also regarded as evolving along with awareness.

The different numbers of restraints of the disciples, the Buddha, etc., are distinguished.

At the moment when a person reaches the state of perfected being, how many stages are there in which he acquires perceptual restraint as evolving in his body along with his awareness? Answers provided by the masters of the Western regions and those of Kashmir are varied.

4. Homogeneous Cause

(85b) Various classifications of this reviewed.

5. Pervasive Cause

(18.90c-93b) Various classifications and conflicting theories are reviewed.

Defilements in the sensual realm can act upon the material and immaterial realms. Among the eleven members of the pervasive contaminants, nine members act not only on their own domains but also others' domains as well, while the other two members act only on their own.

(19.93c-95a) False view can be eliminated through knowledge of the truth of frustration and of its cause in the sensual realm; they do not increase themselves in acting in the material and immaterial realms.

Defiled factors to be eliminated by a perfected being's repeated practice have origination by way of acting upon others or have no origination: a variety of views are classified.

6. Maturation Cause

(96a-99a) Dārṣṭāntika: No maturation cause is found dissociated from awareness, nor is there any effectuation from the maturation cause without feeling.

Mahāsāṅghika: Only the awareness and awareness-concomitants are capable of having maturation causes and effects from them.

Kāśyapīya: A maturation cause continues to function as long as its effect does not reach maturation, but is bound to decay when it has reached full maturation.

Some heretics say: Good or bad that is done do not bear satisfaction or frustration as their respective maturations.

Sarvāstivādin: There are seven different factors in the category of cognizable manifest actions (*vijñaptikarman*) each of which has a maturation effect. Each member comprises many atoms and each atom has three time dimensions, while each time dimension comprises multiple moments, each moment being a maturation effect.

Discussion of various theories about what kind of maturation cause produces the trance free from conceptual identification.

Concerning the maturation of karma to be received within one and the same lifetime, the maturation of karma to be received in the immediately following life, the maturation of karma to be received in the third life and after.

There are many theories about the meaning of the word "maturation". One difference is between maturation of homogeneous effects and of heterogeneous effects.

There is no maturation involving unconditioned factors or neutral factors.

(20.99a-103c) The action of one moment invites common characteristics shared by living beings. One action determines an entire lifetime. Sometimes an action mixed with another induces some effect other than its own, while when operating independently it only produces its own effect.

The karmic maturations of animals, ghosts, gods and bisexuals are discussed. Also the maturations of deeds in the three spheres (sensual, material and immaterial).

The good factors in the initial stage of meditation have in common being the maturations of the same kind of cause. In the sensual realm the three roots opposing the three good roots are stronger. The strongest good karma influences one's life for a duration of 80,000 larger *kalpas*, while the strongest bad karma influences one's life negatively for 20 median *kalpas*. Bad acts in the sensual realm lead to the five different courses through their maturations, but good acts do not.

Some say that those who fell into evil courses because they killed

living beings and who are later reborn as human will have shorter lives.

Question: How can the good conduct of parents help their ten-year-old child live longer?

Four kinds of death—due to natural exhaustion of the natural life span, etc. A perfected being's karma must all mature so that he will not be reborn.

7. Efficient Cause

(103c-109b) Heretics hold that when factors come into existence they arise without cause. Some say that only conditioned factors can become general existential causes. Still others say that efficient causes receive as well as produce effects. Again, there are those who deny that there are any efficient causes which arise after their effects.

In response to all these the correct view is expounded. The essential nature of the efficient cause is identical with that of the dominant condition. Still there are varied opinions about this offered by Vasumitra, Buddhadeva, Bhadanta Kātyāyayanīputra and others.

Dārṣṭāntika: The origin of a factor requires causes and conditions, but the termination does not. If both the origin and termination of a factor are equally bound to wait for causes and conditions to work, why don't they arise simultaneously when they terminate? Vasumitra, Bhadanta Kātyānīputra[9] and Ghoṣaka are reviewed on this.

The causal aspect of factors lies in their function. The essential nature of a factor is unchanged, and so cannot be a cause or effect.

Question: Since Mt. Sumeru and all the continents, etc. are the product of the mutual karma of all beings, what will happen to, e.g., Mt. Sumeru when someone attains final liberation? Vasumitra: Since there is a limitless number of sentient beings alive, even if a large number of persons attain liberation the karma of the rest will maintain order. Buddhadeva: Besides, past as well as present karma is responsible for Mt. Sumeru; it will not be affected by a single person's demise.

The six types of causes mutually combine to make up many classifications of causes. The relationships among them are examined. It is also discussed which of the six are defiled, which undefiled, which worldly, which higher worldly, etc. Then the six are permuted with the four kinds of conditions. Finally, a cause is distinguished from a condition.

Part Twelve: Contaminants in Relation to Awareness and its Destruction

(22.110a-115a) Some who advocate the continuity of one and the same awareness say: There is no difference between an awareness affected by contaminants and another awareness unaffected by them insofar as the essential nature of the awareness in question is concerned. It is only when those contaminants are destroyed that the awareness is said to be absolutely free.

Dārṣṭāntika: It is only relating to the person that the notion of increase for a contaminant makes sense.

There are five major groups of contaminants: (1) those causing delusion about the four noble truths, (2) those causing delusion, i.e. attachment, hatred and pride in the three realms; (3) generally permeating contaminants; (4) generally permeating bad forces, and (5) limited permeating bad forces. They have a nature capable of increasing force within an awareness affected by similar contaminants.

Theories of Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra, Ghoṣaka and Buddhadeva are reviewed relating to the state of being afflicted by contaminants respecting the supporting object.

Contaminants grow in two ways: (1) with regard to their supporting object, (2) with regard to their connected factors. Even past and future contaminants grow, though only present ones exert activity.

Śrīlāta, a Sthavira or Dārṣṭāntika: No. (1) If contaminants related to supporting objects, then pure factors could be objects of the growth of contaminants, and (2) if contaminants grow with regard to their connected factors, these factors will *always* grow, since connected factors never become dissociated.

Answer: No. (1) Only impure factors in the present can conduce to growth. And (2) even though the connected factors cannot be disconnected, they can be overpowered by contrary forces arising in the life-stream.

Part Thirteen: Consciousness Destroyed by the Instrumentality of its Objective Field

Consider the state in which one has acquired knowledge of the frustration-truth but not yet of the origin-truth. The destruction of those contaminants to be destroyed through the path of vision can be increased as to one particular group as well as to other groups as a whole. Likewise relating to the path of spiritual practice. Contaminants can increase their force in relation to those associated with it as well as of the supporting object. Such an increase is possible

because of the four aggregates excluding matter.

Ghoṣaka: Past as well as future contaminants can increase their influence.

Vasumitra: It is because of all five aggregates that the contaminants can be destroyed.

Question: At which moment does wisdom no more see any objects? At the moment when contaminants are destroyed? Discussion by fourfold argument.

Chapter Three: Personality
Part One: Dependent Origination

(116c-117c) Some say: Although past and future factors have no essential nature, and only present ones do, factors are unconditioned in nature.

The Vibhajyavādin says that dependent origination itself is unconditioned.

There are four kinds of conditions of dependent origination: (1) momentary, (2) related to successive moments, (3) related to a particular stage, (4) bound to remote continuity.

Part Two: Conditions

(118a-120b) Awarenesses and concomitant mental factors arise from the four kinds of conditions. Meditation that realizes cessation, etc., arises from three kinds of conditions. Material factors and factors dissociated from awareness arise from two kinds of conditions.

Different masters are cited as having different theories about dependent origination and the factors so conditioned, as e.g. how to allocate the twelve members over twelve stages.

Śremadatta(?) (She-mo-ta-to in Chinese) holds that it is within the duration of a single moment that all twelve members occur. Some hold that each of the twelve has two kinds.

The five stages beginning with conception are reviewed, as well as the six sense-bases.

It is proper to term ignorance, etc. as conditions but not as causes.

(24.120c-125c) All three kinds of feeling (satisfying, frustrating and neutral) are conditions of craving, which itself has five kinds.

(25.126b-131b) All operative factors can be classified into eleven kinds, which in turn can be related distributively to the four conditions, six causes and their absence.

The quickest means to liberation takes three life-cycles.

Ignorance and knowledge discussed, and classified as relating to

aggregates, senses and elements.

The path of vision can be achieved only by those physically residing in the nine regions—three of human habitation (excluding the northern region of Mt. Sumeru) and the six heavenly regions belonging to the sensual realm. The path of spiritual practice can be achieved, however, by those who reside in the sensual, material or immaterial realms. Supreme, perfect enlightenment can be achieved by those who have lived in the Jambudvīpa region (south of Mt. Sumeru) for one hundred years.

Part Three: The Locus of Breathing

(26.132a-137a) Inhaling and exhaling depend on the four aggregates and as long as the four are present breathing occurs, not otherwise. E.g., the embryo at the second, third or fourth week after conception does not breathe.

Vasumitra and Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra say that breathing ceases at the state of the fourth meditation-stage.

The essential nature of mindfulness of inhaling and exhaling is wisdom. The difference between mindfulness with breathing and the mindfulness with breathing of foul things is explained. The former has six causes. The Buddha spent two months a year with his disciples sitting in a circle practicing breathing.

The noble state is described as: 37 allies of enlightenment; the divine state, which is the highest stage of meditation; the Brahma state, which is the fourfold practice of the four boundless states; the state of the Buddha; the seeker's state leading to perfection; the adept's state requiring no further perfection.

Part Four: The Locus of Awareness

(27.137a-138a) The homogeneous nature of all humans is explained.

Part Five: Attachment to Nonbecoming

(138a-139a) There are three kinds of attachment: (1) to desires, (2) to becoming, (3) to nonbecoming. It is the Vibhajyavādin who holds that attachment to nonbecoming is destroyed by both the paths of vision and practice.

The discussion in the text is classed here as discussion between a *yuktivādin* and a *vibhajyavādin*. There is discussion of some of the ways of defeating an opponent in debate.

Part Six: Awareness is Free From Attachment, Etc.

(140b-142a) Vibhajyavādin: The nature of awareness is absolutely pure.

Dārṣṭāntika: There are two divisions of time, past and future, and another division, already perished and not yet perished. Other than these two sets of two there is no other time for a factor to have just arisen or just perished, and so factors do not really exist in the past or future.

(28.142b-146b) The methods of gaining diamond-like concentration are described, and as many as 164 different preparatory concentrations are discriminated.

Discussion of the awareness-concomitants "delight" and non-anxiety, nongreed and extreme greed, nonhatred and extreme hatred, nondelusion and extreme delusion.

Part Seven: Locus

(147a-147b) Release has resolve, one of the ten generally permeating factors, as its essential nature.

The liberation of awareness from defilement realized in due course of time, and that liberation that is realized without due course of time, i.e. by abruptly bypassing steps.

Part Eight: Elements

(147c-148a) The three elements reviewed. Concerning shared theses and unshared theses.

Peace and insight are two within one and the same awareness, only differentiated because of their ways of application.

To whatever the Buddha grants recognition, four groups of Buddhists follow faithfully.

Chapter Four: Of Affection and Reverence
Part One: Affection, Respect and Reverence

(150c-152c) There are two kinds of affection: (1) involving attachment, viz., greed, and (2) not involving attachment, viz., faith.

Reverence has conscientiousness as its nature.

The two ways of paying respect are discussed. The former, alms-offering, is not found in the material and immaterial realms, nor in hell. The second way, of offering *dharma*, is found in the sensual and material realms and in the five levels of the life cycle. Examples are offered, and the kinds of beings who make these

offerings and receive them are identified.

(30.153a) Alms-offering and respect through *dharma* evolve together in relation to one and the same object.

Part Two: Power

(154b-156b) The views of the Vibhajyavādins, Dharmaguptakas, Dārṣṭāntikas, etc. concerning physical power and inferiority. They view power as an independent essence. The orthodox view is defended against this.

Examples of power: comparing the strength of different kinds of elephants. The limitless power of a Bodhisattva is contrasted with the declining of the Buddha's strength.

On the ten powers, and the power of one enlightened for himself alone and in a group.

(31.158a-160b) The four confidences (1) that I have correct awareness, (2) that I have my evil influences destroyed, (3) that I can name the factors that are obstacles to the disciple, (4) that I can name the path of liberation of a disciple.

The ten powers and the four confidences are combined.

The best disciple is bound to wait for a duration of 60 *kalpa*s and the best endowed of those enlightened for themselves for a duration of 100 *kalpa*s.

On compassion. Great compassion (of the Buddha) has the fourth meditative stage as its locus and appears only in the body of a great man in the Jambudvīpa region of the sensuous realm. There are eight kinds of difference between ordinary human compassion and the Buddha's great compassion.

Three applications of mindfulness and the eighteen special qualities unique to the Buddha (viz., ten strengths, four confidences, three applications of mindfulness, and great compassion).

Part Three: Cessation[10]

(161a-162c) Dārṣṭāntika: The three kinds of cessation do not really exist.

Vibhajyavādin: The three kinds are always unconditioned factors.

Calculated cessation is what has to be realized through separation from defilements. Uncalculated cessation is not thus realized, but rather preempts such separation, as well as bondage. The noneternality-cessation is realized through natural dispersion, breakdown and withdrawal from existence.

Some say that the essential nature of calculated cessation is single or as many as 89.

The view of the critic: Since conditioned factors possess their essential nature where they arise, the calculated cessation also has its essential nature where separation takes place, since an event with which factors are connected has its essence where it occurs.

Some say that when people realize the calculated cessation they undergo one and the same experience although their experiencing of it is independent of each other's.

(32.163a-166b) Calculated cessation is also called *nirvāṇa.* It has no homogeneous cause and thus is known as "having heterogeneous nature" (*visabhāgatva*).

The critic: Uncalculated cessation is to be realized only in terms of the nonoccurrence of factors in the future.

Which, calculated or uncalculated cessation, takes place more often? Critic: Calculated cessation occurs in proportion to the number of defiled factors, while uncalculated cessation occurs in proportion to the number of continued factors.

How the uncalculated cessation is sometimes realized in the evil courses. Is the uncalculated cessation realized in an evil course a temporary acquisition or a special acquisition? When one has reached the state of steadiness of insight into the nature of the factors involved in the four noble truths (i.e. the path of vision), it is generally the case that he should realize (the state of cessation), but it is not determined whether he can reach it from any state lower than that.

Part Four: Liberation

(167b-169a) The world of liberation realized while one is living and the world of liberation after death both have their essential nature, and this nature is pure. Views to the contrary are considered and refuted.

The theory attributed in the words "some say" is in fact that of the Vātsīputrīyas.

The text related a series of disputes between the Yuktivādins and Vibhajyavādins. There are two theories attributed to the Vibhajyavādin: (1) that there is no predetermined order as to the referential entities of liberation, and (2) that liberation comprises three kinds. The latter is viewed as more correct.

Part Five: Aggregates

(171b-173c) As to the five aggregates, the Buddha is the highest in quality, the enlightened for oneself is medium in quality, and the disciple is lowest in quality; for one and the same series (of factors) there should be no sense of difference.

Part Seven: Ascertainment

(175a-176c) Ascertainment is of two kinds: the one accomplished ascertainment of knowledge, the other separation from defilements. A number of views about the nature of ascertainment are reviwed. The one who ascertains is the perfected being.

Part Eight: The Three Treasures

(176c-178c) Taking refuge in the Buddha, the *dharma* and the *saṅgha* is generously explained.[11]

Chapter Five: Shamelessness
Part One: "Black-White"

(178c-180a) The fourfold negation method is used to analyze each of the two topics of this chapter, shamelessness and disregard. Their functions and objective domains are treated in detail.

Part Two: Two Faculties

(180b-198c) The eradication of the good root factors is examined in reference to the nine levels of saintly practice in the spiritual path.

Some theorists are said to hold that the essential nature of eradicating the good root factors is lack of faith. A critic says that the essential nature of the eradication of the good root factors is nonaccomplishment. The act of eradicating the good roots happens among men of the three regions of the world of desire. It can happen to those who are oriented toward views, not to those who are oriented toward craving; the former perform actions intensely, the latter not. Both men and women may abandon the good root factors, though Ghosavarman disagrees, holding that only men can backslide since their covetousness is greater.

Various classifications are presented in answer to the question at which stage of saintly career one eradicates the good root factors. Wrong views about the truth of cessation and of pure objects can also lead to the eradication of the good root factors, as can a wrong view concerning unconditioned objects.

Question: How can the good root factors be abandoned? Are both those naturally born with one and those earned by practice lost? Answer: Those earned by practice having been already overpowered by defilements, it is just when those naturally inborn are lost that one reverts.

Two cases are distinguished: (1) one who maintains the norm of

the good root factors while having a doubting awareness, (2) one who maintains it while having correct view. The eradication of the good root factors eventually matures in the *avīci* hell. When can one who has abandoned his good roots regain them? Only in the next life or in hell.

It is explained why the good roots subject is explained only in reference to the sensual realm, but not in reference to the material and immaterial realms.

Between (1) the conventional awareness acquired in the last stage of the path of vision along with the highest supramundane knowledge of the four noble truths, and (2) the knowledge of destruction acquired in the spiritual path through the ninth and last trance (viz., the cessation trance), which one is superior and which inferior is explained.

The final stage of direct knowledge of the noble truths is elucidated. When practice directed to the first three noble truths is finalized one is aware of completion, but not when one practices the fourth and final noble truth (when one is not aware at all). But when the practitioner abides in the final seven stages (the sensory realm, the nonreturner stage, the intermediate concentration, and the four meditative concentrations) one becomes aware of completion.

Nevertheless one is never aware of its having occurred, only that it will occur (before it has done so); thus in an absolute sense it is nonoccurrent.

Those who are affected by the delusions that are eliminated by the paths of vision and practice will be reborn into the courses of life, but if he has no delusion about the four noble truths to be eliminated in the path of vision he will not be subject to rebirth.

Question: When a perfected being acquires ultimate knowledge does he invariably practice the good factors in the nine stages spread through the three spheres of existence? Answer: This is undetermined.

These good root factors are found in the classes of elements among the representative conditions.

The six kinds of states to be maintained are explained in detail.

When one acquires the knowledge of destruction he at once practices his good root factors which are to be effected in the future three spheres of existence, since liberation is fully at hand in this state.

Part Three: Awareness

(190a-191a) Various theories, both Buddhist and others, are reviewed concerning the real nature of things past and future.

There are generally two kinds of change-and-decay of factors: (1) conventional and (2) necessary.

Part Five: Stolidity and Sleepiness

(191c-193a) Sleepiness is commonly found in all three kinds of awareness—good, bad and indifferent. While it occurs accustomed action can occur, but any action that requires deliberation cannot, including penetration and achieving the state of a perfected being.

Part Six: Dream

(193b-194c) Dārṣṭāntika: Dreams do not really exist. But the orthodox hold that there is textual evidence that they do. Dreams are to be found classified among the representative cognitions.

Vasumitra is cited as holding that dreams are conditioned by five conditions. Āyurvedins are said to hold the number as seven.

Part Seven: Obstructions

The five obstructions, viz., attachment, repugnance, stolidity and sleepiness, excitedness and regret, and doubt are explained.

Part Eight: Ignorance

(194c-197b) Ignorance is the sixth obstructive obstacle. The Dārṣṭāntikas hold that every contaminant is bad, but others say that while defilements in the sensual region are bad, those in the material and immaterial spheres are indeterminate.

It is explained which cases involve ignorance and which do not, in which cases ignorance occurs simultaneously with other factors and in which it does not. Ignorance of appropriate sorts can be removed through both the path of vision and the spiritual path.

Chapter Six: Characteristic Marks

Part One: Two-fold and Three-fold Distinctions

(198a-198c) There are two kinds of factors, conditioned and unconditioned. The Dārṣṭāntikas hold that various conditioned characteristics do not essentially exist. The Vibhajyavādins hold that the essential nature of those characteristics is unconditioned. The Dharmaguptakas hold that birth, maintenance and decay are conditioned but that cessation is unconditioned. Some monks say that what characterizes and what is characterized are homogeneous. The Sautrāntikas say that all these factors are of single duration. The

orthodox hold that each moment has the four characteristic marks of birth, maintenance, old age and noneternality.

Acquisition-force and what is acquired are not the same, nor are they invariably co-existent, since they are not a simultaneous cause. They may belong to different dimensions. Nevertheless they are cofunctional, mutually coexistent causes, always occurring at the same moment.

Part Two: Four Characteristic Marks

(199b) The difference between death and noneternality is explained.

Part Three: Three Momentary Things

(199c-203b) The phenomenal features of three conditioned factors are arising, cessation and being other than static. The Dārṣṭāntikas hold that these three are not momentary, but it is argued here that they are. Though they are all occurrent at the same time, in their essences they functionally have a temporal order.

Does the essential nature of conditioning factors change? There are two kinds of change, one in essential nature and one in function.

Are the four characteristic marks (arising, subsistence, decay and destruction) special features of (some?) conditioned factors or universal features of them all? Some say that there are two kinds of specific characteristics, viz., the essential form of self and the nonessential form of self. Others say that the four marks are universal features of everything. Still others deny both these theories. The orthodox view is that the four characteristic marks are universal and that there are two kinds of universal features: essential and compounded, and that the four marks compounded into one are found in all conditioned factors.

There are three features, maintenance, old age and decay; they are mutual enemies.

Question:[12] Since maintenance is conditioned, how can the *sūtra* be explained that states that the conditioning factors do not persist through time?

Answer: The *sūtra* means that they do not persist very long, but of course they realize the factors persist for a moment.

Vasumitra: If conditioning factors did not persist at least a moment the Buddha would not have spoken of a period of time or of the thing called "a moment". But the topic is difficult—only a Buddha, not even a *pratyekabuddha*, knows the measure of a moment.

We say: Since one cannot explain this text otherwise, it must be

accepted that a thing persists as conditioned after having arisen, and that after that it terminates. Otherwise activity cannot be explained.

Question: Is the feature of old age postulated to explain decay and cessation or to explain change and transformation?

Question: Are the characteristic marks and things marked the same or different?

The status of a corpse of a liberated person is discussed.

There are 6,400,099,980 moments within the duration of one day and night.

Question: When a conditioned factor arises does its essence arise because of the factor of arising or because it is united with the features of arising? Answer: It arises because of the factor of arising.

It is irrelevant for the conditioned factors to be united with the phenomenal features of arising. There are no such features of the conditioned factors. Various theories of Vasumitra and others concerning these matters are reviewed.

Chapter Seven: Unprofitable Things

(203b-215b) Rather than self-mortification Buddhas practice the true path of purity according to virtue, concentration and wisdom. There is discussion of the lotus posture in meditation.

Contemplation of foul things is mentioned under the ways of focusing mindfulness. A contrast is drawn between Aniruddha, who could not regard the heavenly nymphs as impure by focusing his mind on them, and the Buddha, *pratyekabuddhas* and disciples such as Śāriputra, who could. A number of other comparisons and contrasts are drawn among well-known persons, including the Buddha, in illustration of their behavior in focusing mindfulness.

Chapter Eight: Thinking
Part One: Thinking, Initial Thought and Excitedness

(215b-221a) Dārṣṭāntika: Thinking and meditating are merely differentiations of one and the same entity, awareness, not separate entities. But that is not right; awareness and meditation are different. The three wisdoms concerning listening, thinking and practicing are distinguished. The first two enhance the respective wisdom of the moment, but the insight acquired from meditation is capable of destroying defilements.

The Dārṣṭāntikas say that initial and sustained thought are both the same as awareness. Others say they are merely nominal truths. But initial and sustained thought are different, though they are not alternatives: there is no conflict between the factors of strength (the

nature of initial thought) and subtlety (the nature of sustained thought) within awareness.

Awareness has three properties: its own nature, recollection and deliberation.

Part Three: Arrogance and Pride

(223a-226a) While defilements are not yet annihilated, they do not become active under five conditions: (1) presence of peace, (2) of insight, (3) of good teachers and friends, (4) of a suitable environment, and (5) of an individual endowed by nature with a lesser amount of defilement.

The nature of conceit is discussed. E.g., one may incorrectly imagine he has acquired a higher state while still in the path of vision, and may proudly imagine he has realized the highest goal while still engaged in spiritual practice, and so remain an adept.

Ordinary persons fall into five kinds of false pride, or nine according to some. The next section reviews a list of seven kinds of pride found in the three realms, and explains how they can be destroyed through the paths of vision and practice.

Part Four: Sickness

(226b-227a) Even though a Bodhisattva be still afflicted by the three defilements, since he knows the evil nature of them, this awareness of his is called heedfulness. His heedfulness consists in overcoming the conditions giving rise to these defilements by dealing with their subjective cause.

Part Six: Career and Faculty

(227b-227c) A question is raised as to whether a Bodhisattva—particularly Siddhārtha—allowed his mind to be affected by the three defilements. A case when he was hungry is cited, and various theories are discussed as to whether such desires harm the Bodhisattva's purity.

Is there awareness of nothing? The Dārṣṭāntika says so, but we (Sarvāstivādins) deny it. Awareness and consciousness are mutually correlated.

Is the living body of the Buddha defiled or not? The Mahāsaṅghikas say no, but we say yes.

Chapter Seven: Ordinariness

(221b-236a) The Vātsīputrīyas say that the ten contaminants can be annihilated by insight into the frustrating nature of the realm of desire; they are the essential nature of the ordinary man.

But we (Sarvāstivādins) believe that the ordinary man's nature belongs to the three realms and can be dealt with by spiritual practice. It is originally uncontaminated, and is to be classified among the forces dissociated from awareness. It is a real entity, a point denied by the Dārṣṭāntikas, who think there is no reality as such for the ordinary man.

Various theories are distinguished about the nature of the ordinary man, concerning the elements, senses and aggregates. The preferred account is that ordinariness consists in not yet realizing the *dharma*.

BOOK TWO
Chapter One: Bad Things
Part One: Headings

(236b-260b) The five fetters and 98 contaminants are not found in the *Āgamas*. But what is discussed here is what is not found in non-Buddhist texts (such as the *Rāmāyaṇa*) which contain many stanzas with little or no meaning.

A stream-enterer is reborn seven times into heavenly and human worlds. Anyone who annihilates the three fetters (listed in the text) and 88 contaminants becomes a stream-enterer. When the text specifies seven rebirths this encompasses 14 existences in each of the main states and 28 in the intermediate states.

The three bad roots have fifteen items as their essence (computed by combining the three bad roots with each of the four noble truths plus the worldly things dealt with by the path of spiritual practice).

The three impurities have 108 things as their essential nature.

The five obstructions include 30 items in the realm of desire.

The five fetters include 37 items comprising 30 kinds of defilements of passion, 5 kinds of defilements of pride, being specifically the defilements of hatred in the realm of desire plus envy and selfishness.

The five (false) views comprise some 36 items, viz., 6 as extreme views in three worlds, 24 false views and adherence to particular views in each of the four groups in all three realms, and six kinds of addiction to views.

The Dārṣṭāntikas say that every defilement is bad. But in fact only those in the realm of desire are invariably bad, but those in the upper

two realms are invariably neutral, for there is no karmic maturation in the upper two realms.

Section 2: Essential Nature of Three Fetters, Etc.

(263a-263b) The venerable Dhumika, as well as the Vibhajyavādins, hold the view that good fetters can be classified into four kinds, due to their own nature, due to the correlation between awareness and concomitant mental factors, due to co-originating, and due to liberation. Likewise, bad fetters are due to their own nature, due to the correlation between bad awarenesses and concomitant mental factors, due to co-originating, and due to the precariousness of life and death.

Part Two: Maturation

(263c-264b) Dārṣṭāntika: There is no maturation cause without thinking, nor is there any maturation effect without feeling.

Kāśyapīya: The maturation cause still retains its existence before the full maturation of its effect, but as soon as its maturation takes place it no longer exists.

Even as there is no pleasure at the time of its cause, there can be dissatisfaction due to the evil course of the life cycle when its full maturation takes place, just as a fool, after covering fire with ashes, steps on it and burns his feet.

Part Three: What is To Be Destroyed

(264b-268a) The three fetters must be terminated before becoming a stream-enterer, and the 98 contaminants must be terminated through the path of vision.

Dārṣṭāntika: An ordinary man cannot terminate contaminants.

Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra: Though an ordinary man does not terminate contaminants, he can overcome the fetters.

Sarvāstivāda: An ordinary man can terminate fetters through the worldly path.

Some say that a saintly man does not terminate contaminants through the worldly path. Others say that all fetters should be terminated suddenly; they cannot be terminated gradually.

The ordinary man and the saint both terminate the belief that the body is real, but with different degrees of efficiency: while the ordinary man must go through nine steps in applying pure knowledge over the five groups of defilements in each of the three realms, the saint does the same by one step in terminating the entire group of defilements. An ordinary man prior to entering the path of vision

cannot differentiate the five classifications of defilements, but must do it step by step through repeated practice, while the path of vision can terminate the defilements at once.

Part Five: Initial and Sustained Thought

(269b-270a) Dārṣṭāntika: Sustained thought is invariably found from the realm of desire up to the realm of being.

Defilements relating to satisfaction and those relating to frustration are differentiated. Dārṣṭāntika: When factors arise they come into existence gradually, not suddenly. Bhadanta: They come into existence in temporal order and not simultaneously. The proper view on this point is explained. But indeed there are many theories.

Part Six: Bases

(271b-274c) Some say that even those in the Brahmaloka are not free from hypocrisy and fetters.

The nine stages of defiled awareness and concomitant mental factors of the path of spiritual practice must be gradually terminated, but those of the path of vision which are material, defiled but good or undefiled but indeterminate must be terminated at once through the power of the ninth path (of the fifteen paths of immediacy).

An insight arising in the sphere of desire may terminate ignorance in the highest stage of the immaterial realm, while an insight arisen in the highest sphere may teminate ignorance in the lowest sphere.

Part Ten: Fulfilment

(274c-283a) A faith-follower or follower of *dharma* should not be called "one who is endowed with the path of vision".

Whenever it is said that material factors are "abandoned" it is meant that involvement is terminated, and vice versa. Thus even when defiled factors of awareness and concomitant mental factors are terminated up to the eighth stage one may still be involved in the lowest realm.

The specific fetters that are removed by each of the five kinds of people are displayed.

Part Eleven: Conditions

(283b-286b) The enlightenment of a Buddha, a *pratyekabuddha* and a disciple consists in their being able to introspect the ways factors arise through the four kinds of cause.

Those causes where the four sets of conditions activate defilements

other than the 33 pervasive ones are distinguished from those in which they activate those defilements.

Chapter Two: Association

(E288a-306c) There are five kinds of facts: (1) things in themselves; (2) objective things for cognitive faculties to act upon; (3) relations that connect one to another; (4) causal factors; (5) things in one's possession. Another five kinds of facts are (1) element, (2) sense, (3) aggregate, (4) external world, (5) moment.

The Abhidharma masters say that whatever is linked and whatever links it with something else are real, while every person (*pudgala*) is existent but unreal.

The Vātsīputrīyas say the recipients of connection, the agent of connecting, and any person are unreal.

The Dārṣṭāntikas say that active agents are real, while recipients of actions and persons are unreal.

The combinations of the fetters are extensively discussed. Fetters are divided into two kinds: (1) those which cause an individual to be deluded about the relations of things to himself (craving, repugnance, pride, envy and selfishness), and (2) those that cause an individual to be deluded about the relations of things to each other (ignorance, wrong views, misinterpretation and doubt).

The relations among the fetters are extensively reviewed.

Vibhajyavādins: Each latent contaminant accompanied other latent dispositions without including its own essence.

Sarvāstivādin: Every factor invariably comprises its own essence.

Discussion of the four principles of accepting others.

(306c-310c) Vibhajyavādin: The undefiled awareness can also cause the factors of phenomenal existence to continue. A *bodhisattva* may be reborn after the proper length of time. Ordinary humans are most of them of perverted identification, such that if male and entering the womb he hates his father and loves his mother, while if a woman she loves her father and hates her mother.

Sarvāstivādin: A *bodhisattva*, prior to his last lifetime, entering his mother's womb without perverted identification, loves both mother and father.

Dārṣṭāntika: Only the defilements of craving and hatred cause the phenomenal existence to continue.

Sarvāstivādin: All defilements cause existence to continue.

Some say that evil paths are caused to evolve through the influence of hatred, while favorable courses are brought about by influence of craving.

Sarvāstivādin: The sensual realm is caused to continue by each

of the 36 contaminants directly, while the material and immaterial realms are caused to continue by each of 31 contaminants.

There are four kinds of existence: (1) existence from birth to death, (2) in the last moment prior to death, (3) intermediate existence and (4) the first moment of birth.

There are five kinds of life-continuum: continuity (1) through intermediate existence, (2) through the moment of birth, (3) through ordinary time, (4) through the nature of factors, and (5) through successive moments of time. When an individual's aggregates perish at death another set of aggregates arises through the intermediate existence.

(310c-312c) Vibhajyavādin: Some defilements can be terminated without trance, as well as for a saint in the neither-identification-nor-nonidentification state who also loses his defilements.

Sarvāstivādin: There is no defilement that can be terminated without trances; thus concentration in trance is the antidote to all defilements.

Ghoṣavarman holds that the worldly path can terminate defilements altogether. Jivala denies this.

The path of vision relies solely on the four meditative concentrations, the preparatory concentration and the intermediate one between the first and second state of meditation—six states in all. The three bad roots and all the defilements except ignorance can be terminated by the preparatory concentration. Ignorance in the realm of desire can be terminated altogether by the four meditative concentrations, as well as the lower three states of meditative concentration in the immaterial sphere by the seven states of meditative concentration.

Some say that when all defilements are terminated there should be no retrogression. The Sarvāstivādins hold there still can be retrogression. The Vibhajyavādins say there is no necessary regularity in this matter.

Sarvāstivādin: A perfected being who has attained liberation may backslide if he (1) does certain bad things, (2) enjoys fruitless disputes, (3) likes to reconcile people's conflicts, (4) likes to explore on long journeys, or (5) has a physical illness all the time.

The perfected being Got(r)ika regressed six times, and being afraid of it happening a seventh time he attained final liberation by committing suicide.

A perfected being, though he has cut off the defilements, has not destroyed them, and so they may reappear in his lifestream. Only when he has attained the disconnection of defilements can they be said to be abandoned.

(312c-318c) Vibhajyavādin: Contaminants are the seeds of en-

velopers. These envelopers arise from contaminants, and if they become manifest, cause regression. Their essential nature is associated with awareness, while the essential nature of contaminants is dissociated from awareness. Since perfected beings have already cut off the contaminants and so no envelopers can arise, no backsliding can occur.

Dārṣṭāntika: "Regression" has no essential nature and is merely a conventional notion (*prajñapti*).

Sarvāstivādin: Regression merely means nonrealization and has nonacquisition as its essential nature.

Because of three conditions awareness incurs latent contaminants. These three conditions are (1) force of cause—the defilements not being terminated, (2) force of external factors—the presence of desire, bondage, and (3) force of action, such as irrelevant or unreasonable willing.

Regression occurs in representative cognition, not in the other five kinds of sense-consciousness. Some tales of those who backslid are told.

There are three kinds of retrogression: (1) for disciples only, regression due to circumstance after having accomplished the goal, (2) when no realization has yet been accomplished in a given state of advancement, (3) which is, as it were, due to the fact that the realization of one's achievement is not directly revealed at the moment. Which of these kinds occur for the Buddha, the enlightened-for-himself, the disciple? Type (3) occurs for all Buddhas. The stream-enterer cannot regress, but regression is possible for the other types in the human stages of the sensual realm. There is no regression for the divine stages in the sensual realm and those in the two upper realms.

Part Nine: Ascertainment

(320c-327a) Some say: There cannot be ascertainment for one who has abandoned fetters. Others say there is one kind of ascertainment. But what does "ascertainment" mean? It refers only to the ninth, the highest state or on the basis of four conditions (in the case of the path of vision) or of five conditions (in the case of the path of practice). Ascertainment is attributed to the nonreturner and the saint, but not to the stream-enterer and the once-returner.

The question is now raised: Who can desire to relinquish which? A candidate who has abandoned the third and fourth defilements in the realm of desire and now enters the path of vision, realizing the first saintly stage, as he is reborn from human to heavenly and from heavenly to human existence must be one who is "headed

toward the state of once-returner". Likewise are explained the other intermediate states tending toward a higher stage.

Ghoṣaka and others: The eight saintly types of persons are essentially real, since an agent who is on his way toward, e.g., once-returnership is required to have given up the stage of streamentrant.

The stream-enterer has accomplished up to the six ascertainment.

Chapter Three: Beings

(327b-329a) The fetters in each of the three (lower) realms (of desire, material and immaterial) must be terminated by the paths of vision and practice. These fetters cause living beings to suffer and to be reborn.

The distinction between sudden and gradual termination and their association respectively with the two paths.

(330a-332c) The three aspects of the uninterrupted path of riddance from fetters are wickedness, frustration and obstruction. The three aspects of the path to liberation are calmness, excellence and deliverance. There are nine kinds of the path of riddance and eight of the path to liberation. It is explained how many of them are experienced during the practice of the saint and of the ordinary man.

At the non-returner stage of concentration approaching the initial meditation, a practitioner practices initial thought about both impure and pure factors, while at the higher stages he is required to apply initial thought only to the higher features of those aspects. Precisely which kinds of initial thought are required is discussed.

Part Three: Destruction of the Ninefold Fetters

(333a-334a) Concerning terminations of fetters through the noninterrupted path and through the liberation path.

Part Four: Destruction of the Ninefold Fetters

(334a-344a) The destruction of the sixteen sets of fetters (corresponding to the eight noninterrupted paths and the eight liberation paths) as to their saintly states as effects.

Vibhajyavādin: The four saintly states are solely of unconditioned nature.

Sarvāstivādin: They are of conditioned or of unconditioned nature.

Why are there only four saintly states and not five? Two saintly states are specified in connection with liberation from the fetters of the realm of desire, while for the material and immaterial spheres only one saintly state, namely the perfected being, is set.

The first of the four saintly states (stream-enterer) applies to the path of vision, while the other three apply to the path of practice.

How can the once-returner and non-returner states be called saintly? The orthodox say: Those states are called saintly states according to generalization.

Question: Of the four saintly states how many of them are nominally so designated and how many of them are actually differentiated thus?

There are four kinds of saints: (1) path-winners, (2) path-indicators, (3) path-subsistent life-makers, and (4) path-polluters.

There are two kinds of Buddha-bodies: (1) living body and (2) *dharma* body.

A man of renunciation, even falling into laxity toward his perceptual vow, is superior to a layman who upholds his precepts.

(350c-352b) Some say: In order for a practitioner who is resolved in faith to become a candidate for attainment of right view he should undertake the application path, nine noninterrupted paths and nine liberation paths. The orthodox hold properly that in order to transform one's faculty fit or for one vehicle to be fit for another a practitioner should take one application path, one noninterrupted path and one liberation path. But it is not implied that a practitioner whose faculty or merit is destined for the lineage of disciple or enlightened-for-oneself should transform his lineage to become fit for that of a Buddha, for even when one changes his vehicle he should be able to realize its goal without waiting for a very long passage of time.

(352b-360c) The subject of intermediate existence is taken up. Some say that no life and death in the three spheres of existence has invariably an intermediate existence. But others say that, since there is some material form in the immaterial realm, there should be some form of intermediate existence in the immaterial realm as well as in those of sensuous and material form. Still others say that there is no intermediate existence for those whose karma in the desire and material spheres are intense and sharp, but there is for those whose karma is weak and slow.

Sarvāstivādin: There is some intermediate existence for everyone in the realm of desire and the material realm. Wherever the aggregates of the last moment before death perish, the aggregates of an intermediate existence must arise at once, just as whenever a seed perishes a sprout arises. And whenever a practitioner dies leaving the immaterial realm and is destined to be reborn in the realms of desire or matter, his intermediate existence should manifest itself in that realm into which he is destined to be born.

Dārṣṭāntika: Even by merely restraining the working of the fetters

one should be able to be born in some higher state of existence.

Our school says: Unless one is freed from the fetters of the lower state (within the nine levels of the three spheres) he will not be able to be reborn in a higher state.

The Vibhajyavādin and the Yuktivādin dispute as to whether there is or is not any intermediate existence. The correct view is that intermediate existence cannot be included in the five life-cycle states.

Some say: While those living beings abiding in hell as well as in heaven have intense and sharp karma and so have no intermediate form of existence, those living beings who abide in the remaining three courses of life and thus have an impermanent nature should have some form of intermediate existence.

Others say: Phantom beings, having intense and sharp karma, have no intermediate form of existence, but those in the remaining three courses do (as before).

Still others say: If a practitioner invites a course of life by way of karma with meditation, he will not have any intermediate existence; but if he does without meditation he will.

Sarvāstivādin: There is no intermediate form of existence in the immaterial realm.

Where within the body one's consciousness is kept as he is about to be reborn on an evil course (in his feet), about to be reborn among men or gods (navel or head), when he is about to be liberated (in his heart), are explained.

Can an intermediate form of existence be changed from one life cycle to that of another? The Dārṣṭāntikas say yes, since even the worst karma, having committed one of the five deadly sins, can be changed. The Abhidharma masters say, however, that no intermediate form of existence can be changed from one life cycle to another. We (Sarvāstivādins) say that during life change of intermediate form of existence is possible, but not during existence in such a form.

(361c-365c) Śremadatta: The intermediate form of existence takes as many as 77 days.

Vasumitra: At the most it takes seven days. But if parental union is not fulfilled the being will not be lost.

Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra says there is no limit to the time that may be taken.

The features of intermediate existence of a peson mirror his life—the features of a person destined for hell is as hellish as the hell where he is destined.

A being in an intermediate state is so minute and subtle that nothing can burn it, etc. The clothing is of the beings in intermediate existence in the material, desire and *bodhisattva* stages are described. Beings in intermediate existence consume scent.

There is an extended discussion (repeating what has preceded in several aspects) of the process by which what transmigrates gets into the mother's womb, etc. A supernormal faculty can be trained so as to see such a being.

The most wicked beings fall into the *avīci* hell while living and instantaneously receive an intermediate form of existence. The ways in which heavenly beings, Indra, etc. are reborn are detailed. Some say that all heavenly beings, when born, already have the form of the prime of their respective lives.

Chapter Four: Ten Doors
Part One: 42 Topics of Contaminants

(366a-369b) The topics of five aggregates, twelve bases and eighteen elements are reviewed as to their names and essences. There are three categories of existence. The terms are examined in respect to their meaning, and the nominal designation and reality of what is referred to examined. It is explained that the three categories differ from each other as the agent who relies on, that on which he relies, and the content constitute three separate factors.

The difference between a visual organ functioning and not functioning (because conditions for function are lacking). A similar distinction can be drawn between a visible object and object visible but not at the moment seen.

(369c-370c) Why aren't the five kinds of consciousness (visual consciousness, etc.) called "mental consciousness", since they involve the functioning of mind? Answer: The visual organ grasps what is visible unmixed with the sensations appropriate for any other faculty; thus it is called "visual", not "mental" consciousness.

Relating to factor-elements, there is no object available but not at the moment grasped.

(371a-374b) The elements of representative cognition are all included in the category of mental elements. They function separately from the sense-organs and their objects. There is an extended discussion of the relations among the three corresponding members of these three groups (e.g., between visual organ, visual object, and visual representative cognition). For instance, are the eye, its object and visual consciousness correlated (i.e., all equally belonging to the realm of desire) or not? The answer seems to be yes for the relation between body, nose, smell and the representative cognition of smell. For other such sets corresponding to other senses the answer is that there are two kinds of relation, correlated and uncorrelated. The difference is applied to explanations of what happens at death and birth to these sensory items.

What kinds of discriminate consciousness should an initial visual consciousness in the realm of desire cause to arise in reference to the same thing? E.g., a visual sensation in a person belonging to the realm of desire could subsequently cause a defiled consciousness in reference to an object of perception belonging to the realm of desire.

(377a-377b) Dārṣṭāntika: The second trance and those higher have their own states of awareness and do not rely on the visual, etc. states of the first trance.

Sarvāstivādin: Each kind of sense consciousness (visual, etc.) always arises in correlation with indeterminate mental stages such as initial thought and sustained thought, and thus are absent from the second trance and those higher, since in the latter states there is neither initial nor sustained thought.

Various opinions are reviewed about whether when a visual element belonging to a higher trance state is acquired, it entails that a material realm belonging to that higher state must be acquired.

(378b-383a) On the senses. Vasumitra and Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra hold that atoms do not touch each other.

There are six inner senses, a different six outer senses. The six tactual senses are different from the latter.

The reason the Buddha refers to the four trance states as "sense" is in order to discredit the heretics' false adherence to them as four kinds of liberation.

The lifetime of one who does not conceptually identify (*asaṃjñika-sattva*, one of the eight heavens belonging to the fourth trance of the material realm) lasts for 500 great *kalpas*. On the other hand, the lifetime of one in the fourth trance state of the neither-identifying-nor-nonidentifying basis is 80, longest among ordinary men.

(383b-386a) Buddhadeva and others: There are no material elements other than the four great elements.

Both the Dārṣṭāntikas and Dharmatrāta reject the theory that unmanifest matter belongs to the category of factor-sense.

(386b-389c)[13] Some say that the essential nature of fear is either rooted in the identification of body with self or in thirst or in delusion (=ignorance).

Fear is distinguished from aversion. It has five kinds.

The expression "grasping aggregate" is explained and distinguished from other aggregates.

The material elements relating to earth, to space. Two kinds of space are distinguished: *ākāśa*-space and empty space. The former exists.

(389c-391b) On matter. Whatever has its own essence is called a physical element belonging to the material aggregate. Again, it is

what changes and resists other elements by occupying space.

Dārṣṭāntikas: Reflected images (in water or a mirror) do not really exist. This view is rejected: they do exist. Likewise echoes, etc. exist.

(391c-393a)[14] Mahāsāṅghikas: The Buddha's body is free from defilements.

Sarvāstivādin: The Buddha's living body is not free from defilements.

(393a-396a) Dārṣṭāntika: Passage of time and forces of conditioning factors are different. Vibhajyavādin: Time is permanent but conditioning factors are impermanent. Sarvāstivādin: There is no difference between the nature of passage of time and of conditioning factors.

The theory that past and future do not really exist is refuted. We Sarvāstivādins hold that all three times exist.

The relation between function (*kriyā*) and essence (*svātman*) is discussed.

(397a-399b) On the four noble truths. Sarvāstivādin: The five aggregates arisen from grasping constitute the truth of frustration; that they have impure causes constitutes the truth of origin; calculated cessation constitutes the truth of cessation; and practice of the seeker and the adept constitutes the truth of the path.

Dārṣṭāntika: The four truths deal respectively with the psychophysical complex, with action and defilement, with the extinction of both, and with the paths of peace and insight.

Vibhajyavādin: The four truths deal respectively with the eight marks of frustration, the attachment of love that induces subsequent rebirth, the extinction of such cause, and the practice of the eightfold path.

Ghoṣaka's theory is also detailed.

What truth means and why the Buddha did not refer to space or uncalculated cessation as "truths".

Some heretics taught four kinds of liberation through multiple paths, but the Buddha taught a single path.

(399c-411a)[15] Concerning the distinction between conventional and highest truth, as viewed by various teachers.

The four truths are discussed at some length. Some sixteen aspects of them are distinguished.

(411b-418c) On the four trance states. The term *dhyāna* does not apply to the four concentrations in the immaterial sphere.

The four trance states are explained by reviewing various names given to them.

In the third trance state one is released from any sense of joy, and in the fourth state one is released from all feeling of satisfaction. When one realizes the second trance state one is released from

attachment and has thus already terminated any sensing of frustration.

Physical disasters such as a holocaust, flood or hurricane, while they can affect those in the first three trance states, cannot affect one who has reached the fourth.

(420b-430c) The four boundless states are discussed. These are loving kindness, compassion, sympathy and equanimity. These are also called "sublime states" (*brahmavihāra*).

Dārṣṭāntika: It is not building shrines, monasteries, etc. that produce merit equivalent to that of Brahmā, but rather it is practice of the four boundless states as promulgated by the Buddha that does so.

Vasumitra: If one erects *stūpa*s commemorating the Buddha one can gain merit of a degree similar to that of Brahmā.

Whoever concentrates with compassion cannot be injured, although the four boundless states cannot invariably terminate all defilements. Specific defilements that can be terminated by practice of each of the four boundless states are detailed and illustrated with examples from Buddhist tradition.

(430c-434a) When one practices loving kindness he should reach the state of complete purity of the third trance state. When one practices the boundless state of compassion he should reach the immaterial realm called the basis of infinite space. When one practices the boundless state of sympathy he should reach the second immaterial realm called the basis of infinite consciousness. When one practices equanimity he should reach the third immaterial realm called the basis of nothingness. These are detailed.

Vibhajyavādin: Even in the immaterial realm there is some matter.

Yuktivādin: Certainly not!

(434b-442a) Concerning the eight liberations. They are accompanied by defilements for the lower four trance states, but for the higher four, immaterial trances they may or may not be affected by defilement.

The eight ways of release achieved through the eight graded trance concentrations are compared to the method and process of training elephants. Events in the lives of Buddhist saints (Aniruddha, Śāriputra) are detailed.

(442b-461b) With respect to dormant defilements such as ignorance or delusion which are to be terminated through the path of spiritual practice through the trances states up to the immaterial realm, which other defilements can increase their influence?

Some say: The visual elements belonging to the body of a purified being or adept are by nature free from defilements (and so of pure influence).

Others say that since defilement is of the "upside-down nature" (*viparītamūḍha*) there is nothing to act on to cause its arising.

There are 22 faculties; six sense-faculties; the five organs of feeling (joy, frustration, satisfaction, sorrow, equanimity); 5 good faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom; the masculine, feminine and life principles; 3 faculties of pure influence (nonawareness, awareness and cognizer).

Still others say that it is meaningless to speak of connected bondage (*samprayogabandhana*) in connection with dormant defilements; rather the bondage is supporting (*ālambanabandhana*).

There is extended and detailed discussion of the dormant defilements—in what numbers do they increase under various conditions.

Dārṣṭāntika: The six sense-organs act on their respective external objects separately from each other, not on the internal sense faculties or on consciousness.

Sarvāstivādin: There are sixteen kinds of objectives for a practitioner (viz., 15 groups of defilements in the three realms of existence, and one group of purely-influencing supporting objects). Accordingly there are 16 kinds of subjective consciousness as well. These become 32 kinds of objectives since each can be connected or unconnected.

Concerning the classification of numerical increases of dormant defilements embedded in each of the kinds of consciousness corresponding to each of the 22 faculties (listed above); also that embedded in the consciousness which acts upon each correlative consciousness arising from the five groups of defilements in the three realms.

A series of such classifications is reviewed.

As to the 5 groups of defilements in each of the three realms, how many awarenesses arise relating to each directly-antecedent condition? The Dārṣṭāntika says that an awareness becomes a directly-antecedent condition, but not for the concomitant mental factors or mental states.

(462c-464c) Do dormant defilements of the visual faculty include such indeterminate mentalities as initial and sustained thought, etc.? The Dārṣṭāntikas say they are included up to the third sphere. We say that the five kinds of receptive appraisal—satisfaction, frustration, joy, sorrow and equanimity—are correlated with the divisions of the paths of vision and practice, as well as to the three spheres.

Some say that the receptive appraisals of satisfaction and frustration are invariably found in the realm of passion up to the material realm, while those of joy and sorrow are found there and higher in the fourth immaterial realm as well.

There is no male/female faculty distinction in the material and

immaterial realms, yet men are men there for all that.

(465a-466b) Ascertainment is twofold, one as acquiring knowledge, the other as the ascertainment of abandonment.

Some say: The lightning-minded concentration swiftly terminates the defilements of the three realms.

The masters of the western region: The noninterrupted path alone terminates the working of the dormant defilements, and the path of liberation alone provides experience of that termination.

The structure of this Chapter (Four: Ten Doors) of the *Jñānaprasthāna* is shown to involve three major categories and 42 topics.

(471c-478c) Very complicated questions are raised, such as this: As to the *indriyālambanavijñāna* and the *indriyālambanālambanavijñāna* equally comprising the defilement of ignorance that must be terminated through the path of practice, as to the visual faculty, etc. up to the immaterial realm, how many series of awarenesses should these two kinds of consciousness produce without an interruption in each group of awareness arising in the three realms and five divisions of the path? The differences between the two kinds of consciousness mentioned is explored. Who is the agent that realizes or does not realize the two kinds of consciousness? Each must be studied in relation to each of the 42 topics.

BOOK THREE: AGGREGATE OF KNOWLEDGE
Chapter One: Aspects of the Seeker Path

(479a-487c) The *sūtras* contain a theory that a perfected being who has totally annihilated the defilements is endowed with the ten qualifications of the adept.

Some say that there is no essential nature in past or future, but there is in the present, and that it is unconditioned.

Dārṣṭāntikas: There is no essential nature of realization or of nonrealization.

Sarvāstivādin: The *sūtras* say, and we do as well, that the essential nature of realization really exists.

Vibhajyavādin: The path is transcendent in nature.

Of the four kinds of passage toward liberation—acquisition, nonacquisition, equanimity, nonequanimity—which should the perfected being acquire, and which should he renounce? Similar questions are asked on behalf of the enlightened one (*buddha*), one enlightened for himself and the disciple, and the relationships of the four kinds of passage is explored for each.

(489b-493b) Some say that all phenomenal conditioned factors are of the nature of vision.

Dārṣṭāntika: That state of steadiness in which a perfected being

acknowledges his insight into the nature of factors prior to clear realization of that knowledge is also of the nature of transcendental knowledge.

Other theorists say: That knowledge of destruction as well as the knowledge of nonorigination (of factors) are also of the nature of vision. Vision explored, contrasted with knowledge, wisdom, etc.

(494c-503c) Some say: In each antecedent trance state there is joy but not moral precepts and vows.

Others say: For each state higher than each antecedent trance state there is right conceptualizing of the respective stage of meditative concentration.

Others: Those in immaterial trance states can also have moral precepts and vows.

Sarvāstivādin: There is no state of joy as one of the seven members of enlightenment. Nor is there right conceptualizing in the higher stages of meditation. Likewise, precepts and vows are absent from the immaterial trance states.

The seven members of enlightenment are clearly mentioned in the *Āgamas* among the 37 limbs of enlightenment. Actually the essential members of the 37 number eleven or twelve. The 37 members are classified and ordered into seven groups.

A different version of the limbs of enlightenment is the 41 conditions of enlightenment of the Vibhajyavādins.

Dārṣṭāntika: Regardless of whether it is sensory or has to do with karma or at the time of death, etc., a faculty of good wisdom does not have the nature of perceiving since it can't differentiate just about anything.

Chapter Two: Five Kinds of Views

(504a-510c) The five false views are listed. Whatever establishes a false view is invariably wrong awareness, but not every wrong awareness is a false view.

Some say that the fetters are not necessarily binding. There is a discriminatory faculty that operates with defiled factors; it is called "left-sided wisdom".

For seekers the faculties of vision and wisdom are co-extensive with their undefiled awareness, so that their introspective faculty is identical with their discriminatory faculty.

Indra is cited as a being (a god) who makes false claims of omnipotence; this is classified as an example of adherence to (false) views. Again, Indra's supposed ability to create illusory beings is an example of addiction to precepts and vows. On the other hand Brahmā is cited as a god who can create illusory beings, and there

is an interesting review of beliefs about Brahmā's functions and abilities. One feature of this account is that Brahmā ends his life during an intermediate meditative trance and enters a new life.

The historical context of Mahādeva's five principles is recounted.

Chapter Three: Knowledge of Others' Minds

(512b-525c) This section also discusses knowledge of previous lives, which is said to be a power of impure minds only, while knowledge of others' minds can belong to either pure or impure minds. Specifically, those in the immaterial sphere have no such power to know others' minds.

The power of knowing others' minds as it is (was) possessed by the Buddha and by those enlightened for themselves is outlined.

Awareness of events in previous lives is likewise not found in the immaterial realm. Some heretics and some disciples, as well as Buddhas, are capable of awareness of previous lives. However, such awareness is confined only to events one has experienced oneself. Events that happened 20,000, 40,000 or even 120,000 *kalpas* ago can be recalled by those who believe that the world is eternal.

Those who can know the minds of others may do it by listening to their words, by examining their features or divination; even those on their way to hell may have the ability of know others' minds prior to their receiving hellish suffering.

Even animals may know the minds of others. An example is given of a wolf and a woman who throughout five hundred life-cycles mutually injured their offspring. Ghosts too may have this capacity. Among men, no one knows others' minds at birth, but those reborn in heavens may have it.

The terms used to describe different kinds of liberation are reviewed; it is shown that some of them overlap each other in meaning. Being liberated at a time is explained and contrasted with being liberated at no particular time. The discussion proceeds toward a characterization of the immense amount of time it takes to gain liberation on the part of the perfected being, the one enlightened for himself, for the Buddha.

(526a-534c) The nature of knowledge of destruction is discussed. The supernatural powers of the perfected being are distinguished from those of the adepts and the seekers.

Jain saints (*nirgrantha śrāvaka*) may be capable of seeing things at a distance through supernormal vision, but they can't see things nearby. Some myths about special abilities are summarized.

Vibhajyavādin: A *bodhisattva* at once realizes a clear and direct insight into the four noble truths.

Sarvāstivādin: No, he gradually realizes it. In what specific order is viewed somewhat differently by different masters.

(536c-545a) The four perverted views are discussed. The Vibhajyavādin posits twelve perverted views, of which eight are to be resolved through the path of vision and four through the path of practice.

Question: If a stream-enterer or once-returner incurs attachment to objects of one of the five kinds of desire does he entertain thoughts of satisfaction and purity or of frustration and impurity?

The stages of three kinds of concentration: on emptiness, on the signless, and on the dispositionless. Various sources and authorities are invoked on these. There is a discussion of the ten kinds of emptiness treated in the *Prajñaptiśāstra.*

Chapter Four: Knowledge gained through Meditative Practice

(546b-559b) Dārṣṭāntika: Awareness that is knowledge is free from any ignorance whatsoever, but when the defilement of perplexity is present along with awareness there is lack of certainty.

Sarvāstivādin: One and the same awareness may be both knowledge as well as ignorance.

Some say that meditational practice deals with good, bad and neutral factors. But we (Sarvāstivādins) say that only such practice which deals with good factors constitutes meditative practice.

Concerning the application-path, the noninterrupted path and the liberation path upon which an ordinary man relies for realization of liberation from defilements.

In the path of vision introspection should be applied only to objects which are related, while in the meditational path one should consider heterogeneous matters.

"Masters of foreign lands": The noninterrupted path terminates bondage through defilements, while the liberation-path experientially acknowledges the accomplishment of cessation.

Sarvāstivādin: The noninterrupted path does both jobs.

Some say that there are no supporting objects, just as there are no objects of hallucinations. Others say that some kinds of awareness capable of knowing have no objects, and some knowable objects are not known.

Discussion of the sevenfold observational consciousness and of the three kinds of introspection (into the general features, the distinctions, and the characteristic distinguishing marks of a thing).

Chapter Five: Seven Kinds of Noble Persons

(562a-577c) Question: Of the practices of the faith-followers, etc. up to the liberation from defilements, how many of the eight kinds of knowledge (the noble eightfold path) should each of them gain and which not?

Some say that each should arise individually but not together. We (Sarvāstivādins) say that the knowledge arising from each of the four noble truths should arise separately.

Still others say (wrongly) that when one meditates on the four truths he applies vision to all four truths simultaneously, so that knowledge of them arises at once.

Some say that there can be various kinds of awareness at the same moment. We (Sarvāstivādins) say that only a single awareness can arise at one moment.

Some say that the three concentrations are one; it is divided into three for the sake of teaching. We (Sarvāstivādins) say that the three concentrations have their respective essential natures.

Some say that awarenesses and concomitant mental factors arise independently and there is no correlation. Others say that they arise in correlation by temporal relationships between precedent and subsequent occurrences. Still others say that correlation only occurs between the essential natures. We (Sarvāstivādins) say that awarenesses and concomitant mental factors arise conditioned by three things (reciprocal interaction due to inclusion and exclusion).

The forty-four kinds of knowledge are discussed. (These are derived by permuting four truths through eleven of the twelve members of the chain of dependent origination excluding ignorance.) By a different permutation 77 kinds are detailed, coming to a total of 275 facts of knowing overall. Which of these are defiled and which undefiled is explained.

This section concludes with a number of questions and answers pertaining to the eight kinds of knowledge.

BOOK FOUR: KARMA

Chapter One: Bad Conduct

(E578a-595a) The kinds of good and bad conduct are reviewed, with related points such as manifest and unmanifest action, the ten courses of good karma. Various heretical theories of karma are discussed: five held by Vaiśeṣika, nine by Sāṃkhya, and twelve by others.

Dārṣṭāntikas say that verbal, bodily and mental acts are all just thinking. The Vibhajyavādins say that action has as its essential nature

attachment, hatred and false view.

The path of action is extensively reviewed. It is said that when the universe begins (at the outset of a *kalpa*) the life span of a human being is immeasurable, but by the end of it human life is reduced to no more than ten years. During this period there are four kinds of declines and four kinds of thriving (as to longevity, population, material means and moral quality).

Examples of four kinds of karma (black-black, black-white, etc.) are provided. E.g., of black-black the example is provided of those who adhere to canine or bovine behavior and fall to hell as result.

The time span for the maturing of karmic residues is discussed. Examples of karmic outcomes are offered, many of them involving the bad results of harming animals.

The Dārṣṭāntikas say that all karma can be transformed.

There are two kinds of indeterminate karma: one is indeterminate as to the time when its effect is to be received, the other is indeterminate as to whether its effect occurs at all.

A discussion of which of the kinds of karma induces its major effect and which induces its specific effect.

Again, as to where the karmic maturation of the kind which is to be received in this lifetime occurs—in what sphere, what kind of meditative stage, which course of life.

(E596a-604b) Three kinds of karmic retribution are frustration, satisfaction and neither. Five kinds are: feeling the specific appropriate nature; feeling the exclusive presence of the retribution; feeling its supporting object; feeling what is connected with it; and feeling the maturation of the karma.

Actions that produce neutral or pure karma do not lead to any maturation at all. Which actions are of which sort—e.g., joy is but sorrow is not—is reviewed.

Two ways are distinguished of experiencing retribution: physical (i.e. through the five senses) and mental.

The three obstructions are defilements, karma and karmic maturation (frustration).

The five deadly sins (matricide, patricide, killing a perfected being, injuring the Buddha's body, and creating schism in the order) are explained. Question: Which of these is the worst? Some say that mental action is the worst.

The different hells are distinguished and discussed. Excepting the *Avīci* hell, in the rest though there is no joy or satisfaction as to retribution, there is a kind of joy and satisfaction after having experienced retribution.

Discussion of various topics relating to the order.

Chapter Two: Bad Speech

(604-608b) Dārṣṭāntika: Besides words and deeds there is an essential nature of right livelihood as well as wrong livelihood.

We (Sarvāstivādins) say that both right and wrong livelihood essentially involve both speech and action.

Discussion of killing, stealing, bad sexual behavior, lying, double talk, abuse, frivolity and wrong views. It is shown that they all arise from attachment, hatred and delusion.

There are 12 types of livelihood that involve unrestrained activity. Goat-slaughter is an example. Three ways of countering such a life-style are discussed. Adoption of such a way of life is part of what is attained by receiving the preceptual vow or at ordination.

(609a-615c) Craftiness (*śāṭhya*, also called *vañka*) gives rise to bodily, vocal and mental karma, but does not occur in the upper two spheres. It is contrasted with filthiness and faults, using the method of the *catuṣkoṭi*.

Awareness as an active agent causes actions to take place, while awareness is immediately followed by actions at the subsequent moment. We say that the five kinds of sensory awareness function only in the latter way and not in the former. Those awarenesses which have to be terminated through the path of vision make for themselves an instantaneous mental follow-up and are incapable of activating material and vocal actions.

Vātsīputrīyas and Vibhajyavādins consider vocal sounds to be karmic outcomes. Others say that sounds are a third item in a series begun by an action which induces various great elements to operate, in turn bringing sounds into being. Still others say that sounds are fifth in a series of operations of material principles of which the second are brought about by action, and thus that vocal sounds are not karmic outcomes.

Some (heretics) say that the later portion of a thing can be a cause of the earlier portion, e.g., spring water pushing preceding water upwards. But we say that if karma is to be experienced in this life as a karmic outcome it must have been caused in the past and the effect must lie in the future.

The kinds of karmic outcomes of the trance free from conceptual identification and of cessation-trance are explained.

Chaper Three: Injuring Life

(616c-624a) Homicide is analyzed.

Six different theories on intermediate existence are reviewed.

The five gravest sins, those that lead to hell, require premeditation

as well as actual accomplishment of the deed. There are no such sins for ghosts or animals.

If an embryo is transplanted from one womb to another, which is the mother of the child? and if (s)he kills one, by killing which is (s)he guilty of matricide?

Those who abide in the uninterrupted hell will not perish at the end of the universe, but because of the power of their karma will be drawn to the hells of other universes to receive their retribution.

Restraints are discussed. Some do and some do not undergo karmic reinforcement. One kind works toward liberation while two others, which do not, are acquired through trance and through purity. There are one, two, or as many as 42 kinds of restraints.

Though the restraints of past, present and future Buddhas are not identical, one can say that their restraints have an identical nature since they all undergo the same practice, have identical merit, and realize the same *dharma*.

(625c-632b) An ordinary practitioner, if he reaches steady insight into factors and his life ends then, should not fall into any evil courses.

Four kinds of birth (from the egg, the womb, from moisture and from transformative generation) are distinguished. All four take place in the realm of desire. In the material and immaterial realms there is only one kind of birth, the transformative generation one.

A saint is not born from egg or moisture.

The most numerous kind of birth is the last, from transformative generation.

Does any embodied person necessarily acquire verbal karma? Various answers reviewed.

Vātsīputrīya: The maturations of actions created from defilements classified into five categories (of the paths of vision and practice) should be classified into those same categories.

Sarvāstivādin: Though those actions are classified into the five categories, their maturations belong in a single category to be dealt with through the path of practice.

The kinds of karmic results are reviewed in the standard manner involving five kinds (outcome, maturation, disjoined, mutually supportive and dominant). The masters of the western regions find nine kinds of karmic effects.

Chapter Four: Manifest and Unmanifest Action

(634b-648c) Dārṣṭāntika: There is no essential nature of either manifest or unmanifest karma.

Sarvāstivāda: Both manifest and unmanifest karma are really existent (i.e. have essential natures).

Is it the case that whenever unmanifest karma is produced manifest karma is also?

There is in the realm of desire no manifest physical karma that is both obstructed and neutral.

What counts as verbal karma? Do echoes, flute-sounds, bird-sounds count? How about magically-created speech? Can a magically created being without a body speak?

If an action is impure is its result also impure?

There are four ways of classifying restraints: (1) according to practices, (2) according to the restraining discipline, (3) according to the three realms, (4) according to human behavioral norms.

There are seven kinds of followers of Buddhism, classified according to the code of discipline (rather than the kinds of trance). Some moral precepts applying to laymen are reviewed.

Chapter Five: One's Own Karma

(649a-661a) One is bound to receive the results of his own karma.

A single action can produce longevity of 80,000 *kalpas* in those whose senses are free from conceptual identification.

Backsliding is considered possible for ordinary people but not for stream-enterers. However, in some (special) cases even a perfected being may be imprisoned because of his past actions, and even a stream-enterer may scheme a homicide.

A perfected being who is capable of prolonging his life should arise from the highest trance and verbally express his intent.

A karmic effect cannot be changed, but the power of karma can.

Suicide is discussed. Some say that Buddhas forsake one-third of their natural life span. Others say it is one-fifth.

Some say that insanity is caused in four ways, or in five according to others. Perfected beings are subject to insanity like ordinary men, but the Buddha was not.

A discussion about what is the central teaching of the Buddha. Some say that nomenclature is its essence. Traditionalists say that it consists of verbal actions. We say that the essential nature of the teaching has the characteristics of goodness and neutrality; he did not preach in order to convert. There is a discussion of the divisions of scripture and how to understand the teachings.

BOOK FIVE: GREAT ELEMENTS

Chapter 1: Great Elements and What is Made of Them

(661c-679a) Sarvāstivādin: There are two masters of our school, Buddhadeva and Dharmatrāta. Buddhadeva holds that 'material

form' means nothing but the great elements themselves; there are no accompanying mental factors, but only awareness itself. Dharmatrāta holds that there is no touching the great elements or anything made of them, and no cognition of material form.

Some (heretics) say that space is one of the five great elements. Others say that it is to reveal a meaning correlative to the characteristic of factors that matter is explained as composed of great elements.

There are four kinds of great elements: that arising from maturation, that arising from growth, that arising as similar outcome, and that arising as a change.

Great elements that belong to one kind are made up of atoms of that kind. But the great elements must be clearly distinguished from conditioned objects. Great elements are invisible, while some of the conditioned objects are visible. The visible, invisible, conditioned and unconditioned tangibles are classified.

The spheres and terminations (through vision, practice or both) of great elements are explained.

The topic of "food" is reviewed in the standard manner. We are told that in hell regular food consists of swallowing heated iron balls. The kinds of food consumed by ghosts, animals and those in the higher realms is considered.

Chapter Two: Conditions

(680b-693b) How great elements are conditioned and function as conditions is explained. The relation of the great elements to the material forms, to awareness and concomitant mental factors is discussed.

An explanation of substantial change from soft to hard and vice-versa is given. Hardness and non-hardness are enhanced or detracted from by the elements of each respectively being increased or disappearing. Hardness and softness are not essential features of things.

Can atoms touch each other? Different theories are proposed.

Some (other Buddhists) say that past elements do not exist, and that the elements of the present time are unconditioned.

Great elements and ordinary substances are always simultaneous in past, present or future.

There are two kinds of unmanifest karma that arise and perish along with the arising and perishing of an awareness of meditation or those of an undefiled awareness, and there are seven kinds of unmanifest karma under each of the two. There are three kinds of unmanifest karma that arise along with manifest karma, and seven

kinds which arise along with restraints as well as with nonrestraints.

Speculations are considered about the possibility of the great elements in spheres of desire and matter influencing each other. Are they of the same sort? Is, e.g., the sphere of the element earth the same thing as the great element earth? Which one is a sense-basis, which an object of awareness?

There is a discussion of the four stages of the universe, viz., the period of evolution, of maintenance, of decay and of emptiness. What happens to the relative population of living beings at these stages? The major kinds of disasters that occur during these stages, and where they will take place, is described.

Chapter Three: Views and Insights

(693b-700c) Vibhajyavādin: The stream-enterer and once-returner have acquired the proper meditative states of concentration of all eight stages. Sarvāstivādin: Not so.

What happens to the great elements between *kalpas*? Do they disappear during the interval or not?

Dārṣṭāntikas and Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra: Magical beings do not really exist. Others say that there is some objective basis upon which the illusion is created. Still others say that there is no such basis. Mythical examples are offered.

Vibhajyavādin: There is no intermediary state between lives. It is discussed whether there are any great elements at that time.

Dārṣṭāntika and Vibhajyavādin: The essential nature of a temporal period and its passage are separate entities, the former being permanent, the latter transitory.

The number of *kalpas* and their objects. There are twenty intermediary *kalpas*, of which the first is only to perish, and the last only increases, and the eighteen in between increase in one condition and decrease in another condition. The appearance of the Buddha takes place only during the *kalpa* that perishes, the appearance of the universal ruler (*cakravartin*) only during the last *kalpa* that increases, and the appearance of one enlightened for himself occurs during those *kalpas* that increase or decrease.

(701b-728c) The duration of a moment.[16] Day and night increase and decrease in duration.

Seven atoms make up a particle.

Some say that there are various kinds of feelings. Others hold that there is only frustrating feeling, not of satisfaction or neutral feeling.

When one becomes a stream-entrant how many applications of mindfulness are to be practiced, and how many in future lives? Some say there is no practice in future lives. The Sarvāstivādin holds that

the stream-entrant and once-returner do not acquire a trance for each state of the four meditations nor for the immaterial contemplations.

Concerning the practice of the fifteen gates.

(729a-742a) Discussion of Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya theories about the number of faculties. Some (heretics) say there are 120 faculties. Actually there are 17. Dharmatrāta says there are 14 actual bases of these 22. Buddhadeva believes that the actual basis of all faculties is just the mental faculty. Some say that a human being is defiled when his mind is defiled. Lengthy discussion of the 22 faculties.

Dārṣṭāntika: There is no experience without thinking and there is none without sense reception. Kāśyapīya: The cause continues to exist until the effect comes into existence, when it disappears.

Dārṣṭāntika: No ordinary man terminates the defilements in worldly life. Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra: No ordinary man terminates the latent dispositions, but they are capable of overcoming 10 kinds of envelopers; still, there is no permanent termination of defilements in the ordinary world. Some say that although an ordinary man may terminate the way of the world he is still an ordinary man and not a saint; he ought to use the superior path.

(743a-759a) Which defilements are destroyed by vision and which by practice explained.

A discussion about which kinds of symbolic processes—gross or subtle—are to be used (Dārṣṭāntika and Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra agree).

(760a-773a) Dārṣṭāntika: Three epistemic factors combine to produce our experience of touch, but contact is not a real entity.

Vision discussed. Some say that when the supernatural visual powers arise the regular visual faculty does not end its function but remains as well. Some say that the supernormal vision can see intermediate existence.

Question: Does supernormal vision grasp the ordinary kinds of color, etc.? The Sāṃkhya opinion is reported to be that the supernatural visual faculty is just the human eye transformed by repeated practice.

Question: Is the object of supernatural vision resistant? Could supernatural vision see things in the dark?

The topic of aging is reviewed, with views of Vibhajyavāda, Vasumitra and Dārṣṭāntikas considered.

Dārṣṭāntikas and Vibhajyavādins believe that a minute mental function still remains in the trance free from conceptual identification. Others say that this state only arises for one who transcends all defilements. This trance only occurs for those in the fourth meditative stage. There is no return from this state, although Dārṣ-

ṭāntikas are quoted as opining that there is. This trance is the result of karma earned in a previous lifetime.

(774a-783a) Dārṣṭāntikas and Vibhajyavādins say that subtle mental function remains in the cessation-trance and that it is not terminated. Other views are reviewed, and the correct one formulated. There is no cessation-trance in the lower trance states. Cessation-trance is sometimes termed "liberation". Its varieties are discussed. Eleven kinds of people induce this trance in themselves, not only perfected beings but also some of those still in a state of bondage. There are many theories about this state.

A mind that is in cessation-trance is impure, but may become pure when leaving it. The examples of Udayana and Śāriputra are considered. A cessation-trance is brief, at its longest not more than seven days and nights. But in the material realm it may last for more than a *kalpa*.

Various theories are offered as to why an ordinary man is unable to enter into cessation-trance. Question: Does a *bodhisattva* enter into it? Is one who enters it aware that he has entered it? It is said that fire cannot burn him, nor water drown him.

One who attains the cessation-trance deserves alms and one who offers them to him will be amply rewarded, like those who give alms for parents, sick, teachers and *bodhisattvas*. This trance breeds no further karma.

Does one who leaves the cessation-trance also leave the state of perfected being? The fourfold-negation method is applied to the question.

(783b-796b) Various questions are raised concerning the trance free from conceptual identification. E.g., does one who falls away from it get reborn in the realm of desire? Is this state part of the third trance state? What thoughts are experienced there?

When one dies in the realm of desire and is reborn there do his faculties perish? The connected psychophysical elements that arise with the mind abide during its existence and perish when it perishes; these are all the elements belonging to the class of concomitant mental factors. A monk is quoted who advocates the theory of three moments, that material factors abide for three moments, but concomitant mental factors for only one.

Those who hold that lives arise without any specific order are wrong; the order is caused.

A variety of issues are reviewed pertaining to the twenty-two faculties, e.g., which are good, bad and neutral, or if there should be a different classification; what their causes and conditions are.

(796b-812b) Review once more of whether things have an essential nature and if so which ones do and what they are. The Sarvāsti-

vādin holds that even nonaccomplishment has its essential nature.

Discussion of acquisition-force. It comes into being at the same time as any factor does, and belongs to the factor at each of the three periods of time (past, present, future). Space and the unconditioned factors cannot be acquired, but even they accompany acquisition-force in past, present and future. The acquisition-force of the uncalculated cessation is an impure factor.

Factors in past, present and future have their acquisition-force in the respective period of time, so that acquiring an occurrence at a time will gain the respective three periods of time as well as factors that transcend that time-period. Those factors that arise contiguously have acquisition-force for each other, and nonacquisition for the factors that don't occur, while there is neither acquisition-nor-nonacquisition-force for factors different from either. This is spelled out in detail.

(813c-859b) Vibhajyavādin: Only the first trance has five branches.

What it's like to enter into and exit from concentration, both in general and relating to specific stages.

Why don't the four boundless states, or the sixteen kinds of contemplation of the four noble truths, terminate defilements completely? There are two kinds of concentration, maturation-concentration and meditation. The former is the upshot of the four boundless states.

Some say that meditative attainment must be pure and undefiled, but that there is no relishing in meditation. Others say that even in the material realm there are undefiled states and the state of neither-identification-nor-nonidentification. The difference between relishing and pure meditation is explained.

A lengthy discussion ensues about concentration and meditation, matching the trance states with types of meditation and liberation.

(860a-885c) Discussion of a variety of topics broadly relating to the five kinds of life cycle as animal, ghost, human etc. Should there be a sixth life cycle of *asuras*?

Further discussion of other groups of five—five objects of sense, five ways of entering liberation from the nonreturner stage.

Vibhajyavādin and Mahāsāṅghika: The Buddha's living body was free from defilements and pure. Sarvāstivādin: The Buddha's body was impure and bound by defilements, since it could have caused other's bodies to increase their defilements; furthermore, he still had impurities from previous existences.

There are four kinds of persons: (1) one who follows his desires, (2) one who strives against his desires, (3) one who abides in the material and immaterial concentrations and does not return to the

ordinary world, and (4) one who is liberated.

If one cultivates good faculties through practice oriented toward liberation, even if he falls into the *Avīci* hell (cases cited), he should be able to escape it as Devadatta did. On the other hand, two are cited who reached the trance free from conceptual identification but nevertheless fell back into the *Avīci* hell.

(886a-919b) To become a Bodhisattva takes difficult practice for three immeasurable *kalpas*. The characteristics of the Bodhisattva are described.

Sarvāstivādin: A Bodhisattva is engaged in the practice of the four perfections for three *kalpas*. The masters of foreign countries hold there are six perfections by adding patience and trance to the four. The masters of this country say, however, that these two are included in the four.

Legends about past Bodhisattvas are cited. The special powers of Bodhisattvas are described and extolled.

(919b-931b) The three types of concentration—emptiness, signlessness and dispositionlessness—are described and compared.

What should one become mindful of to complete the path of vision? The orthodox say that it is by contemplating the three kinds of frustration. The Dārṣṭāntikas say that it is by contemplating the impermanent nature of life.

Vibhajyavādin: One who enters the trance free from conceptual identification will, when defilements end and all karma has been exhausted, attain the state of perfected being.

Dārṣṭāntika: The three spheres of existence and the nine states of concentration all include three types: those who will realize the goal in the future, those who aren't to realize it because of evil karma, and those whose future is indeterminate.

Mahāsāṅghika: The stream-enterer may still backslide.

Dārṣṭāntika: The factor of the trance free from conceptual identification should not be accepted.

(932a-1003b) The work concludes with a wide array of subjects arranged in no discernible order.

NOTES

PART ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

THE HISTORICAL BUDDHA AND HIS TEACHINGS

1. See for example *Dīgha* 1: 186-187, where the Buddha rejects three of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*'s five levels of the soul, and *Majjhima* 1: 135-136 rejecting the universal *ātman*.
2. *Saṃyutta* 2: 25. A parallel to this phrase occurs also in the *Śālistamba Sūtra*, paragraph 9, the historical significance of which is discussed below.
3. G. S. Murti and A.N.K. Aiyangar, *Edicts of Aśoka*, Adyar Library, Madras, 1951, pp. 132-135.
4. *Aṅguttara* 1: 145-146.
5. *Majjihima* 1: 163.
6. *Majjhima* 1: 163; 240; M2: 93; 212.
7. We use the Sanskrit forms when words are used in the text; thus we provide *sūtra* for Pali *sutta*. When passages are quoted, however, we use the form given in the passage quoted.
8. *Majjhima* 1: 160-175 and 237-251.
9. *Majjhima* 1: 163-166; 240.
10. *Majjhima* 1: 77-80 (abridged).
11. *Majjhima* 1: 246-247.
12. *Majjhima* 1: 248-249.
13. *Majjhima* 1: 168-170.
14. *Saṃyutta* 5: 420-424.
15. *Dīgha* 2: 95-98.
16. E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, London, 1962, pp. 31-32; *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, Oxford, 1967, pp. 1-13.
17. *Dīgha* 2: 72-167.
18. *Dīgha* 2: 156.
19. See A. Bareau, *Les premiers concils bouddhiques*, Paris, 1955.
20. *Majjhima* 1: 133.
21. *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*, translated by A. Bareau, *Journal Asiatique*, Paris 1954.
22. Bhāvaviveka, *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna*; Vinītadeva, *Nikāyabhedoparśanasaṃgraha;* both translated by A. Bareau, *Journal Asiatique*, Paris 1956. See A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, Delhi, 1980, pp. 214 and 544; and E.J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, 2nd Ed., London, 1951, pp. 33 and 288.
23. See Paul Demiéville, "L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'après Paramārtha", *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, vol. 1, Louvain 1932.
24. See A. Bareau, *Les premiers concils bouddhiques* op. cit.
25. *Mahāvaṃsa*, ch. 5, vs. 1-10.
26. See A. Bareau, *Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule*, Paris, 1955, for the classical study of these schools. See also A.K. Warder, *Indian*

Buddhism, 2nd edition, Delhi 1980, pp. 288-351, and E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, Louvain 1958, pp. 571-606.

27. See Anesaki, "Some problems of the textual history of the Buddhist scriptures" and "The Four Buddhist *Āgamas* in Chinese", *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, vol. 35, nos. 2 and 3, 1908. See also Thich Minh Chau, *The Chinese Madhyama Āgama and the Pali Majjhima Nikāya*, The Saigon Institute of Higher Buddhist Studies, n.d. but probably 1964.

28. E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, op. cit., p. 31.

29. See E. Conze, *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, op. cit., pp. 1-13.

30. E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, op. cit., p. 31.

31. This exercise was first undertaken by Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Théorie des douze causes*, London, 1913, and recently updated by N. Ross Reat, *The Śālistamba Sūtra*, Delhi, 1993.

32. Minor Pillar Edicts of Sārnāth, Kosami, and Sāñcī. See G.S. Murti and A.K. Aiyangar, *Edicts of Aśoka*, op. cit., pp. 127-131.

33. Bhabra Edict. See Murti and Aiyanagar, *Edicts of Aśoka*, op. cit., pp. 83-85.

34. See N.A. Jayawickrama, 'A reference to the Third Council in Aśoka's edicts?', *University of Ceylon Review* 17.3-4, 1959, pp. 61-72.

35. E. Conze, "Recent progress in Buddhist Studies", *The Middle Way*, vol. 34, 1959, 12. Reprinted in E. Conze, *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, op. cit. See also Constantin Regamey, "Der Buddhismus Indiens" in *Christus und die Religionen der Erde* volume 3 (Vienna 1951), 231-317 (reprinted in *Der Christ in der Welt*, series 17, volume 6 (Zurich 1964), 1-103.) See also Regamey, "Le problème du Bouddhisme primitif et les derniers travaux de Stanislaw Schayer", *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* vol. 21, 1957, 37-58. See S. Schayer, "Precanonical Buddhism", *Archiv Orientalni* vol. 7 fasc. 2, 1935, 121-132, and "New contributions to the problem of pre-Hīnayanistic Buddhism", *Polski Biuletyn Orientalistyczny* vol. 1, 1937, 8-17. Response to former by A.B. Keith, "Pre-canonical Buddhism", *Indian Historical Quarterly* vol. 12, 1936, 1-20. See also M. Falk, *Nāma-rūpa and Dharma-rūpa* (Calcutta 1943). Reluctantly no doubt, these scholars join C.A.F. Rhys-Davids in her quest for a pre-canonical Buddhism; see *Sākya or Buddhist Origins* (London 1931).

36. *Aṅguttara* 1:10.

37. *Dīgha* 1:223.

38. Yaśomitra, *Abhidharmakośasphuṭārtha;* Prajñākaramati, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*; Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakakārikāprasannapadā.*

39. *Dīgha* 3:76.

40. *Dīgha* 2:1-54.

41. *Majjhima* 1:191.

42. *Saṃyutta* 3:120.

43. *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Suzuki trans., p. 278. *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, Lamotte trans., pp. 93-95. See Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, op. cit., p. 222; *Buddhist Texts Through the Ages*, p. 166.

44. *Saṃyutta* 3:105.

45. In these volumes of the *Encyclopedia* we regularly translate *duḥkha*

as "frustration".

46. *Dīgha* 1:223.

47. See, for example, *Kena Upaniṣad* 1.3.7; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.3.6; 4.4.1-25 and 4.5.13-15; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 2.41; 8.11 and 12; *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.9. See note 54 below.

48. *Dīgha* 1:188; *Majjhima* 1:426-432, 483-489; *Saṃyutta* 2:18-22, 222 and 4:374-403 *passim.*

49. *Saṃyutta* 4: 400-402. See *Itivuttaka*, verse 67.

50. *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, ch. 61, Suzuki translation, pp. 123-124. See also *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*, ch. 9, Thurman translation, p. 77; Luk translation p. 100; and E. Conze, *The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom* (Berkeley 1975), p. 209.

51. See *Saṃyutta* 2:15-20 and 4:400; *Dīgha* 1:13 and 34.

52. N. Ross Reat, *The Śālistamba Sūtra*, Delhi, 1993, p. 75.

53. N. Ross Reat, *The Śālistamba Sūtra*, op. cit., pp. 46; 68.

54. In the following passages, all four of the *catuṣkoṭi* alternatives are addressed concerning the question of whether the innermost soul is conscious (*caitanya*) (*Maitrī Upaniṣad* 6.10), not conscious (*acitta*) (*Maitrī* 6.19), both (*vijñānam cāvijñānam*) (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 6), or neither (*na prajñā, nāprajñā*) (*Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* 7).

55. See S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge 1922), Vol. 1, pp. 179-181; and N. Smart, *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy* (London 1964), pp. 66-69.

56. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism* (London 1936), ch. 11.

57. *Saṃyutta* 2:19-20.

58. *Saṃyutta* 2:19-20, 33, 38. See also *Dīgha* 1:200; D3:137; *Udāna*, pp. 69-70; and *Milindapañha*, Pali Text Society edition, pp. 46-48.

59. N. Ross Reat, *The Śālistamba Sūtra*, op. cit., pp. 46-47; 68-69.

60. *Saṃyutta* 2:20.

61. *Dīgha* 2:354; *Saṃyutta* 1:227 and 3:54.

62. The Ājīvakas appear to have been something of an exception.

63. E.g., *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 1.3

64. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.2-5; 3.2-6. See *Paiṅgala Upaniṣad* 2.7.

65. See *Majjhima* 1:421-423.

66. *Dīgha* 1:223, 2:63, 335, 338. *Majjhima* 1:296. *Saṃyutta* 1:122, 3:124.

67. *Majjhima* 1:258.

68. *Saṃyutta* 1:122, 2:91 and 3:124; *Dīgha* 1:223 and 2:63, *Suttanipāta* vs. 1037.

69. Ninian Smart, *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy* (London 1964) p. 46.

70. E.g., *Majjhima* 1: 111; *Dīgha* 1: 222-223, 2: 62. See N.R. Reat, "Some fundamental concepts of Buddhist psychology," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* vol.17, 1987, 15-28.

71. *Majjhima* 1:190.

72. See *Suttanipāta*, verse 909: "A seeing man will see name-and-form". Having seen he will understand those things. Let him at pleasure look much

or little, for the skillful do not say that purity is (attained) by that". See also *Suttanipāta*, verses 1037 and 1073.

73. *Saṃyutta* 2:24.

74. *Majjhima* 1:190: "A space enclosed by bones, sinews, flesh and skin is known as *rūpa*", in the context of a discussion of *nāmarūpa*, is in fact the only unambiguous instance I have located.

75. *Dīgha* 2:32.

76. *Mādhyamika Kārikā*, section 3, vs. 1-9.

77. *Majjhima* 1:137.

78. N. Ross Reat, *The Śālistamba Sūtra,* op. cit., pp. 57-60. *Dīgha* 3:214; *Majjhima* 1:147; 489.

79. *Sutta Nipāta*, verse 705.45.

80. *Aṅguttara* 3:415. Cp. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* VI.4.5.

81. *Majjhima* 1:301.

82. *Dīgha* 1:206.

83. *Aṅguttara* 1:125. Cp. *Aṅguttara* 1:230 ff. regarding *śīla*, *citta* and *prajñā.*

84. *Dīgha* 2:312.

85. *Aṅguttara* 1:261; *Saṃyutta* 2:167.

86. As at *Dīgha* 2:312.

87. As it is extensively at *Dīgha* 1: 4-8 and 63-69.

88. As at *Majjhima* 1:85.

89. *Majjhima* 1:286; *Saṃyutta* 5:264.

90. *Dīgha* 2: 312; *Aṅguttara* 5:205.

91. *Dīgha* 1:9-12; *Majjhima* 3:754; *Aṅguttara* 3:208; etc.

92. *Dīgha* 2: 312.

93. *Majjhima* 1:118-122.

94. Also occurring at *Dīgha* 2:49.

95. *Dīgha* 1:251; *Majjhima* 1:351.

96. *Dīgha* 2:1-53.

97. *Majjhima* 1: 60. (1) sensual desire (*kāmachanda*), (2) hatred (*vyāpāda*), (3) sloth and torpor (p. *thīnamidha*), (4) flurry and worry (P. *udhaccakukucca*), (5) uncertainty (P. *vicikicchā*).

98. *Majjhima* 1: 61-62. (1) mindfulness (P. *sati*), (2) investigation of *dharma* (P. *dhammavicaya*), (3) energy (P. *viriya*), (4) joy (P. *pīti*), (5) serenity (P. *passaddhi*), (6) concentration (*samādhi*), (7) equanimity (P. *upekkhā*).

99. *Majjhima* 3:71; *Dīgha* 2:313.

100. *Majjhima* 1:163-166.

101. *Dīgha* 1:184; *Aṅguttara* 4:451-454, and see Paul Griffiths, *On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem* (La Salle, Illinois, 1986).

102. *Majjhima* 1:296.

103. Paul Griffiths, "Concentration or insight: the problematic of Theravāda Buddhist meditation-theory", *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 49, 1981, 605-624.

104. *Dīgha* 3:213; *Majjhima* 1:33, 494; *Aṅguttara* 5:99-100, 131; *Saṃyutta* 5:52.

105. *Aṅguttara* 4:360 and 5:99-100, 131.
106. *Majjhima* 1:71, 357; *Aṅguttara* 1:61, 3:417, 4:360; 31-32, 99-100, 131.
107. *Aṅguttara* 3:355.
108. *Dīgha* 3: 93-94.
109. At *Saṃyutta* 2:118.
110. *Dīgha* 1:184.
111. *Majjhima* 1:435-437.
112. *Majjhima* 3:76. See *Saṃyutta* 5:20.
113. Rod Bucknell, "The Buddhist path to liberation: an analysis of the listing of stages", *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies,* 7.2, 1984, 10-11. See *Majjhima* 1:182-184, 347-348 and 2:38-39.
114. *Majjhima* 1:33, 70-71, 356-358; *Aṅguttara* 1:61, 3:417, 4:360, 451-454 and 5:32, 99-100; *Saṃyutta* 5:203.
115. *Dīgha* 2:71; *Majjhima* 1:477; *Aṅguttara* 4:453; *Saṃyutta* 1:191; *Aṅguttara* 1:73 and 4:10, 77.

2. THE BUDDHIST WAY TO LIBERATION

1. See the list of ten relevant meanings in Peter Harvey, "'Signless meditation' in Pali Buddhism", Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 98.1, 1986, 31-33.
2. Henepola Gunaratna, *The Path of Serenity and Insight* (Delhi, 1985), p. 18.
3. *Aṅguttara Nikāya* 5:113.
4. *Saṃyuttanikāya* 5:64-65.
5. Gunaratna, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
6. Gunaratna, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
7. *Samprasādana.* Gunaratne translates it as "confidence".
8. George D. Bond, "The development and elaboration of the *arahant* ideal in the Theravāda Buddhist doctrine", Journal of the American Academy of Religion 52.2, 1984, p. 227.
9. Ibid., p. 234.
10. Irene B. Horner, *The Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected*: A Study of the Arahan (London 1936).
11. Gunaratna, op. cit., p. 189
12. Paul J. Griffiths, *On Being Mindless. Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem* (La Salle, Illinois, 1986), pp. 10-13. This book should be consulted for an extended investigation of the conception of this state in the various kinds and stages of Buddhism. Note also the discussion in the present volume by Noble Ross Reat, pp. 53-55 above.
13. Gunaratna, op. cit., p. 205, suggests the superiority of the latter, but even he admits that "the *paññā-vimutta* and *ubhatobhagavimutta arahats* are equal with respect to release from suffering".

3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ABHIDHARMA PHILOSOPHY

1. T.W. Rhys Davids, trans., *Book of Discipline, Mahāvagga* I. p. 6.
2. *Aṭṭhasālinī* I.2, 3.
3. *Vinaya-Aṭṭhakathā,* vol. 5, p. 990: "*abdhidhamme" ti nāma-rūpa-pari-*

cchede vinetum na paṭibalo hoti. Cf. also *Aṭṭhasālinī*, I.52.

4. Pradhan, ed. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, p. 2.

5. Cf. P. Pradhan, ed., ibid.: *eṣa tāvat pāramārthiko 'bhidharmaḥ.*

6. *Vibhaṅga-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 7-8: *ettha ca khanādikathā va "nippariyāyā". sesā "sappariyāyā" tāsu nippariyāyakathā idha adhippetā.*

7. *Utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā tathāgatānāṃ sthitaivaiṣā dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā.* This is a common refrain in a number of Buddhist texts; see the references in Ronald M. Davidson, "An introduction to the standards of scriptural authenticity in Indian Buddhism", in *Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha*, ed. Robert E. Buswell, Jr., Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1990.

8. The *mahāpadeśas* have been treated by Étienne Lamotte, "La critique d'authenticité dans le Bouddhisme", *India Antiqua* [Vogel Festschrift] (Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1947), pp. 213-222. A recent survey article examining the role of the *mahāpadeśas* in Buddhist standards of textual authenticity has been written by Ronald M. Davidson: see previous note. There were other standards of textual hermeneutics, as for example the *catuḥpratiśaraṇa* (the four resorts): i.e. to take resort (1) in Dharma, not individuals; (2) in meaning, not the words; (3) in *sūtras* of definitive meaning [*nītārtha*], not *sūtras* of provisional meaning [*neyārtha*]; (4) in knowledge, not consciousness; for these, see Étienne Lamotte, "La critique d'interpretation dans le bouddhisme", *Annuaire de l'institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves IX* [Mélanges Henry Gregoire] (1949), pp. 341-361.

9. Ernst Waldschmidt, ed., *Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschafte, 1951), vol. 2, pp. 238-240; idem., *Die Überlieferung vom Lebensende des Buddha*, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, Nr. 29 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1944), vol. 1, pp. 136-140. See also André Bareau, *Recherches sur la Biographie du Buddha dans les Sūtrapiṭaka et les Vinayapiṭaka anciens*, Publications de l'École Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, vol. 77 (Paris, 1971), part I, pp. 222-239; translated in Davidson, "Standards of authenticity", op. cit.

10. See T.W. Rhys Davids and J.E. Carpenter, eds., *Dīghanikāya* (London: Pali Text Society, 1890-1911), vol. 2, pp. 123-126; R. Morris, E. Hardy, M. Hunt, eds., *Aṅguttaranikāya* (London: Pali Text Society, 1885-1910), vol. 2, pp. 167-170.

11. E. Hardy, ed., *Nettipakaraṇa* (London: Pali Text Society, 1902), pp. 21-22; Nanamoli, trans., *The Guide*, Pali Text Society Translations Series, no. 33 (London: Luzac, 1962), pp. 37-38. The Sarvāstivādins have also interpreted *dharmatā* as *pratītyasamutpāda*: "[na ca sūtraṃ badhate] na ca sūtrāntaraṃ virodhayati. [na dharmātāṃ bādhate] iti pratītyasamutpāda-dharmatām." For *dharmatā* as indicating the "way of things", see Walpola Rahula, "Wrong notions of *dhammatā* (*dharmatā*)", in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B. Horner*, ed. L. Cousins, et al., pp. 181-191 (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1974).

12. *Majjhimanikāya* ii.245: "appamattako so, Ānanda, vivādo yad idam—ajjhājīve vā adhipātimokkhe vā. magge vā hi Ānanda, patipadāya vā saṅghe

vivādo uppajjamāno uppajjeyya; svāso vivādo bahujanāhitāya bahujanāsukhāya bahuno janassa anatthāya ahitāya dukkhāya devamanussānaṃ."

13. *Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka of Haribhadra*, ed. G. Tucci, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, vol. 62 (Baroda, 1932), pp. 260-261; see also *Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 197-8 n. 7.

14. The major European research concerning the Buddhist Councils has been succinctly treated by Charles S. Prebish, "A review of scholarship on the Buddhist councils", *Journal of Asian Studies* 33 (1974), pp. 239-254.

15. *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta, Dīghanikāya* ii. 162; Rhys Davids, trans., *Dialogues of the Buddha*, vol. 2, p. 184. Also *Cullavagga* 11.1 (*Vinaya-piṭaka* iii.284): "tena kho panāvuso, samayena Subhaddo nāma vuddhapabbajito tassam parisāyaṃ nisinno hoti. Atho kho, āvuso, Subhaddo vuddhapabbajito te bhikkhū etad avoca: 'alaṃ, āvuso, mā socittha; mā paridevittha. Sumuttā mayaṃ tena mahāsamaṇena; upaddutā ca mayaṃ homa—idaṃ vo kappati, idam vo na kappatī ti. idāni pana mayaṃ yam icchissāma tam karissāma, yaṃ no icchissāma na taṃ karissāmā' ti. handa mayaṃ, āvuso, dhammaṃ ca vinayaṃ ca saṅgāyāma." The interlocutor who makes this remark is identified variously in the literature of the different schools as either Subhadda (Theravāda), Upananda (Mahīśāsaka, Dharmaguptaka, and Haimavata schools), or anonymous (Sarvāstivāda, Mahāsāṃghika); see discussion in Davidson, "Standards of authenticity", op. cit.

16. Scholarship on this council has been discussed by Prebish, "A review of Buddhist councils", op. cit., pp. 240-246.

17. André Bareau, *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques*, op. cit., p. 28, noted in Prebish, "A review of Buddhist councils", op. cit., p. 245.

18 "Therehi, avuso Purāṇa, dhammo ca vinaya ca saṅgīto, upehi taṃ saṅgītim' ti. "Susaṅgītāvuso, therehi bhikkhūhi dhammo ca vinayo ca. api ca yatheva mayā bhagavato sammukhā sutaṃ, sammukhā patiggahītaṃ, tathevāhaṃ dhāressāmī' ti. *Cullavagga* 11.7; *Vinaya-piṭaka* iii.290.

19. For this list, see Nalinaksha Dutt, *Buddhist Sects in India* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), pp. 15-22; Prebish, "A review of Buddhist councils", op. cit., pp. 246-247.

20. See, for example, Wilhelm Geiger, trans., *The Mahāvaṃsa, or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon* (1912; reprint edition, London: Pali Text Society, 1964), p. lix.

21. M. Hofinger's study, *Étude sur la concile de Vaiśālī* (Louvain; Bureaux de Museon, 1946), was the first to attempt to debunk the theory that the first schism took place at the council of Vaiśālī.

22. Among the most exhaustive treatments of these five points is Janice J. Nattier and Charles S. Prebish, "Mahāsāṃghika origins: the beginnings of Buddhist sectarianism", *History of Religions* 16 (1977), pp. 250-257. Mahādeva's fifth point adumbrates the debate concerning sudden and gradual enlightenment that is of vital concern to several of the Asian traditions of Buddhism, and figured in the epic debate between the Indian gradualist and Chinese sudden enlightenment traditions that is supposed to have occurred at the "Council of Lhasa".

23. Nattier and Prebish, "Mahāsāṃghika origins", op. cit., pp. 238-239.

Based on internal text-critical evidence noted by modern scholars of the *Vinaya-piṭaka*, such as Bareau, Pachow, Hofinger, Frauwallner, and Roth, these scholars show that the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya was the most ancient and conservative of the Vinaya recensions, and the schism with the Sthaviravādins seems to have been prompted by attempts of the Elders to expand the *Śaikṣadharma* sections of the *Vinaya*; see ibid., pp. 268-270.

24. *Mahāvaṃsa* v.278; Wilhelm Geiger, trans., *The Mahāvaṃsa or The Great Chronicle of Ceylon*, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

25. The attribution to this sect of the *Sammitīyanikāyaśāstra*, which is available only in Chinese translation (*T*1649), has been challenged by Thich Thien Chau, "The literature of *pudgalavādins*", *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 7 (1984), p. 8.

26. Bareau, *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques*, op. cit., pp. 115-118. See the outline of this council in Prebish, "Buddhist councils", op. cit., pp. 253-254.

27. According to the Pali *Mahāvaṃsa* (ca. 6th century) xii; Geiger, *Mahāvaṃsa*, pp. 82-87.

28. *Mahāvaṃsa* xiii; Geiger, *Mahāvaṃsa*, pp. 88-90.

29. Cf. Geiger, *Mahāvaṃsa*, pp. 39-50.

30. P.L. Vaidya, ed., *Divyāvadāna*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts Series, no. 20 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1959), notably *avadānas* nos. 26-29.

31. See Geiger, *Mahāvaṃsa*, pp. 32-50 passim.

32. For accounts of the Third Council of the Sarvāstivādins see Bareau, *Premiers conciles*, op. cit., pp. 112[?]-133; for the compilation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, see *infra*.

33. Pe Maung Tin, trans., *The Expositor* (1920; reprint ed., London: Pali Text Society, 1976), pp. 18-21.

34. Vaidya, ed., *Divyāvadāna*, p. 258.

35. Pe Maung Tin, trans., *The Expositor*, pp. 20-21.

36. Pe Maung Tin, trans., *The Expositor*, p. 21.

37. Pe Maung Tin, trans., *The Expositor*, p. 2.

38. Pe Maung Tin, trans., *The Expositor*, pp. 6-8.

39. *Sphuṭārthā Vyākhyā*, p. 12. For sources on the *Udānavarga*, by Dharmatrāta (ca. 2nd cent. A.D.), see Maurice Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1933), vol. 2, p. 237; and for Dharmatrāta, see the summary in Charles Willemen, trans., *The Essence of Metaphysics*, Publications de l'Institut Belge des hautes études bouddhiques, series études et textes, no. 4 (Bruxelles, 1975), pp. xiv-xv.

40. Jean Przyluski, *Le Council de Rājagṛha*, Buddhica, no. 2 (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1926), pp. 201, 303.

41. Przyluski, ibid., pp. 229-231. The approaches to legitimation adopted by the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins has received extensive treatment in Davidson, "Standards of authenticity", which may be consulted for further references.

42. *Sphuṭārtha*, p. 11.

43. *Dīghanikāya* iii.128; Rhys Davids, trans. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Sacred Texts of the Buddhists vol. 2, p. 120.

44. For a complete explanation of these thirty-seven items, see Rhys

Davids, *The Dialogues of the Buddha*, ibid. pp. 128-130 n. 2.

45. See, for example, the *suttas* included in Vibhaṅgavagga of the *Majjhimanikāya*: *Cūlakamma-vibhaṅga, Mahākamma-vibhaṅga, Saḷāyatana-vibhaṅga, Uddesa-vibhaṅga, Araṇa-vibhaṅga, Dhātu-vibhaṅga, Sacca-vibhaṅga* and *Dakkhiṇā-vibhaṅga*.

46. The *Nidānasaṃyutta* (ii.1-132) includes several *sūtras* dealing only with dependent origination. The *Dhātusaṃyutta* (*Saṃyutta* ii.140-177) deals with all kinds of elements and gives their traditional definitions. The *Khandhasaṃyutta* (*Saṃyutta* iii.1-180) discusses details relating to all the aggregates. The *Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta* (*Saṃyutta* iv.1-172) deals with the way in which the three marks of existence apply to the sense-fields. The *Sāriputta* (*Saṃyutta* iii.235-240) and *Moggallāna Saṃyuttas* (*Saṃyutta* iv.262-280) are long discourses on the form and formless concentrations. The *Asaṃkhatasaṃyutta* (*Saṃyutta* iv.359-373) deals with *nirvāṇa*. The *Mahāvagga*, the last book of the *Saṃyuttanikāya*, deals with the path. Finally, there are seven separate *saṃyuttas* dealing with the seven categories of *dharmas* included in the *bodhipakkhiyadhammas*.

47. See, for example, the *Saccavibhaṅga-sutta* and *Uddesavibhaṅga-sutta*.

48. Pe Maung Tin, trans., *The Expositor*, p. 3.

49. A.L. Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas* (London, 1951), p. 75 has suggested that this is instead a reference to the death of Makkhali Gosāla.

50. T.W. Rhys Davids, trans. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part II, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, vol. 14 (1921; reprint ed., Pali Text Society, 1977), p. 199.

51. Takakusu Junjiro, "On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins", *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 57 (1904/1905), pp. 99-101. As Takakusu notes, however, the contents of the *dharma*-lists included in the two texts are usually different.

52. *Majjhima* i.472.

53. *Majjhima-Aṭṭhakathā* iii.185.

54. *Aṅguttara* i.117.

55. See references cited in Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, Volume 2: Dictionary (Delhi 1970), p. 428, s.v. "*mātṛkā*"; *Divyāvadāna*, p. 18.

56. These *mātikās* are listed in Nyanatiloka Mahathera, *Guide through the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka* (1938; reprint ed., Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971), pp. 6-11; they have received extensive treatment in Nyanaponika Thera, *Abhidhamma Studies: Researches in Buddhist Psychology* (1949; reprint ed., Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1976), passim.

57. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* 1309. Edward Muller, ed., *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (1885; reprint ed., London: Pali Text Society, 1978), p. 226; Caroline Rhys Davids, trans., *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics* (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1900), pp. 341-2.

58. *Dīgha* iii.212-214; Rhys Davids, trans. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, op. cit., pp. 205-207.

59. Nos. 1-18 of this chart appear in the first Kośasthāna; nos. 19-21 are taken from the third Kośasthāna.

60. Prahlad Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, Visvabharati Studies 12, 1950.

61. A.K. Warder, "The *Mātikā*", in A.P. Buddhadatta and A.K. Warder, eds., *Mohavicchedanī: Abhidhammamātikaṭṭhavaṇṇanā* (London: Pali Text Society, 1961), Introduction, p. xx.

62. Warder, *Mohavicchedanī* op. cit., Introduction, pp. xx-xxi, and see discussion pp. xxi-xxiii.

63. A cogent summary of these three stages of development of Pali Abhidhamma literature may be found in Mizuno Kogen, "Abhidharma literature", *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, ed. G.P. Malalasekera (Ceylon: Government of Ceylon, 1961), fascicule A-Aca, p. 75-80. See also K.R. Norman, *Pali Literature* Wiesbaden 1983.

64. It has also been suggested that the text came to be included in the *Abhidhammapiṭaka* because it served "to define the limits of philosophical discourse"; see A.K. Warder, "The concept of a concept", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1 (1971), p. 185.

65. Nyanatiloka, *Guide through the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka* (1938; rev. ed., Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971), p. 61.

66. *Kathāvatthu* xvii.6; Shwe Zan Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, trans., *Points of Controversy* (1915; reprint ed., London: Pali Text Society, 1979), p. 318. Nyanatiloka (*Guide*, op. cit., p. 81) suggests that Vetulyaka is corruption of *Vaipulya*, alluding to the *Vaipulya-sūtras* of the Mahāyānists.

67. For an extensive bibliography on the "Council of Lhasa" and a discussion of this issue of sudden and gradual enlightenment in Indian Buddhism, see Luis O. Gomez, "Indian materials on the doctrine of sudden enlightenment", in *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, ed. Whalen Lai and Lewis R. Lancaster, Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, vol. 5, pp. 393-434 (Berkeley, 1983).

68. See discussion in H.N. Randle, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools* (London, 1930), pp. 13-15.

69. For a discussion of each of these twenty-four *paccayas*, see Nyanatiloka, *Guide*, op. cit., pp. 117-127.

70. At 159, 160, 169, 324.

71. The most extensive discussion on the term *bhavaṅga* appears in E.R. Sarathchandra, *Buddhist Psychology of Perception* (Colombo: Ceylon University Press, 1958), pp. 75-96, who cites also the *Milindapañha* treatment of the term; see also O.H. de A. Wijesekera, "Canonical references to *bhavaṅga*", *Malalasekera Commemorative Volume* (Colombo, 1976), pp. 348-352.

72. Mizuno Kogen, "Abhidhamma literature", op. cit., p. 67.

73. A.K. Warder, Introduction to *Path of Discrimination*, (*Paṭisambhidāmagga*), trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli (London: Pali Text Society, 1982), p. xl.

74. For an elaborate discussion of the chronology of the text's evolution, see A.K. Warder, Introduction to *The Path of Discrimination*, ibid., pp. xxix-xxxix; its place in the Abhayagirivasin is discussed at p. xl. Much material on the philosophy of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* and its place in Abhidhamma philosophy may be found *passim* throughout his Introduction.

75. For references to the appearance of these ten knowledges in Pāli materials, see Warder, Introduction to *Path of Discrimination*, ibid., p. xxi. For the term *gotrabhū*, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Pāli *gotta/gotra* and the term *Gotrabhū* in Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit", in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B. Horner*, ed. L. Cousins, et al., pp. 119-210 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1974); the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* treatment of the term appears in *Path of Discrimination*, pp. 200-202.

76. For the relationship between these two texts, see Nanamoli Thera, "Translator's Introduction", *The Guide*, op. cit.

77. *Aṅguttara* I.36, iv.203.

78. For detailed treatments of these two books, see George D. Bond, *The Word of the Buddha: The Tipiṭaka and Its Interpretation in Theravāda Buddhism* (Colombo: M.D. Gunasena, 1982); and Bond's "The gradual path as a hermeneutical approach to the *dharma* in the *Netti Pakaraṇa* and *Peṭakopadesa*", in *Buddhist Hermeneutics*, ed. Donald Lopez (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, forthcoming).

79. For specifically Sarvāstivāda ideas that were adopted by the Mahāyānists, see Hirakawa Akira, "The rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its relationship to the worship of the *stūpas*", *Toyo Bunko* 22, 1963, pp. 59-69 (full article, pp. 57-106), translated Taitetsu Unno.

80. These members are listed at Fukuhara, *Abhidatsuma ronsho*, pp. 174-177, where also is clarified its distinction from the forty-member *mātṛkā* included in the earlier translation of the *Jñānaprasthāna*.

81. For early Sarvāstivāda activities in Mathurā, and especially the contribution of their patriarch, Upagupta, none of whose works survive, see Nalinaksha Dutt, *Buddhist Sects in India*, op. cit., pp. 126-128. For inscriptional evidence to the Sarvāstivāda *vihāras* in Mathurā, see Klaus L. Janert, *Heinrich Luders: Mathurā Inscriptions* (Gottingen: 1961).

82. For the *bahirdeśakas*, see Kimura Taiken, *Abhidatsumaron no kenkyu*, p. 213; Watanabe U., *Ubu Abhidatsumaron no kenkyu* p. 124; Charles Willemen, trans., *The Essence of Metaphysics*, p. xxii.

83. Dutt, *Buddhist Sects*, op. cit., pp. 136-137.

84. Junjiro Takakusu, *I-tsing's Record*, pp. xxii-xxiv. Another Chinese pilgrim, Fa-hsien (travelled to India A.D. 399-414) refers to "followers of Hīnayāna" predominating in several of central Asia kingdoms; see James Legge, trans., *A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms* (1886; reprint ed., New York: Dover Publications, 1965), passim. While it is unclear to which specific school these followers belonged, certainly many would have been Vaibhāṣika adherents.

85. *Jñānaprasthāna*, *T* 26.887a221-22; see discussion in Takakusu, "Abhidharma literature", op. cit., p. 78. For extensive references to secondary materials on this division, see Willemen, *Essence*, op. cit., pp. 191-192 n. 111.

86. *T* 26.514a7.

87. See discussion in Fukuhara, *Ubu Abhidatsuma*, p. 109.

88. Watters, *Yuan-chwang*, vol. 1, p. 294.

89. Étienne Lamotte, trans., *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse* (*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*), vol. 3 (Louvain, 1970), p. xx; Erich Frau-

wallner, "Abhidharma-studien", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 15 (1971), p. 71; see discussion in Willemen, *Essence*, op. cit., p. xix.

90. *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* ed. U. Ogihara (Tokyo, 1971), p.11.

91. Fukuhara Ryogen, *Ubu Abhidatsuma ronshc no kenkyu* (Kyoto, 1965), pp. 102-219.

Sakurabe Hajime has proposed three major stages in the development of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma literature. First was the *Saṅgītiparyāya* and *Dharmaskandha*, the primitive style of which was evocative of the *Āgamas*. This was followed by a fivefold second stage: (a) *Vijñānakāya*, *Dhātukāya*, and *Prajñaptibhāṣya*; (b) *Prakaraṇapāda*; (c) *Jñānaprasthāna* and *Ārya-Vasumitrabodhisattva-Saṅgītiśāstra*; (d) the various *Vibhāṣās*; and (e) *Abhidharmāmṛta* of Ghoṣaka. This was followed by *Abhidharmahṛdaya* of Dharmaśrī, Dharmatrāta's *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, culminating in Vasubandhu's celebrated *Abhidharmakośa*. See Sakurabe Hajime, *Kusharon no Kenkyu* p. 42 ff, 50 ff.; Sakurabe's position has been summarized in Willemen, *Essence*, p. xxii.

Mizuno Kogen ("Abhidharma literature", op. cit., p. 69) has also divided the several canonical texts into three similar groups. He places in his earliest group the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, *Dharmaskandha*, and *Prajñaptibhāṣya*; the *Vijñānakāya* and *Dhātukāya* in the middle; and *Prakaraṇapāda* and *Jñānaprasthāna* in the latest group.

All of these various chronologies must be considered tentative, and information that may be gleaned from stylistic considerations or passages quoted from other works will have to be taken fully into account in order to make a more definitive determination.

92. For a chart of the number of *dharmas* included in each chapter, see Fukuhara, *Ubu Abidatsuma*, p. 106.

93. *T* 26.463a 6-7.

94. *T* 26.435b.

95. See also the listing of these seven types in Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, p. 380.

96. For a chart of the contents of the three texts, see Fukuhara, pp. 110-112.

97. See *Abhidharmakośa*, pp. 54 ff for discussion on the reasons for adopting the former order; and cf. *Visuddhimagga*.

98. *Dīgha* 27, *Hsia-yüan ching*, *Dīrghāgama*, *sūtra* no. 5.

99. *T* 32.173-225.

100. Fukuhara, p. 124.

101. For the scholarly debate on this point, see Fukuhara, *Ubu Abidatsuma*, p. 129.

102. See Hsuan-tsang's *Hsi-yu chi* 5, *T.* 51.898c.

103. This according to Fukuhara, pp. 130-131, citing Akanumi Chizen, p. 157b.

104. *T* 26.5319 ff.

105. This Maudgalyāyana, the namesake of one of the chief disciples of the Buddha, is otherwise unknown. According to Fukuhara (p. 131), he was

a follower of the Mahāsāṃghika school, but Fukuhara provides no substantiation for his surmise. It may be recalled in this connection that Maudgalyāyana's name figures prominently in the *Abhidharmakośa* in the debates concerning the reality of the three times. There, it is stated that certain *parivrājakas*, having killed Maudgalyāyana with cudgels, subsequently claimed that their actions would have no consequence in the future because they occurred in the past. In order to correct this false view regarding the potency of karman, the Buddha then is said to have declared, "Past karman does exist". These words thus served as the source for the debate between the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas concerning the reality of the three times. The relevance of the name Maudgalyāyana in connection with the claim in this passage of the *Vijñānakāya* that only the present exists is perhaps to be traced to the ambiguities present in this tale.

106. *Chü-she lun chi* 20, *T* 41.310a19-20.

107. Its discussion is summarized at Fukuhara, pp. 133-134, citing *Vijñānakāya*, *T.* 26.353b. ff.

108. *T* 26.537a ff.

109. *T* 29.157a ff.

110. As, for example, at T 27.41a.

111. *T* 26.547b.

112. Further clarification of the meaning of past and future is found in the *Vasumitrasaṅgītiśāstra* (*T* 28.795b), which excerpts the material by Vasumitra on three times that appears in the *Vibhāṣā*, and clarifies that where there is the *samanvāgama* (=*prāpti*) of a *dharma*, that *dharma* exists, but where there is *asamanvāgama* (=*aprāpti*), it does not. Noted Fukuhara, pp. 136-137.

113. Fukuhara, p. 153.

114. These two recensions are composed in Fukuhara, p. 154.

115. *T* 28.98-100.

116. *T* 28.995-998. The texts have been reconstructed into Sanskrit first by N. Aiyaswami Sastri, "Pañcavastuka Śāstra and Vibhāṣā", *VisvaBharati Annals* 10 (1961), pp. 1-54; and later by I. Imanishi, "Das *Pañcavastukam* und die *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā*", Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, I Philologische-Historische Klasse (Jahrgang, 1969).

117. Fukuhara, p. 156; Aiyaswami (*"Pañcavastuka"*, p. i n. 1) suggests that the *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā* is adopted from the *Prakaraṇapāda*, with only minor variations.

118. *T* 26.501a-b

119. *T* 26.804c 25-27.

120. *T* 26.494c.

121. For the development of Sarvāstivādin *dharma*-classifications, see Fukuhara Ryogon, "Shoho bunrui no shiteki tenkai" [The historical development of *dharma*-classifications], *Ryukoku daigakyu ronshu* 359 (1958).

122. At Fukuhara, p. 155.

123. Fukuhara, p. 158.

124. *T* 28.981c ff.

125. See discussion in Fukuhara, "Shoho no bunrui", op. cit.

126. Other traditions place him between one and five centuries after the

Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*; see discussion in Fukuhara, op. cit., pp. 172-174.

127. *Pa chien-tu lun*, *T* 1543.

128. Fa-chih lun: *T* 1544.

129. For discussion of the differences between these two Chinese recensions, see Fukuhara, op. cit., pp. 218-219.

130. *Chi-i-man tsu-lun*: *T* 26.383a 27-28.

131. *T* 26.8-9.

132. For extensive discussion on the soteriological orientation of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, see Fukuhara, op. cit., pp. 180-187.

133. *T* 26.547b.

134. *T* 27.79a ff.

135. For discussion of these six *hetus* and the role of the *Jñānaprasthāna* in their development, see Fukuhara, op. cit., pp. 196-217.

136. For lists of these teachers and schools, see Mizuno, "Abhidharma literature", op. cit., p. 72; Fukuhara, *Ubu*, pp. 223-227. It should be noted that the names of several of the early Sarvāstivāda teachers mentioned are reconstructions of the Chinese transliterations, and must be considered as tentative.

137. *T* 1545.27.1 a-b.

138. For a summary of this account, see Fukuhara, *Ubu*, p. 222.

139. Takakusu Junjiro, "The Life of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha (A.D. 499-569)", *T'oung Pao* 5 (1904), pp. 276-279. Aśvaghoṣa's sectarian affiliation is a matter of considerable controversy. E.H. Johnston (*Buddhacarita* II, p. xiii) proposes that Aśvaghoṣa belongs to the Bahuśrutīya subsect of the Mahāsāṃghikas. B.C. Law (*Aśvaghoṣa* [Calcutta, 1946], pp. 16-17) suggests that he was an adherent of the Dharmaguptaka school. Finally, de Jong (*Indo Iranian Journal* 20 [1978], pp. 125-126) hypothesizes that he was a follower of the Sautrāntika school. See the summary of these views in David Seyfort Ruegg, *Madhyamaka Literature*, p. 121 and n. 402. It should be noted that Aśvaghoṣa's connection with the authorship of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* is mentioned only in Paramārtha's account.

140. *T* 1545.27.

141. Kimura Taiken, *Abhidharumaron no kenkyu*, p. 248 ff.

142. Yaśomitra (*Sphuṭārthā*, op. cit., p. 58) refers to the debate over the identification of a certain Bhadanta as being Dharmatrāta, and suggests that "he is some other elder Sautrāntika monk besides Venerable Dharmatrāta". Dharmatrāta II's *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (*T.* 28.946b15) notes that Dharmatrāta I (a Dārṣṭāntika, who was one of the four Ābhidharmikas cited in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*) is sometimes referred to as the Bhadanta; noted in Willemen, *Essence of Metaphysics*, op. cit., p. xv. These comments are probably not relevant to the identification of the Bhadanta in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* as Kātyāyanīputra, who is the only plausible candidate in the context of a text that is, it must be remembered, fundamentally a commentary to the *Jñānaprasthāna*.

143. For example, in one section of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (*T* 27.393a), which opens with the query, "What are the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*?", the presentations of the views of most of the teachers begin with the stock phrase: "Ghoṣaka gives this explanation: If a *dharma* is...." For Vasumitra, how-

ever, we instead find a citation that seems to be from a commentary by Vasumitra embedded in the text: "Vasumitra gives this explanation: "What are the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*? ..." This appears to be a quote directly from a text by Vasumitra himself. This is because if this were purely and extemporaneous oral presentation, there would have been no need to repeat verbatim the Vibhāṣāśāstrin's question that opened the discussion; indeed, such a requotation is not found in the citations of other teachers.

144. Cf. *T* 10.46a26.

145. Tao-an in his *Preface to the Vibhāṣā* (quoted in *Ch'u-san-tsang chi-chi, T* 55.73b-c) questions the authenticity of this attribution to Sītapāṇi; see Fukuhara, *Ubu*, pp. 227-228.

146. The contents of these three texts have been compared by Kawamura Kosho, *Abidatsuma ronsho no shiryoteki kenkyu* (Kyoto, 1974).

147. *T* 27.116b16-24.

148. *T* 28.860c.

149. *T* 27.809b.

150. *T* 27.106c-107A.

151. *Kathāvatthu* 8.7; cf. *Kathāvatthu* 17.3.

152. *Abhidharmakośa* 4.1.

153. *T* 27.690a 23-24.

154. For an outline of the attitude toward the *antarābhava* held by the various Buddhist sects, see Alex Wayman, "The intermediate state dispute in Buddhism", in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B. Horner*, L. Cousins et al., eds. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974), pp. 227-239.

155. *T* 27.220a.

156. See *T* 27.146c ff.; Fukuhara, pp. 252-253.

157. For this relationship, see the extensive discussion in Fukuhara, pp. 248-259.

158. On the two types of doubt, see *T* 27.386b, Fukuhara, p. 248; for a different listing of four kinds of doubt, see *T* 27.68c, Fukuhara, p. 249.

159. Cf. *T* 27.146c.

160. See Fukuhara, pp. 287 ff.

161. *T* 28.33b4-21, where they are listed as (1) *parihānadharman* (*t'ui-fa*); (2) *cetanādharman* (*ssu-fa*); (3) *anurakṣaṇadharman* (*hu-fa*), (4) *sthitikampya* (*ju-fa*); (5) *prativādhanadharman* (*t'ung-ta*); (6) *akopyadharman* (*pu-tung-fa*).

162. *T* 28.585a ff., quoted in Fukuhara, pp. 289-290.

163. *T* 28.147b79-c4.

164. For Fukuhara's treatment of Ghoṣaka's scheme, from which the expository descriptions of the significance of each state included above has been drawn, and his discussion of the relation between this scheme and the Yogācāra, see Fukuhara, pp. 278-280.

165. *T* 28.389c25.

166. *T* 28.389c 24-26.

167. *T* 28.389c28-390a5. The tree-shadow simile may also be found in the *Abhidharmakośa* 1, *T* 29.3a.

168. See discussion in Fukuhara, pp. 317-8, who cites no reference from the Vibhāṣā.

169. *T* 32.266a ff.
170. *T* 28.389c.
171. *T* 32.266a.
172. *Abhidharmakośa* I.15.
173. See *Samayabhedopacaracanacakra.*
174. *T* 28.888b.
175. *T* 29.543c.
176. *T* 28.688c-689a.

4. A FEW EARLY ABHIDHARMA CATEGORIES

1. Johannes Bronkhorst, "Dharma and Abhidharma", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 48.2, 1985, p. 318.
2. Bronkhorst, ibid., p. 305.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 318.
5. Ibid., p. 309.
6. *The Path of Discrimination.* Pali Text Society Translation Series 43, London 1982.
7. Warder, ibid., pp. xxx-xxxi.
8. Based on Nyanaponika Thera, *Abhidhamma Studies. Researches in Buddhist Psychology* (Colombo 1949; Kandy 1965, 1976, 1985), pp. 31-33. I have replaced Nyanaponika's translations of Buddhist terms with those used in this Encyclopedia.
9. R.M. Gethin, "The five *khandhas*: their treatment in the *nikāyas* and early Abhidhamma", Journal of Indian Philosophy 14, 1986, pp. 35-53.
10. Ibid., p. 36.
11. Cf. Y. Karunadasa, "The Buddhist conception of *mahābūtas* as primary elements of matter", University of Ceylon Review 22, 1964, pp. 28-47.
12. As translated by Y. Karunadasa, ibid., p. 28.
13. Gethin, op. cit., p. 36.
14. Paul M. Williams, "Some aspects of language and construction in Madhyamaka", Journal of Indian Philosophy 8, 1980, pp. 16-17.
15. Williams, ibid., p. 1.
16. Gethin, op. cit., p. 37.
17. O.H. de A. Wijesekere, "The concept of *viññāna* in Theravāda Buddhism", Journal of the American Oriental Society 84, 1964, pp. 255 ff.
18. Wijesekere, ibid., p. 257.
19. William Montgomery McGovern, *A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy. Cosmology.* London 1923; Lucknow 1976, pp. 101-102.
20. "The history of the Dārṣṭāntikas and Sautrāntikas are closely intertwined, with the Dārṣṭāntikas as the probable precursors of the Sautrāntikas." Collett Cox, "On the possibility of a nonexistent object of consciousness: sarvāstivādin and Dārṣṭāntika theories", Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 11.1, 1988, p. 70.
21. Cox, ibid., 32-33.

PART TWO

1. DHAMMASAṄGAṆI

1. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, op. cit., p. 208.
2. Bareau in the Introduction to his French translation of *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* of 1951 (B19A; RB8).
3. Warder, Introduction to his edition (with A.P. Buddhadatta) of Kassapa's *Mohavicchedanī* (Pali Text Translation Series, London 1961), pp. ix-xx.
4. Other important materials pertaining to this text are as follows:

Editions: by Edouard Muller, 1885 (B14; RB1); by P.V. Bapat and R.D. Vadekar, 1940 (RB5); by D.S. Mahathera and V. Sarman, 1960 (B19; RB9).

Translation: into French by André Bareau, 1951 (B18A; RB8).

Outlines or Summaries: by Nyanaponika Thera, 1949 (RB6); J. Kashyap gives a summary in his *Abhidhamma Philosophy*, Chapter II (B5072; RB7969) and in his Introduction to B19 = RB9.

5. According to Frauwallner (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 15, 1971, 117-121—16, 1972, 95-117) this *Cittakāṇḍa* (Book One) is an "interpolated work". Frauwallner provides an extended discussion, involving comparisons with other works in our list, and a treatment of the meditation-path as viewed in this work. Summarizing this section, Frauwallner reports that it consists of three parts: (1) an ancient psychology based on the distinction between good and bad psychic processes; (2) treatment of the neutral *dharmas*, a development of psychic processes and karma theory; and (3) an independent account of the path of meditation to liberation.
6. For presentation of the first part of the list of *dharmas* in this section see above, pp. 124-125.
7. Frauwallner (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 16, 1972, 118-120), considers this Book a second interpolation, and gives a short account.
8. Cf. Frauwallner, ibid., pp. 121-124.
9. Frauwallner (ibid. p. 121) suggests that this *mātikā* and its commentary is an interpolation from a Pali work that corresponds to the *Saṅgītiparyāya* of the Sarvāstivādins.
10. K.R.Norman, *Pāli Literature* (Wiesbaden, 1983), pp. 99-100 points out that Buddhaghosa considered this last section the work of Sāriputta—or, alternatively, of the Buddha himself. The *Dīpavaṃsa* says it is one of those texts rejected by the Mahāsāṅghikas when they split from the Theravādins. Norman thinks it was included in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* by the time of the third council.

2. VIBHAṄGA

1. Erich Frauwallner, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 15, 1971, 107 ff., provides an extended summary in German of this work. Here is a rough English translation of the first bit of his account:

The *Vibhaṅga* is basically three matrices, bound together with two little

texts, the *Ñāṇavibhaṅga* and the *Dhammahadaya-vibhaṅgo.*

The first matrix is this:

1. 5 aggregates
2. 12 sense-bases
3. (a) 6 elements (earth, etc.)
   (b) 6 elements (satisfaction, etc.)
   (c) 6 elements (realm of sexual passion, etc.)
   (d) 18 elements
4. 4 noble truths
5. 22 faculties
6. dependent origination.

This matrix matches the third matrix of the *Dharmaskandha* (Chapters 17-21), except that the four truths are arranged differently.

The second matrix is

1. 4 applications of mindfulness
2. 4 right endeavors
3. 4 supernatural powers
4. 7 conditions of enlightenment
5. eightfold path
6. 4 trances
7. 4 boundless states
8. 5 bases of spiritual training
9. 4 discriminations.

This matches the first matrix of *Dharmaskandha.* A similar list—though not entirely the same—is found in *Dhātukathā,* and seems to descend from its earlier formulation in the *Parinibbānasutta.*

The third matrix is based on the *Kṣudravastuka* and corresponds to the second matrix of the *Dharmaskandha.*

2. Cf. Frauwallner, op. cit., pp. 111-112 for an analysis of this section.

3. DHARMASKANDHA

1. Cf. (RB13) Jikido Takasaki, 'Remarks on the Sanskrit fragments of the *Abhidharmaskandhapādaśāstra*', Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 13.1, 1965, 33-41.

2. Fumimaro Watanabe (RB14), *Philosophy and Its Development in the Nikāyas and Abhidharma* (Delhi 1983), pp. 54-55.2.

3. Warder, *Indian Buddhism,* op. cit., pp. 221-222.

4. Hajime Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism,* op. cit., p. 106.

5. In KIK, Bidanbu, volume 3.

6. J. Takakusu, op. cit., pp. 111-115.

7. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 8, 1964, pp. 73-80.

8. The same list with a few discrepancies is found in the *Prakaraṇapāda* (T. 1541, p. 663a5 ff; T. 1542, p. 733a17 ff.)

9. *Saṃyuktāgama* 30, T. 843; *Saṃyutta* 55.5 (V. 347 ff.)

10. *Saṃyuktāgama* 30, T. 836, cf. *Saṃyutta* 55.17 (V. 365f.)
11. Cf. *Aṅguttara* 7.4 (IV.406)
12. Cf. *Aṅguttara* ix.27.4 (IV.406).
13. *Saṃyuktāgama* 28, T. 796; *Saṃyutta* 45.35 (V, p. 25).
14. S.C. Banerjee, *Sarvāstivāda Literature*, ibid., p. 66.

6. PRAJÑAPTIBHĀṢYA

1. J. Takakusu in Journal of the Pali Text Society 1904-05, p. 116.
2. L. de la Vallee Poussin, "Cosmologie bouddhique", *Études asiatiques oubliées a l'occasion du 25e anniversaire de l'École-francaise de l'Estreme Orient*, Volume One (Paris 1925), pp. 295-350.
3. In Volume 6 of his translation of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* (revised by Étienne Lamotte), *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 16, 1971, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii.
4. Stcherbatsky, according to Takakusu, located these three chapters in the Tanjur Mdo, lxii, 1-107; 107-191; 191-257.

7. PAṬISAMBHIDĀMAGGA

1. Erich Frauwallner's opinion (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 16, 1972, 124-127) is that this work is a loose series of sometimes longer, sometimes shorter texts dealing with various concepts. At the beginning of each section a key word or *sūtra* is provided (not reflected in the summary here provided): the source of these in passages from the Pali canon and elsewhere can sometimes be traced.

8. KATHĀVATTHU

1. There is a substantial body of critical literature available pertaining to the *Kathāvattu*.

Discussions of the date of the KV: Dwijendra Lal Barua (B6; RB47); S.N. Dube (B11; RB54).

Analyses: of the entire work by S.N. Dube, *Cross Currents in Early Buddhism* (Delhi 1980); of KV's treatment of Mahāsāṅghika tenets by Nalinaksa Dutt (B5012; RB7937, 7954); of KV's treatment of Sarvāstivāda by Dutt (B5013; RB7861); of KV's treatment of Sammitīya views on *pudgala*, by Dutt (B5059; RB7962); of the "five points of Mahadeva" by Louis de la Vallée Poussin (B4; RB45); of its treatment of karma by James P. McDermott (B12; RB535); of the "Magadhisms" in the work, by K.R. Norman in A.K. Narain and L. Zwilling (eds.), *Studies in Pāli and Buddhism* (Delhi 1979), pp. 279-287; of the section on the *Pudgala* by A.K. Warder (B10; RB52), paraphrased and sometimes expanded by Fumimaro Watanabe in *Philosophy and Its Development in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma*, ibid., pp. 156-174; on the relation of Mādhyamika methods to the method of KV, by Shohei Ichimura (RB57); of B.C. Law's translation of KV by C.A.F. Rhys Davids (B9; RB51), and in various parts of other books and articles.

Summaries: by J. Kashyap (B5072; RB7969); by Rahula Sankrtyayana

(tr. M.L. Morin) in Journal Asiatique 1934, pp. 195-208.

2. In his Introduction to his French translation of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (typescript, Paris 1951).

11. ŚĀRIPUTRĀBHIDHARMAŚĀSTRA

1. Cf. Kogen Mizuno, 'About the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*' (in Japanese), Kanakura-hakushi Koki-kinen Indogaku Buddyogaku Ronshu, Kyoto: Heirakuji-shoten, 1966, pp. 109-133.

2. According to Erich Frauwallner (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 16, 1973, pp. 137 ff.) Chapters 5-10 comprise the remainder of the *dharmas* that make up the first matrix of the *Vibhaṅga*. Frauwallner thinks parts 1-4 of this section, dealing with elements, karma, person and awareness, may be independent small works interpolated into our text. As for Sections Three and Four, on inclusions and relations among the *dharmas*, Frauwallner compares the changes wrought here on the *Vibhaṅga* with the comparable changes found in *Dhātukāya*. Section Five bears a parallel relation to the *Paṭṭhāna*.

3. Frauwallner, ibid., pp. 133-135, provides a summary of the contents of the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*. We provide here an English translation of his account of the remainder of the work.

14. DHĀTUKĀYA

1. Yaśomitra, *Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā*, commentary on *kārikā* 1.iii, Wogihara (ed.), (Tokyo, 1971), p. 11; Dwarikadas Sastri (ed.), (Varanasi, 1981), p. 25; noted Willemen, *Essence of Metaphysics* (Bruxelles, 1975), p. XVIII; Mizuno Kogen, 'Abhidharma Literature', *Encyclopedia of Buddhism* I (Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1961), pp. 68-69; Takakusu Junjiro, 'On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins', Journal of the Pali Text Society 57 (1904-5), pp. 73-80. For the Chinese listing, see P'ukuang's *Chü-she lun chi.*

2. K'uei-chi's postface, p. 625c.20; *Chü-she lun chi* 1, noted by Mizuno, 'Abhidharma', p. 69. A list of the five Vasumitras can be found in Watanabe Baiyu, "Abidatsuma kaishin soluron", *Kokuyaku issai kyō* 107, Bidonbu 5 (Tokyo, 1932), pp. 5-6 n. 2; of these, the two most logical candidates would be the Vasumitra who flourished ca. 300 after *nirvāṇa* (A.N.) and composed the *Prakaraṇa*; and the Vasumitra who was one of the four major Vaibhāṣika exegetes who participated in the compilation of the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra*, c. 400 A.N.

3. Yaśomitra, ibid.; and Bu-ston, *Chos-hbyung*, E. Obermiller (trans.), *History of Buddhism by Bu-ston* (Heidelberg, 1931), p. 49.

4. Watanabe Baiyu, 'Abidatsuma kaishin sokuron', p. 1.

5. Mizuno, "Abhidharma", p. 69.

6. Sakurabe Hajime, *Kusharon no kenkyu* (Kyoto, 1969), pp. 42 ff. and 50 ff.; noted Willemen, *Essence*, p. XXII.

7. Fukuhara Ryogon, *Ubu Abidatsuma ronsho no kenkyū* (Kyoto, 1965).

8. *T.* 26.625c16. (Hereafter, this text will be cited by fascicle and page

number)

9. K'uei-chi's postface to *T.* 26.625c.18-20.

10. *Chieh-shen tsu-lun* 3, p. 625c1-2.

11. *Ta T'ang Hsi-yü chi* 2, *T* 51. 881a13-16; Samuel Beal (trans.), *Buddhist Records of the Western World* I (London, 1911), p.109.

12. Vasumitra's authorship of both the *Prakaraṇa* and *Dhātukāya* is mentioned by P'u-kuang, *Chü-she lun chi* 1, ibid.; noted Mizuno, "Abhidharma", p. 69.

13. Frauwallner, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens 8, 1964, pp. 8-88, makes some provocative comments on this text.

14. It will be noticed that these lists differ considerably from those given by Takakusu in his pioneering article, 'Abhidharma Literature', p. 110; the majority of his comments which follow about the substance and organization of this can now be safely discarded with the advance in our knowledge of this material over the past eighty years.

15. In Takakusu's synopsis of this second division ("Abhidharma Literature", p. 111), he has badly misread this verse to imply that there were "...88 categories minutely discussed under 16 sections". As we have seen from the above outline, this is decidedly not the case. Indeed, as the concluding line of the text tells us, "Thus, the abbreviated exposition has sixteen sections; if [these were] expounded upon in detail, there would be eighty-eight sections." [*Chieh-shen tsu-lun* 3, p. 625c1-2] Takakusu's confusion is probably due to the fact that Hsüan-tsang's recension retained the opening verse to the *Vibhajyavarga* which appeared in the full-length recension but proceeded to abbreviate the repetitive material which appeared later in the text.

15. DHĀTUKATHĀ

1. In his article in *Studies in Indian Philosophy. A Memorial Volume in Honour of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi* (Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 84; Ahmedabad 1981), p. 9.

2. *Indian Buddhism*, op. cit., p. 105.

3. Introduction to Bareau's French translation of *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, op. cit., p. 27.

4. E. Frauwallner, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 8, 1964, p. 84.

16. VIJÑĀNAKĀYA

1. Watanabe, *Philosophy and Its Development in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma* (Delhi 1983), p. 187.

2. Watanabe, ibid., p. 197.

3. Watanabe, ibid., p. 176. This section and the remaining three are briefly summarized by Frauwallner, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens 8, 1964, pp. 89-92.

4. Watanabe, ibid., p. 176.

5. Watanabe, ibid., p. 176.

6. Watanabe, ibid., p. 176.

17. PRAKARAṆAPĀDA

1. Erich Frauwallner, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 8, 1964, pp. 97-98, notes that Kumārajīva states in his *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* that only four chapters were Vasumitra's work, the other four being written by 'the Arhat' from Kashmir. But which are which? Frauwallner thinks that it is Chapters 1-3 and 8 that are the authoritative parts, but admits his is only a guess.

2. Cf. Frauwallner, ibid, p. 96.

18. PEṬAKOPADESA

1. Hajime Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism,* op. cit., p. 114.

19. NETTIPPAKARAṆA

1. Carolyn A.F. Rhys Davids, "The Nettippakaraṇa an earlier book than the Paṭṭhāna (Mahā-Pakaraṇa)", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1926, pp. 111-113.

2. Lance Cousins in the Journal of the Pali Text Society 1984, pp. 24-25; Hajime Nakamura in *Indian Buddhism,* op. cit., p. 114.

3. Discussions of this text include: W. Piyananda Thera, "The Nettipakaraṇa and the logic of interpretation", Mahabodhi 85, 1977, pp. 190-195; George D. Bond, "The nature and meaning of the Netti-pakaraṇa" in A.K. Narain and Leonard Zwilling (eds.), *Studies in Pāli and Buddhism* (J. Kashyap Memorial), 1979, pp. 29-39, and "The Netti-pakaraṇa—a Theravāda method of interpretation" in S. Balasoriya et al., eds., *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula* (London 1980), pp. 16-28.

4. *Majjhima* 1.280 and elsewhere.

5. *Dīgha* II.123ff, cf. *Aṅguttara* II.167ff.

20. JÑĀNAPRASTHĀNA

1. M. Takakusu, Journal of the Pali Text Society 1905, p. 84.

2. Takakusu, ibid. Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism,* op. cit., p. 105, tells us that *T* 1543 comprises 30 volumes of Chinese, and has been translated into Japanese by Giyu Nishio and Yakio Sakamoto in KIK, Bidunbu, vols. 17-18, while *T* 1544 comprises 20 volumes of Chinese translation. Takakusu, ibid., pp. 86-98, provides a lengthy summary of the two Chinese translations side by side to show they are essentially the same.

3. This according to Takakusu, ibid. p. 85.

4. Louis de la Vallée Poussin in Volume 6 of his translation of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa,* op. cit., pp.

5. The Sanskrit translated by 'highest worldly *dharmas*' is regularly restored as *Laukikāgra.* Takakusu and Banerjee, op. cit., have *lokuttara-.*

21. ABHIDHARMAHṚDAYA

1. Ch. Willemen, *The Essence of Metaphysics. Abhidharmhṛdaya.* Bruxelles 1975.
2. Paris 1978.
3. Leon Hurvitz, "Dharmaśrī on the sixteen degrees of comprehension", *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 2.2, 1979, 7-30.
4. P. Pelliot, "Les stances d'introduction de l'Abidharmaśāstra de Dharmatrāta", JA 217, 1930, 267-273.
5. Hajime Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism*, op. cit., p. 108.
6. Erich Frauwallner, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 15, 1971, p. 72.
7. Nakamura, ibid.
8. Frauwallner, op. cit., p. 71.
9. Frauwallner, ibid., pp. 72-73.
10. Frauwallner in Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 15, 1971, 73-102 provides an anlysis of this chapter that is a good deal longer than the text analyzed. Here is the gist of what he says.

Man is afflicted by 10 contaminants in 98 varieties. The path to liberation consists of the display of the four noble truths constituting the path of awareness (*darśanamārga*) followed by a meditation of this, called the spiritual path (*bhāvanāmārga*, leading to the removal of these contaminants. When that removal is accomplished one attains the awareness of destruction (*kṣayajñāna*) and the awareness of nonarising (*anutpādajñāna*), and liberation is achieved.

Frauwallner finds this account a significant departure from the preceding literature. For one thing, he points out, it replaces the canonical "outflows" (*āsrava*) with the notion of contaminants (*anuśaya*). These latter, though not unknown in the older works, were usually numbered there as seven rather than the present 10. The change is brought about by eliminating the distinction between sensual desire (*kāmarāga*) and lust for being (*bhavarāga*) and replacing the single "views" (*dṛṣṭi*) by the 5 specific beliefs (1) that the body is real, (2) in extremes, (3) in false views, (4) adherence to particular theories, and (5) addiction to moral precepts and vows.

In an extended theoretical reconstruction Frauwallner develops a wide-ranging account of what he calls "the new doctrine." The ten contaminants are now classed under five headings. Four of these are the proper "vision" or understanding of the four noble truths—frustration, its origin, its elimination and the path thereto. This corresponds to what is termed the path of awareness. The fifth is the spiritual path. And the "new doctrine" involves a systematization of the myriad older categories of outflows into a set of contaminants. These contaminats are first identified by a vision of the four noble truths and then expunged by meditation on them. Frauwallner uses this model to approach the 98 contaminants in the three realms of sexual passion (*kāma*), material (*rūpya*) and immaterial (*arūpya*).

11. For an extensive analysis of the first part of this Chapter see Frauwallner, ibid., pp. 82-85.
12. Frauwallner believes this Chapter represents a later and different

tradition from the previous two (ibid., p. 85).

22. MILINDAPAÑHA

1. In addition we may note a few other discussions of this work: S.B. Dasgupta, "Nāgasena's popular exposition of Buddhist doctrines", Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission of Indian Culture 4, 1953, 188-192; Rabindra Nath Basu, "*Anattāvāda* in the Milindapañha" in H.C.Das et al., ed.s, *Buddhism and Jainism* (Bhubaneshwar 1976), pp. 178-180; James P. McDermott, "*Nibbāna* as a reward for kamma", Journal of the American Oriental Society 93, 1973, 344-347 and "Karma in the Milindapañha", Journal of the American Oriental Society 97, 1977, 460-468; Arthur L. Herman, "Ethical theory in Thervāda Buddhism", Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 47, 1961, 170-187. Concerning the Chinese translations of the work see Paul Demiéville, "Les versiones chinoises du Milindapañha", Bulletin de l'École Francaise d'Extréme-Orient 24, 1924, pp. 1-258; J. Takakusu, "Chinese translations of the Milinda Pañha", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1896, pp. 1-22; Edouard Specht, "Deux traductions chinoises du Milindapañho", Proceedings of the International Congress of Orientalists 9.1, 1892, 518-529.

2. Cf. V. Trenckner, "Critical and Philological notes to the first Chapter (*bāhirakathā*) of the Milinda-pañha", Journal of the Pali Text Society 1908, pp. 102-151.

23. ABHIDHARMĀMṚTA

1. Its Chinese title is *A-p'i-t'an-lu-wei-lun.* Its Chinese version appears in Taisho 1553, its Tibetan version is Nanjio 1278. There is a Japanese translation by Kogen Mizuno in KIK, volume 2.

2. E, p. 7.

3. According to the *Abhidharmakośa* the Apparāntakas hold this view; the Vaibhāṣikas say that only *tṛṣṇa* (i.e., *rāga*), *avidyā* and *prajñā* can be considered *avyākṛtamūlas*. Cf. L. de la Vallée Pousin's translation, op. cit., Chapter 5, pp. 42-43.

4. These enumerations are not found in the Abhidharmakośa.

5. In a form not found in the *Abhidharmakośa*

6. Also in a form not found in the *Abhidharmakośa.*

7. Ghoṣaka differs from Vasubandhu in omitting *aprāpti, sabhāgatā* and *jīvitendriya,* whilt including *pṛthagjanatva* and *deśa-, vastu-* and *āyatana-prāti.*

8. The list is the same as Vasubandhu's.

9. This list differs from that of the *Abhidharmakośa* in several respects. It omits *pramāda* andstyāna, while it includes *muṣitasmṛtitā, cittavikṣepa, mithyāmanaskāra, mithyādhimukti, avidyā* (as a separate *dharma,* in addition to *moha,* in the sense of *traidhātukajñāna*), and *mithyāsaṃskāra.* Ghoṣaka's list is similar to a list attributed to the "*Mula Abhidharma*" by Vasubandhu. A discussion of the difference between the latter list and Vasubandhu's can be found in the *Kośa* (Louis de la Vallée Poussin's translation, op. cit.,

Chapter 2, pp. 161-164).

10. This list differs from Vasubandhu's in that it includes *māna* and *mahāmāna* but omits *vihiṃsā* and *mada*. According to Ghoṣaka, these *dharmas* are of "limited" occurrence because they are only associated with *manovijñāna* and not with the other five (sense) consciousnesses. For the *Kośa*'s explanation of the term see Louis de la Vallée Poussin's translation, op. cit., Chapter 2, pp. 164-165.

11. These are the same in the *Kośa*, but they are presented in a different order.

12. In a note the editor identifies these as *āveṇikī* and *sādhāraṇa*.

13. This list corresponds to that of the *Abhidharmakośa*.

14. This list is not identical to the list found in the *kārikās* of the *Abhidharmakośa*, but see de la Vallée Poussin's translation, op. cit., Chapter Six, p. 261, note 4.

15. The last two are considered varieties of *akopyadharmā in the Abhidharmakośa*, the latter being called *ubhayatobhāgavimukta*.

16. But others believe that it is associated with *samudayānvayajñāna*.

17. Different from that in the *Abhidharmakośa*—de la Vallée Poussin translation, op. cit., Chapter Seven, p. 98.

24. MAHĀVIBHĀṢĀ

1. Willemen, op. cit., Introduction.

2. Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism*, op. cit., p. 107. Takakusu, op. cit., p. 119, writes "We may have to abandon the theory that the *Vibhāṣās* were compiled in the Buddhist council under King Kaniṣka. There may have existed several *vibhāṣās* before the compilation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*." Takakusu provides an outline, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

3. Willemen, op. cit., p. xix

4. Takakusu's outline of this appears op. cit. pp. 126-127.

5. Ibid.

6. According to Takakusu, op. cit. p. 124.

7. See the outline of this by Takakusu, op. cit., p. 125.

8. This section is translated into French by Johannes Rahder, "Le *satkāyadṛṣṭi* d'aprés Vibhāṣā, 8' (B462; RB697), Mélangues Chinois et Bouddhique 1, 1932, 227-239.

9. The section on Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra's view is translated into French by Louis de la Vallée Poussin in Mélanges chinoise et bouddhique 5, 1937-37, pp. 148-149.

10. This Part is translated by Louis de la Vallée Poussin into French in Bulletin de l'École Francaise d'Estreme Orient 1930, pp. 1-28.

11. The first part of this section is translated into French by Poussin, Mélanges chinoise et bouddhique 1, 1932, pp. 74-85.

12. This discussion of time is translated into French by Poussin, Mélanges chinois et bouddhique 5, 1936-37, pp. 155-157.

13. This section is translated into French by Poussin, Bulletin d'École Francaise d'Extreme Orient 1930, pp. 247-250.

14. This section is translated into French by Poussin in Mélanges chinois

et bouddhique 5, 1936-37, pp. 8-25.

15. This section is translated by Poussin, Mélanges chinois et bouddhique 5, 1936-37, pp. 161-169.

16. Poussin translated this short section into French at Mélanges chinois et bouddhique 5, 1936-37, pp. 441-443.

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